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SUMMARY 
This research focuses on how water sector reforms are unfolding in the state of 
Maharashtra, India. In 2005, Maharashtra launched an ambitious reform 
programme with support from the World Bank to establish an independent water 
regulator and make water user associations mandatory for water delivery in the 
state. The establishment of the regulator, the first of its kind in the Indian water 
sector, invited much attention from policy makers and civil society organisations 
after which several Indian states followed Maharashtra’s footsteps.  Celebrated 
for its ‘independent’ and ‘apolitical’ virtues, this model of regulation was 
designed to provide answers to inefficiency and political opportunism in the 
water sector. What gained immense traction in the regulatory discourse was the 
concept of entitlements and the possibility of introducing water markets for 
‘efficient’ pricing and distribution of water. To date, however, this reform project 
has faced reversals, limitations and subversions which have been described as 
‘evolution’ by pro-reformers and ‘failures’ by the resisting groups. 
This thesis shows how a seemingly ‘apolitical' initiative aimed to dilute the 
authority of the State in the water sector is subverted to shape and reinforce its 
control. Though the idea of independent water regulator is increasingly getting 
mainstreamed into water policy discourses in India, divergent framings and 
rationales have made regulation a deeply contested political process. In 
Maharashtra, the turf war between politicians, the water resources department and 
the water regulator coupled with cases of corporate water grab lie at the heart of 
rule-making for regulation. This has made the authority of the water regulator and 
the meaning of regulation ambiguous and blurred. This ambiguity in turn shapes 
the distribution of water entitlements. In the sugarcane belt of Western 
Maharashtra where farmers access water from different sources, entitlements are 
shaped by persistent inequities in water distribution. They take on different 
meanings as they are subsumed into struggles over water control between the 
irrigation officials and the farmers on one hand, and amongst different groups of 
the farmers on the other. This struggle over meanings and practices across the 
reform process constitutes what I call “regulatory cultures” in this thesis.   
Using anthropological methods to study policy processes, this work shows how 
water regulation is discursively shaped and becomes a deeply political practice 
embedded in networks of power. These networks are formed at the intersection of 
donors, different layers of irrigation bureaucracy, water user associations and 
 
 
prosperous sugarcane farmers. I argue that the architecture of the Indian State, 
embedded in these very networks, is central to understanding the politics and 
practice of water regulation in Maharashtra. 
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1. Introduction: The Promise of Water Regulation 
Maharashtra has pioneered [emphasis mine] in the establishment of a water resources 
regulatory authority [MWRRA]. The authority would regulate sectoral allocation, water 
rates, changes in water use/diversion of water use and compensation for such changes in 
water use.  
                           The Financial Express,  10 October, 2005 
 
When a state enacts a law with the specific objective of facilitating and ensuring 
"judicious, equitable and sustainable management, allocation and utilisation of water 
resources", it is time to sit up and take notice. When the state in question is Maharashtra, 
with its long history of struggles and campaigns around equity and justice, then one is 
even more interested.  
             Shripad Dharmadhikary, India Together, 23 May, 2007  
 
“The Maharashtra Water Resources Regulatory Authority (MWRRA) is not needed any 
more,” said Radhakrishna Vikhe Patil, Minister for Agriculture and Marketing […] 
Recently, a bill was passed in the state Assembly to amend the MWRRA Act […], 
effectively stripping the MWRRA of all its powers.  
                          The Indian Express, 24 April, 2011 
 
Introduction 
Between 2005 and 2011, the Maharashtra Water Resources Regulatory Authority 
(MWRRA) had generated euphoria, scepticism and charged debates across the 
country. Besides being the first ‘independent’ water sector regulator in the 
country, it was its ‘promise’ of water markets and tradable entitlements which 
made reform enthusiasts and sceptics alike sit up and take notice. But by 2011, in 
the wake of an amendment to the Regulatory Act, this model of regulation, which 
was celebrated by the World Bank and national bodies such as the Finance 
Commission (Government of India, 2009) as a model for emulation, seemed to be 
falling apart. In a roundtable consultation that I attended in Mumbai in April 
2011, days after the amendment to the Regulatory Act was passed, doubts 
persisted over the very existence and relevance of the water regulator in 
Maharashtra. This scepticism was as real in the minds of the civil society actors 
who tried to block this legislation between 2003 and 2005 as it was for the 
MWRRA officials in Mumbai, who read in the amendment the “fizzling out” of 
the Regulator (KI22)
1
.  
 
                                                          
1
 Please see appendix 11.2  for the list of key individual (KI) interviewees 
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The MWRRA is the institutional manifestation of a particular understanding of 
water regulation ensconced in neoliberal principles in the water sector. The chief 
aim is to make the water resources sector commercially viable by opening it to 
private sector participation and mimicking market-like conditions by unbundling 
its services. As part of this institutional restructuring, an ‘independent’ water 
regulator needs to be established to promote efficient pricing and check political 
opportunism in the water sector. Alongside these changes, the water 
bureaucracies are to be downsized and transformed into professional service 
agencies, and a client-based relationship is to be established with ‘consumers’ and 
norms of standardisation of service set. This reformist enterprise subscribes to the 
principles of efficiency and full cost recovery, and regulation is portrayed as the 
magic wand (by the government and the World Bank) to set things right in the 
water sector. But regulating a distinct and multifaceted resource such as water is a 
challenging task. What happens when ‘apolitical’ regulation is applied to an 
intensely political resource such as water? What does regulating water entail? Is 
regulation merely about pricing and measuring water? Or is it about legitimising 
water diversions from agriculture to industry and bringing discipline to the 
irrigation sector? How are discourses of regulation constructed, rationalised and 
contested in this process? And how does its emergence revise the lines of 
authority that have developed over time in the Indian water sector? These issues 
are the focus of this work. 
 
This thesis examines the evolution of water regulation reform in Maharashtra, 
India. It examines the discourses and practices that have shaped the water 
regulation reform, and analyses how they do so. Through a policy process study 
of the regulation reform, this thesis will show that water regulation is 
multifaceted in nature and is not restricted to the narrow role of an economic tool 
for pricing and cost recovery. It is ‘constructed’ and ‘rationalised’ in different 
ways, and it assumes different meanings for different actors involved in the 
process. For example, to a water resources engineer in Maharashtra, regulation 
means enforcing volumetric pricing of water, an exercise made intensely 
technical in nature with a primary emphasis on gauges and structures. But for 
farmers at the tail-end of the canal system, who are made into consumers through 
this regulation reform, it means a guaranteed water supply to irrigate the jowar 
3 
 
(sorghum) crop, more control over water rotations in a system dominated by the 
sugarcane barons, and more water for cultivating sugarcane. For the World Bank, 
the principal architect of the regulation reform, regulation means ensuring 
efficiency in water use through scientific pricing of water and enforceable water 
rights which can be amenable to trading. For some civil society activists, 
regulation means checking illegal water diversions from agriculture to water-
guzzling thermal power plants and industrial zones. It also means extending the 
mandate of water rights to include rights to livelihood for the marginalised and 
landless population.  
 
Regulation thus assumes different meanings as it travels from the precincts of the 
World Bank to the farmers in Maharashtra who cannot be grouped into a 
homogeneous set of consumers. In this sense, although independent regulatory 
agencies are taken as the entry point to this study on water regulation, I argue that 
they highlight only one aspect of the regulatory process. Regulation in 
Maharashtra is the culmination of interaction between various domains that cross 
sectors and social and economic spaces that are central to water control and its 
regulation. These include donors, the national bodies responsible for water 
resources, the Maharashtra Water Resources Department (WRD, henceforth the 
Department), the MWRRA, the civil society actors, and farmers. These actors are 
internally heterogeneous and their interactions are embedded in underlying 
relations of power, which leads to different meanings and practices of regulation. 
These constitute the diverse patterns of rules on water and around water. It is 
these interactions and rules that constitute the regulatory cultures in this work. 
 
This work therefore analyses the unfolding of water regulation in Maharashtra 
through a multi-sited study that traces the evolution of regulation across different 
scales (central, state and local) and a diversity of settings (irrigation bureaucracy, 
civil society and water user committees). These interactions are embedded in 
particular dynamics of power defined through the relationship between 
politicians, the water resources department, donors, large business corporations, 
sugarcane barons and small and large farmers. This thesis is not designed as an 
evaluation of reforms, but it looks at the practice of making reforms and the 
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fluidity of concepts and practices which create the regulatory cultures in 
Maharashtra. 
1.1 Study area and research objectives 
The primary focus of this study is the water regulatory framework in 
Maharashtra. This is the first state to have introduced a water resources regulator, 
the Maharashtra Water Resources Regulatory Authority (MWRRA)
2
, in 2005. As 
in other parts of the country, the water sector in Maharashtra is witnessing a 
series of changes by way of reforms. These include the shift from supply-driven 
schemes to demand-driven schemes in the rural and urban drinking water sector, 
with its emphasis on concepts such as efficiency and self-sufficiency. In the 
irrigation sector, reforms have been introduced by way of Participatory Irrigation 
Management (PIM) and Irrigation Management Transfer (IMT), privatisation of 
the water supply, the establishment of a regulatory authority, and the 
formalisation of water entitlements. While IMT (irrigation) and privatisation 
(water supply) reforms are under way in other Indian states (see Mollinga et al., 
2004; Madhav, 2007; Shah, 2008; Coelho, 2010; Ranganathan, 2010; Walters, 
2013), it is the establishment of the water regulatory authority and the water 
entitlements regime that make Maharashtra a model for reform-led regulation in 
the country (Sangameswaran, 2009a).  
The Indian state of Maharashtra is the second largest in India in terms of 
population and the third largest in terms of the area (Government of Maharashtra, 
2002). It is the most industrialised, the second most urbanised, and judged by the 
per capita income, the third richest state in the country (ibid). Although the 
economy of Maharashtra is dominated by the secondary and tertiary sectors, 45.1 
percent of the total workforce in the state still depends on agriculture and allied 
activities (Government of Maharashtra, 2011a). Given this predominance of 
agriculture, and the demands of high industrialisation and rapid urbanisation, the 
water sector in Maharashtra is facing immense challenges. The impending threat 
of water ‘scarcity’ has been used consistently to advocate for reforms (discussed 
further in Chapter 5 and 6) in the state. Despite being home to one half of India’s 
dams (Sodal, 2007), the state suffers from persistent problems of inequity in 
                                                          
2
 At the time of fieldwork, this was the only Indian state with a functional regulatory body. 
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distribution of water due to geographical reasons and unequal distribution of 
power (Sangameswaran, 2009b). Maharashtra was reputed to be the only state in 
the country (as in 2011) to have accorded high allocation priority to industry over 
agriculture in its state water policy
3
. 
This water situation is further complicated by the presence of a large and 
politically mobilised sugarcane lobby that represents the interests of the 
sugarcane industry (Lele, 1990; Livemint, 2011). Maharashtra, which is one of 
the largest producers of sugar in the country, has sustained this status due to the 
complex history of cultivating a perennial irrigation crop such as sugarcane in the 
semi-arid and drought-prone topography of Western Maharashtra. This 
necessarily has involved a great deal of political dynamism and entrepreneurship 
in the state, where political fortunes and development ambitions are inevitably 
tied to use of, access to and control of water (Rosenthal, 1974; Sathe, 1986). A 
rapidly industrialising and urbanising state with a politically strong sugarcane 
lobby puts water at the centre of Maharashtra’s politics. How then is 
‘independent’ regulation shaped by such diverse and contested geographies of 
power? 
In Maharashtra, the unfolding of the regulatory model started in 2005 under the 
aegis of the World Bank-aided Maharashtra Water Sector Improvement Project 
(MWSIP). This reform package was instrumental in institutionalising 
independent regulation to address the problems of inefficiency and political 
opportunism in the “loss making and cost incurring” water sector (KI02, KI20). 
The tools for this restructuring were tariffs and entitlements. These were to be set 
by an independent body operating at arm’s length from the Executive, i.e. the 
Water Resources Department. Prior to these reforms, the Department was 
responsible for setting and collecting water tariffs, and delivering water. With the 
setting up of the MWRRA, a certain decoupling of the roles was envisaged. The 
Department was now to be the water service provider and the MWRRA would 
take up the role of setting tariffs and monitoring the standard of water delivery. 
The 2005 Act also designated some of the sensitive decisions of regulating water 
use across sectors as vital functions of the MWRRA. To this end, it provided for 
                                                          
3
 The Policy was amended in the light of the 2011 amendment to the MWRRA Act, and now 
accords second priority to irrigation. I discuss the implications of this change in Chapters 6 and 7. 
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entitlements to water, which were described as rights to use water, or 
usurfructuary rights (Government of Maharashtra, 2005b). 
 
The MWRRA Act (2005) defined entitlement as an authorisation given by the a 
River Basin Agency (RBA) to use water (Government of Maharashtra, 2005b). 
These entitlements existed as use rights and were to be fixed and enforced by the 
Regulator
4
 and the RBAs
5
. The Regulator was also authorised to fix, regulate and 
enforce entitlements governed by the sections of the MWRRA Act (Government 
of Maharashtra, 2005b). The 2005 Act was also accompanied by the Maharashtra 
Management of Irrigation Systems by Farmers Act (MMISFA), which in 
principle is an Act for Irrigation Management Transfer. Bulk water consumers in 
the form of the WUAs were to be created, which could then eventually trade 
water entitlements amongst themselves and also across sectors i.e with industry 
and drinking water utilities. These two Acts constituted the regulatory framework 
in the state of Maharashtra from 2005 onwards. This promise of water was 
envisaged as a  response to the looming spectre of scarcity and water crises with 
rapid urbanisation and mounting intersectoral conflicts in the state of Maharashtra 
(Government of Maharashtra, 2005c; World Bank, 2005).  
This study examines the evolution of this water regulatory framework in 
Maharashtra. It examines how the regulatory discourse is constructed, and how it 
is practised in the state. It specifically examines the interaction of three levels of 
discourse formation and practice: national (macro), state (meso) and project level 
(micro). The project-level work is based on the Left Bank Canal of the Jahot 
irrigation project in Western Maharashtra. This was also one of the first six pilot 
cases chosen for the implementation of the entitlement programme in 2007. The 
Jahot project is located in the heart of the sugarcane economy of Ahmadnagar 
district in Western Maharashtra.  
 
                                                          
4
 In this work, I have used MWRRA and Regulator interchangeably. 
5
 The establishment of River Basin Agencies was also one of the institutional commitments 
mentioned in the MWSIP document. At at the end of my fieldwork, the RBAs had still not been 
established. Thus the Regulator played a predominant role in the fixing and enforcement of 
entitlements. This is discussed in Chapter 6. The MWSIP closed in March 2014 and the RBAs 
were not established in Maharashtra until then.  
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Although this study looks at the construction of regulatory discourse at several 
levels of the reform process, the regulatory tool of entitlements become the focus 
for analysing the practice of regulation. In Maharashtra, entitlements became the 
pivot for articulation of the regulation reform. Since they came wrapped up in a 
donor-led reform package, they have also created polarising discourses of 
efficiency based on market principles, and judicious and equitable allocation of 
water. Moreover the politics of the amendment chiefly targeted this regulatory 
tool of the MWRRA. This thesis therefore analyses how different versions of 
entitlements affect the practice of water regulation in Maharashtra. I will show 
that these divergent framings shape not only the particularities of regulatory 
discourse and intervention, but make entitlements the very site for the articulation 
of the rule of the State. 
 
This work uses different theoretical streams, with an underlying focus on power, 
to understand regulation both as a discursive process and as an embedded 
practice. Using a combination of methodological tools to study policy processes, 
this thesis shows that politics of regulation is articulated through different frames 
and practices, which are shaped by the social, historical and political context that 
has evolved over time in the water sector. It focuses on the underlying power 
relations that are constituted across this process, and also on how the State is 
constituted through these power relations. This thesis specifically seeks: 
 to understand how water regulation is discursively constructed at the national 
and state levels; 
 to examine the institutional, political and historical alignments that shape the 
regulatory discourse in Maharashtra; 
 to analyse how different actors ‘construct’ regulation in Maharashtra and 
how they compete for power in doing so; 
 to understand the interaction of the emerging regulatory discourse with the 
prevailing practices of water management in the localised settings of the 
water project; and 
 to examine how the State is constituted in this discourse and practice of water 
regulation. 
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1.2 Background to research: motivation and points of departure  
This study on water regulation is an intrinsic part of my academic and personal 
interest. As an MPhil student in an Indian university
6
, I conducted research on the 
rural drinking water reform programme in India, Swajaldhara. I observed how 
ideas such as ‘community, ‘participation’ and ‘cost recovery’ are shaped by 
underlying relations of power in two villages of rural Uttar Pradesh. What was 
striking even then was how these ideas were shaped and contested across the 
policy process (see Srivastava, 2012). My interest therefore encompasses two sets 
of issues: how interventions such as these act upon the ideas, lives and 
motivations of different sets of actors including the programmers and officials, 
and not just the ‘beneficiaries’; and as a political sociologist, I am also interested 
in exploring what these reforms do to prevailing lines of authority, especially the 
State.   
 
By the time I completed my MPhil degree in 2010, independent regulation had 
emerged as another buzzword on the horizon of Indian water sector reforms. 
Despite an emerging set of studies that have found that neoliberal water reforms 
have had haphazard results in other parts of the world (Bakker, 2010; 2013) as 
well as in the Indian context (see for instance Coelho, 2010; Ranganathan, 2010; 
Walters, 2013; Sangameswaran, 2014), it is intriguing to see that new terms and 
new programmes continue to be proposed in this sector consistent with the broad 
neoliberal trends. 
 
I follow Harvey’s (2007) understanding of neoliberalism as those political 
economic practices which propose that human well-being can best be advanced 
by the maximisation of entrepreneurial freedoms within an institutional 
framework characterised by private property, individual liberty and a free market. 
Using the Foucauldian understanding of power, I will argue – in this work – that 
at the heart of the neoliberal water reforms is a certain rationale for improving the 
lives of the population based on the logic of market principles. However these 
rationales are not ahistorical and rather use history and prevalent practices as a 
trope to derive legitimacy. For example, this thesis will show how demand 
                                                          
6
 The Centre for the Study of Law and Governance, Jawaharlal University (New Delhi). 
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management of water, volumetric pricing and constitution of user groups, which 
guide the current practice of reforms, were also an intrinsic part of the colonial 
intervention in irrigation, which centralised the powers of the State (Chapter 5). 
In the reformist discourse, these very ideas have become tropes to legitimise and 
contest reforms.  
 
Another pertinent example of this discursive practice is the narrative of scarcity. 
In several parts of the world, the spectre of looming scarcity has been used to 
initiate large scale restructuring in the water sector by way of reforms (Movik 
2012; Bakker, 2003; Finger and Allouche, 2002). Arguing along similar lines, 
this thesis will also show how scarcity has been the guiding premise for 
introduction of the water regulation reform in Maharashtra (Chapters 4 and 6). 
For example at the heart of the entitlement regime, is a process of water use 
allocation based on market based principles (Chapter 6) with the underlying 
belief that with such mechanism water will gravitate to high value and efficient 
uses. However as this thesis will demonstrate that scarcity is neither absolute nor 
limited to the bio- physical aspects. It is produced, manufactured and reproduced 
through social, political and historical practices (chapters 5, 7 and 8). For 
instance, the cultivation of a water guzzling crop such as sugarcane was part of 
the famine mitigation strategy in colonial times. However this intensification of 
sugarcane cultivation in the drought prone regions of Maharashtra is at the heart 
of the water (mis)allocation in the state (Chapter 7 and 8). Therefore the focus of 
this work is on those practices and discourses “that are layering up one upon the 
next and intersecting with other processes” (Li, 2007: 3) to shape the water 
regulation reform. 
 
I study independent regulation as a particular aspect of the neoliberal water sector 
reforms in India, as a specific subset of what Li (2007) calls the “will to improve” 
which generates a scheme of framings, labels, calculations and technologies to 
achieve a desired set of results. Reforms are those particular technologies of rules 
aimed at the betterment of “men and things” (Foucault, 1991) and thus require 
that human conduct be governed by certain calculated means. This necessarily 
involves questions of power and knowledge. However, as this study will show, 
these new rules come into close encounters with other discourses and practices 
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that are part of the institutional and social landscape of the Indian water sector. It 
is these discursive and material interactions which are the focus of this work. 
 
I begin this study from the premise that the effect of neoliberal reforms can be 
heterogeneous (Larner, 2003; Ekers and Loftus, 2008). The focus, therefore, is on 
the geographically and historically contingent nature of practices rather than on a 
uniform metanarrative of neoliberalism (Bakker, 2005; Castree, 2005). In her 
work on privatization of water supply in England and Wales, Karen Bakker 
illustrates how this neoliberal reform has actually led to re-regulation of 
environmental management, water supply industry and consumers. This has 
“entailed an expansion of state and regulatory oversight in the water sector” 
(Bakker, 2003: 15).  
The current wave of water reforms in India have also been contextualised within 
the broad process of neoliberalism. They are read as attempts to extend market 
principles to the water domain (Sangameswaran, 2009a; Urs and Whittell, 2009; 
Coelho, 2010; Cullet et al., 2010; Madhav, 2010; Walters, 2013). Others such as 
Mollinga (2005) interpret water reforms as part of the nature of political 
democracy in India alongside neoliberal trends. The focus of this burgeoning 
literature operates at two levels. The first is the macro context of policy making 
and implications for law making (Iyer, 2009; Cullet et al., 2010); the second set 
focuses on the micro context of implementation and practices (Narain, 2003; 
Coelho, 2004; Narayanamoorthy and Deshpande, 2005; Raju and Gulati, 2008; 
Shah, 2008; Ranganathan, 2010; Walters, 2013). There is limited understanding 
of how these reforms are articulated in meso processes and across processes 
(Mollinga, 2005; Asthana, 2009; Mollinga et al., 2010). As a critical ethnography 
of policy, this study examines the regulation reform by bringing together the 
analytics of discourse and practice. Through the study of ‘independent’ water 
regulation reform, this work adds to the limited but emerging literature on policy 
process studies of water sector reforms in India, more conspicuously looking at 
the heterogeneous effects of neoliberalism in the Indian water sector. 
Independent regulatory institutions as a distinct mechanism of governance are of 
recent origin and have a marked presence in American and West European 
systems. Independent regulators are those ‘specialised law backed agencies’ 
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(Majone, 1994) operating at arm’s length from government, insulated from daily 
political pressures, which embed their decisions in technical expertise (Yeung, 
2010). In India, the initiation of independent regulation as a governance 
mechanism is more a result of policy transfer and diffusion from the North than a 
domestic concept (Dubash, 2008). Consistent with neoliberal trends, these 
independent regulators are being promoted by national government and 
international donors alike as an ‘efficient’ and ‘apolitical’ solution to problems of 
political opportunism, ‘adhocism’ and inefficiency in public sectors7. However, 
there is little discussion about how these discourses of efficiency and political 
opportunism are necessarily constructed and rationalised in this big push for 
regulation. This study therefore examines what concepts such as ‘independent’ 
and ‘apolitical’ mean in the regulatory discourse, and questions whether they are 
necessarily static throughout the reform process in the water sector. 
 
Independent regulation is an emerging and relatively understudied phenomenon 
in India (Dubash, 2008). Moreover the studies on regulation reform, so far, have 
been confined to utility sectors (see Mukherji, 2004; Dubash, 2013), and water 
sector regulation is the first – and still emerging – case of a resource regulator. 
Unlike the UK and other European countries where regulation has succeeded 
privatisation (Bakker, 2005), in the Indian water sector this trajectory remains 
unclear. I locate the emergence of independent regulatory institutions in 
neoliberalized forms of governance, which promote commercialization and 
market based allocation of water resources. However throughout this thesis, I will 
provide empirical evidence to highlight this ambiguity about the objectives and 
path of water regulation in India. One of the fundamental reasons for this 
ambiguity, I will argue, is the distinct nature of water as a good and its boundary 
blurring properties (Baviskar, 2007). This refers to the very capacity of water to 
transcend sites, levels, and social and political actors, and the different frames in 
which water is perceived as a public good (Petrella, 2001), as a community good 
(Wade, 1989; Ostrom, 1990) and as a basic human right (Barlow and Clarke, 
2003; Mehta, 2006).  
                                                          
7
 For example, in their analysis of the global data set, Jordana et al. (2009: 4) show how regulatory 
agencies have been diffused as the  “appropriate model of governance” across countries and 
sectors. 
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These multidimensional characteristics distinguish water from other public goods 
such as electricity or telecommunications. These have, as I will show in Chapter 4 
and Chapter 6, influenced water regulation, but such comparisons are limited in 
nature because regulating water entails regulating several rule-based spheres. For 
example, in the Jahot system where I studied the practice of entitlements, water 
regulation and its practices of management were strongly bound to the political 
and social significance of sugar cooperatives. Thus water pricing and recovery 
measures came to be closely aligned to the running of sugar cooperatives 
(Chapters 5, 7 and 8). I also noticed that farmers in the Jahot system attached 
different significance to the canal water in different seasons. For the head-end 
farmers who have access to various sources of water, canal irrigation is a means 
to recharge their wells. On the other hand, tail-end farmers who rely on canal 
irrigation as their primary source of water also see it as source of livelihood 
activities during times of scarcity. Therefore regulation of water has to take into 
account the wider set of social networks, underlying power relations, and political 
relationships, and the value and meanings attached to water. These in turn 
determine the practices and rules through which water is distributed (cf. Mosse, 
2003). 
  
In this work, I argue that the emergence of regulators in the Indian context is the 
result of policy diffusion from the Global North (OECD countries). Though the 
Northern context is riddled with specific complexities and historical 
contingencies (see Vogel, 1996), independent regulation has gained salience as an 
institutional apparatus nevertheless. In the Global Southern context, however, 
these need to be located in the institutional complexity of developing countries 
where the borders of state authority and distinction of roles are far more porous 
and amorphous (Dubash and Morgan, 2013b), and even more so – as I argue – in 
the context of water.  
 
This therefore requires an examination of the relationship between the State and 
water. This relationship has long been established in two disciplinary trajectories. 
In his classic work, Oriental Despotism, Wittfogel (1957) established a strong 
relationship between hydraulic structures and water control by the State. Taking 
this line of thought, writers such as Worster (1985) showed how control over 
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water resources can lead to concentration of power with the bureaucratic and 
technocratic elite (also see Ramamurthy, 1995). This understanding was 
fundamentally challenged through studies that analysed more decentralised 
mechanisms of water management, thus arguing that power may not be centred in 
the State after all (see Agarwal and Narain, 1989; Lansing, 1991; Vani, 2009). 
Therefore this analytical divide also led to the emergence of a certain dichotomy 
of state vs. community. In many ways, the current trend of neoliberal reforms in 
the water sector also reinforces this polarised relationship. Aimed at the 
“hollowing out” of the State (Rhodes 1997 cited in Leach et al., 2007: 12), 
reformist prescriptions often take a romanticised view of the community, 
positioning it as the ‘other’ of the ‘corrupt and inefficient State’ (Briscoe and 
Malik, 2007). This study does not treat these categories as static and 
unchangeable (Mosse, 2003), and argues that both the community and the State 
are constituted in diverse ways, and at times also constitute each other. For 
example, Chapters 7 and 8 will illustrate how the State acted as a midwife to 
bring communities into existence and defined their boundaries of work. Another 
limitation within this literature on the State and water is its overemphasis on the 
role of bureaucracy as the State. This work also examines how the State functions 
in the water sector, and how it is relationally constituted through various 
encounters, such as those between the canal officer and the farmer, the legislature 
and the water regulator, the Department and the water regulator and even through 
the reformist narratives of the donors.  
 
By providing specificities of the water regulatory regime in India, this work 
builds on the regulation literature in the Southern contexts (Hsueh, 2011; Dubash 
and Morgan, 2013a). It analyses how this neoliberal project of reform-led 
regulation, articulating a certain idea of the State, gets interlocked with the 
existing discourses and practices across the policy process. I argue that these 
reformist and regulatory interventions exist as layered practices over sediments of 
organisational and cultural practices that are defining features of the Indian State 
in the water sector. 
 
This study shows that independent water regulation has emerged as part of larger 
package of neoliberal water reforms in India and, specifically, Maharashtra. It 
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argues that at the heart of this prescription of regulation is the revision of the lines 
and authority of the State in the Indian water sector. From a narrow understanding 
of cost recovery and efficient pricing, regulation has become the very ground for 
expanding and reinforcing the powers of the State. This may be through framing 
regulation in divergent ways, legitimising water grabs, or governing the water 
user associations through techniques that reinforce the power of the State. 
Reform-led regulation is thus discursively shaped and increasingly being 
subsumed into discourses of State and State power. As a consequence, it 
eventually becomes a contested practice embedded in various networks of power. 
The primary reason for this water control, as I will argue in this thesis, lies in the 
way in which the State is constituted and operates throughout the water reform 
process.  
1.3 Thesis Plan  
Chapter 2 outlines the conceptual framework for the study, with its central focus 
on the Foucauldian understanding of diffused power. Chapter 3 builds on this 
conceptual framework and provides the methodological scaffolding that has 
guided this research. I further outline and identify my approach as one of policy 
ethnography, where I study regulation through three interconnected processes: 
regulation as texts, regulation as discourse and regulation as practice. Chapter 4 
focuses on the national level as the domain of discourse production. I describe the 
contextual, structural and political economic factors that have led to the 
emergence of the regulatory discourse in India, in specific relation to water. I 
analyse the divergent discourses emerging from different actors at the national 
level, underlining the points of convergence and departure.  
In Chapter 5, the focus of the study shifts from the national level to the state of 
Maharashtra. With a historical review from the late 19
th
 century, this chapter 
demonstrates the many shades of regulation that pre-date the reform period. It 
also locates certain discourses and practices, which provide plural lenses to 
analyse the current practice of regulation in the state. Chapter 6 describes the 
current discourse of reform-led regulation in the state of Maharashtra. The focus 
is on the emerging regulatory framework in Maharashtra. Here I analyse the 
interactions between the various state-level actors such as the Water Resources 
Department, the MWRRA, the legislature, and the civil society actors who are 
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shaping water regulation in Maharashtra. From this chapter onwards, I 
concentrate my attention further to the regulatory tool of entitlements, which is 
the key subject of investigation at the local level.  
Chapter 7 moves further down into the water system of the Left Bank Canal of 
the Jahot system in Ahmadnagar district. The primary focus of this chapter is to 
understand and unpack the different rules that exist vis-à-vis entitlements. Here, I 
analyse how the notion of entitlements is understood, subsumed and reinforced 
when consumers are created through the WUAs, and how this process is 
embedded in the complex power dynamics of the Jahot canal system. In Chapter 
8, I extend these observations through a detailed observation of the process of 
calculation and distribution of entitlements in a particular tail-end WUA, in a 
village which I call Uzalgaon. Here I analyse the practice of entitlements, and 
show how the farmer-bureaucracy interactions shape the distribution of 
entitlements. Chapter 9 draws the discussion on water regulation to a close by 
analysing the critical process of rule-making through these reforms. As a 
reflective and critical author, I also engage with the possible ways forward and 
make a case for a diffused and dynamic understanding of regulation through 
regulatory cultures. 
1.4 Setting boundaries: scope and limitations 
As is evident from the thesis outline, this study tries to cover a vast ground, for it 
crosses different, dispersed yet interlinked domains of the regulatory process. 
Given the breadth of this work, certain caveats are in order. First, this study is not 
an ethnographic study of Participatory Irrigation Management or Irrigation 
Management Transfer policy. Furthermore, canal irrigation is not the central 
focus of this study. Since reform-led regulation is a diffused process, the thesis 
does try to engage, at several points, with issues and debates in the expansive and 
rich literature on these topics, but a thorough examination of these works is 
beyond its scope. The guiding premise of this work is to understand the 
emergence and practice of water regulation reform from a policy process 
perspective. The study does examine WUAs as sites for regulation reform but 
does not aim to investigate the reasons and motivations for common property 
resources management. 
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In this work, there is limited discussion on aspects of corruption and rent-seeking 
in the water sector. This is not to dispute that corruption could veritably be one of 
drivers for shaping water regulation. However, research with corruption as the 
primary focus would demand a different kind of research strategy in order to 
address issues of gaining access to records and practices. I have therefore limited 
my understanding to the responses of my interviewees and triangulated this data. 
Besides the practical limitations in studying corruption in the water sector, I 
concur with Lele’s (2000) argument that reducing the study of the water sector 
and State to arguments about corruption and rent-seeking may circumvent other 
possible ways of understanding the State and practices in the water sector. 
Therefore the emphasis of this work is on those ‘other’ practices that constitute 
water regulation. 
As a study of independent regulation, this work focuses on the regulatory tool of 
entitlements as opposed to tariffs. Tariffs are undoubtedly another key function of 
the regulatory authority, but issues of access and my disciplinary approach have 
limited this analysis. By 2010, MWRRA had already conducted its first round of 
tariff consultation. A second round of consultation was scheduled during the 
course of fieldwork, but was postponed due to the drought situation in 
Maharashtra in 2012. I have therefore chosen to focus on entitlements as a tool to 
study water regulation in Maharashtra. 
Regulation, as a subject of study, transcends several disciplines such as 
economics, law, sociology and political science. In this thesis, I have adopted an 
anthropological lens to study water regulation reform as opposed to taking a 
strictly economic or legal approach. Moreover, this study also departs from a 
traditional ethnographic approach that focuses on a temporally and 
geographically bound field. Therefore certain field explorations were limited due 
to factors of time and space. For instance, I do not explore, in detail, the 
groundwater economy of the Jahot canal system. Since entitlements were 
calculated and distributed only for the canal water, this work does not examine 
the other sources in detail. Nevertheless, I do analyse these aspects where they cut 
across the making of regulation in the Jahot system. This certainly is an 
assignment for future work, to be pursued with rigour and interest.  
17 
 
2. Theoretical Streams of Enquiry 
Introduction 
This study analyses the emergence of independent regulation as the most recent 
subset of water sector reforms in India. Water sector reforms, as I have argued in 
the previous chapter, are often read synonymously with neoliberalism as their 
strategies are imbued with the market ethos of commodification, privatisation, 
contracts and audit culture, but the effects of neoliberalism are neither consistent 
nor homogenous (cf. Larner, 2000). This work locates the water regulation reform 
under these ‘incoherent’ effects of neoliberalism and argues that such reforms 
reinforce the control and centrality of the State in the Indian water sector. 
 
In the previous chapter, I laid out my personal and academic motivations for 
pursuing this study. The objective of this chapter is to gain the interpretive lens to 
analyse the empirical chapters that follow. This chapter is divided into three 
sections. After situating this study in the broad literature of regulation (section 
2.1), I argue that the current emergence of independent regulation is a feature of 
two conjoined processes: the regulatory state and roll-out neoliberalism. I then 
move further to develop the conceptual framework that guides my study (section 
2.2). Here, I locate my thesis in the broad field of power, keeping the dispersed 
and intangible effects of power in focus. I highlight three key ways in which I use 
this framework in the study, through the concepts of discourse, decentred 
regulation and the State. This theoretical constellation also helps me develop the 
idea of regulatory cultures (section 2.3) with which I conclude this discussion. 
2.1  Situating regulation 
Some form of regulation is central to every social order (Hancher and Moran, 
1989a), and the State represents one of the significant forms of regulation in 
modern times. Baldwin and Cave (1999) offer three ways to define regulation: 
rules that guide social behaviour; direct State intervention to influence market; 
and all forms of social control. Regulatory reform, in the context of independent 
regulators, can be traced back to State-initiated reform efforts in the U.S. during 
the Progressive Era of the late 19
th
 century, followed by the New Deal package of 
reform, recovery and relief. These initiatives were characterised by State-directed 
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intervention to improve market performance and in the public interest
8
. State 
regulation moved into economic as well as social spheres, and the strengthening 
of the welfare state in these advanced economies was also dotted with state-based 
regulation (see Glaeser and Shleifer, 2003). Intervention therefore became the 
concomitant of regulation in this era.  
 
However, in recent times, it is the regulatory failure of the State – whereby excess 
regulation may be counterproductive to economic welfare (Parker and 
Kirkpatrick, 2002) – that has become the focus of studies on regulation (Majone, 
1997). This understanding has also coincided with the neoliberal forms of 
governance, which underline the reduced role of the State. Post-development 
scholars such as Pick and Tickell (2002) make a distinction between roll-back and 
roll-out neoliberalism. While roll-back neoliberalism marks the retreat of the 
welfare State (in Northern contexts) or developmental State (in Southern 
contexts), the characteristic feature of roll-out neoliberalism is that it reshapes the 
State to complement the market in particular ways. This shift is marked by a 
gradual movement from the “active destruction and discredition of the Keynesian 
welfare state to the purposeful construction and consolidation of neoliberalized 
state forms, governance and regulatory relations” (Peck and Tickell, 2002: 384). 
This study locates the emergence of independent regulators at this convergence of 
neoliberal reforms and (supposed) regulatory failure of the State. Before I discuss 
this convergence through the phenomenon of the regulatory State, it will be 
useful to elaborate the different perspectives to understand regulation.  
 
Regulation, as a field of enquiry, cuts across disciplines of economics, political 
science, international relations, law and sociology. These disciplinary streams 
offer different hypotheses and causal factors for the emergence and sustenance of 
regulation. This literature is vast, and what I present here is a very small subset 
useful to contextualise this study. Morgan and Yeung (2007) provide three broad 
trends for reading regulation, i.e. the Public Interest theories, the Private Interest 
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 Market failures may result from economies of scale or information asymmetries whereby state 
intervention is deemed necessary to regulate markets (see Akerlof, 1970; Parker and Kirkpatrick, 
2002). 
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theories and the Institutionalist theories. These clusters are not neat categories but 
represent different views across the spectrum of this literature. 
The Public Interest theories view regulation as a process to correct market 
failures, control monopolies and serve the common good. For instance, Chang 
(1997: 204) defines economic regulation as “the government activity that is 
intended to affect directly the behaviours of private sector agents in order to align 
them with public interests”. By correcting market failures, enhancing the 
efficiency-based ways of deciding what shall be produced, directing how 
resources shall be allocated in the production process and to whom the resources 
shall be distributed (Ogus, 1996), regulation, according to this line of thought, 
promotes public interest. 
This Public Interest can also be articulated in terms of non-economic purposes. 
Sunstein (1990), for example, outlines other social values or non-economic 
substantive goals that justify regulatory intervention. These may be redistribution, 
collective desires, diverse experiences, social subordination, endogenous 
preferences and the interests of future generations. Besides being prescriptive in 
nature, the Public Interest Theories grapple with the difficulty of what constitutes 
the public interest, and thereby whose interest regulation represents. Moreover 
they tend to assume that the regulating authority will be a neutral arbiter, and will 
serve the interests of the public (Noll, 1985; Morgan and Yeung, 2007; Dubash, 
2008; Zwanenberg et al., 2011).  
The Private Interest theories fill this gap by arguing that regulation emerges from 
the actions of individuals or groups motivated to maximise their self-interest, and 
that any connection between the regulatory interest and public interest is merely 
contingent. Regulatory capture happens when officials within the regulatory 
institutions, who are charged with promoting the collective welfare, develop such 
close relations with those whom they regulate that they promote the narrow 
interests of this group rather than the interests of the community at large (Morgan 
and Yeung, 2007). In his analysis, Stigler (1971) concludes that regulatory 
capture is more likely to reflect the policy preferences of powerful and narrowly 
focused interest groups, and as a consequence generates net social loss. By using 
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regulation, industry or groups of industries either manage to win benefits and 
subsidies or prevent the entry of other firms into the market (Stigler, 1971).  
Alternatively, regulation may also be amenable to political capture, whereby 
regulatory goals are distorted to pursue political ends (Stiglitz, 1998; Parker and 
Kirkpatrick, 2002). Drawing its strength from the theory of group interests, this 
body of work treats institutions as an economy in which the relevant actors, 
including ordinary citizens, legislators, agencies and organised group interests, 
exchange regulatory goods on the basis of demand and supply (Croley, 1998). 
This perspective shares interesting similarities with the rational choice 
perspective that Gilardi (2003) puts forth to understand the rise of independent 
regulatory agencies. The rational choice perspective states that actors are utility 
maximisers whose behavior is shaped and constrained by institutions that are 
defined as the rules of the game (North, 1990). Institutions, therefore, are a result 
of deliberative design and their shape is determined by the benefits that they can 
provide to the relevant actors. Regulation through IRAs, according to Gilardi 
(2003), is a manipulation of interests by the politicians to address issues of 
political credibility and political uncertainty resulting from unsecured tenures. 
Prosser (1999; 2005), however, is critical of such capture theories, which presume 
a sort of bilateral or contractual relationship between the regulated and the 
regulator. As an alternative he argues for a stakeholder approach where the 
regulator exists in a web of relationships with plural actors and thus private 
interests may be balanced out to reach some sort of public interest in the end. 
The Public and Private Interest theories on regulation represent two distinct 
positions: the ‘good’ regulation in the ‘public’ interest and regulation under siege 
from group-based interests respectively. In terms of the regulatory process, they 
highlight a narrow but bilateral relationship between the regulated and the 
regulator (Prosser, 1999). Moreover, they are preoccupied with regulatory 
outcomes of either public interest or private gains, and pay limited attention to 
how these ends are constituted, i.e. the process of regulation. 
Though Public and Private Interest theories are largely actor-centric, it is the 
Institutionalist theories that have emphasised the importance of contexts in 
determining regulation and provide a room for a process-based view of 
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regulation. This body of work underlines the importance of rule-based spheres, or 
the relationship between different rule-based spheres, as crucial to the emergence 
of regulation. Examples of rule-based spheres are regulatory agencies, 
corporations and States as well as embedded norms and routines or political, 
economic or legal systems (Hancher and Moran, 1989b; Black, 2002; Morgan 
and Yeung, 2007). From systems analysis (Tuebner, 1988) to using ideas of 
deliberative democracy in responsive regulation (see Braithwaite, 2006), the 
theories within this cluster largely subscribe to the idea that institutional 
dynamics has a life of its own, such that it often shapes the regulatory outcomes 
in surprising ways. Besides, avoiding a position of extremes of ‘naïve regulator’ 
or ‘regulatory capture’, through the institutionalist lens, regulation is read as a 
deeply contested process of power. It does not downplay the importance of public 
interest or the possibility of regulatory capture, but argues that such relations are 
among the many ways in which regulatory decisions are made and outcomes 
achieved. For example, Hancher and Moran (1989) in their concept of regulatory 
space (described later in this chapter) reject the capture theory on the grounds that 
it creates ‘false dichotomies’ between the State and society. They argue that - 
Economic regulation under advanced capitalism is therefore best conceived as an 
activity occurring in economies where the public and the private are 
characteristically mixed […]in this world the language of regulatory capture is 
devoid of meaning [...] different institutions have come to inhabit a common 
regulatory space (Hancher and Moran, 1989b: 276). 
 
In this study, I use the idea of the regulatory space to understand and unpack the 
water reform regulation. However, one must note that these theoretical streams 
also emerged with the Northern context in mind, and are more concerned with 
regulatory outcomes, regulatory bargaining and regulatory decision-making. 
There is limited discussion on the question of framing of regulation, and how 
diverse framings can potentially shape outcomes and decision-making (Black, 
2002; Zwanenberg et al., 2011). In this work, I contrast the different frames that 
are put forth by regulatory actors to justify regulation and will show how plural 
framings of regulation are determined by the embedded positions of the actors. 
This eventually shapes the politics and practice of regulation in the water sector.  
2.1.1 The rise of the regulatory state  
Independent regulators emerged as particular institutional creatures to check 
excessive regulation by the State. An offshoot of the New Public Management 
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discourse, they are often associated with the concept of the regulatory state 
(Majone, 1997). The central idea of the regulatory state is premised on the 
distinction between the executive and regulatory functions of the State, whereby 
the State is entrusted to perform the steering and rowing functions rather than the 
providing and distributing functions (Braithwaite et al., 2007), Majone writes: 
The failure of regulation by public ownership explains the shift to an alternative 
mode of control whereby public utilities and other industries that are deemed to 
affect the public interest are left in the private hands, but are subject to rules 
developed and enforced by specialised agencies (Majone, 1997: 144). 
 
This shift from direct to “indirect or proxy government” (Seidman & Gilmour 
cited in Majone 1994: 146) is also marked by certain internal changes such as 
administrative decentralisation and regionalisation, breaking up of monolithic 
entities into specialised units, delegation of service delivery to private actors or to 
bodies operating outside of the executive department, competitive tendering and 
contractual arrangements for services. However, Majone cautions us that this 
government by proxy is also a government by regulation, administered through 
tighter procedures concerning contracts. Thus deregulation becomes the 
concomitant of re-regulation in discreet ways (Vogel, 1996; Finger and Allouche, 
2002; Hsueh, 2011). 
In this context scholars such as Vogel (1996) and Finger and Allouche (2002) 
studying deregulation in Europe in the 90s as well as Hsueh (2011) in her recent 
study of the Chinese regulatory state have argued that free markets have in effect 
led to more rules. This transformation has been most salient in the case of 
Northern countries and has reached the developing countries of the South through 
the diffusion of sectoral reforms (Levi-Faur, 2005; Dubash, 2008; Dubash, 2013). 
The corpus of literature elaborated so far shows the trajectory of regulation in the 
North with specific emphasis on the phenomenon of the regulatory state. Though 
there is an overemphasis of European and American experiences in much of the 
regulation literature, there is an increasing emphasis on studying regulation, 
embedding it in the  institutional context (Hancher and Moran, 1989a; Levy and 
Spiller, 1994; Vogel, 1996; Parker and Kirkpatrick, 2002; Jordana and Levi-Faur, 
2004), which refers to the capacities of the State, the organisational endowments 
and the interaction between different organisational actors. This literature 
however, presupposes a certain idea of the State: a division between regulator and 
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service provider functions (Majone, 1994; Moran, 2002): a boundary which can 
be extremely amorphous in the context of states in the South. 
It is in this light that Dubash and Morgan (2013b) situate the regulatory state of 
the South in three corresponding features or the shared context of ‘the South’: the 
prominence of donor agencies as significant actors in diffusion; the politics of 
redistribution; and limited State capacity signalled through budget and staffing 
constraints and the particular attributes of the developmental state. By arguing 
that States in the South may exist between hard rules and soft negotiations, they 
point towards a more embedded role for the Regulatory State of the South. This 
study adopts this perspective and takes this view as the entry point for the 
analysis of water regulation in India. Using this line of enquiry, this work asks: 
how is regulation framed by different actors in this process? Is there one or many 
discourses of regulation? What are the specificities of the emerging State? How 
does power operate in the regulatory process? I examine in detail the different 
rationalities that constitute reform-led regulation and how they are locked into 
struggle over meanings and authority among the actors.  
 
There are three fundamental arguments which drive this study of regulation. First, 
I argue that power is decentred and dissipated across spaces, practices and actors. 
Second, in this decentred context, the regulatory process is also about power and 
the contest among actors, which is unequal. It is not a neutral arena, but rather 
one which has differential access to power (Hancher and Moran, 1989b). Third, 
this perspective on power also helps me build an ascending view of the State, i.e. 
constituted relationally rather than as a fixed entity.  
2.2 Studying water regulation reform: towards a decentred 
analysis of power 
This thesis takes a position on power in its most fluid, fragmented and dispersed 
form, which is unitary in neither its source nor its strategies. Power is 
characterised as “an effect of a myriad of relations, and not something that can be 
held” (Ekers and Loftus, 2008: 700). In this regard, the Foucauldian 
understanding of power as circulating through the social body (Ekers and Loftus, 
2008) is extremely useful. Foucault’s engagement with power focused on 
understanding the strategies of power rather than defining power itself. He 
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attributed centrality to its relational aspects, such as action upon the “action of 
others” (Foucault, 1982: 793), or what is famously understood as the 
governmentality or the conduct of the conduct (Foucault, 1991). Governmentality, 
or the art of government, explained Foucault was an - 
ensemble formed by institutions, procedures, analyses, reflections, the 
calculations and tactics that allow the exercise of this very specific albeit complex 
form of power, which has its target as population, as its principal form of 
knowledge political economy, and the essential technical means of security 
(Foucault 1991:102). 
 
In this sense, Foucault’s central concern was how specific subjectivities are 
performed, which is the ‘how’ of the government, and this placed knowledge at 
the center of his conception of power and the constitution of social relations. 
Critical of Althusser’s formulation of ideology, Foucault took power away from 
the realm of ideas and introduced a strong connection between knowledge, power 
and subjectification, to consider the micro-techniques of power that must be 
challenged as part of the broader political project (Ekers and Loftus, 2008). He 
emphasised that government is a method for “the right disposition of things” 
rather than something to be invested in some institutional form (Mitchell, 2006). 
Using this framework, several studies have deconstructed the category of 
development (Ferguson, 1990; Escobar, 1995; Agarwal, 2005) and framed it as 
“dominant problematic, a powerful interpretive grid through which reality is 
rendered knowable and categories defined” (Coelho, 2004: 25). Though they 
emphasise the project of development as a totalising discourse, their work misses 
the grey areas of subversive practices that comprise the protests, provocations or 
even resilience of certain communities. Thus the Foucauldian notion of 
governmentality is more useful in portraying development as a project of 
governmentality than describing how this fragile operation could be (Coelho, 
2004; Li, 2007)
9
. For instance, the analytic of governmentality may not explain 
instances of such subversion when farmers in tail-end villages break measuring 
devices for water, or field officials acting down the line cooperate with them to 
do so (Chapters 7 and 8). Nor may it explain instances where the objects of 
                                                          
9
 This has also motivated recent scholarship on water reforms to use a governmentality framework 
alongside Gramsci’s concept of social power, most notably his concept of hegemony. (For 
example, see Coelho, 2004; Li, 2007; Ekers and Loftus, 2008; Ranganathan, 2010). 
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governmentality do not possess uniform characteristics and thus may require 
“multiple techniques of administration” (Chatterjee, 2004: 36). 
A different line of enquiry therefore conforms to the ‘agency from below’ 
perspective. This is reflected in the works that alert us to the ‘devious, dispersed 
and subversive practices’ against the strategies imposed by the ruling order (de 
Certeau, 1984). This subversion and resistance is defined as the hidden 
transcripts, or “the weapons of the weak” in Scott’s work (1990). The resistance 
framework privileges the agency of the actors/subjects but does not sufficiently 
answer how this agency, through ‘jokes, gossiping and laughing’, impinges on 
the development programme.  
However the dominance-resistance framework may not be useful in 
understanding the nuances of the policy process where outcomes are generally a 
mixture of unintended consequences of the process (Mosse, 2005). Thus 
technologies of rule will depend on the manner in which they are interpreted and 
put to work by lower-level government officials, elected representatives and 
others (Fuller and Harris, 2001). This drives us to the attribute of translation: how 
concepts and ideas are interpreted and made sense of. Latour defines the concept 
of translation thus: “in its material and linguistic connotations, it refers to all the 
displacements through other actors whose mediation is indispensable for any 
action to occur” (Latour, 1999: 399).  
Following this line of argument, this work looks at the polytheistic practices that 
represent power through outright resistance, everyday practices of subversion, 
discursive struggles, compromises, translations and collaborations that derail the 
reforms from their ‘intended’ course of action. This study critically looks at the 
circulation of power through “socio-hydraulic landscapes in a decentralized and 
taken for granted manner” (Ekers and Loftus, 2008: 700). It follows Foucauldian 
understanding as far as its illustration of power and its strategies for producing 
subjects. However, it is also alert to the limits of a totalising discourse and 
therefore particularly looks at the discursive construction at several levels of the 
policy, which may account for the limits to totality.  
It highlights the moment of hybridity of subjectivities that make space for 
discipline, resistance, contestation and co-production, highlighting the power of 
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the State in subtle ways. In the next sections, I highlight three key concepts which 
guide my analysis and constitute the regulatory cultures in this study. These 
concepts do not emanate from a particular framework, and this theoretical 
eclecticism is also an attempt to understand the complexity in the Indian water 
sector which defies being fitted into a singular theoretical framework.  
2.2.1 Knowledge as power: policy as a discourse 
The guiding premise of discourse analysis is that policies are neither value-
neutral nor ahistorical (Shore and Wright, 1997): they emerge in the particular 
nested context of government programs and in a discrete political, economic and 
historical setting (Rein and Schön, 1993). Policies therefore are inherently 
political and it is imperative to understand how particular wisdoms are created 
through those policies, and how certain cultures, practices and expertise become 
authoritative (Keeley and Scoones, 2003). 
 
In this study, discourse is understood in two ways. One: following a post-
structural understanding, discourse is a particular way of “thinking and knowing 
which involves the political activity of naming and classifying” (Sutton, 1999: 6). 
In this classic Foucauldian understanding, policies become political technologies 
that conceal the operations of power through objective and neutral idioms (Shore 
and Wright, 1997: 8). The second dimension reflects the argumentative turn in 
policy, which privileges the role of language in the operation of power and 
construction of subjectivities (Fischer and Forester, 1993). Focusing on aspects of 
language and semiotics, the second definition of discourse pertains to dialogue, 
conversation or communication related to practices of framing, labelling, coding 
or numbering (Apthorpe, 1996). Fischer explains this centrality of language as: 
[…] how language and modes of representation both enable and constrain their 
[policy makers’] work, how their practical rhetoric depicts and selects, describes 
and characterizes, includes and excludes, and more (Fischer and Forester, 1993: 2) 
 
To define problematic and render the field intelligible for intervention is one of 
the central thrusts of the governmentality argument. (Rabinow, 1991). Scott’s 
(1998) representation of the high modern and his classic example of cartographic 
domination by the State are illustrative of this dynamics of visuality and 
intervention. However, discourse is not merely a form of representation but also 
makes power operative in discrete ways. It deconstructs the structured political 
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interests and ideologies which form part of the larger power/knowledge 
phenomenon. Foucault argues: 
What makes power hold good, what makes it accepted is simply the fact that it 
doesn’t only weigh on us as a force that says no, but that it traverses and produces 
things, it induces pleasure, forms of knowledge, produces discourse. It needs to be 
considered as a productive network (Rabinow, 1991: 61). 
 
Knowledge is constructed through categories and frames or systems of meanings 
that are relationally constituted (Haugaard, 2002). One of the fundamental 
functions of this knowledge-power phenomenon is to problematise issues and 
make them amenable for intervention (Li, 2007). Thus, policies are significant in 
drawing the contours for this operation of power, especially so through frames 
and narratives. 
Narratives and framings: the power to define 
To render ‘things’ governable is to frame an ill-defined, problematic situation, 
argue Rein and Schön (1993) as they reinforce the practice of problematisation. 
In their illustration of frame, policies become “a way of selecting, organizing, 
interpreting and making sense of a complex reality” (Rein and Schön, 1993: 146); 
they highlight the lived realities and constructions of people, communities and 
groups. These practices are political as they as lead to closures of options and 
alternatives, to certain ideas becoming ‘truths’ in the discourse or to analysing the 
‘mobilization of bias’ (Bachrach and Baratz, 1962) that excludes and includes 
issues within the agenda of decision-making. For example, in chapter 4, I show 
how independent regulation is projected as a remedy to rescue the loss-making 
water sector. The ‘failing State’ rhetoric framed in the language of corruption and 
oversized bureaucracy is used to justify an intervention which is expert-led and 
outside of the State. 
 
The significance of framing is illustrated by Hajer (1993), who takes language to 
be “a medium, a system of signification through which actors not simply describe 
but create the world” (Hajer, 1993: 44). This is useful in unpacking how certain 
relations of dominance are structured and reproduced. He refers to the social 
construct of political problems through discourse analysis and argues that these 
constructs do not emerge in a historical vacuum but are produced through 
discourses. Therefore language does not merely become a way to define complex 
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problems but is also instrumental in labelling or developing selective 
categorisations such as ‘rural poor’, ‘uninformed citizens’, ‘target groups’ that are 
under-descriptive and disempowering as well (Sutton, 1999; Fairhead and Leach, 
2003). Frames represent particular world views and also become justifications for 
regulatory interventions (Zwanenberg et al., 2011). 
Discourses are often entrenched in certain narratives or storylines, which 
policymakers and their critics use to articulate and make sense of uncertainty, 
complexity, and polarisation (Roe, 1994). They provide a set of diagnoses for 
complex problems, thus making them amenable to intervention. These narratives, 
though highly subjective (Kaplan, 1993), have the force to construct and highlight 
the lived realities of people.  
These narratives often rest on certain iconic facts or mobilising metaphors (Shore 
and Wright, 1997; Keeley and Scoones, 2003; Mosse, 2005) such as 
desertification (Fairhead and Leach, 1996), acid rain (Hajer, 1995), scarcity 
(Mehta, 2005) and generate multiple - and often contradictory – stories. For 
example, within the water sector, the scarcity narrative has assumed a hegemonic 
hold usually mobilised through very powerful metaphors of water wars and water 
crises. This narrative is to a great extent responsible for the discourse of 
Integrated Water Resources Management, which is the underlying inspiration for 
water sector reforms across the world. This discourse rides on powerful 
metaphors of efficiency and equity emanating from particular systems of 
knowledge based on market and private property rights (see for instance:Movik, 
2012).  
These mobilising metaphors and narratives reinforce and privilege a particular 
kind of knowledge, especially scientific knowledge. In this regard, expertise and 
epistemic communities play a central role, which invariably turns political 
problems into technical solutions and supplants the “everyday, less sophisticated” 
(Fischer, 1993: 22) opinions of the common citizen with arguments designed and 
legitimated in the language of technical discourse, based on scientific decision-
making techniques. As a result of this change, the political demands are converted 
into technically defined ends that can be pursued through administrative means 
(Fischer, 1993). For instance, Chatterjee (1998), studying developmental planning 
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in the early decades of post-independence India, argues that the emergence of the 
Planning Commission as a non-elected body was essentially aimed at short-
circuiting the political debate on key questions of development. Likewise Li 
(2007) reiterates the depoliticising effects of technical discourses whereby 
“questions which are rendered technical are simultaneously rendered non-
political” (Li, 2007: 7). This therefore takes policy away from the realm of 
politics, to a more technical and administrative domain. 
This understanding is also central to the debate on regulation of water. In theory, 
regulation is couched in the language of law and economic arguments of 
efficiency (Chapter 4 and 5), but they have a concomitant effect on the everyday 
practices of farmers (as shown in chapter 7) who capture these technical 
discourses and make them people’s discourses. Thus understanding regulation as 
a discourse offers useful insights into the meaning and coordination of social 
practices, the construction of identities, the practices of framing and labelling, the 
relationship of knowledge, language and power and the malleability of social 
construction (Black, 2002). I use this lens to see how the multiple definitions of 
regulations that are embedded in powerful - and often contradictory – discourses 
of water managerialism, State and water control are created, constructed and 
rationalised. Chapter 4 illustrates the moment in time and history that led to the 
genesis and acceptance of regulation discourse in India. However, as the 
succeeding chapters will show, there are several discourses of water regulation 
across the national, state and village levels and therefore discourse structuration - 
how a particular discourse gains ascendancy – becomes the dominant theme for 
Chapter 6. These contests for power and authority, to provide meaning, occur in 
distinct regulatory spaces, which are spaces of uneven power and therefore deeply 
contested.  
2.2.2 Decentering formal regulation: regulatory space and the 
contest for power 
Power, within the regulatory arena, is described as a process of “enlisting 
cooperation of chains of actors who ‘translate’ power from one locale to another. 
The process entails activity on the part of the ‘subjects of power’ and it builds 
into the probability that outcomes will be shaped by resistance due to the private 
objectives of those acting down the line” (Garland, 1997: 182).  
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The post-regulatory (State) scholarship has emphasised the diffused nature of 
regulation and underlines the importance of power within the regulatory process 
(Braithwaite and Drahos, 2000; Black, 2001; Scott, 2004). They argue that State-
centred law is not the sole repository of regulation as there are other non-state 
actors, especially private actors, who are no longer mere takers but also shapers 
of regulation (Hancher and Moran, 1989a; Morgan and Yeung, 2007). This 
plurality has been tapped into by the decentred concept of regulation whereby 
control is not just centred on the State but diffused through society as norms and 
practices (Black, 2001). Drawing on the Foucauldian notions of power, decentred 
regulation recognizes fragmentation of knowledge, power and control for 
“regulation occurs in many locations, in many fora; there is regulation in many 
rooms” (Black, 2002: 4). 
Decentering regulation celebrates plurality, ungovernability and interdependence 
of actors. It blurs the boundary between the public and the private, and 
emphasizes that social problems are a result of various interacting factors. Such 
interactions are complex in themselves as different actors have diverse goals, 
intentions, purposes, norms and power thus making regulation not merely a 
dynamic exercise which includes (and excludes) a range of actors as the State, 
bureaucracy, markets and networks that occupy the regulatory space (Black, 
2001). In this context the decentred notion challenges three key assumptions of 
the traditional regulatory paradigm. One: it asserts that the State is not the sole 
locus of regulatory authority. Two: it challenges the hierarchical nature of State’s 
role and recognises multiple levels of governance which operate in overlapping 
ways, and not necessarily in a vertical fashion. And three: it suggests that 
command is not central to regulatory enforcement as there are other policy 
implementation techniques which are more varied, networked and diffused 
(Black, 2001; Zwanenberg et al., 2011; Vibert, 2014) .  
Decentred regulation can also be studied through the optic of the regulatory 
space. Underlining the decentred nature of power, regulatory space  provides the 
lens to study the spaces and practices of reform, and analyse how actors engage, 
negotiate and contest with each other (Hancher and Moran, 1989b). In the 
regulatory space, regulatory power and the capacity to exercise it is dispersed, 
fragmented and divided unevenly between actors. Unpacking the regulatory 
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space, Scott (2001) argues that such resources are not centred on formal, State 
authority derived from legislation and contracts but also includes information, 
wealth and organisational capacities as resources that are fragmented between 
state and non-state authorities. Since power is not centred on any formal 
authority, it indicates that regulation is a negotiated process among actors. This 
perspective underlines the importance of historical timing, the organisational 
setting and the embedded nature of the regulatory process. It highlights the 
“recurrent tension between the common structural forces shaping regulation in the 
economies, and the idiosyncrasies introduced by the unique historical, national 
and industrial settings” (Hancher and Moran, 1989a: 4), which impinge on 
questions of what constitutes regulation. Hancher and Moran state: 
[…] regulatory ‘issues’ are in an important sense ideological constructions: their 
recognition depends on social actors construing the world in a particular way; 
their allocation to a particular arena is likewise the result of a process of 
ideological construction. But these acts of issue recognition and definition are 
underpinned by the structural forces at work in the economy (Hancher and Moran, 
1989b: 297). 
 
However, Hancher & Moran’s construction of regulatory space was developed 
with American and European traditions of regulation in mind, i.e. regulation in 
advanced capitalist economies. It began with the premise of clearly defined 
boundaries of organisational interests, divisions of public authority and private 
goals, and state and non-state actors. In certain ways, their construction of 
regulatory space is organisation-centric, consisting of actors such as corporations 
and the State which are tied into a ferocious struggle over regulatory decision-
making. Recent scholarship has taken the idea of regulatory space beyond the 
Northern contexts (Chng, 2013; Uruena, 2013) and has included a diversity of 
actors such as the judiciary, the private water suppliers and the NGOs in the 
constitution of the regulatory space. 
 
Chapter 6 will show how the regulatory space becomes more amorphous in the 
context of Maharashtra. In this work, the idea of regulatory space analyses the 
point and moment of transplant and intervention through reforms. It relates to 
contestation over who has the power to regulate rather than the nature of 
regulatory decision-making and analysis of outcomes, as is the case in works 
mentioned above. Unlike the post-regulatory scholarship which operates on the 
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dichotomy of the State and non-State, this study emphasises that the State 
remains at the very centre of regulation but assumes different manifestations of 
collaboration, collusion, competition and control through its relationship with 
other actors, institutions and techniques (cf. Morgan and Yeung, 2007). These 
include the World Bank, the sugar cooperatives, the private power companies, the 
civil society actors in Maharashtra and the farmers.  
What is central to the decentred – regulatory space formulation is the emphasis on 
embedded cultures. Vogel (1996), in his comparative study of regulatory reform 
in Europe and Japan, shows how political-economic institutions shape policy 
choices and how these choices in turn shape the institutions. This iteration and 
construction brings in the possibility of studying the institutional layers that are 
contingent on historical and cultural factors. In the next section, I locate this 
regulatory process in the institutional and cultural context of the State. In this 
study, the understanding of the State is not merely restricted to institutional sites 
and practices but also to certain imaginings and ideologies developed over time 
due to specific historical contexts which impinge on these practices.  
2.2.3 The Decentred State 
This study understands the State “as a dispersed ensemble of institutional 
practices and techniques of governance” (Hansen and Stepputat, 2001: 14), which 
produces certain state effects (Mitchell, 1991; Trouillot, 2001). Trouillot (2001: 
126) categorises the state effects into four themes: an isolation effect for the 
production of atomised subjectivities for governance of the ‘public’; an 
identification effect for realignment of subjectivities on collective lines; a 
legibility effect which is about production of knowledge and empirical tools for 
governance; and a spatialisation effect which defines the jurisdiction and 
boundaries of governance. Throughout this thesis, I will show how the State, 
through these diverse effects, operates as a central category in the 
operationalisation of reforms. Though reforms have principally targeted the 
revisions of the lines of the State authority (Chapter 4), the State continues to 
retain its control through ways such as making its rule legible through governing 
communities (Chapter 7); reinforcing its hydraulic supremacy through knowledge 
production (Chapter 8); and spatialising its power through the constitution of the 
water regulatory framework (Chapter 6).  
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The discussion on water reforms cannot escape the debate on the tenuous 
relationship of the State and neoliberalism. Reforms therefore focus on certain 
core functions of the State (Hansen and Stepputat, 2001), chiefly the economic 
functions, and should be read as an attempt to fine-tune the capacity of the State 
to penetrate the market, i.e. roll out neoliberalism. Therefore even the corpus of 
literature which emerged to debunk this myth of the powerless state (Weiss, 
2012) has focused on these particular core functions of the State. In sum, central 
to this debate of retreat and resurrection has been the functionalist lens, i.e. the 
economic functions of the State. However, this perspective- I argue- is limited in 
understanding and reading the capacity of the State, which is to exist not merely 
as an instrument of governance but also as an idea with capacity to control and 
govern. This study departs from this functionalist reductionism and argues that 
the State does not exist as monolithic structure and cannot be reduced to merely 
functional elements of governance. It operates in multiple sites and state effects 
are a result of interactions between actors and practices which constantly 
reproduce the state (Corbridge et al., 2005; Mitchell, 2006; Sharma and Gupta, 
2006; Ekers and Loftus, 2008). 
In this sense, I find the distinction made by Abrams between state systems and 
the state-idea extremely useful. Abrams
10
 defines the state system as “a palpable 
nexus of practice and institutional structures centered in the government” 
(Abrams, 1988: 58). On the other hand, the state idea is “the idea [of the State] 
projected, purveyed and variously believed” (ibid). Unlike Abrams’ dichotomy, 
in this study, the Indian State represents both an idea and a system since they are 
mutually constitutive and reproduce each other (Mitchell, 2006). It is “protean 
and complex” (Harriss-White, 2004: 102). In fact, Bourdieu argues that the State 
possesses “cultural capital” which operates at an objective and subjective level 
(Bourdieu et al., 1994). The State therefore also exists as what Ferguson and 
Gupta (2002: 981) argue to be “powerful sites of symbolic and cultural 
production that are themselves […] understood in particular ways”. They are 
                                                          
10
 In his study, Abrams notes that the State exists as a social fact and does not have a material 
reality. It exists as a third world object, as an ideological project (Abrams 1988: 76). He argues 
that the State should be studied as the construction of an idea. But Mitchell (2006) rightly points 
out that removing the idea from the state’s existence as a system of power may present difficulties 
in defining the limits of this system. In this study, my attempt is not to valorise this distinction. 
Alternatively, I argue is that both idea and system are interlinked and tend to reproduce each 
other.  
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cultural artifacts reified through State spectacles, meetings, registers and water 
channels that portray the reach of the State (Gupta, 1995); these imaginings of the 
State form the cognitive scaffolding which has made the State a reality even in 
this era of ‘retreat’. 
The ethnographic literature on the everyday practices of the State has made a 
phenomenal contribution to the study of the State in understanding its intangible 
practices. This body of work unfolds the wry, mundane and routinised everyday 
practices that provide the flesh and bones to the State between villagers and 
bureaucracy (Gupta 1995), indigenous communities and colonial masters (Li 
1999), and between indigenous communities and international donors (Li 2007). 
The State is constructed through a variety of ways in different contexts (Hansen, 
2001; Jeffrey and Lerche, 2001; Mosse, 2003; Gupta, 2005). This literature 
destabilises the coherence and uniformity attributed to the study of the State and 
highlights its relational attributes whereby the distinctions between state/society, 
public/ private, state/non-state are not only blurred but are constructed afresh on 
an the everyday basis. 
These studies have reflected on the constitution of the local State represented by 
street bureaucracy in great detail, but how does the State work at levels above the 
‘local’? Also, beyond these everyday practices that materialise the State, what are 
those practices and ideas that not only constitute the local but are also enmeshed 
in similar contestations? Here I refer to the policy-making processes, the elite 
bureaucrats, the engagement of donors with State officials, ministers with 
bureaucrats, which also construct the State in particular ways. Therefore there is a 
need to disassemble the State beyond everyday practices. 
Corbridge et al (2005) refer to three levels of sightings of the State, or what they 
call “seeing the state” by poor people (both as citizens and as marginalised 
sections), by different line departments and different levels of bureaucracy, and 
the sightings made by the wider development community, including donor 
organisations and consultants (Corbridge et al., 2005). However their analysis of 
the Employment Guarantee Scheme in India largely remains circumscribed to the 
local state and its actors. Along a similar line, Gupta and Ferguson (2002) argue 
for the spatialisation of the State; their argument of translocality forcefully 
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stresses the construction of State practices and discourses in multiple sites, but 
this locality does not move ‘above the local’, beyond the neoliberal discourses. 
There seems to be a credible neglect of the meso-State in anthropological 
accounts: a world that exists between the neoliberal and macro actors and the 
street-level bureaucrats, and the distinction which Mosse (2005) captures in the 
unfolding of the policy process: the distinction between elite and vernacular 
societies (Kaviraj, 1984), where translation is at work (Latour, 1999).  
Chopra (2011) takes this distinction as the point of departure in her study on 
policy-making on employment guarantees and focuses on four domains of policy-
making: parliamentary, party, civil society and executive. She points out the 
dynamic process of statecraft in the policy-making arena whereby through the 
process of governing, “the State itself is reconstituted through the agency of those 
who are sought to be governed” (Chopra, 2011: 93). Chopra’s conception of 
policy praxis as statecraft is interesting but she limits her analysis to the state 
system alone. However, I find the analysis of statecraft useful as it provides a 
constructive flexibility in so far as an iteration between the governed and the 
governing is concerned; it attributes reciprocity and agency in and to the contest 
for power which constructs and reproduces the dominance of the State as an idea 
and as a system.  
Likewise, in his rich historical ethnography of tank irrigation in South India, 
Mosse (2003) shows how statecraft lay at the centre of the demise of tank 
irrigation. He also underlines a decentred concept of the State which subsumes 
the zamindars (aristocratic land-owners), the British Raj and the bureaucracy, as 
well as the politicians. Similarly Lele (2000:6) in his study of Participatory 
Irrigation Management challenges the monolithic conception of the State as “a 
rent-seeking, turf-maximising entity”, and a self-serving bureaucracy and argues 
that this may be a fundamental oversimplification because such construction 
ignores the political and democratic calculations of the political arm of the 
government.  
Therefore, in this study the State is multilayered and decentred (Mosse, 2003). It 
is the shaasan (bureaucracy) and the sarkaar (government). It is defined as a web 
of networks that runs from water channels in the fields up to the Water Resource 
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Department in Maharashtra and the Commissions at the national level; the State 
works at the local interface (a subject of ethnographic studies on water reforms) 
and at sub-national and intra-national levels. The State is discursively constructed 
in policy, in the acts of donors (Chapter 4), the dialogues of policymakers and the 
contestations of the civil society groups (Chapter 6), historically constructed and 
embedded in certain cultures and practices which tie irrigation and State 
formation together (Chapter 5), and also in certain imaginings and practices that 
create spaces of discipline and control (Chapter 8). This approach helps me to 
examine regulation as part of the society-wide networks of regulatory processes 
which remove the insularity of State regulation and highlight the distinctiveness 
of its role at the same time. It helps me to unpack the ‘government’ of regulation 
at several scales (policy process) and between several actors (regulatory space) 
and simultaneously disassemble it at several points.  
2.3 Regulatory Cultures 
The discussion above highlights three key points which guide this study on water 
regulation reform in the Indian water sector. First, power is understood to be 
decentred and dissipated, and this understanding is central to my analysis of 
reform discourses and regulatory spaces. Using this lens of fragmentation, I also 
unpack the understanding of regulation vis à vis the role of the Indian State. 
Second, this study maintains a strong focus on the context and the specific 
historical, political-economic and social contingencies which impinge on 
regulation. Third, it is these contingent factors, prevalent in the Indian context 
and more specifically in the context of the water sector in Maharashtra, which 
define the regulatory culture(s)
11
 in this study. 
‘Culture’ is a fluid category as it could mean anything from habits to institutions 
to everyday patterns of living. The organisational literature which subsumes a 
large part of the study on regulation has wisely referred to organisational cultures 
as they touch upon institutional contexts in which regulation is largely located. I 
                                                          
11
 There are clear overlaps between the concept of regulatory cultures and regulatory space 
because of their emphasis on regulation as a practice embedded in distinct socio-political and 
historical contexts. In this work, regulatory space forms a sub-set of regulatory cultures It is used 
as an analytical tool to explain the spaces of interaction that open up during the process of 
regulation reform. These are also shaped by situated positions of actors etc. The idea of regulatory 
cultures, however, provides a more nuanced approach to distil those structural, historical and 
political forces that make up for these situated positions with a strong emphasis on the importance 
of discourses, narratives and the diffused apparatus of the State.  
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widen this angle of regulation in so far as I locate these institutions in a larger 
social, political, historical and cultural formation. I follow Wright’s 
understanding of culture as “a contested process of meaning making”, and a 
product of historical and social forces, contingent on time and space (Wright, 
1998: 9). Culture marks the cognitive boundaries (Douglas, 1986; Hall et al., 
2000) of the regulatory purpose and regulatory objects (Meidinger, 1987). In 
short, what comprises regulation and its meaning-making. It marks the distinction 
between the politics of symbolic and technical regulation (Chapter 7) and 
provides legitimacy to rule-making, thus determining the path and process of 
translation. It also refers to the larger organisational fields (Powell and DiMaggio, 
1991) and the ‘messy contexts’ formed at the junction of several constitutive 
factors through global-national-state-local interlinkages, locating each of them in 
the wider politics of knowledge diffusion, regional development and politics of 
the State in the context of water reforms. It is through this optic that the 
boundaries of the State become blurred “between the State and the intermediate 
classes, between the official State and a very large ‘shadow’ state, and between 
social identities and official state roles” (Harriss-White, 2004: 77).  
The conceptual framework elaborated will be used to unpack the embedded 
nature of the regulatory discourse(s) and practice(s) that constitute the regulatory 
cultures in this study. This framework is useful to understand how reforms are 
shaped, contested, resisted and co-produced. The study analyses the interaction 
between various domains of regulation that cross sectors, social and economic 
spaces central to water control and its regulation. I widen the angle of regulation 
(Nader and Nader, 1985) to analyse some of those controlling processes, which 
tell the story of resistance, subversion and agency, and shaping, in sum, the 
elements of power in the water sector. I argue that reformist and regulatory 
interventions are layered over sediments of bureaucratic, clientele, organisational 
and cultural practices that are defining features of the Indian State in the water 
sector. I substantiate this argument through the empirical chapters that follow.  
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3. The Alchemy of Fieldwork: Methods and Positionality 
Mr. Shirke (section officer): Madam, what are you doing here? 
Me: Sir, I am here to study the water reforms in Maharashtra. This is the first state to 
adopt such reforms, you know? 
(Explaining the importance of reforms and what I am trying to study)  
Mr. Shirke: Is it? Yes, we have a lot of problems regarding water [after a pause]. So you 
are an Engineer? 
Me: No, Sir. 
Mr. Shirke: Economics or Law? 
Me: No, Sir. 
Mr. Shirke: A Science graduate? (and now he begins to wonder) 
Me: No, sir. 
Mr. Shirke: So what is your first degree? 
Me: I am a Social Scientist with interest in water policies and reforms. 
Mr. Shirke: Ohhh (shocked)…you are an Arts student! (shakes his head in 
disapproval).Who studies Arts
12
 today? - It’s Commerce or Engineering. These are tough 
papers. We did not know that Arts could be so tough. Perhaps in England it is! Who is 
paying for your survey? 
 (I smile) 
Mr. Shirke: Ahh, so you want to look at how farmers distribute water, the ‘social work’ 
type of things? 
Me: Yes, but also how you distribute water to the farmers. 
Mr. Shirke: (with a sense of pride) Ahh, it’s all measured at gauges and outlets. It is all 
Mathematics, Madam. It is these farmers and politics…they bring their [equipment] to 
break the canal. 
Me: There must be a lot of political pressure on you during the water rotations? 
Mr. Shirke: (confused) No, no…we are very clean people. We do not allow politics in 
water, but these farmers get their ministers and loyalists. And then there is violence...it is 
a tough job, madam. Not meant for a woman! 
         
And we drive on through the canal roads of the Jahot system … 
                                (Field Journal; March 2012) 
 
Introduction 
Several encounters with my interviewees during fieldwork echoed the sentiment 
of the excerpt above. For the initial months, several of my respondents within 
bureaucracies – and, most surprisingly, within civil society and NGOs - struggled 
to understand the motivation for and meaning of my doctoral project. Many of the 
doubts were dispelled during the course of my fieldwork as I tried to unsettle the 
disciplinary and gender boundaries in the water sector in Maharashtra. My 
methods and strategies in the field were shaped by the contingencies, contexts 
and, most often, by the way people viewed me. However, this attitude helped me 
to enter their ‘thought worlds’, which operated on varied assumptions about 
equity, power, accountability and the State. This chapter maps the ‘field’ in which 
                                                          
12
 In common parlance in India, ‘Arts’ refers to a degree in Social Sciences. 
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I was located for a span of about fourteen thirteen months (September 2011 – 
October 2012). This iteration shaped my work in diverse ways. While, at times, it 
opened otherwise closed doors, at the same time it limited my access to certain 
areas of action. Field data is “a construct of the process by which we acquire it” 
(Bellah in Strauss, 2000: xi). Before I distil this data into the interpretive grid of 
concepts and empirics, I outline the process which has shaped my approach 
(section 3.1), fieldwork (section3.2) and analysis (section 3.3) for this study. 
3.1 Research design and methods 
This research is designed as a multi-sited qualitative study. Qualitative research is 
an appropriate strategy for this kind of project because it underlines an 
interpretive approach, which emphasises understanding the meanings that people 
attach to a phenomenon (Snape and Spencer, 2003). As a multi-sited research 
project, this study maps the evolution of regulation across scales and a diversity 
of settings, from the offices of the World Bank and the Planning Commission 
(New Delhi) to the MWRRA and Department of Water Resources in Mumbai, to 
the civil society organisations scattered across Western Maharashtra (Pune, 
Aurangabad, Ahmadnagar, Nasik and Mumbai) and to the localised settings of 
the Water User Associations (WUAs) in the villages of the Jahot canal system. 
Given the imperatives of my study, my field moved from the “single site of 
location [...] to multiple sites of observation and participation that cross-cut 
dichotomies such as the ‘local’ and ‘global’ (Marcus, 1995: 95).  
In order to follow the ‘discourse and practice’ of regulation which transpired 
through variously situated subjects, circulations of meanings, objects and 
identities (Appadurai, 1990; Marcus, 1995; Strauss, 2000), I adopted a policy 
process (Keeley and Scoones, 2003) or what Mollinga et al.(2010) have called the 
policy odyssey approach where the path of circulation necessarily crossed 
through interlinked domains of global politics, the politics of the policy making 
and implementation into everyday politics (Mollinga et al., 2010). This has 
helped me to unpack the “located nature of particular policy processes” (Keeley 
and Scoones, 2003: 3) and navigate through the “discontinuous contexts” 
(Marcus, 1995: 98) in which my respondents were located. Though I had 
originally planned to focus on global politics as well, I restricted this dimension 
to the analysis of discourses that strategically shape the path and process of 
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regulation in India and Maharashtra, complemented with interviews conducted in 
Delhi. I now outline the contours of the approach that helped me draw the “spatial 
canvas”(Marcus, 1995: 98) of the field of study. 
3.2 Anthropology of public policy: a policy process approach  
In the previous chapter, I emphasised the significance of translation in my work. 
In order to study the translation of regulation in wider regulatory cultures, I adopt 
a policy process approach to show how global knowledge tends to shape national, 
state and local level discourse and practice, producing at every level points of 
creativity and contestation (Mollinga et al., 2010). These are also embedded in 
complex power relationships.  
For traditional anthropology, the difficulty of combining macro and micro levels 
within a single field of analysis has been both a methodological and theoretical 
issue (Shore and Wright, 1997). An anthropological approach to policy thus 
uncovers “the constellation of actors, activities and influences that shape the 
policy decisions, their implementation and results” (Wedel et al., 2005: 30) In this 
study, it helps to understand the working of the multiple intersecting and 
conflicting power structures that span the donor organisations, government 
departments, non-state actors, civil society organisations and WUAs that make up 
the layered nature of water regulation. 
 
As a critique to the study of ‘otherness’ in anthropology, Nader (1972) 
encouraged anthropologists to study the “colonizers rather than the colonized, the 
culture of power rather than the culture of powerlessness, the culture of affluence 
rather than the culture of poverty” (Nader, 1972: 289). Inverting the gaze or 
‘studying up’ rather than down, she argued, provides a useful lens for capturing 
the analytics and mechanics of power, and how these ‘bounded subjects’ are 
actually produced. Though these perspectives of studying up or down are not 
asymmetrical or unilinear, they ignore the fact that there is a circulation of 
people, meanings and assumptions across these sites. There is an additional 
caveat: the powerful bureaucracy or the powerful State are not one, but are 
constituted by several networks, which sometimes defy the proposition of up and 
down, and are shaped by contingent practices. The media and civil society also 
act as powerful vectors to mutually constitute this up-down narrative. In this 
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sense, Reinhold’s (1994) suggestion of ‘studying through’ makes a useful 
addition. ‘Studying through’ emphasises how policy creates webs and relations of 
power between actors, institutions and discourses- 
Studying through offers insight as to what happens both within and outside a 
single locale. It allows space for the actual complex interdependence of multiple 
sites, actors, and institutions and struggles that have therefore been a mostly 
uncharted area in the field of anthropological knowledge (Reinhold, 1994: 478). 
 
This is not merely a useful approach for bridging the micro-macro dialectics but 
also reconstructs the ‘field’ around these actors and activities, which may no 
longer remain fixed and constant in terms of geographical or social boundaries 
(Gupta and Ferguson, 1997). An anthropological approach, in this study, analyses 
the construction, production and interaction of discourses and practices, at several 
levels of policy, in social and political spaces articulated through systems of 
governance and networks of actors (Keeley and Scoones, 2003). 
 
Alternatively, the unbound field also presents challenges of drawing the 
boundaries to one’s study, a challenge that I faced squarely throughout my 
research. When I embarked on the journey to study regulation in 2011, it was still 
an evolving process, and ‘young’ by the standard of reforms. The initial three to 
four months were hectic and confusing. I had chosen to focus on an area where 
work seemed thin and debates fragmented. The literature on the Indian style of 
water regulation was so far limited to organisations such as SOPPECOM
13
 and 
Prayas
14
, but there was substantial focus on policy negotiations. My initial 
conversations with experts and bureaucrats carried mixed messages, and very few 
people identified with the Regulator, MWRRA. The initial interviews were 
marked by suspicion, with respondents referring to the MWRRA as a failure or 
‘an institutional layering’ over what already existed in the Maharashtra water 
sector. These preliminary yet discouraging responses made me nervous but I took 
them with a pinch of salt and moved on.  
                                                          
13
 Society for Promoting Participative Ecosystem Management is a Pune-based non-governmental 
organisation working in the area of natural resources management. It is one of the leading policy 
level actors in Maharshtra and it is at the forefront of the grassroot movements in the water sector. 
14
 Prayas is a non-governmental, non-profit organisation based in Pune. With substantial 
experience of work on electricity sector regulation, this organisation also coordinated several 
round-table discussions on water regulation across the country between 2005 and 2011. Some of 
its members, such as Prof. Subodh Wagle, also chaired the working group on water regulation for 
the 12
th
 Five-year Plan (2011-2012). 
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The initial three months of soaking in, combined with a first round of interviews 
at the national level and short trips to project sites in Maharashtra, provided the 
foothold from where I began an in-depth study. For this purpose, I demarcated 
my field into three levels: national (Delhi), state (Mumbai) and local level (Jahot 
Canal), along the axes of actors and interests, discourses and institutional context. 
The research strategy therefore oscillated between micro and macro aspects of 
research, where each site built the context for the other, this is how I proceeded to 
‘construct my field’(Amit, 2000). 
 
 
Figure 3.1: Spatial canvas of the field 
This strategy had attendant trade-offs. One was that different sites required 
different strategies with varied foci, where I necessarily struggled to balance 
depth with breath. For instance, while pursuing the MWRRA amendment 
(Chapter 6), I was tempted to follow the case of water conflicts and illegal 
diversions at the micro level, but that would have meant compromising the 
emphasis on entitlement and regulation, which are the focus of the study. 
Moreover, strategic and institutional factors played a very significant role in 
shaping this study
15
. During the course of my fieldwork, some politically 
sensitive events also limited my access and affected the nature of my interaction 
                                                          
15
 Before I gave in to my temptations, my meetings with the officials concerned indicated that 
access would be hard to negotiate, especially since the case of illegal diversion (Upper Wardha 
controversy, Chapter 6) was then in the State High Court. 
National/Delhi 
Maharashtra 
Western 
Maharshtra 
Jahot Canal 
system 
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with my respondents. When I had just reshaped the strategies for fieldwork in the 
wake of the 2011 amendment, the Department was charged with embezzlement of 
funds. There followed a highly-charged political debate, with Public Interest 
Litigations (PILs)
16
, setting up of review committees and the government 
bringing out the White Paper on Irrigation. For me, this also meant interviews 
with politicians being cancelled, and a certain amount of reticence on the part of 
my respondents, especially the bureaucracy. To do fieldwork in such times also 
meant that my study could be misinterpreted as an evaluation. Also, I could not 
get access to the ministers, due to the politically charged climate. 
I travelled back and forth between Mumbai and Delhi, depending on the 
availability of the interviewees, for the first four months. The national-level 
interviews provided specific inroads into the policy circuits of Maharashtra. In 
these four months, I also realised that in Maharashtra the MWRRA had a far less 
discursive presence than the MMISFA, for reasons that I discuss in Chapter 6. 
Several key individual interviewees preferred to speak about reforms rather than 
specifically about regulation. Following this experience, I changed the vocabulary 
of my fieldwork. I began to introduce my study as a project on reforms rather 
than regulation. This translation is also explicit in the title of my thesis: I treat 
regulation as a subset of the larger discourse and practice of water reforms. In the 
field, my questions were most certainly directed towards the water regulator and 
entitlements. This shift in nomenclature was well received, as respondents began 
to open up and share their perspectives. This shift was also symptomatic of 
translations that had already occurred as water regulation shifted from Delhi to 
Mumbai. I discuss this further in my empirical chapters. 
3.3 Carrying out the research: strategies and methods in the 
field 
The policy process approach required a set of methods which could provide 
boundaries to the field. Within a few months, some of the methodological 
illusions set in my research proposal began to disappear. As I found it difficult to 
                                                          
16
 Also known as Social-Action Litigation. Indian Constitution guarantees its citizen fundamental 
right to constitutional remedies under Article 32 of the Constitution of India. A citizen whose 
fundamental right or legal right is violated has the constitutional remedy to approach the Supreme 
Court of India or High Court and invoke its jurisdiction for remedy. With the growing trend of 
Judicial activism any public spirited citizen can move/approach the court for a public cause (in the 
interests of the public or public welfare) by filing a petition  (see Baxi, 1985). 
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maintain a balance between the national, state and local level fieldwork, I traded 
off the national with more vertical slices from Maharashtra. At the national level, 
I concentrated on fewer actors but ensured that I ran an in-depth analysis of texts 
and policy documents from various institutions. This decision was not merely 
based on setting the range for translations in regulation, but also on the fact that it 
became very difficult to ‘chase’ the national level actors from non-Delhi 
locations. For the first few months, I concentrated on Delhi/Mumbai coupled with 
field visits across Maharashtra. I narrowed this focus to Mumbai/Jahot in the 
following six months, and then returned to final policy level interviews in the last 
three months. This back and forth approach also gave me the elbow room to be 
flexible and eclectic with my approach, for triangulation and objectivity, as I 
moved between these sites. I followed a three tier strategy and adjusted my 
methods as the context demanded.  
3.3.1 Studying regulation as texts and discourse  
For this study, one of the first entry points to understanding regulation was the 
primary and secondary literature, with a focus on the national and state level. For 
this purpose, I conducted an in-depth document content analysis, studying reports 
as cultural and symbolic texts (Wetherell et al., 2001). For the first few months, I 
concentrated on the voluminous literature on water regulation and water reforms 
in India, which included reports and policies from the Government of India and 
the Government of Maharashtra, Project Appraisal Documents and reports from 
the World Bank, and publications from the Asian Development Bank. In course 
of time - and by virtue of having access to the MWRRA - I also obtained 
permission to receive several project-related documents from the Project 
Preparation and Implementation Unit (PPMU, Mumbai), which included aide-
memoires and progress status reports on the MWSIP. I also focused on literature 
sources from civil society organisations such as Prayas, SOPPECOM, and 
GOMUKH,
17
 which are active participants in the regulatory discourse at the state 
as well as the national level.  
Accessing information from these actors became, at times, a difficult proposition, 
especially as I was travelling continually between sites, with intermittent internet 
                                                          
17
 A civil society organisation based in Pune, Maharashtra. Their main area of work is river basin 
management and watershed development.  
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access. The fact that, unlike most of the government establishments, the 
Government of Maharashtra does maintain an online repository of documents, 
was extremely heartening and helpful. I revisited and analysed these documents 
in the light of what I observed in the field. It was the next step, accessing specific 
documents that were not necessarily in the public domain, which required leg-
work. For example, I tried to procure the minutes of the meeting between the 
Government of Maharashtra and the World Bank, as well as of the public 
discussions held prior to the introduction of the Act in 2005, but could not do so. 
I considered recourse to the Right to Information, but since I had relocated to the 
village site the idea was lost in the mist of fieldwork. To fill in this gap, I relied 
on interviews and conducted a rapid newspaper search from 2000-2005. This was 
extremely helpful, as the journalistic reports also provided another insight into the 
meaning of reforms and into constructing the idea of regulation through a 
discursive analysis (cf. Gupta, 1995). 
However, for certain sources there really were no alternatives, and some of them 
required constant negotiation, which became easier as the time passed. When I 
started my fieldwork in 2011, I was keen to understand the nature of legislative 
discourse on the MWRRA Bill, and especially the amendments to it, and I asked 
the MWRRA and the Department for the documents. They postponed the issue 
month after month, but finally persistence paid off. Government documents in the 
public domain are hard to access at times, especially when it is difficult to 
ascertain where they may be housed and the path to procure them. The Secretary 
of MWRRA deputed a staff member to give me an introduction at the 
legislature’s library. I spent a week in this library, studying the discussions on the 
Bill (2003-2005) and the Amendment Act 2011 (Chapter 6). Similarly, I also 
gained permission to access the minutes of the meetings and public consultations 
on the discussions on tariffs with the MWRRA. This, however, happened in the 
last two months of the fieldwork, in 2012.  
These primary documents opened world views - so essential for understanding 
and analysing regulation - and also helped me in developing my interview 
schedule. These texts provided the first foothold for constructing the discourse 
and unpacking the underlying politics of knowledge (Chapters 4 and 6). 
Moreover, the process of gaining access also illuminated certain dominant 
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patterns of regulation, making negotiations a site of practice. I explain this in 
detail in the section on positionality in this chapter. 
3.3.2 Moving from texts to talk: interviews and discussions  
In April 2011, I attended a round-table consultation on water regulation in India, 
organised by TISS
18
, IIT
19
 (Mumbai) and Prayas. Here I had the opportunity to 
introduce myself as a prospective research student, and also get an overview of 
the main stakeholders in the regulatory discourse in India. Having very little 
familiarity with the waterscapes of Maharashtra, my initial strategy was to 
develop contacts with NGOs working in Maharashtra so that I could be 
introduced to the region. With this approach, I targeted three NGOs: Prayas, 
SOPPECOM and Gomukh. These three NGOs had three different entry points 
and very entrenched positions in the regulatory discourse, and their pallid 
responses regarding the ‘ineffective’ regulator were not very useful. They advised 
me to acquaint myself with Maharashtra first, but were not very helpful in paving 
the way for access. It was at this point that I decided to try another way and get 
access via the government.  
From the time that my research proposal was approved in July 2011 to the time 
when I started the fieldwork in September 2011, significant changes had taken 
place in the regulatory landscape of the country. The Expert Regulatory Group 
was constituted by the Planning Commission to reconsider the model for a Water 
Regulatory Authority (Chapter 4). This made Maharashtra’s model of ‘regulation’ 
a sought-after case in policy circles at the national level. This topical situation 
provided an excellent hook for me to latch onto the national policy circuit, which 
in turn linked me to the state circuit.  
Despite having several references, I was wisely advised to take a ‘neutral and 
objective’ reference for the MWRRA. This alerted me, for the first time, to the 
sensitivity of the issue. Prof. Philippe Cullet from SOAS (University of London) 
willingly put me in touch with Mr. Suresh V. Sodal, the Secretary of the 
MWRRA. This contact proved to be the key link for my study in Maharashtra. 
From here, strategic snowballing gave me contacts with people across several 
different nodes in the Maharashtra policy circuit. It was through Mr. Sodal that I 
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 Tata Institute of Social Sciences, Mumbai. 
19
 Indian Institute of Technology, Mumbai. 
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had the ‘uncommon’ opportunity to meet the top brass of the policy leadership in 
the state, and get access to meetings at the MWRRA. In time I became a regular 
visitor to the MWRRA if not a permanent fixture in the Regulator’s office. I was 
also allowed to access the MWRRA library to access documents. I had the 
opportunity to attend meetings at the MWRRA office and engage in casual 
conversations with the staff members, who willingly shared their experience of 
the water sector and reforms in Maharashtra, in their varying capacities. The staff 
would greet me upon my arrival, and refresh me with their insights into my 
fieldwork. These constant and consistent interactions also helped me to 
understand the dynamics and relationships between the Water Resource 
Department and the MWRRA and their styles of operation (Chapter 6). By 
December 2011, I had managed to gain entry into the policy level hierarchies in 
Maharashtra, and the next step was to choose a project site for the everyday 
politics of regulation. 
I conducted 116 semi-structured interviews across policy scales ranging from 
New Delhi down to the canal site. This wide spectrum included key informants 
from the World Bank, the Planning Commission, government officials in 
Maharashtra and Delhi, academics, water professionals, civil society members, 
field level bureaucrats, local politicians, members of WUAs and the farmers. 
While the majority of the interviews were conducted face to face, some 
interviews had to be conducted over telephone or by email. This approach was 
complemented by observations gathered during meetings in the Regulator’s 
office, and at seminars and conferences organised by the government and civil 
society actors. I used these opportunities and available spaces for meeting 
stakeholders and setting up follow-up discussions. I also analyse these settings as 
specific sites of institutional practice that make up the regulatory culture in 
Maharashtra.  
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Figure 3.2: Farmers' meeting at Nevasa, Ahmadnagar  
(December 2011)
20
 
3.3.3 Studying policy through everyday practices  
Besides the policy level dynamics and changes outlined in the section above, 
there was yet another change which required some re-thinking on my part. In my 
research proposal, I proposed to choose one of the six pilot sites to study 
entitlements in the canal system. I settled on three criteria for this purpose: (1) 
sites where the MWRRA piloted the entitlement; (2) the level of organisation of 
WUAs; and (3) the level of urbanisation and industrialisation in the district, 
which would showcase the competing demands for water. However, two events 
changed my course of action. One: by November 2011 the MWRRA had 
upscaled the six entitlement sites to 226, so the matrix required some re-thinking. 
Two: the amendment row between 2009 and 2011 changed the course of the 
MWRRA and the nature of entitlements, making the third criteria - competing 
demands - redundant for my study (Chapter 6).  
 
After two months of searching for the appropriate local site, I realised that there is 
not a single site that complemented the map in my mind. Unfortunately the sites 
that I had in mind were based on policy documents. This was a fiction and my 
variables had to be tweaked and twisted, refined and polished to fit into the 
                                                          
20
 Unless explicitly stated, all photographs used in this thesis have been taken by the author. 
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realities of the field. I met with sugarcane farmers in Ahmadnagar and officials in 
Nasik, attended meetings for WUA formation, and visited the celebrated sites of 
Waghad (Nasik) and Satnur (Amravati), which have sustained their prosperity 
through grape cultivation and orange farming respectively. In this process, I was 
exposed to the cultures, practices and implicit biases of farmers, officials and 
NGOs, the reporting strategies of bureaucracy, the relationship between farmers 
and irrigation officials, and the underlying implications of regional development 
for the prosperous and powerful sugarcane farmers of Western Maharashtra and 
the cotton and paddy farmers of Vidarbha (Chapter 5). This understanding is 
clearly superficial in terms of thick data but the experience prepared me for 
unpacking and working my way through the rest of the fieldwork.  
 
 
Figure 3.3: Revenue divisions of Maharashtra with location of the Jahot system 
(see the arrow) and other project sites visited during the course of fieldwork (see dots) (Source: 
Government of Maharashtra)  
 
It took me two months of touring “model sites”, “best sites”, “good sites” and 
“sites where I would find good data”21 according to the government, to arrive at 
                                                          
21
 The sites visited include: Waghad (Nashik); Dongargaon and Pench project (Nagpur); Satnur 
project (Amravati) ‘and Mula project (Ahmadnagar). Jahot was chosen after a month of pilot 
visits across 7 sites to understand the regulatory reach of the reforms. I also visited the Kukadi 
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Jahot. On 17
th
 January 2012, I finally arrived in Jahot after travelling to several 
other reform sites in Maharashtra. The Jahot dam comes under the Kukadi circle 
office, with administrative headquarters in Pune. The dam is located in 
Chinchani, a village in Pune district. The Jahot canal system covers the three 
talukas
22
 of Shirur (Pune), Shrigonda and Karjat (Ahmadnagar). The right bank of 
the canal system flows through the Shirur taluka in Pune, and the left bank, 
extending to 84 kms, is covered by Shrigonda and Karjat talukas in Ahmadnagar.  
 
The command area (area irrigated by the dam) of the Jahot system also intersects 
with the command area of the adjoining Kukadi canal system and several places 
on the Left Bank Canal (LBC). Especially in the middle and tail regions, farmers 
were beneficiaries of both systems. The main reasons for selection of the Jahot 
system were as follows: first, it was one of the first six systems to be taken into 
the entitlement programme in 2006/07. Second, the sugarcane economy in a 
drought-prone region provided a robust background for understanding the 
embedded nature of institutions and power dynamics
23
. Third, it was a twelve-
month project providing water for two cropping seasons of rabi (winter cropping 
season) and hot weather, as opposed to some eight-month projects in Maharashtra 
which provided water for one cropping season. This gave me the scope to study 
water use patterns for two rotations (part of January, March and May rotations).  
 
From January until May, the Jahot system was the focus of my work, interspersed 
with brief visits to Mumbai and Pune for interviews and collection of data. These 
trips were not only an opportunity to visit the city and stock up on food, but also 
provided me with an objective distance from the data to plan my strategy and 
offered space for reflection. For instance, the experience at the Jahot system 
prompted me to ask: what has sustained water-intensive sugarcane cultivation in a 
semi-arid, drought-prone region? This crop has an important bearing on the 
development of irrigation practices and systems in Jahot. Thus, in order to 
understand this process, I studied the archival resources at the Dhananjay Rao 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
project, adjacent to Jahot, during my stay there. I based my selection on the data available with the 
MWRRA on the implementation of entitlements. 
22
 Talukas are administrative jurisdictions in a district, below the district level.  
23
 This refers to the interdependent nature of the canal system, sugar cooperatives and local 
politics in the Jahot system. 
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Gadgil library, Gokhale Institute of Politics and Economics and the 
corresponding records available in the House of Commons (UK) e-library.  
In Jahot, I spent the first month making contacts and understanding the water 
cultures of the Jahot system, adopting and using the language of rotations, outlets, 
rehabilitation, form no.7 and dushkaal (seasons of intense heat and dryness with 
no or low rainfall). The Jahot Left Bank Canal (LBC), which was my canal-level 
site, had 36 WUAs. Jahot was not merely divided across the primary axis of head 
prosperity and tail poverty: these divisions cut across political lines, sugar 
cooperatives and administrative jurisdictions (Chapter 7). It also showed how the 
vocabularies of regulation changed as the regulation reform it travelled from one 
locale to the other. I discuss this in detail in Chapters 7 and 8 of this thesis. 
 
Between 2007 and 2008, ten sites in the head region were chosen under the 
entitlement programme, but by 2011 it was upscaled to cover the whole canal 
system. Based on the data gathered from the sub-division office, demographic 
patterns, membership of WUAs, their location and the progress of entitlement 
delivery, I decided to take three sites (head, middle and tail) to study and 
understand the water practices and dynamics of regulation. This selection was 
based on pilot visits, analysis of the social demography and interviews with 
NGOs that had previously worked on this site. The tail, and my final, site for 
extended observation was more a matter of serendipity than a conscious and 
calculated decision. For the March water rotations, when the water was being 
supplied to the tail region, I secured permission to accompany the Department 
officials on patrols. They took me to the WUA, which I have chosen to call the 
Jai Gauri Paani Waapar Sanstha (JGP) in Uzalgaon (name changed), where water 
rotations were on for the next two days. This was a tail site, with a functioning 
WUA, unlike the other two sites in the head and tail. From the March rotation 
onwards, I decided to focus my work in Uzalgaon supplemented with site visits to 
other two WUAs in the head (Triveni-Balaji WUA) and middle (Sangam WUA).  
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Figure 3.4: Water assessments after the March rotation in the JGP WUA 
 (March 2012) 
 
 
Figure 3.5: Registering water use in the JGP WUA 
                           (April 2012) 
53 
 
  
Figure 3.6: On patrol with field officials at Jahot 
                          (May 2012) 
 
In JGP, I got the opportunity to see the entitlements in action (Chapter 8). The 
strategy here was of both observation and participant observation. I went on 
patrol visits with the field level officers, accompanied Sanjay bhau - the canal 
inspector for the WUA - to farmers’ fields as he carried out water assessments, 
attended group discussions and morning chaupals (community meetings), and 
benefited from numerous informal conversations at the Uzalgaon bus stop. In 
time, I was naturalised into Uzalgaon. In between sugary milk teas (during the 
pleasant months from January to March) and ice-cold, fresh sugarcane juice and 
shikanji (lemonade, in the summer months of March to May), I interviewed a 
heterogeneous set of people grouped together into water communities in the Jahot 
system.  
 
I preferred to record all my interviews (with permission) and used my mobile 
phone for this purpose. I noticed that using a mobile phone instead of a voice 
recorder was a comfortable choice since my respondents were unperturbed by its 
presence once the interview started to flow. A mobile phone was a far more 
familiar and homely apparatus than a voice recorder. By mid-May, when I 
decided to return to policy interviews and relocated to Mumbai, I had soaked up 
the friendly yet intensely politicised environment of the Jahot system.  
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3.4 Negotiating Research: gatekeepers, ethics and positionality 
The field is an intensely social experience where political choices and trade-offs 
are made. It is thus a mix of serendipity and constraints (Strauss, 2000) 
influenced by issues of positionality and access, to which I now turn. 
Negotiations regarding my fieldwork started from day one. For the practical 
constraints that I mention above (in section 3.3.2), I took the help of the MWRRA 
to get access and introduction to the canal-level sites. This initial breakthrough 
came with a trade-off with bureaucracy who acted as gatekeepers, much as 
Hammersley and Atkinson (1995) point to - 
Gatekeepers[…]will understandably be concerned as to the picture of the 
organization[...]that the ethnographer will paint, and they will have practical 
interests in seeing themselves and their colleagues presented in a favourable 
light[….] (Hammersley & Atkinson, 1995: 54). 
 
Through these close connections, I was also exposing myself to being guided in 
my research. For instance, the initial field trips to the model sites, though 
thoroughly illuminating, also made me aware of the ‘shepherding and control’ 
issues inherent in this hospitality. In most of my visits I was accompanied by a 
Department official and introduced to the ‘right people’ for the ‘right answers’. It 
is for this reason that my selection of Jahot was not welcomed by several 
bureaucrats in Mumbai, who also tried to shepherd me to the “ islands of 
salvation” (Chambers, 1988: 49) or the model sites. I was insistent and tough in 
offsetting such biases and did not change my decision in the face of discouraging 
remarks about Jahot, such as “people are not very nice there” or “it is very remote 
and tough for a woman”. The second big challenge came during site selection in 
Jahot. I realised within a month of my stay at Shrigonda that the further I was 
from the division office, the less would be the interference from the officials in 
my day-to-day work. I tried my best to secure accommodation in Uzalgaon, but I 
was advised better to stay at the Department guest house as it would be the safest 
place for a woman on her own. People fear the shaasan [bureaucracy] and no one 
can harm you at the Inspection house! was the repeated advice from all quarters. 
 
While staying at the guest house subjected me to the surveillance of the field 
staff, it did bring some benefits. One: proximity to the office kept me abreast with 
all the important events and meetings - and also fights and feuds - between 
farmers and the Department. I could check with staff members about the dates of 
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rotation, or when the water was due to be released, and also witness first-hand the 
charged climate during water rotations. Prior to and during the rotations, vehicles 
lined up in front of the office and I was given instructions to stay indoors for fear 
of violence breaking out. Two: the guest house was equidistant from all three 
sites, and therefore was an ideal location to travel from. Three: it gave me some 
very good friendships and insider accounts of the area, the Department and the 
context of Jahot itself.  
Since I am not a native Marathi speaker, I also hired a research assistant
24
, who 
accompanied me during my field visits in Jahot. Initially, I hired a student from 
the local college, the daughter of a (irrigation) staff member, as my translator. 
However I realised very soon that my research was being discussed in the 
Shrigonda office. In order to protect my respondents, I decided to get a translator 
from another village, who has also helped me transcribe the interviews in 
Marathi.
25
 Sanjay bhau also acted as an impromptu translator when the need 
arose. In time I picked up some Marathi but did not come close to sophistication 
and proficiency; its similarity with the Devanagari script (Hindi) made Marathi 
easy to comprehend but my spoken language was a howler! Mr. Sikandar Attar
26
, 
Mr Ravindra Pomane and Mr. Sachin Bhopal
27
 performed word-to-word 
transcriptions for me. They were from a contiguous area, aware of the context and 
were also social work graduates. I later triangulated the audio records with 
transcripts from my assistants and my own field notes. 
Given my proximity to the Department and the nature of my initiation into the 
field, several respondents located me as a Department official. The fact that I was 
staying at the official guest house did not help either. I tried to distance myself 
from this image as far as possible. Though the officials offered to help with 
conveyance, I preferred to travel by bus to the village and then walk through the 
                                                          
24
 A Masters student in Social Work at the Pune University and a local resident of the area. 
25
 Several of my respondents in the local village site were comfortable with speaking to me in 
Hindi (my native language). However, there were also a set of respondents who could not 
converse in Hindi and my RA came along to help me with these interviews. The WUA Canal 
inspector, Sanjay bhau (who was conversant in Hindi, Marathi and basic English) also provided 
me with great help. Since farmers did not stay in the village but in their farms which were 
inaccessible through roads, he took me on his motor bike to meet the farmers and also to observe 
the water rotations. 
 
27
 Graduates  in Social work at the Pune University and a local resident of the area. 
56 
 
fields to meet the farmers
28
, most often getting a ride with Sanjay bhau. During 
my stay in Jahot, people were certainly confused about my status. This oscillated 
from being a World Bank employee to a government official or an NGO worker. 
Some of them felt that this “survey” (my PhD) would give me a position in the 
Department and I would be one of their sahibs (officers) in future. While the 
farmers expected water channels and field channels from me, the bureaucracy 
was initially nervous and saw me as an evaluator of their progress. I could do 
neither! When I explained to them that I am a researcher doing a study on WUAs 
and the changes in the water sector, they did not see much sense in me 
‘wandering around’ in the fields for the purposes of my study. I had to negotiate 
between these imposed identities on a daily basis. In my conversations with 
farmers, I had to explain to them that I could not get their outlets and field 
channels repaired. I reassured the field bureaucracy that the data would be 
anonymised, and that this was not an evaluation. For purposes of confidentiality 
and anonymity, names - especially of government officers - have been changed. I 
have also changed the names of the villages, WUA sites and numbers and names 
of the outlets and distributaries to protect my respondents. Some respondents 
were comfortable with the use of their names and I have used them with their 
written or verbal consent. 
Having said this, my presence for five months in Jahot did cause some curiosity 
and stirrings. For the WUAs, I became the harbinger of information as they 
struggled to understand the reasons for my ‘mindless wanderings’, whilst the 
bureaucracy’s responses would oscillate between guarded ambivalence and 
honest criticism. Even beyond the precincts of Jahot, my respondents were 
intrigued and curious to know what I found in Jahot and in other parts of 
Maharashtra.  
                                                          
28
 In Western Maharashtra, it is difficult to meet the farmers in the village (except for the morning 
between 8am to 9am) since they reside in their farms. This was the furthest the bus could take me. 
I therefore required a motorcycle and a driver to help me. Sanjay bhau proved immensely helpful. 
He was the canal inspector of the WUA, farmer and a local resident. We arranged specific days 
and times for the visit, so that his schedule was not interrupted. I was uncomfortable that he would 
not take payment even for the petrol for his bike. I had to be very firm to make him accept my 
request for paying for the petrol when we travelled for long hours, and between villages. He 
would merely mention that he was learning through this study. 
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3.4.1 Hierarchies and gendered realities 
My positionality in the field was influenced by my being an Indian student from a 
British university, a North Indian, educated, female researcher and a social 
scientist. While being a PhD student from a British university opened doors of 
access for me, especially with the bureaucrats, who went out of their way to help 
me, being a social scientist was an unwelcome and “shocking” revelation to a 
community of engineers, who initially saw me as unfit to conduct research in the 
water sector. I had entered into a domain of hydraulic masculinities (Zwarteveen, 
2011) where my respondents portrayed their ‘superiority’ of knowledge, age and 
gender. My initial interactions with them were premised on their attitude that I 
needed to be “taught about water engineering”. They would throw engineering 
jargon at me to test my knowledge.  
 
In these initial interactions, to my surprise, my father came to my rescue. The 
initial introductions would be premised on my study, my gaon (my home and 
native village), my caste and my family. While they categorised my study as 
social work, the fact that I was the daughter of a Superintendent Engineer (SE) in 
the Irrigation Department in Uttar Pradesh melted some technical hearts. For 
others, the Class 1 officer
29
 status of my father earned me respect. Initially, I was 
often introduced as ‘the daughter of SE sahib’, but later I did graduate to ‘PhD 
researcher’ at some point. 
 
However, this attitude not only helped me to enter their ‘world of calculations and 
measurements’, which operates on assumptions about equity, policy and power, 
but also enabled me to observe how shaasan (bureaucracy) operates socially. It 
also provided me with a hands-on opportunity to understand water practices with 
these field practitioners. As I held my fort, with time the condescending attitude 
was soon replaced with very productive conversations and a sense of respect for 
my effort. I benefitted from the overwhelming response of the field bureaucracy 
who took me on patrols, and the canal inspectors who helped me “participate in” 
and observe water rotations.  
 
                                                          
29
 Highest in the hierarchy of public servants (1-4) in India. They are also referred to as Gazetted 
officers. They also have the authority to issue official stamps. 
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Nevertheless, there were several occasions when I would be bound by social 
constraints. In several spaces, in the offices or at the canal, I would be the only 
female person in a given space. This was initially a discomforting experience, but 
with time I gained confidence as well as acceptability. Being a female researcher, 
I had to dress appropriately and follow strict time schedules - returning home by 
sunset. This limited my observation of night patrols and water rotations. It is for 
these reasons that I could not observe in person activities related to issues of 
corruption, water thefts, and sabotage of the canal system during water rotations. 
These restricting demands were further exacerbated by the fact that I was an 
Indian girl, where it was assumed that I would know and adhere to the standards 
of ‘female modesty’ when it came to talking with men. I skirted jovially the 
questions on marriage, my career choices, and how my parents could permit me 
to travel alone. At times they would discuss my matrimonial prospects, bring me 
offers of marriage and give strict injunctions that I must find a husband when I 
finish my survey. I had, on a regular basis, to navigate between being an insider, 
being an Indian and at home, but also subjected to the boundaries of an outsider, 
for not being a Maharashtrian mulgi (girl, here woman).  
 
I found it extremely disheartening that across so many interviews and 
observations, my interaction with womenfolk was marginal and peripheral. There 
were very few women in the policy circles, but more troublesome was the fact 
that even as members of the WUAs, their role was peripheral, or more as proxy 
candidates. It clearly showed the skewed participation and marginalisation in the 
masculine water sector. However, I did meet in Jahot a fiery lady, Gangu tai, 
whose spirited participation and conversation still keeps me hopeful about 
change. With time, I managed to sink into the organisational and water culture of 
Maharashtra and after a few rough months, fieldwork became an evolving 
experience. I was madam for field officers, vishesh ladki (unique girl) for village 
people, foreignchi patlin
30
 for friends that I made during my stay in the village 
and in Shrigonda, and a daring mulgi (girl/woman) from Delhi for several others 
that I met during my countless journeys in Maharashtra.  
                                                          
30
 The title of a famous Marathi movie in which the protagonist, a girl from the USA, comes to a 
village in Maharashtra and slowly adopts the culture of the place. The similarity was especially 
reinforced by my Marathi pronunciation. 
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3.5 Towards analysis 
By the end of the fieldwork, my field reports to my supervisors had begun to 
show the evolution of my work. Storylines had emerged which needed to be 
probed and intellectually challenged once I returned to the UK in October 2012 to 
write up the thesis. This distanced relationship with the field and movement 
towards analysis also involved interpreting, objectifying and textualising the data 
(Mosse, 2006). I used Nvivo software for data coding as I organised the data 
according to the themes and storylines that emerged. One of the strongest charges 
levelled against the use of qualitative software such as Nvivo is that the 
researcher may lose the possibility of reading the data in different ways. I also 
think that at some point, it dehumanises your field respondents, who are entered 
as codes and themes in the database. As researchers, it also puts us in a privileged 
position to interpret a reality, which we attempted to understand through our own 
subjective lenses. 
Throughout my fieldwork, I maintained a written journal. It contains my first 
impressions, my own biases, and moments of serendipity and frustration 
encountered in the field. This always kept me close to the life of the people with 
whom I engaged for a period of several months, and gave me an opportunity to be 
reflective about my own work and interpretation. My positionality has not merely 
affected the process of data collection in terms of what I see and observe, but is 
contingent on what I understand and where I am located. Thus the interpretation 
is far more layered due to my partial subjectivity.  
This data is mediated by the in-betweeness of understandings that arises from my 
hiring translators and transcribers (Rabinow, 1977; Twyman et al., 1999). Though 
I made my research intentions and objectives very clear to my research assistants, 
I also opened my work to another layer of interpretation. It is for this reason that I 
triangulated the transcriptions with my own field notes and first impressions. 
Also using my rudimentary knowledge of Marathi, I have tried to offset these 
biases as far as possible. 
Research is also an interpretive process and my study was determined by my own 
positions in the field, and by the privilege of choice that I exercised when I coded 
my data through Nvivo for analysis and interpretation. It is the construction of 
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data which could tell several different stories through different vantage points, 
and this is the interpretation I present. This is among the many exercises of 
situated knowledge (Haraway, 1988) of accounts of truth open to interpretation 
and constructions. I now turn to the story of regulation stitched and pieced 
together through these multivariate axes in the subsequent chapters. 
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4. Framing Regulation: Constraints, Convergence and the 
Emergence of the Discourse 
 
 
India faces an increasingly urgent situation: Its finite and fragile water resources are 
stressed and depleting rapidly while various sectoral demands are growing rapidly […] 
significant restructuring is thus required of the institutional and financial environment in 
order to create the incentives to initiate a continuous and vigorous process of change […] 
The performance improvement approach entails achieving the devolution of operations 
and maintenance to lower administrative levels and user groups; financial viability and 
sustainability of the service agencies, more appropriate technology and information 
systems; and a demand- and client-orientation in the services.  
                                  (World Bank 1998: i-vi) 
Introduction 
This growing spectre of resource scarcity has been one of the foremost drivers of 
water sector restructuring in India and the world for the last two decades. In India, 
this has unleashed several types of experiment by way of ‘reforms’ ranging from 
community participation, privatisation of water supply and irrigation management 
transfer under the rubric of performance ‘improvement’. The latest to arrive in 
this cluster is the idea of independent regulation and water markets. Though the 
ideas of tradable entitlements and independent regulation entered the vocabulary 
of the water reform discourse around 2003 in India, these are particular 
manifestations of problems that have been discussed and debated for more than a 
decade in the Indian water sector (Wade, 1984; Chambers, 1988; Government of 
India, 1992; World Bank, 1998a). Independent regulation, therefore, is the 
institutional culmination of several policy processes and reform narratives (global 
and national) that started from 1990 onwards, some directly linked to the water 
sector and others, such as utility regulation, affecting its path-dependent nature.  
 
In this chapter, I focus on these constellations of forces, which have led to the 
emergence of reform-led regulation in the Indian water sector. I focus on the 
national level as the domain of discourse production, which has successively built 
up the momentum for water reforms and has made regulation salient in the Indian 
water discourse. I argue that regulation has emerged in the context of neoliberal 
restructuring of the economy, and is legitimised by discourses of expert-driven 
and ‘apolitical’ institutions that can function as third parties and ‘outside of the 
State’. In doing so, I also show the particular ways in which the State is 
constituted through the production of regulatory discourse at the national level. 
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After providing a brief context of the Indian water sector at the national level 
(section 4.1) I argue that the evolution of regulation can be divided into three 
broad phases at the national level. The first phase of regulation (1990-1998) 
primarily focused on core sectors of the economy, and was fundamental in 
creating the ‘thought world’ for regulation, i.e. making ‘independent regulation’ 
salient in a hitherto interventionist economy. This particular framing of regulation 
rested in the ideology of rolling out neoliberalism, trimming the State in ways that 
would complement market conditions and thus heralding private sector 
participation in infrastructure sectors (section 4.2). This phase created the ground 
conditions for the second phase of regulation (1998-2005), which focused on 
social sectors such as water. Bolstered by narratives and models from both within 
the global water sector and outside of it, the regulation encompasses several 
techniques for ‘improvement’ (section 4.3), which are based on the logic of 
‘efficient water pricing’. Conspicuous in this phase is the inflated role of the 
donors, such as the World Bank, which have emerged as the key drivers of the 
water regulatory discourse in India. The third and the current phase (2006 
onwards) therefore takes cognisance of this donor-defined regulation. It is 
preoccupied with revisiting the thinking on regulation and making it a home-
grown discourse (section 4.4). Though this has meant critiquing - to some extent - 
the ‘imported models’ derived from dominant narratives of neoliberal reforms, it 
also makes regulation driven by expertise and technical knowledge salient in the 
Indian water reform discourse. 
4.1 Water sector: setting the national context  
India inherited an over-centralised polity and bureaucratic system from the 
colonial rulers (Asthana, 2009), which remained intact due to the separatist and 
the divisive fears that the partition of the country witnessed immediately after 
independence (Weiner, 1999). The Indian Constitution gave a great deal of 
economic and political power to the centre, where sub-national units (henceforth 
states) depended on the centre for a share of economic resources. The instruments 
for this transfer were shares in taxes, plan outlays (Five Year plans prepared by 
the Indian Planning Commission), grants-in-aid mainly from the Financial 
Commission, and loans to help the states prioritise their development needs and 
reduce regional disparities. The states’ share of central government taxes was 
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significantly less than that of the centre
31
(Weiner, 1999). Therefore central 
support for state projects within the social sector remained critical until the 1990s 
as the states had limited fiscal autonomy (ibid). 
Under the Indian Constitution, the responsibility to develop and manage water 
resources forms a part of the State list (Item 17 in List II of the Seventh Schedule) 
(Basu, 2009). Thus the states have the freedom to legislate on the corresponding 
laws related to water supply, irrigation, flood and drainage. The centre can 
provide - and has done so, in various instances - the enabling framework within 
which the states operate and manage their water resources through persuasive 
politics.   For example, national water policies, prepared by the Ministry of Water 
Resources (MoWR), provide the basic guiding principles for water management 
in the country
32
. Furthermore, Entry 56 of the Union list stipulates that the extent 
to which regulation and development of water supplies “falls under the control of 
the Union is declared by Parliament by law to be expedient in the public interest” 
(Ministry of Water Resources cited in Mehta 2004: 22). 
 
The Centre can also influence the states using the politics of pressure, through 
grants and financial outlays from the Planning and Finance Commissions 
(Sangameswaran, 2006). Thus there are three national bodies which deal with the 
water sector - the Ministry of Water Resources (MoWR), the Planning 
Commission and the Finance Commission
33
. These bodies, through grants, 
outlays and loans, have encouraged the states to toe the line of the central 
guidelines. For example, the Command Area Development Programme (CADP) 
was one of the major initiatives from the Centre, and focused on raising irrigation 
                                                          
31
The major tax sources for the states are sales tax, liquor excise duties, land revenue, agricultural 
income tax, urban land taxes and motor vehicles tax. Income tax (with the exception of 
agricultural tax), corporate and customs duties are collected by the central government and these 
shares are larger than the state tax portfolio. See Weiner 1999. 
32 The Centre also has direct control over planning and technical resources through organisations 
such as the Central Water Commission, Central Ground Water Board, and National Water 
Development Agency. These function under the MoWR (Saleth and Dinar, 1999). There are also 
several line ministries at the Centre including Ministry of Rural Development, Ministry of Urban 
Development which deal with the water sector, for example drinking water, sanitation, etc.. Here I 
have referred to these three bodies for the purposes of the water resources sector. 
33
 Transfers from the state comprise statutory and non-statutory transfers and take place through 
three channels. The Finance Commission recommends the proceeds from central taxes and non-
plan grants. These are statutory transfers. The Planning Commission makes non-statutory 
transfers through plan grants. The third channel is the Central Ministries, which make both plan 
and non-plan grants (Government of India, 2010b). 
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potential and agricultural productivity (Sekhar, 2007). The CADP was launched 
in the Fifth Five Year Plan (1974-78) following the recommendations of the 
Irrigation Commission and on the advice of the World Bank (Ramamurthy, 
1995). Since the 1970s, the Planning Commission has heavily financed irrigation 
projects in several states under the CADP (Narayanamoorthy and Deshpande, 
2005; Sekhar, 2007)
34
.  
 
Prior to the 1990s, the central thrust of the water policy was aligned to the 
development planning model of the country. Though water forms part of the State 
list, the Planning and the Finance Commission were instrumental in 
universalising the Nehruvian vision of socialist development across the country. 
The national (water) strategy in the first few decades after independence treated 
water as a critical input for agricultural intensification, hydropower generation 
and achieving food security. This was most evident in the drive for a Green 
Revolution after the food crises of the mid-1960s (Ramamurthy, 1995; Iyer, 
2011). Irrigation also became a substitute for more fundamental changes such as 
land reforms in the country (Ramamurthy, 1995). 
 
This strategy of water development thus prioritised water availability, optimising 
storage and building more dams. This thinking was also marked by “an 
engineering paradigm”, explained a former Secretary of Water Resources, Mr. 
Ramaswamy R. Iyer. This essentially meant making more water available for use, 
a supply side response to projected irrigation demand. He writes - 
Attention was focussed on what is referred to as ‘water resource development’, 
which meant mainly big projects, i.e dams, reservoirs, canal systems. This 
approach became a part of the Green Revolution strategy and produced dramatic 
short-term results […]. However, in the long term, that approach, and the idea of 
‘development’ with which it was linked set in motion an ever-growing, 
unmanageable demand for water, inflicted great damage on soil, was accompanied 
by inequities and injustices various kinds (Iyer, 2011: 203). 
Thus, water was essentially a productive asset to be harnessed for food 
productivity and agricultural development. Irrigation, prior to the 1990s, was 
                                                          
34 The CADP was later restructured into the Command Area Development and Water 
Management Programme (CADWMP) (2004-05). In 2008-2009, it became a state sector scheme 
funded by individual states. The main function is to encourage devolution of water resources 
management according to the principles of subsidiarity (Government of India, 2010a).  
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viewed more as an input than a resource in itself. This ‘productive’ focus was 
also retained in the 1987 National Water Policy (NWP), which was the first 
attempt to consolidate the basic principles of water management at the national 
level. The emphasis of this policy was still on development and harnessing of 
water resources, how water could best be harnessed and its productive use 
optimised. The 1987 policy noted that- 
While the irrigation potential is estimated to have increased from 19.5 million 
hectares at the time of Independence to about 68 million hectares at the end of 
Sixth Plan, further development of substantial order is necessary if the food and 
fibre needs of the growing population are to be met (Government of India, 1987: 
3). 
 
This NWP was the culmination of the first attempt to bring a consensus among 
the states to agree on certain basic principles about water. However it was also 
drafted against the background of a changing political and economic climate. Mr. 
Rajiv Gandhi, the Prime Minister of India, was critical of the license-permit raj, 
or an interventionist economy, and professed a “complete absence of prejudice 
against the private sector” (Ahluwalia 1998 cited in Asthana, 2009: 32). Mr. 
Gandhi placed emphasis on dismantling India’s excessive regulatory apparatus 
and unleashing entrepreneurial forces
35
. Though this reformist intent was not 
sharply visible in water policy, the 1987 policy did signal a movement towards 
managerial concepts such as river basin planning, volumetric pricing of water and 
cost over-runs in irrigation projects, issues that have continued to recur in policy 
documents elsewhere (Government of India, 1987; World Bank, 1998b; 
Government of India, 2002). However, the 1987 policy remained no more than a 
“brief enunciation of generalities and was never operationalised” (Iyer, 2009: 
570). It also portrayed how “policy makers either wanted to keep covering their 
policy positions with a robe of ambiguousness or were naïve to the emerging 
political realities of water markets” (Narsalay, 2003: 3).  
Up to the 1990s, donors also played a significant role in the overall development 
of the water sector. Through objectives of rural and agricultural development, 
irrigation formed an important component of the aid strategy (Lipton and Toye, 
1990). For example, the World Bank (henceforth “the Bank”) was one of the 
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 Gandhi’s regime is also regarded as the phase of halted liberalization (cf. Sachs et al., 1999; 
Weiner, 1999). The primary target for reform was dismantling economic controls especially 
related to industrial development and private sector. 
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primary lenders and technical advisers in the irrigation sector (Kirk, 2011). 
Between 1950 and 1993, total lending for irrigation accounted for 7 percent of the 
total Bank lending in this period (Mollinga et al., 2010). This was, however, 
miniscule in relation to the country’s Gross National Product, and had little effect 
in terms of engaging with the politics of irrigation policy (Ramamurthy, 1995). 
However the balance of payment crises in 1990s, which heralded the economic 
reforms in the country, changed the nature of this aid relationship. It was during 
this transition from the command and control style of governance to market led 
mechanisms - which led to a new style of water managerialism - that regulation 
made its entry into the Indian policy discourse. I now turn to those ideational and 
political alignments in the next section. 
4.2 The first step to ‘managerialism’: economic federalisation of 
the Indian State (1990 onwards) 
The balance of payment crises and the growing fiscal deficit of 1991 brought 
fundamental changes to the governance structure of the country. This was also 
part of the global trend, diffused across the world through the ‘Washington 
Consensus’36. Besides opening the doors to disinvestment in core areas of power, 
telecom and the financial sector, the Indian State underwent major deviations 
from how it had traditionally conducted its centralised planning (Asthana, 2009). 
The economic crises radically restructured the centre-state relationship and 
altered the balance of power between the states and the Centre (see Jenkins, 1999; 
Sachs et al., 1999; Weiner, 1999; Rudolph and Rudolph, 2001; Saez, 2002; Sinha, 
2004; Asthana, 2009).  
 
Against the backdrop of the financial crises, capital expenditure of both Centre 
and states as a proportion of national expenditure declined significantly. The 
Centre’s gross assistance to states’ capital formation declined from 27 percent in 
1990-91 to 12 percent in 1998-99 (Rudolph and Rudolph, 2001). Figure 4.1 
demonstrates this decreasing trend in the irrigation sector against the total plan 
outlay; from the Seventh Plan onwards (1985-1990) there is a steady decline in 
                                                          
36
 Term coined by Williamson in 1989 which defined ten policy prescriptions of structural 
adjustment reforms such as tax reforms, trade liberalisation, fiscal reforms etc. It was initially 
articulated in reference to the Latin American countries but is also used generically to denote 
economic reforms that followed the structural adjustment packages in developing countries. (see 
Williamson, 2004). 
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the outlay for the irrigation sector. In this context of reduced funding from the 
Centre, the state governments were required to ‘put their house in order to 
compete for private investments’ (Sachs et al., 1999). As direct intervention by 
the centre reduced in the state economies, the states  also became prepared to take 
advantage of the changing investment climate (Weiner, 1999).  
 
Figure 4.1: Percentage outlay for irrigation in Five Year Plans 
               (Government of India, 2012a). 
 
This search for capital also meant radical restructuring of the financial and fiscal 
performance of the states. Kirk (2011) calls this a transition from Indian states to 
an “India of the States” (Kirk, 2011: xxiii) whereby states emerged as “marquee 
players” (Rudolph and Rudolph, 2001: 1541) in defining their growth strategy 
supported by a new group of businessmen, economic regulators, and financed by 
international banks such as the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank. 
This group were to become the policy intellectuals who accelerated the reform 
agenda in several sectors. In this process, the states were also exposed to the 
discipline of the international lenders who simultaneously applied gentle pressure 
to adopt neoliberal policies. Bilateral agencies, such as DFID, the USAID, the 
BMZ (German aid) and the OECF (Japanese aid) expanded their work through 
various projects and policies related to drinking water, sanitation and irrigation 
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(Narsalay, 2003; Asthana, 2009). This changed the nature of Centre-state 
relations in that the states which had previously competed vertically for centrally 
determined resources were now locked into horizontal competition among 
themselves for funds from a variety of different actors, especially the donors 
(Sinha, 2004).  
Andhra Pradesh was one of the first states to fall in line with this radical 
restructuring programme (Rudolph and Rudolph, 2001; Asthana, 2009), or what 
the World Bank called the “big bang approach” (World Bank, 2002: 10). 
Chandrababu Naidu, the Chief Minister of Andhra Pradesh, emerged as the very 
model of a Chief Minister CEO and was rewarded by the World Bank for his 
business-style governance (Rudolph and Rudolph, 2001). Several other states, 
such as Karnataka, Maharashtra, and Rajasthan, followed the same trajectory 
whereby the Chief Ministers transformed themselves into de facto CEOs to chase 
private and foreign funds (ibid). In the water sector, Andhra Pradesh led the way 
by bringing in a state-wide Act for WUAs, also referred to as the Andhra model 
for irrigation management transfer (discussed further in the next section). 
This horizontal competition was also well timed to fit with the country strategy of 
the Bank, which made the strategic shift from project-based financing to sector-
specific investment. Even before the balance of payment crisis in the 1990s, the 
Bank’s lending portfolio comprised individual development projects. In contrast 
to project-based lending, sector loans were large-scale integrated investment 
packages that gave better leverage to the Bank to consolidate and push through 
fiscal and financial restructuring in the states (World Bank, 2002; Sekhar, 2007; 
Kirk, 2011). This “comprehensive packaging ensured that the Bank’s dialogue in 
each sector/ subsector addressed institutional and financial reforms issues 
consistently - a major problem in the past” (World Bank, 2002: vii). 
 
The first phase of regulation (1990-1998) emerged in this context of altered 
federal relationships, aligned with economic liberalisation and change in the 
emphasis of the donors. The investment packages targeted dismantling the 
overburdened State and changing its role to that of a regulator from that of a 
service provider. In this philosophy lay the genesis of independent regulation. 
Sectors such as financial securities, insurance, telecom and electricity were 
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opened up to private actors, and independent regulators either became precursors 
or followed the ‘de-regulated’ sectors. The Multilateral Financial Institutions, 
especially the World Bank, acted as purveyors of this regulatory model, which 
was now embedded on the European style regulatory state (cf. Majone 1994), 
where regulators monitored the relationship between the service providers and 
consumers (see Chapter 2). Some of the regulators that emerged in the 1990s 
were the Securities Exchange Board of India (1992), the Insurance Regulatory 
and Development Authority (1999), the Telecom Regulatory Authority of India 
(TRAI, 1997), and the Central Electricity Regulatory Commission (CERC, 
1998)
37
. 
 
Sectors such as power and telecoms, which had hitherto been State-led, were now 
opened up to private participation, favouring competition, and corporatisation of 
the relevant government department. The regulators, in these sectors, were 
constituted to enhance competition and prepare congenial ground for private 
investments. However, the specificities of this transition differed because power, 
unlike telecommunications, is part of the Concurrent list of the Indian 
Constitution (see Mukherji, 2004), whereby states and the centre share equal 
jurisdiction. To start with, the Indian government chose to reform those sectors 
which were less risky and relatively safer to reform, reforms that primarily 
affected ‘elite politics’(Varshney, 1999; Weiner, 1999), for example, the capital 
market reforms. It was only towards the end of the 1990s and early 2000s that the 
regulatory model was replicated in the public infrastructure sectors such as 
telecoms and electricity.  
 
The first generation of reforms therefore focused on core sectors of the economy. 
Regulation was the by-product of the economic liberalisation that took place in 
1990 onwards, whereby the State had to vacate the commanding heights of the 
economy and make space for provision of public services through private sector 
participation or public-private partnerships (Government of India, 2006). The 
2006 Planning Commission, which provides a comprehensive review of the 
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 For concurrent subjects (both the central and state governments can legislate over such 
subjects). States such as Orissa had restructured their sectors long before the constitution of the 
CERC at the national level. In fact in 1996 Orissa became the first state to have a power sector 
regulator (see Mukherji 2004). 
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nature of regulation in India, summarises the purpose and character of such 
regulation as economic regulation: 
The State seeks to achieve the effective functioning of competitive markets and 
where such markets are absent to mimic competitive market outcomes to the 
extent possible. It also identifies and addresses subsidies and cross subsidies in 
the pricing of infrastructure services. States generally use economic regulation 
in a broader context to achieve a range of non-market objectives which include 
ensuring universal and equitable access, consumer protection and maintaining 
safety and health standards (Government of India 2006: 2). 
 
This particular framing made regulation the concomitant of privatisation, with a 
pronounced emphasis on efficient pricing, promotion of competition, 
standardisation of services and consumer protection. There has since then been 
general agreement on these factors being the essence of regulation, i.e. regulation 
is seen as important to ensure private sector participation, to signal political 
credibility to investors, and to ensure fair competition (Dubash, 2010). This 
economic regulation was marked by a movement “from an interventionist State 
that plans and directs the economy to a regulatory state that attempts to constrain 
and improve the market economy”(Rudolph and Rudolph, 2009: 70). This shift 
also created the policy space to experiment with ideas of transfer of ownership 
rights, license and pricing use (Narsalay, 2003; Asthana, 2009), and to move 
policy making from a public- to an expert-led private/semi-private domain, 
steered by the regulators.  
However the water sector was yet to be formally opened up to these ideas. The 
first phase of reform also focused on those sectors which were either the 
exclusive domain of the central government (telecoms, insurance or capital 
market) or subjects shared under the Concurrent List, such as power. Water, 
however, was the prerogative of individual states (Narsalay, 2003). In its 1995 
report, Economic developments in India: achievements and challenges, the World 
Bank noted that discrete changes in the policy regime in a few sectors such as 
finance, commerce, industry and telecommunications might not be enough to 
improve the economic and enabling environment in India unless sustained 
reforms were pursued in several key areas, such as irrigation and transport, that 
are constitutionally the exclusive responsibility of the state governments (World 
Bank, 1995). Although this first phase therefore introduced the vocabulary of 
independent regulators in infrastructure sectors to the country, it was only in the 
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second half of the 1990s, when reforms were gradual and incremental (Asthana, 
2009), that the water sector was opened up to massive restructuring through 
several policy-driven mechanisms. 
4.3 Water: the last sector to be reformed  
In the early years of reforms, water did not figure so prominently in the reform 
debate. Water, being a politically charged subject sensitive to vote bank politics, 
was pushed to the second stage of reforms; the fact that it came under the 
jurisdiction of states only exacerbated its political implications. Alternatively, it 
could be argued that the specificities of the water sector, with economies of scale 
and sunk costs, also make it economically less viable for private sector 
participation (cf. Bakker, 2010). Nevertheless the need to reform this sector has 
been expressed independently in several quarters. Some examples are the 1992 
report on irrigation water pricing (Government of India, 1992), the scattered pilot 
studies on promotion of participatory management since the 1980s (Patil and 
Lele, 1994), and the thrust on Command Area Development (from 1970s 
onwards). However by the 1990s the emphasis and the rationale for reforms were 
deeply embedded in the logic of the market and commercialisation of this sector. 
This was also supported by a growing ‘international consensus’ on water 
management which emerged with the Dublin Principles. 
The International Conference on Water and the Environment (1992) at Dublin, 
and the UN Conference on Environment and Development (Rio de Janeiro) were 
a “turning point” (Finger and Allouche, 2002: 22) in water resource management 
because new approaches to managing water emerged from these conferences. 
These were the Dublin guidelines and the Integrated Water Resources 
Management (IWRM). The Dublin Principles
38
 underlined the need to manage 
water holistically and stressed the benefits of devolution and participatory 
approaches to water management. However what the Dublin Principles are 
closely associated with is the fourth principle - of water as an economic good - 
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 The four Dublin Principles are: (1) fresh water is a finite and vulnerable resource, essential to 
sustain life, development and the environment; (2) water development and management should be 
based on a participatory approach, involving users, planners and policymakers at all levels; 3) 
women play a central part in the provision, management and safeguarding of water; and (4) water 
has an economic value in all its competing uses and should be recognised as an economic good 
(International Conference on Water and the Environment, 1992). 
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which has become hugely influential in guiding water policy debates, 
international deliberations and national policies across the globe.  
In succession to the Dublin guidelines the ‘IWRM package’ (Shah and Koppen, 
2006) sought to institutionalise the Dublin Principles, emphasising the need for a 
national water policy, water law and regulatory framework to guide sustainable 
water resource management and provide a normative framework to guide all 
water sector players. Central to the Dublin Principles and the IWRM paradigm 
were prescriptions emerging from a scarcity narrative (Movik, 2012) or the 
“perceived urgency of a water crises” (Finger and Allouche, 2002: 28). This 
precipitated the need to optimise the use and allocation of water, embedded 
mainly in an economic logic of efficient pricing. These guidelines strategically 
overlapped with the structural adjustment policies of the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, and “led to systematic opening of the policy 
and institutional spaces in [the] water sector in many countries of the world” 
(Mehta 2004: 2).  
I have so far explained how regulation emerged as an off-shoot of structural 
adjustment processes that altered federal relations in India. These changes in 
federal relations laid the state economies open to the discipline of International 
Financial Institutions, and also those sectors which were predominantly the 
prerogative of the state governments. This led the way for widespread 
restructuring in the water sector. However this restructuring was chiefly inspired 
by an emerging global consensus, or “behind the border consensus” (Mehta, 
2004), on water which began to emerge in the 1990s. This consensus is primarily 
embedded in defining water as an economic good. The Dublin formulation also 
became the guiding premise for the Bank’s39 policy in the Indian water sector 
from the mid-1990s onwards. I will now show how the idea of independent 
regulation emerged and was rationalised in several of the Bank’s documents40. 
                                                          
39
 There are several other multilateral and bilateral aid organisations which have provided aid to 
the water sector. These include the Asian Development Bank, DFID (UK), USAID (USA), OECF 
(Japan) and BMZ (Germany). However the World Bank is the largest donor in this sector (see 
Narsalay, 2003) and the analysis primarily focuses on the Bank because the reform project, 
MWSIP, is also funded by the Bank.  
40
 See Appendix 11.3 for the list of documents. 
73 
 
4.3.1 The World Bank’s comprehensive approach 
The 1993 Water Resources Management Policy of the Bank recognised the 
dismal performance of the water sector in terms of outputs, and shifted from 
project-specific to sector-specific funding (World Bank, 1993; World Bank, 
1998b; World Bank, 2002; Dharmadhikary, 2008). This global policy paper also 
highlighted the shift from water development to water management and served as 
a guideline for developing an analytical framework - 
…that takes into account interdependencies among sectors and protects aquatic 
ecosystems. Such a framework would guide the establishment of improved 
coordination among institutions, consistent coherent policies, and targeted 
government actions…efficiency in water management must be improved through 
greater use of pricing and through greater reliance on decentralization, user 
participation, privatization and financial autonomy to enhance accountability and 
improve performance incentives (World Bank, 1993: 40). 
This shift in the Bank’s approach was a result both of internal reviews within the 
Bank regarding their lending projects and of the growing concern over 
environmental issues at the global level. It also fused economic and 
environmental concerns together through the concept of “sustainable water 
resources management” (Finger and Allouche, 2002).  
These changes
41
 also worked in tandem with the economic federalisation of the 
Indian State and the emerging global consensus on water. Sector lending provided 
greater leverage to the Bank to directly influence sector restructuring at the state 
level. By attaching stringent conditions to the loans, the Bank could now 
pressurise recipient states to introduce ‘permanent and serious’ changes, as 
opposed to mere project-driven exercises (Dharmadhikary, 2008). With this 
“changing focus” (Saleth, 2007: 300), the Bank increasingly involved itself in 
Indian policy debates, both inside and outside the water sector. Moreover, the 
altered federal relations provided the Bank with the opportunity to finance water 
resource consolidation projects, thus “enhancing the state[s] as the focus of 
decentralisation in national policy” (World Bank, 2002: vii). The 1993 review 
laid the foundation for the global discourse of reforms, but it was the 1998 review 
which further institutionalised these principles in the Indian context. For example, 
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Outside of the water sector, there was yet another Bank report that lay the foundation for this 
transition. The 1994 Bank report on Infrastructure for Development also proposed changes in 
infrastructure sectors. It provided three key prescriptions for reform: commercial management, 
competition and user participation. (see Finger and Allouche, 2002) 
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from 1993 onwards, several states either came up with water policies or made key 
changes in restructuring the water sector: Tamil Nadu (1994); Orissa (1995); 
Rajasthan (1999); Andhra Pradesh (1998); Uttar Pradesh (1999); Karnataka 
(2002); Madhya Pradesh (2003) and Maharashtra (2003) revised their policies in 
line with World Bank principles. 
The 1998 review was the synthesis of a sector-wide programme undertaken in 
partnership with the Government of India and the World Bank, with contributions 
from the governments of UK, Denmark and Netherlands (World Bank, 1998b). 
Highlighting that the Indian sector is caught in a ‘vicious circle’ of inefficiency 
and low returns, the review recommended two mechanisms for performance 
improvement: first, intersectoral and intra-sectoral allocation and management; 
and second, improving water service delivery in all subsectors (irrigation, 
drinking water and sanitation). Given that water has both public and private good 
characteristics, the Bank argued that responsibilities should be divided between 
the government and the non-government stakeholders. It thus stressed a shift 
towards demand-oriented water management, decentralisation of decision making 
and inclusion of non-government stakeholders to achieve financial viability of 
service delivery (World Bank, 1998b).  
Drawing heavily on the Dublin-IWRM formulation, the 1998 review 
recommended “commercialization of operations at all levels” (World Bank, 
1998b: 53) in the water sector. The principal focus of this review was on 
developing the appropriate framework of economic incentives to provide efficient 
allocation and utilisation of water resources. This meant an emphasis on full cost 
recovery, private sector participation, raising agricultural tariffs and developing 
enforceable water rights for inter- and intra- sectoral transfers (World Bank, 
1998b). 
The 1998 report became the ideological precursor to all the major water sector 
reforms - rural and urban drinking water supply, irrigation and drainage - that 
came afterwards. Following this, the Bank also began to invest in several large-
scale restructuring projects in many states, starting with Andhra Pradesh, Madhya 
Pradesh, Uttar Pradesh and Rajasthan (Dharmadhikary, 2008). The National 
Water Policy (Government of India, 2002), which was released in 2002, 
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mainstreamed several of these initiatives into basic principles. The policy 
encouraged the participation of non-state actors: the water users, civil society, 
private sector, municipalities and gram panchayats. It laid particular emphasis on 
the involvement of users in the operation, maintenance and management of water 
infrastructure, with a view to eventually transferring such facilities to user groups. 
For the 2002 policy, private sector participation became the purveyor of 
innovative ideas, corporate management, service efficiency and financial 
resources (Government of India, 2002). Stressing financial sustainability, the 
policy declared: 
a need to ensure that water charges for various uses should be fixed in such a way 
that they cover at least part of the capital costs subsequently. These rates should 
be directly linked to the quality of service provided (Government of India, 2002). 
 
The 2002 policy therefore created the space for non-state actors in a sector which 
had been predominantly been State driven. However the 2002 policy did not 
mention independent regulators explicitly and stopped at private sector 
participation and corporate management of water resources, underlining the 
regulatory role of the State. Given the state-sector specific focus, the vocabulary 
of the water regulator only gained prominence with the articulation of the Bank-
aided Maharashtra Water Sector Improvement Project (MWSIP). The Bank also 
played a prominent role in introducing the concept of ‘independent regulation’. It 
is the 1998 review and several subsequent documents that built up the momentum 
for the regulatory model in Maharashtra. I now focus on three key interlinked 
narratives that emerged in this ‘knowledge-building process’ and show how these 
have shaped the evolution of ‘independent’ regulation in the World Bank-assisted 
MWSIP project in Maharashtra. These narratives legitimate certain ways of 
portraying the ‘problem’ (cf. Keeley and Scoones, 2003) of the Indian water 
sector and also mark the “cognitive and ideological boundaries” (Molle, 2008: 
131) that define the nature of the regulatory discourse in the country. 
Indian Water sector as the ‘failing’ sector 
Douglas (1986) remarks on the sociological origins of institutions, and states that 
institutional origin and survival often hinges on construction of binaries, to create 
the ‘other’ in order to gain legitimacy for institutions. Likewise, the Bank’s 
framing of reforms and the need for regulation rested on certain binary categories 
that have been reiterated over time in several policy pronouncements and 
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documents. Some examples of these binary constructions are: subjects vs. clients 
and consumers, department vs. water service agency, ad hoc tariffs vs. scientific 
tariffs. I now show how these binaries were refracted through certain narratives 
and models and argue that at the heart of these binary constructions is the contest 
of the State vs. the market. 
 
The 1998 review by the Bank began with the premise that the Indian water sector 
was caught in a vicious circle of “inadequate financial allocations” and 
“inefficient and bloated service institutions”, leading to poor service quality. The 
result is “customer dissatisfaction” reflected through “unwillingness to pay”, 
which, finally, results in low financial returns (World Bank, 1998b: 30). 
Complementing this situation was the looming scarcity scenario due to which 
India was speeding towards “a turbulent future” (Briscoe and Malik, 2006), wrote 
emphatically John Briscoe, the chief architect of water reforms in several 
countries of the South. He is also the principle architect of the MWSIP 
programme in Maharashtra.  
From 1998 onwards, several Bank publications not only reified this scarcity 
scenario but also brought forth ‘comprehensive’ strategies to bridge the efficiency 
and incentives gap in this sector. The focus now was on the need to ‘develop 
economic incentives’ and not infrastructure. This led to a distinct water 
managerialism that ‘water needs to be managed rather than developed [the 
strategy for the first four decades after independence] and that such management 
is possible only when water is treated as an economic good rather than a public 
good’ (World Bank, 1998a; World Bank, 1998b). By putting management at the 
centre of water problems and the future strategy, the Bank was also putting the 
State at the centre of its restructuring strategy. Recommending commercialisation 
of operations at all levels, these reviews essentially stressed the overhauling of 
the water sector, with the principle emphasis being on limiting the bulky 
bureaucracy, which was a strain on the state budget. Therefore the old 
development paradigm based on centralised decision making, administrative 
regulation, and bureaucratic allocation was now to make way for “decentralized 
allocation, economic instruments and stakeholder participation” (Saleth and 
Dinar, 1999: iii).  
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This ‘rescaling of the State’ (Asthana, 2009) created pressures on the Indian State 
from above and below, whereby both the Centre and state governments were 
required to reassess their monopoly and ascribe new roles to the energetic, 
nongovernment sections (World Bank, 2002: 17) In his analysis of India’s 
turbulent future, Briscoe writes that the water sector is attuned to a “command 
and control” style of operation: 
The Indian state water apparatus still shows little interest in the key issues of the 
management stage - participation, incentives, water entitlements, transparency, 
entry of the private sector, competition, accountability, financing and 
environmental quality […]Confronted with [the] reality of limited supplies and 
growing and changing demands, the need is obviously for a management 
framework which stimulates efficiency and which facilitates voluntary transfer of 
water as societal needs change […]A central element of a new approach is that 
users have well-defined entitlements to water. The broader messages are that the 
ideas of the 1991 economic reforms must be drilled down from the regulatory and 
financial sectors into real sectors (including water) if India is to have sustainable 
economic growth, and that the role of the Indian water state must change from that 
of a builder and controller to creator of an enabling environment, and facilitator of 
the actions of water users, large and small (Briscoe and Malik, 2007: 2-6). 
 
For the Bank, the ‘controlling’ and closed state water apparatus was clearly not 
on the same frequency as required for reforms. Moreover, extrapolations from 
real or core economic sectors came along with recipes for institutional 
restructuring. For the irrigation sector, this meant restructuring the role of the 
state irrigation institutions and unbundling their services into water services 
agencies, creating regulatory institutions modelled on Orissa’s power sector and 
the UK water sector, and opening up the sector to private players. Bulk water 
delivery, maintenance and financial management were to be assigned to 
autonomous and financially viable units, which would now be accountable for 
their performance to regulators and users (World Bank, 2002). Therefore service-
based entities were to be created out of the state departments, and consumer 
entities were to be created out of bulk consumers, mainly farmers.  
The Project Appraisal Document (PAD) of the MWSIP also places clear 
emphasis on reshaping the role of the State in line with this thinking. The team 
leader for the MWSIP, a World Bank official, made it clear that independent 
regulation was the answer to such a command and control style of operation in 
the water sector in Maharashtra, when he argued:  
This is a new idea and we need to see how it will take root because there is a 
legacy of the water sector as being state-run, and everything is in the hands of the 
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government. Previously, the case was that the ministers would reserve water 
projects in their constituency. They did not bother about the availability of water 
or feasibility of the project but just sanctioned it. Now with the MWRRA, the 
political interference will be kept in check. The Regulator will do it in the perfect 
way and the institution will evolve (KI02). 
 
Thus for the Bank, the setting up of the independent regulator was the ‘first step’ 
in water regulation in Maharashtra. Regulation served various functions: it 
depoliticised decision making and “kept the adhocism of politicians and state” out 
of the water ‘business’. It also transformed farmers into water users who were 
tied to the water service agency through the Regulator to ensure efficient pricing 
of water. Extolling the benefits of independent regulation, the Bank official 
explained that: 
Independent regulation is the efficient way to determine water pricing because it 
will be done on a scientific basis (what is the cost of providing that water and who 
pays that cost, of course). We have to know it independently. We have to come 
away from the idea of ‘giving water for free’ (KI02). 
 
This resonates with the economic framing of regulation explained through 
efficiency, depoliticised decision making and, above all, ensuring the economic 
value of water. However, this framing also had the ‘dangerous potential’ to move 
water into the domain of the technical; it scientised water pricing and allocation 
and rationalised it through the arguments of efficiency. Regulation therefore 
assumed a degree of insularity from the unscientific qua ‘political’ aspects of 
water allocation and pricing. Thus the narrative that emerged was that the 
inefficient and bulky state apparatus and excessive political interference were 
significantly responsible for the poor performance of the water sector, and the 
solution thus lay in restructuring the state apparatus, both political and 
bureaucratic. The question that was yet to be addressed was how the networks of 
power embedded in the State would be displaced by this managerial overhauling. 
I analyse this further in forthcoming chapters.  
 
While regulation entered the reform lexicon as part of institutional restructuring, 
its success was associated with a larger reform package, which also rested on 
certain models. Inherent in using these models as “blueprints of success” (Molle, 
2008: 146) were the dangers of universalising the recipe for success, on one hand, 
and circumventing the discussions on institutional complexity and the demands of 
the political economy, on the other. 
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Models as Messiahs: the Andhra and Orissa models  
The Bank’s documents, which are inadvertently self-referential (Molle, 2008; 
Asthana, 2009), prescribed institutional restructuring of the Indian water sector 
through certain models: the Andhra Pradesh model for Irrigation Management 
Transfer and the Orissa model for power sector reforms. The Andhra model was 
in turn modelled on international examples such as Mexico, Chile, and Turkey, 
which are celebrated as ‘best practice’ cases of irrigation management in the 
resource database of the Bank. In these examples, irrigation systems were handed 
over to the water users to achieve financial viability in the irrigation sector. 
(Gorriz et al., 1995; Saleth and Dinar, 1999; World Bank, 2004). These models 
served two purposes: they were seen as risk minimisers because they came with a 
belief that what was successful elsewhere should be successful in India; more 
significantly, they provided “a stabilised interpretation of the origin, organisation 
and outcomes of a policy” (Rap, 2006: 1304) by outlining a clear roadmap for the 
transfer of management and its (presumed) success. 
  
As I mentioned before, the south Indian state of Andhra Pradesh was the first 
state to take up the massive overhauling of its irrigation sector under the aegis of 
the Bank project. In 1996-97, under the leadership of its CEO, Chief Minister 
Chandrababu Naidu, Andhra Pradesh introduced the Andhra Pradesh Farmers’ 
Management of Irrigation Systems Act (1997) to reform its canal irrigation 
system. This required the establishment of WUAs across the state, which now 
took up the distribution, maintenance and management of the system (Mollinga et 
al., 2004). This process attracted substantial national and international attention, 
and is a role model for the formation of WUAs in the country. This model was 
part of a comprehensive restructuring package from the Bank, in which it sought 
to develop ‘an Indian model’ on the lines of Mexico and Turkey (World Bank, 
1998a). 
 
The Andhra model became an icon of the Bank’s Irrigation Management Transfer 
(IMT) effort in the country (World Bank, 1998a; World Bank, 2002). Through 
this process, the Bank achieved two of its water managerialism goals: one, the 
restructuring of irrigation bureaucracy as a service provider, i.e. the water 
services agency, and two, the unbundling of distribution services to a non-state 
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actor, i.e. the WUAs, who equate to private actors in the Bank’s vocabulary 
(World Bank, 2002). This model created a successful image of consumer 
formation for the ‘reformists’ and also held some incipient roots of a pricing 
structure.  
 
Under this reform package, the Water Charges Review Committee (WCRC) was 
established to ensure and work towards the financial viability of the irrigation 
sector. The main functions of this Committee were to undertake a review of 
financial performance, guide the transition to collection of water charges by 
WUAs and irrigation department, and manage the transition to volumetric 
charges. It was the first attempt in the Indian water sector to introduce a 
‘separate’ body for reviewing water charges. However the 1998 World Bank 
Review noted that the WCRC did not have: 
 the desired level of autonomy to set water rates, but [it did] provide expert input 
to the process […]future steps of evolution should include : Granting the WCRC 
full autonomy to set water charges; ‘vesting the WCRC with regulatory authority 
over the irrigation sector; and the continued decentralization and privatization of 
the sector[…]this process is not new to India , and is being successfully initiated 
for the power sector in the state of Orissa (World Bank, 1998a: 88). 
 
Thus, for the Bank, the ideal version of the WCRC was a facilitator of both 
privatisation and decentralisation in the irrigation sector. Under this sector-wide 
restructuring, the Andhra Pradesh Water Resources Development Corporation 
was also set up. The Corporation was given the responsibility managing and 
coordinating the water resources of the state (see Madhav, 2007). The functions 
outlined for this body bear a striking similarity with the Maharashtra model but 
unlike Maharashtra, the corporation was not envisaged as an ‘independent body’ 
and was state-led (KI03) since it consisted of elected representatives from the 
government. 
 
There was yet another model which clearly influenced this rationale and 
mimicking of regulation in the water sector: the Orissa model of power reforms. 
Orissa was the first state to experiment with an independent power sector 
regulator in 1996, the Orissa Electricity Regulatory Commission. The regulator 
was construed as an autonomous body, and was required to set tariffs, issue 
licenses to private distributors, set standards of service delivery and settle 
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disputes between the provider(s) and consumers. The Orissa model underlined the 
‘distanced role of the State’, where the power sector was open to private operators 
and service contracts were required to monitor standards (PPIAF, 2002). It 
demonstrated a method for “achieving sectoral restructuring, corporatization, 
commercialisation, privatization, competition, tariff rationilization, and 
autonomous regulation” which, according to the Bank, were to be the new rules 
of the game for water regulation in the irrigation sector (World Bank, 1998a: 90). 
Two fundamental issues emerged from this model-building exercise: first, the 
creation of consumers through WUAs which, as private entities, are the bulk 
water providers (the Andhra model); second, the need as a matter of principle for 
maintaining the autonomy of a body that sets tariffs and issued licenses (Andhra 
and Orissa models).  
 
This proliferation of models as success mantras has been persistently questioned. 
Doubts remain as to whether the transformation promised in Mexico or Andhra 
models have been translated into reality (Jairath, 2001; Mollinga and Bolding, 
2004; Rap et al., 2004; Rap, 2006; Madhav, 2007), and also over the autonomy 
and sustainability of the Orissa model of power reforms (Dixit et al., 1998). 
However, as failure of development projects becomes the justification for more 
development in Ferguson’s view (see 1990), models have also become the 
justification for more models despite their limitations. 
 
Reverberations of the Andhra model are fairly visible even in the MWSIP 
package. In my interview with the Bank official, he reiterated that the Bank, in 
Maharashtra, “was not doing PIM but Irrigation Management Transfer” (KI02). 
This clarification also underlines the Bank’s vision, which lays emphasis on 
transfer of responsibilities. At the heart of PIM (Participatory Irrigation 
Management) is the argument that user participation will lead to sustainable 
management of resources. IMT uses similar logic but extends it further to the 
transfer of responsibilities. The farmers are transformed into consumers and state 
departments operate as a water service agency, and this relationship is monitored 
through a regulator. This is also in line with the neoliberal thinking which 
emphasises shifting of responsibilities from government to non-state actors. It is 
for this reason that, in Maharashtra, MWSIP consists of a package of three reform 
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legislations: the MWRRA for the independent regulator, the MMISFA for the 
WUAs, and legislation for the River Basin Agencies (RBAs)
42
. These constitute 
the regulatory framework in the state. The interlinkages of the MWRRA and the 
MMISFA were explained as follows by a senior official who was involved with 
Cabinet level discussions on these two Acts: 
The decision makers [in Maharashtra] were familiar with the ills of department 
monopoly. One of the proposals was to pass on the distribution to the WUAs. If 
you had the Water Users Act without the regulator, it would be difficult to 
implement it because no department is ready to give up power, so the WRD would 
have made things more difficult to give up power (KI23). 
 
Here, the regulator is understood as a body ‘outside the Department’ and one that 
regulates the relationship between the users and the Department. In doing so, the 
regulator is required to check the powers of the Department. This is also 
consistent with the Bank’s framing of rescaling the State. These models outlined 
the roadmap for institutional restructuring, but pricing and cost recovery also 
required economic incentives. These were also crucial in mitigating the effects of 
the intersectoral competition that plagued the water sector and in developing 
synergies for allocation of water (Saleth 2007). The solution lay in voluntary 
transfers with clearly defined entitlements. Therefore what were known as 
licenses for power and telecom utilities now became entitlements in the water 
sector. 
Entitlements as economic instruments 
In India, entitlements came into the reform lexicon through the MWSIP 
programme and they formed a critical part of the Bank’s prescription for reforms. 
The 1998 review underlined that through legally enforceable water rights, states 
would provide users with protection, encourage water saving, and facilitate intra- 
and inter-sectoral transfers of water. This does not mean that India did not already 
have a system of water rights. Rights of prior appropriation (first come, first 
served), riparian rights (allocation based on proximity of flows) and systems of 
public allocations via public authorities, common pool rights and individual rights 
to groundwater are very much a part of the trajectory of how water is distributed 
and governed in India (Singh, 1992; Vaidyanathan and Jairaj, 2009; Woodhouse 
and Chhotray, n.d.). 
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 However, this Act had not been passed as at the completion of my fieldwork in October 2012. 
The MWSIP project was closed in March 2014. 
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However, in the context of reforms, entitlements have different connotations. 
Unlike the other rights, these rights could now be delinked from land ownership. 
Dominant models for this thinking were Chile, Mexico and Australia, where 
water rights systems existed and had paved the way for water markets (Rosegrant 
and Binswanger, 1994; Gazmuri and Rosegrant, 1996; World Bank, 1998a; 
Briscoe and Malik, 2006; Briscoe and Malik, 2007; Saleth, 2007). When I asked a 
senior bureaucrat in Maharashtra about the origin of entitlements, he immediately 
replied that “it is the Bank’s idea and they got it from Chile and Australia” 
(KI26). In India, the nomenclature of entitlements only came into the picture with 
the articulation of the MWSIP. Here they were defined as use rights to water, to 
be measured volumetrically (Government of Maharashtra, 2005a). For Briscoe  
and Malik (2005), the justification for entitlements was premised on the limited 
availability of water. He argued: 
Confronted with limited availability of water, India needs to promote efficient use 
of the resource and facilitate voluntary transfer of water in response to changing 
societal needs. Clear, enforceable water entitlements at all levels are an obvious 
prerequisite (Briscoe and Malik, 2007: 5). 
Inherent in this framing is a market-based logic whereby these entitlements can 
be traded in a free market with the understanding that such market-based 
allocations and re-allocations would eventually gravitate to the highest value 
uses. Prof. R.M Saleth (2007), a key advocate for market-based instruments in 
water management, argues that entitlements will also help in shaping the 
behaviour of the consumers and the service providers, whereby standards will be 
enforced by an autonomous agency as the regulator and users will be mindful of 
putting water to efficient use and avoiding wastage.  
The Bank’s strongest defence came with the example of Chennai Metrowater. 
Here the urban municipal provider, in the wake of a water shortage, was able to 
buy groundwater from paddy farmers in the surrounding areas and thus secure the 
water supply for the urban population of the city. This was a compelling rationale 
for advocating a regulatory framework for a water exchange regime operating on 
the principles of open market (World Bank, 1998c; World Bank, 2002; Saleth, 
2007) 
43. Since intersectoral conflicts and the ‘perceived sense of scarcity’ were at 
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 For details of the case and a critical review, see Coelho (2010). 
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the heart of this economic formulation of rights, sectoral allocation via a third 
party was central to this framing of regulation as water market transactions also 
required a role for public institution performance to guard against monopoly 
development and resolve conflicts among the users (Rosegrant and Binswanger, 
1994). 
Calculated on a volumetric basis, entitlements, in principle, were the answer to 
the adhocism and political interference in the water sector (KI02) and an 
instrument to stimulate efficiency and accountability in this sector (Briscoe and 
Malik, 2007). As the Bank official explained: 
The intention behind entitlements is to ensure transparency and get rid of 
adhocism in decision making, which will also bring in water efficiency. We need 
to quantify somewhere and plan in advance and quantification brings in 
efficiency. Equity within entitlements means that everyone must get a share and in 
order to get their share, they must know what their share is and they should be 
able to get it. And this decision should be taken independently on the basis of 
water availability and the project planned availability. 
 
This intention reflects how the World Bank conceptualised entitlements as a tool 
of regulation premised on the language of efficiency and quantified in terms of 
volumetric supply. In its framing, the Bank also successfully transformed a 
potentially explosive question about rights, entitlements, how one should use 
water, and who should decide, into ‘technical questions’ of efficiency and 
sustainability (Li, 2007). This understanding also circumvents questions on issues 
of customary rights (Roth et al., 2005), resource capture (Bauer, 1997) and state 
control (Rap et al., 2004; Movik, 2012) that have continued to recur in the 
implementation of water rights in other parts of the world. 
Regulation therefore emerged as a congruence of different sets of rationalities, 
explored and experimented with in different contexts and in different sectors. 
Moreover, in the Bank’s understanding, independent regulation is the framework 
which defines and revises the relationships between three actors: the State 
(political and bureaucratic), water users and the regulator. Besides constructing 
and universalising success through models, there are several assumptions in this 
prescriptive line of thought: one, water is an economic good and needs to be 
priced for its scarcity value; two, rights can be decontextualised and need to be 
understood through an economic logic (Narsalay, 2003; Roth et al., 2005): three, 
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non-state - i.e. private sector - is more efficient than the public sector and would 
thus be able to provide better services at reduced cost. The prices could be set 
through apolitical ways so that they would reflect the scarcity value of water. 
Feeling this water constraint will ‘compel’ users to be less wasteful (Saleth, 
1998). These are the fundamental assumptions that drew the boundaries of 
‘independent’ regulation in the Bank’s discourse, where questions of power 
relations are necessarily absent.  
After the introduction of the independent regulator in Maharashtra in 2005, 
several water regulators were set up at the state level, some at the behest of the 
restructuring programmes of the World Bank (Uttar Pradesh and Andhra 
Pradesh). By 2009, this regulatory fever also caught up with other Indian states 
when the Finance Commission laid down the condition of constituting 
independent regulators before state governments could access grants from the 
centre. This signalled the mainstreaming of the regulation discourse at the 
national level, only to be intensified by two exercises: the setting up of the Water 
Group by the Planning Commission, and the discussions on the 2012 National 
Water Policy. This phase also constitutes the third phase of regulation in the 
country. I now turn to these national-level actors and analyse their politics of 
framing water regulation.  
4.4 Re-claiming the ground: the ‘national’ project of water 
regulation  
After nearly fifteen years of economic reforms that led to sector-wide 
restructuring in India since the 1990s, several kinds and types of regulators 
emerged in the Indian institutional landscape (Government of India, 2006). 
However, regulation entering by the backdoor through donors (Dubash, 2013) led 
to a widespread concern over the haphazard growth of sectoral regulators. The 
Planning Commission took the lead in generating a discussion on the regulatory 
philosophy in India. This was also the time when Mr. Montek Singh Ahluwalia 
took over as the Deputy Chairman of the Planning Commission in 2004. An 
Oxford graduate, and an economist by training, Mr. Ahluwalia had held several 
key advisory positions in the Indian government and in international financial 
institutions such as the World Bank and the IMF before he took over this 
position. Part of the ‘Change Team’ which ushered India into its first phase of 
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liberalisation (Asthana, 2009), Mr. Ahluwalia played a key role in driving 
reforms within the economy on market principles. 
In 2006, the Planning Commission published The Approach Paper to Regulation. 
This paper was a comprehensive review of the evolution of regulation in several 
infrastructure sectors. It also underlined the conspicuous absence of any single 
philosophy of regulation in India (Government of India, 2006). Though this paper 
started a dialogue on infrastructure regulation in India, water did not feature 
prominently. Going with this momentum, the Planning Commission released the 
2010 (Draft) Bill on regulation, as a follow-up to the 2006 paper. This Draft Bill 
underlined the need to for a uniform regulatory philosophy for the utility sectors 
(Mehta, 2010). However this discussion was limited to economic regulation, 
designed to serve the interests of private investment, enhance competition and 
ensure consumer protection (CUTS International, 2010).  
Though the 2010 Draft Bill made specific mention of social sectors, this 
discussion was limited to water supply only (The Economic Times, 2010; The 
Hindu, 2010). This Draft Bill reiterated the position on the retreat of the State, 
whereby the need for such an initiative arose because economic liberalisation has 
distanced the relationship between the state ownership and the responsibility for 
providing infrastructure services, as compared to the earlier arrangement where 
infrastructure was provided almost exclusively by the public sector (Government 
of India, 2010c; The Economic Times, 2010). Despite the peripherality of water 
in the 2010 discussions, it signalled two important things: one, the increasing 
salience of regulation premised on the understanding of the ‘distanced role’ of the 
State; and two, the need to make the ‘northern’ models of regulation relevant to 
the Indian context. This sentiment was further entrenched with the euphoria of 
water regulation that emerged at the national level with the publication of the 13
th
 
Finance Commission Report in 2009
44
. 
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 The Planning Commission, in its mid-term appraisals, for the 10th and 11th Five Year Plans had 
acknowledged  that water resources regulatory authority could be envisaged , which could draw 
on the strengths and weaknesses of the MWRRA model (Koonan and Bhullar, 2012). But it is 
with the grant conditionalities laid down by the Finance Commission together with the 
constitution of the Working Groups for the Twelfth Plan (2009-2012) that this mainstreaming has 
received a concrete and strong push. 
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4.4.1 Nationalising the Maharashtra regulator: The Finance and 
Planning Commission 
The 13th Finance Commission (2010-2015) laid down the important criteria for 
grants in the water sector. Setting conditions for grants-in-aid in the irrigation 
sector, the report mentions that the only states that would be incentivised were 
those that would establish an independent water regulatory authority for the water 
sector. This Report also noted that “the surface irrigation sector is in need of 
urgent policy correction” (Government of India, 2009: 212) due to poor 
maintenance of irrigation systems, low recovery of user charges, and overstaffed 
departments which result in poor service delivery. The Finance Commission 
repertoire is no different from the Bank’s mandate of reforming the ailing state-
led sector which is trapped in a vicious cycle of inadequate financial allocations 
(World Bank, 1998b; World Bank, 2002). For the Commission, therefore, an 
independent regulatory authority staffed with qualified technical experts may help 
to improve the sectoral performance by aiding cost recovery. The report 
mentions: 
Since so many of the problems in this sector stem from lack of systematic 
attention by technically qualified people to the issue of the structure and level of 
user charges, the grant provision is conditional on setting up by states of an 
independent Water Regulatory Authority by 2011-12 (Government of India, 2009: 
212). 
 
This is in line with the Bank’s framing of water regulation, which underlines the 
need to “scientifically” (KI02) price water. It also reinforces the simple narrative 
of cost recovery leading to better efficiency, and that such an exercise is a 
preserve of experts – a reasoning also offered by the Bank. The regulator would 
be able to price water efficiently and apolitically, and also rescue an ailing water 
sector in the midst of low cost recovery.  
 
By placing conditions on grants, the Commission mainstreamed the discourse on 
water regulation in India at the national level. Until this point, water regulation 
had come under the rubric of infrastructure regulation but had lacked any 
substantive discussion. It was the first time that the need for water regulation was 
expressed via a government body at the national level. The report also signalled 
the interest of the central government in flagging up independent water regulation 
as a key area of water policy concern, not only favouring the independent 
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regulatory model in Maharashtra, but also laying the foundations for its state-
wide emulation. The report notes: 
The Maharashtra Water Resources Regulatory Authority set up in 2005 serves as 
a possible model for consideration by other states. It is expected that an 
independent body of this kind would incentivise water user associations that 
would self-regulate the use of water among members and decentralise 
maintenance of water bodies, with funding locally recovered from users, so 
improving compliance with cos recovery (Government of India, 2009: 212). 
 
By falling into line with the Maharashtra model, the Commission’s 
recommendations overlapped with regulatory functions restricted to the irrigation 
sector. The regulator was also to be a facilitator for decentralisation of water 
distribution to aid cost recovery. The regulator would be able to determine and 
regulate water tariffs for all uses, determine and regulate distribution of 
entitlements, and periodically monitor and review costs and revenue in the water 
sector (Government of India, 2009). The report also made it mandatory that the 
establishment of regulatory authority should be notified by March 2012. The state 
of Jammu & Kashmir was the first to pass a law related to water resources 
regulation following this report (Prayas, 2011). 
However these developments which affirmed the evolving Maharashtra ‘model’ 
were resisted by several civil society organisations who since 2003 had been 
critiquing the Maharashtra model as a neoliberal import. In recent years, several 
sections of civil society, including NGOs, independent researchers and 
academics, have from time to time organised roundtables and consultations to 
discuss the emergence and evolution of water regulation in the Indian context. 
The aim of these endeavours is to generate valuable discussion and debate on the 
nature of this institutional import, and to raise public awareness (CTARA et al., 
2009).  
Critical of the Maharashtra model as a neoliberal and World Bank import, the 
Finance Commission conditions meant a potential vindication of the neoliberal 
version of water regulation. The civil society actors got an opportunity to present 
their mandate when Dr. Mihir Shah, a serving member of the Planning 
Commission (2009-2014), proposed the idea of drafting a model regulatory bill, 
which could then provide a guiding framework for the states. Dr. Shah, an 
economist and academic with over twenty years of experience in grassroots 
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initiaves, brought to the Planning Commission a different style of working. In 
charge of the water resources portfolio for the Twelfth Plan (2012-2017), he 
brought together several working groups to work on the water sector. Underlining 
that the “business as usual” (Shah, 2012: 42) approach to water management 
might not work in the face of water stress and the limits that it places on the 
development of water resources, the Water Group was entrusted with bringing to 
the table fresh ideas about water management in India.  
The unique feature of these groups was that for the first time in the history of the 
Planning Commission, groups were chaired by experts from outside of the 
government, i.e. non-bureaucrats (Shah, 2012). This also meant the entry of 
several actors from civil society. I now show how this group attempted to reshape 
the ‘mainstream’ thinking on independent regulation at the national level.  
4.4.2 The Sub-Group on Water Regulation: getting the ‘experts’ 
together 
In April 2011, a national consultation entitled Water Regulatory Authorities in 
India: Rethinking the Current Models was organised by Prayas, TISS and Indian 
Institute of Technology (Mumbai). Organised against the backdrop of the Finance 
Commission’s conditional grants, the key aim of this consultation was to discuss 
the nature of regulation in the Indian context. Another aim was the constitution of 
the Sub-Group on water regulation (henceforth the Sub-Group), which was 
entrusted with the responsibility for suggesting a “blueprint for the better 
functioning of Water Resource Regulatory Authorities in India” (Prayas, 2011: 
2).  
With Maharashtra being the only state with a working regulator, the Consultation 
took the MWRRA as the reference point for discussion. Invited to ‘observe’ the 
discussion, I noticed that this consultation created several dichotomies in the 
epistemic community on regulation in India. While it attracted academics, 
practioners and bureaucrats from across the country, the gathering was marked by 
bureaucrats being under-represented and civil society over-represented. In the 
majority were the members from Maharashtra-based organisations such as Prayas 
and SOPPECOM which work in the water sector, Shripad Dharmadhikary from 
MANTHAN, an ardent critic of the World Bank approach in the water sector, 
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Mrs. Rohini Nilekani, Chairperson of Arghyam, a Bangalore-based philanthropic 
organisation working in the water sector. It also included several academics such 
as Dr. Navroz Dubash, a policy intellectual with expertise on infrastructure 
regulation, and Prof. Philippe Cullet from SOAS who has worked on water law 
reforms in India. Some of the participants in this consultation were later dispersed 
across the several working groups coordinated via the Twelfth Plan.  
The Sub-Group on the Model Bill for State Water Regulatory Authority Act was 
also constituted alongside this Consultation. This group was chaired by a 
Professor from Tata Institute of Social Sciences (TISS), associated with the non-
profit organisation, Prayas. Prayas works in the area of electricity regulation and 
has begun to focus on water sector regulation in recent years. For the 
Chairperson, this group was an opportunity: a potential way to block the World 
Bank approach to regulation from entering the national framework. In a public 
seminar organised at the Institute of Development Studies (UK), he stated: 
The Planning Commission approached us and we said that we do not subscribe to 
the idea of a model bill. There is huge diversity in India, and there is no point in 
trying to thrust something on the states because water is the issue of the autonomy 
of the states. In the federal system of India, water resources are a matter of state 
policy. They threatened us and said that they will get the World Bank to do this. 
This went on for some time and later they said that okay, we will give it to the 
World Bank persons and they might bring down the same model against which 
you have been fighting for the last ten years (December 2011).  
 
Thus, alongside the donors who had ‘programmed’ the regulatory model into the 
Indian water sector, this group virtually became the main group for providing an 
alternative discourse on regulation in the country. The distinction was made clear 
at the start as the proposed Bill used the term ‘Water Regulatory Authority 
(WRA)’ instead of ‘independent water regulator’. The Background Note from 
Prayas explains this: “WRA encompasses various forms of regulatory agencies 
[…] that could be established in the water sector, ranging from a fully 
independent regulatory authority to advisory level regulatory agencies” (Prayas, 
2011: 1). 
According to Dr. Dubash, one of the unique features of this group was that it 
brought “practioners, policy makers and scholars from diverse groups into one 
single room” (KI06). Though this was a remarkable feature as far as the 
constitution of the group was concerned (Shah, 2012), this selection also sowed 
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the seeds of discord between the officials and the civil society. The MWRRA 
officials, some of whom were members of this group, saw it as a direct assault on 
their own institutional processes (K121, KI23) - a critique of their model. 
Moreover, the fact that the group had a substantial number of members from civil 
society organisations such as Prayas and SOPPECOM, one of whom was even 
the Chairperson, was a sore point for government officials. This tussle between 
the ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’ was echoed in several interviews with policy makers 
during my fieldwork in Mumbai. For some of the members, it was a point scored 
for civil society, but for the MWRRA officials, this group became more of a 
policy challenge than a partner. Several officials disapproved of the constitution 
of the group and the model bill, which they would eventually call ‘impractical 
and institutionally unsound’ (KI20, KI21). Explaining his annoyance, a MWRRA 
official stated that he “would try his best to get it removed from the final 
document” (KI21). 
While this Group did create friction between the civil society actors and the 
government officials, it was also internally fragmented and had dual positions on 
the conceptualisation and institutionalisation of regulation. The predominant role 
of Prayas gave rise to the perception that they controlled key issues and agendas 
(KI12, KI22) Though SOPPECOM championed the cause of devolution of the 
regulatory role, the Bill was often referred to as Prayas’ bill (Field Journal, 2011). 
Moreover, this internal fragmentation became more prominent at the state level 
where these very organisations which opposed the regulatory model at the 
national level were now working with the Regulator in the state (see Chapter 6). 
However, the group’s recommendation for WRAs now forms a part of the 
Twelfth Plan. Highlighting the need for a paradigm shift in water, the Plan 
document underlined that new frameworks were required for the water sector. 
The rationale for WRAs is explained thus: 
We need to evolve an institutional framework…that facilitates setting up of 
regulatory bodies that would enable resolution of water conflicts. To protect the 
right to drinking water for all, there is no alternative to entitlements and 
appropriate pricing of water. This demands a transparent and participatory process 
of determination of entitlements and prices. Again to ensure sustainability and 
meet environmental needs, a regulatory authority is a must in each State. Since 
water is a natural monopoly, international experience clearly indicates that it is 
regulators who provide the cutting-edge that is otherwise missing in a non-
competitive sector. Regulators have contributed to major improvements in water-
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use efficiency, water quality and provision of environmental services 
(Government of India, 2012c: 174). 
 
Therefore the Plan document provides several reasons for setting up a regulatory 
authority with a strong public interest motive. By incorporating social aspects of 
regulation, including health and water access, it continues to place heavy 
emphasis on the function of pricing determined through participatory processes 
(also see Koonan and Bhullar, 2012). It specifies that any decision on tariffs is 
ultimately a political one, where the regulator plays an advisory role
45
. It resolves 
the issue of autonomy of the regulator by putting political and normative 
decisions under the State Water Resources Regulatory and Development Council 
(SC), which will consist of elected representatives from government bodies as the 
legislature and stakeholders from other sections of the society. This Council will 
review the work of State Independent Water Expert Authority (SIWEA). The 
SIWEA, on the other hand, will be a body staffed with ‘independent’ 
professionals from diverse disciplinary fields and will make the technical or 
predominantly non-normative decisions which include preparing regulations, and 
enforcing compliance with the guidelines and rules of regulation. Through the 
principle of subsidiarity, the Plan also suggests a regional presence for the 
regulator at state, river-basin, sub-basin and local level (Government of India, 
2011).  
The Planning Commission’s initiative thus culminated in a rethinking of the 
regulatory framework for the Indian water sector. It attempted, to an extent, to 
provide a different version to the World Bank model in two key ways. One: it 
tries to replace the model of regulatory ‘independence’ with a framework for 
political accountability and legitimacy, calling it “water regulatory systems”. 
This, as the working group member put it, was to “incentivise various 
sections/actors in order to make the regulatory framework work” (KI06). Two: it 
opposed a centralised regulator (such as the MWRRA) in favour of a 
decentralised regulatory system with a regional presence. As much as it sought to 
delink itself from the top-down model of the Maharashtra model, it also created a 
set of binaries in the process. It retained the division between the political and 
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 It lists several other areas of regulation: water use and extraction, service provision, 
environmental sustainability, disaster management, climate change, allocation of financial and 
other resources, etc. (see Government of India, 2012c). 
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technical decisions across the two bodies, the SC and the SIWEA. This reinforces 
the argument that a regulatory authority, whether autonomous or independent, is 
still constituted as a ‘body of experts’. 
Nevertheless, this Bill and the accompanying exercises that went into its 
preparations have further mainstreamed regulation into the national discourse. 
This initiative also indicated the government’s stand that there is no going back 
on regulation which is ‘independent’ or autonomous in some other form. This is 
further ratified by the 2012 National Water Policy, which also mentions the need 
for an ‘independent’ regulatory authority. 
4.4.3 The National Water Policy 2012 
As the Planning Commission prepared the model Bill, a new National Water 
Policy (NWP) was being drafted by Ministry of Water Resources (MoWR). The 
2012 NWP Policy is in line with the 2002 water policy, which made the shift 
from t the service provider to the regulatory role of the State. This policy also 
recommends the formation of an independent regulatory authority whose chief 
function is to set tariffs. It states: 
Pricing of water should ensure its efficient use and reward conservation. Equitable 
access to water for all and its fair pricing, for drinking and other uses such as 
sanitation, agricultural and industrial, should be arrived at through an independent 
statutory Water Regulatory Authority, set up by each state, after wide ranging 
consultation with all stakeholders (Section 7.1, Government of India, 2012b) . 
 
Following the policy, MoWR also constituted a group to prepare the national 
framework law, which also recommends the constitution of an ‘independent’ 
Water Regulatory Authority for every state as an institutional mechanism to 
determine ‘equitable’ pricing. Thus it does not digress from the economic and 
price setting role of the regulator: it merely elaborates some of the principles on 
which this role could be based. It provides three principles for the constitution 
and operation of such a mechanism: 1) the authority will ensure equitable access 
to water for all and its fair pricing for all its uses; 2) the decisions of the 
regulatory authority will be subject to judicial review; and 3) water charges will 
be determined on a volumetric basis. While it recommends differential pricing for 
fundamental needs such as drinking and sanitation, it also underlines the need to 
subject the allocation of pricing to economic principles to ensure efficient use 
(Government of India, 2013). Up to May 2013, the latest document from the 
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central government was the framework law, which underlined the need for a 
regulator for the water sector. The NWP 2012 and the national framework law 
define MOWR’s position on regulation. It provides the rationale for regulation as 
a pricing framework, and places less emphasis on institutionalisation as in the 
Model Bill of the Planning Commission. Unlike the Model Bill, which proposes 
to balance the autonomy of the regulator with political legitimacy, the framework 
law recommends a third party judicial review of the regulator’s decisions. 
It is evident from this section that these three central bodies have chosen to adopt 
the language of regulation defined through regulators even though their entry 
points have differed from each other. The Finance Commission has adopted and 
backed the all-in-one Maharashtra model, a managerial regulator for ensuring 
cost recovery from the WUAs and ensuring the commercial viability of irrigation. 
The Planning Commission, on the other hand, has tried to provide an alternative 
to the World Bank model by emphasising issues of institutional accountability 
and including various other aspects within the scope of regulation besides tariffs 
and entitlements. The MOWR framing has taken a middle ground between these 
two positions by placing a strong emphasis on the tariff role of the regulator. 
While the Finance Commission and the MoWR limit their frames of reference to 
the irrigation sector, the Water Group has tried to expand the scope of regulation 
by including various other functions such as environment sustainability, climate 
change etc. All of them have chosen not to use the language of tradable 
entitlements, an idea that is central to the Bank’s conception of regulation. As 
regulation becomes increasingly mainstreamed into the national discourse, 
fundamental disputes are no longer about resistance to ‘expert-led regulation’ per 
se, but about its role and mandate in the water sector, and how to make them 
accountable in a democratic and federal framework.  
4.5 Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have argued that reform-led discourse of water regulation 
emerged in a particular context of policy and institutional congruence at the 
national level when the emerging global consensus on water coincided with the 
macro shifts that occurred following the post-1990s crises. With the rise of states 
as economic entities, the donors were able to use their financial strength to act as 
key purveyors for water reform in the states. The 1990 crisis also acted as a 
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catalyst for reforming several key public sector areas, but the first phase of roll 
out comprised only the core sectors such as banking, insurance, 
telecommunications and electricity. I argued that this rolling out created the 
ideational environment for concepts such as regulation, entry of non-state actors 
and private ownership rights to embed themselves in the policy and reform 
culture in India post the 1990s. The role of the State needed at that point to 
change from service provider to that of a facilitator. Therefore the need for 
‘independent regulation’ emerged in the context of this changed role of the State. 
I then traced the origins of independent regulation to the 1998 World Bank 
Review of India, which provided the momentum for the discursive shift in the 
Indian water sector. I argued that three key points define the Bank’s articulation 
of regulation: the failure of the State water apparatus, diffusion of models, and the 
need for entitlements for water pricing and allocation. Regulation therefore 
emerged as part of a water reform package and is intimately tied to other 
institutional instruments, which came along with the need for an independent 
regulator. Therefore independent regulation is deeply entrenched in the ideology 
of roll-out neoliberalism and is a framework for restructuring the State-led water 
apparatus. This discourse of water regulation became further embedded in the 
water policy discourse of the country in its third phase. Here I focused on the 
three national bodies that have mainstreamed regulation through grant conditions 
(Finance Commission), plan proposals (Planning Commission) and policy 
frameworks (MoWR). This is also a vindication of the argument that expert-led 
regulation is becoming embedded in Indian water policy discourse. 
This process of evolution was marked by an interaction of discourses that do not 
necessarily emanate from the water sector. The meaning of ‘independent’ 
regulation was primarily derived from other core economic sectors, especially the 
power sector. At the national level, this meaning-making was, however, 
constrained by the effects of federalism, which put water in the domain of the 
states. This also meant a greater role for donors than for the national bodies in 
defining the role and rationale for independent regulation. For the water sector, 
the national discourse of regulation, especially in its third phase, is more a 
refraction of the Maharashtra model than vice-versa. While the Finance 
Commission made Maharashtra’s MWRRA into a model, the Sub-Group has 
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tried to address some of the limitations of this very model, grounding it in the 
federal and democratic framework. Moreover there is still a great deal of 
ambiguity about what regulation constitutes and how it needs to be 
institutionalised; the roadmap is unclear in the national discourse, mostly for the 
state specific nature of this sector. Despite the alternative proposed by the Water 
Group, regulation is constructed in the language of pricing and cost recovery with 
limited emphasis on questions of access and equity.  
There are three broad framings of regulation that can be derived from this 
chapter. First is the World Bank idea of regulation, which is essentially situated at 
the intersection of the retreat of the State, private sector participation and the need 
to have an independent regulator to ensure credible commitment to investors and 
private sector participation. This framing is adopted in the national water policy, 
the 2006 Approach Paper of the Planning Commission’s 2010 Draft Regulatory 
Bill. Independent regulation, therefore, is seen as an important constituent for 
private sector participation and investment. Second in the specific context of the 
water sector, the Finance Commission and the MoWR have advocated an 
irrigation sector regulator with prime responsibilities of setting tariffs and 
ensuring cost recovery. Regulation therefore forms a key element of their pricing 
reforms, but not explicitly through private sector participation in this sector. 
Third, the Sub-Group provides a more holistic perspective on regulation, and 
grounds regulation in the framework of accountability. Devising checks on the 
regulatory body through the body of elected representatives (SC) also signals the 
need to ground legislation in a democratic framework, a key point in the 
evolution of the regulatory framework in the Indian water sector in its current 
phase.  
However these three framings have not displaced the expert-led character of 
regulation. The Bank and the Finance Commission make explicit the need for 
‘technical experts’ for water regulation, who have the knowledge to determine 
prices in a ‘scientific way’. The Water Governance group has tried to tone down 
this expert-led discourse through arguments of participatory processes and 
democratic oversight, but does not overrule the technical nature of water 
regulation. Here too regulation is rationalised through arguments of appropriate 
pricing, which needs to be ‘apolitical’ and scientifically done. Regulation is 
97 
 
therefore equated more with pricing and incentive structures, and less with 
aspects of social regulation i.e. access and equity. 
It is this economic view of regulation, emanating from the neoliberal logic of 
public sector management, stressed and pushed for emphatically in the World 
Bank’s approach that has made its way into the Maharashtra water sector. The 
next chapter provides the context for water reforms in Maharshtra and begins to 
draw the regulatory space in the water sector. It highlights the plurality of 
regulation(s) that might exist in the working of the water sector owing to its 
social, political and historical context. It is followed by chapters that outline how 
this reform-led regulation is translated in Maharashtra. 
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5. The Nested Context of Maharashtra: Irrigation and Development 
 
Maharashtra is not an irrigation state! It is strange that most of the reforms in the 
water sector are happening in a state with the lowest irrigation potential in the 
country. 
Member MWRRA, Mumbai  (January, 2012) 
 
Introduction  
My discussions with several policy officials in Mumbai underlined the urgent 
need to optimise the use of water resources in Maharashtra. The fact that 
Maharashtra has the lowest irrigation potential in the country was most often the 
strongest defence lined up in favour of the reforms. With an irrigation potential of 
17.9 percent, as against the national average of 49 percent (Government of 
Maharashtra, 2012; Dandekar and Naravade, 2013), harnessing water resources is 
at the heart of water infrastructure development in Maharashtra. Since a large part 
of Maharashtra comes into the rain shadow belt, droughts
46
 have not only been a 
recurring feature of its geography, but also the strongest drivers for the state-led 
irrigation projects in this state.
47
 This state also enjoys the reputation of having 
the largest number of dams
48
 in the country. While irrigation is scarce, the state 
for a long period has supported (and encouraged) the cultivation of water-
intensive sugarcane, much of which grows in the semi-arid region of Western 
Maharashtra. This pattern is sustained by a complex history and politics of 
agrarian transformation, regional development and politics of the state. 
 
In the previous chapter, I highlighted how water regulation reform is essentially 
about the irrigation sector. In this chapter, I build the context for studying water 
regulation reforms in Maharashtra. After giving a brief background of the state of 
Maharashtra (Section 5.1), I turn to the sugarcane belt of Western Maharashtra 
                                                          
46
 Droughts can be distinguished as famines (occurring in the periods before independence), 
sustained periods of scarce rainfall (biophysical aspects due to the nature of geography) and social 
distribution of access (governance structures and power politics). Increasingly, droughts in the 
post-independence period are a combination of the last two aspects: scarce rainfall which is 
amplified through skewed access and social distribution of the resource. For contextual and 
political readings of scarcity in other parts of the country, see Mehta (2005) and Jairath (2003). 
47
 This is not to suggest that that there are no initiatives beyond the state-led irrigation projects. I 
discuss two of them in detail in Section 5.2.3 of this chapter.  
48
 As per the National Register of Dams, the state had 1,845 dams by the year 2009. (Dandekar 
and Naravade, 2013). 
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(Section 5.2), where the local fieldwork took place. Maharashtra has a varied 
geographical profile and it is difficult to cover the development trajectory of each 
of the regions for reasons of space and consistency. I therefore focus on Western 
Maharashtra. In this chapter, development refers to the ensemble of rationale and 
practices “to determine better life for everyone” (Peet and Hartwick, 2009: 1). 
However there are different ways in which this ‘better life’ is interpreted and it is 
a contested issue. Therefore, in this chapter, I use a broad definition of 
development, inspired by interventions from above and below to ameliorate 
conditions of the ‘subject population’. These cover the diverse rationales ranging 
from infrastructure building to socio-ecological concerns. 
In this chapter, I argue that “improvement” has not only been at the heart of 
development of water resources, but also in the subsequent proliferation of socio-
economic development in this region. By focusing on four specific interventions, 
I show how development of water resources was most often attached to disparate 
ambitions of securing colonial rule, revenue extraction (for the colonial State), 
stabilising political ambitions (postcolonial State), and challenging the status quo 
(civil society)
 49
. This is critical in understanding the translation of reforms as 
these factors impinge on how regulation is understood, interpreted and negotiated 
in contemporary times.  
5.1 The Making of Maharashtra 
The Indian State of Maharashtra has a creditable development trajectory 
(Government of Maharashtra, 2002). It is regarded as one of the frontline states 
for economic development in India, with Mumbai being the finance capital of the 
country. Maharashtra is the second largest state in terms of population and third 
largest in terms of area in India. Carved out of a linguistic imperative in May 
1960, the state of Maharashtra was created by “cobbling together”(Government 
of Maharashtra, 2002: 42) units from the present day states of Madhya Pradesh 
(Central Provinces & Berar in British India), Andhra Pradesh (the Nizamiyat of 
Hyderabad in British India); Vidarbha (Nagpur and Amravati division) belonged 
                                                          
49
 I do not intend to trace these developments in a linear fashion as some of the initiatives run 
parallel to each other, especially in the post-independence period. In Maharashtra, there are 
several other water management practices, such as the Phad system in Nasik, or the watersheds in 
Ahmadnagar, but I do not discuss them in this work because they bear no direct relation to the 
subject of this study. 
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to the Central Provinces, and Marathwada (Aurangabad) was part of the kingdom 
of Hyderabad (see figure 5.1). 
These socio-cultural units have also morphed into the six revenue divisions of 
Aurangabad, Nagpur, Amravati, Konkan, Pune and Nasik. The divisions of Pune 
and Nasik comprise the geographically contiguous and ‘developed’ belt of 
Western Maharashtra (see figure 5.1). The current study is located in the Jahot 
command area, which is situated on the border of Pune and Ahmadnagar districts. 
In this chapter, I primarily focus on Western Maharashtra for its historical 
trajectory of development and irrigation in Maharashtra. 
 
Figure 5.1: District map of Maharashtra 
(with location of the Jahot canal system)
50
 
 
Prior to independence, these states were either princely kingdoms or under the 
direct dominion of the British rule. Thus they had different administrative and 
agricultural practices
51
. While the agrarian reforms following independence were 
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 https://www.maharashtra.gov.in/1125/Home (Accessed 12/10/12). 
51
 For instance, the Konkan region had a double tenure system called khoti, while Western 
Maharashtra practised the Ryotwari system. Vidarbha, which belonged to the Central Provinces, 
and Berar had also Ryotwari alongside Malgujari systems (Lele, 1990). As for Marathwada, 
which was carved out of the Nizam of Hyderabad’s principality, it had uneven distribution of land 
marked by inequality (Government of Maharashtra, 2002). 
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introduced to address issues of inequity, land ownership and fragmentation, their 
impact varied in each of these regions (Government of Maharashtra, 2002). In 
fact, prior to 1960, three irrigation Acts were in place: the Bombay Irrigation Act 
(1879) for the Bombay Presidency; the Central Irrigation Act (1935) for Vidarbha 
(Northeast part of Maharashtra) and the Hyderabad Irrigation Act for 
Marathwada. These Acts were later replaced by the rules of Maharashtra 
Irrigation Act of 1976, which largely govern the irrigation practices in the state
52
. 
In the early years of independence, writes Kamat (1980), the economic 
development of Maharashtra was largely concentrated in the industrial hub of 
Mumbai, with political leadership divided between the urban industrial elite in 
Mumbai and the agrarian rural elite from the Maratha-Kunbi caste cluster (see 
Omvedt, 1973; Kamat, 1980; Lele, 1990). He further argues that the economic 
development of Maharashtra, excluding Mumbai, was dominated by three 
regional forces: Marathwada (Aurangabad division), Western Maharashtra (Pune 
and Nasik) and Vidarbha (Nagpur and Amravati divisions). Their conflicts 
originated in demands for “economic development but they often [had] overtones 
of socio-cultural identities” (Kamat, 1980: 1673). Prior to the formation of 
Maharashtra, there was widespread apprehension regarding the creation of a 
predominantly Marathi-speaking state from regions of Marathwada (part of 
Hyderabad) and Vidarbha. In order to allay these fears, Article 371 (2) provided 
certain special powers to the Governor to oversee the balanced development of 
these regions (see Prabhu and Sarker, 1992). 
These development feuds, to this day, simmer beneath the political and economic 
growth of Maharashtra. Even during my visit, the farmers from Vidarbha (Nagpur 
and Amravati divisions) complained of being the “step-children of Maharashtra” 
(KI37). In recent years, the mounting crises of suicides amongst cotton farmers 
has brought Vidarbha to the centre stage of uneven development in Maharashtra. 
This lopsided account of regional development is significantly intertwined with 
the politics of Maharashtra, which has divided the state into ‘us’ and ‘them’. For 
example, the Vidarbha farmers known as kastkars were quite assertive that they 
cannot be compared to “those [Western Maharashtra] farmers who are rich and 
                                                          
52
 Alongside the 1976 Act, other Acts, such as the Bombay Canal Act 1879, also provide the 
governing framework for irrigation. 
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have political support”, while the farmers in Ahmadnagar, known as shetkaris, 
would dub the other set as “lazy people who do not know the value of water” 
(Field Journal December 2011). It is interesting to see how these entrenched ideas 
and representations are naturalised and institutionalised into some of the very 
much contested decisions about water use, water conflicts and irrigation in the 
present times (Chapter 6). 
While agriculture is not a major driver of the much-celebrated economic growth 
in Maharashtra (Lele, 1990; Government of Maharashtra, 2002), it is the driving 
factor behind the political edifice of the state, which for a long time has been 
dominated by the politics of the sugar lobbies from Western and Southern 
Maharashtra (Government of Maharashtra, 2002). It is these lobbies that have 
brought to the centre stage some of the most powerful leaders in Maharashtra and 
in national politics.
53
 I now turn to this politically powerful and economically 
prosperous region of Western Maharashtra, where this study is based. 
5.2 History of Irrigation Management and Practices in Western 
Maharashtra 
Western Maharashtra comprises the administrative divisions of Pune and Nasik 
and falls in the Deccan trap area, also called the classic famine belt (Rath and 
Mitra, 1989; Attwood, 1992). Famines, and now droughts, are a central feature of 
the topography of this region. Part of the Maratha kingdom in the 18
th
 century, 
this region formed the part of the Bombay Presidency after the colonial 
annexation in 1818. The Deccan lies in the rain shadow area of the coastal 
mountains, and has an uncertain rainfall pattern. Before the late 19
th
 century, i.e. 
before the large-scale irrigation works were built, well irrigation or medium scale 
diversion networks called bandharas (temporary mud embankments across the 
river bed) were the source of irrigation in this region. Wells, which were privately 
owned, were the sole source of water and these were highly dependent on rainfall 
(Attwood, 2005). Despite the extension of irrigation networks over the years, a 
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To name a few: Vasant Patil (Chief Minister of Maharashtra 1977-78); Sharad Pawar (Chief 
Minister of Maharashtra at several points from 1978 upto early 1990s. He is also the President of 
the Nationalist Congress Party (NCP), which currently rules Maharashtra in coalition with 
Congress party); Ajit Pawar (nephew of Mr. Sharad Pawar, currently the Deputy Chief Minister of 
Maharashtra. He is also the owner of a sugar factory in Karjat taluka of the Jahot command.). Late 
Mr. Gopinath Munde (ex- Deputy Chief Minister of Maharashtra; he was a prominent politician 
of the Bharatiya Janata Party). 
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large proportion of this region is still under well irrigation even in contemporary 
times (Government of India, 1995). 
Speaking of the Ahmadnagar district (where this study is located), the Imperial 
Gazetteer (1909) notes that this district is liable to droughts, and numerous 
famines. The awful calamity of 14
th
 century called the Durga Devi famine, which 
lasted for twelve years, and the Mahadurga famine in 1640 are but a few 
examples of the devastating famines of the medieval Deccan (Enthoven, 1909; 
Attwood, 2005; DeSouza, 2010). Even during the colonial period, famines dotted 
this region (Indian Irrigation Commission, 1903a; Narain, 2003; Attwood, 2005), 
which eventually became the reason for state intervention in the form of 
protective irrigation works (Enthoven, 1909). 
The British rulers’ initial redress strategy for famine-affected areas was limited to 
extending takavi
54
 loans to the cultivators for well construction (Attwood, 1987). 
However the Deccan Riots (1875), a peasant rebellion in the face of massive 
immiserisation, pressed the rulers to consider effective strategies to stabilise their 
rule. These riots also revealed the failure of the rulers’ modernisation strategy, 
which initially focused on reforming the land revenue system through the taxation 
of individual peasants (Bolding et al., 1995).  
With the Deccan riots, the emphasis shifted from reforming revenue systems to 
using western technology such as irrigation and railways, which would result in 
“more modern and more productive forms of agriculture” (Bolding, Mollinga, & 
Van Straaten, 1995 :810). This would ensure a stable revenue stream to the 
colonial rulers and also address situations of political and economic unrest. Thus, 
technology became the potent purveyor of modernisation, with the inherent 
ambition of securing and stabilising colonial rule (Stone, 1984; Bolding et al., 
1995). The Famine Commission (1880), which outlined the colonial policy for 
dealing with recurring famines, drew attention to the indirect returns from the 
irrigation works through savings on famine relief expenditure. It recommended 
that the government take steps in anticipation of famine and provide relief. It also 
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 Loans advanced by the government to the farmer to finance the construction of wells, purchase 
bullocks or plant a new crop. These loans were often advanced for famine relief and the 
repayment was collected through the land revenue machinery. In a series of famines from 1899-
1902, takavi advances were above 20 million rupees, from which 3.75 million rupees were meant 
for repairing and building wells (Mann 1925 cited in Attwood 1992). 
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recommended the extension of irrigation and railways to encourage 
diversification of occupation (Narain, 2003). 
This momentum was built specifically into the report of the Indian Irrigation 
Commission (IIC) Report (1901-1903). The IIC undertook extensive analysis of 
irrigation across several provinces of British India to determine the potential and 
possibility of extending irrigation networks (Indian Irrigation Commission, 
1903a). In its report, the IIC outlined three advantages of irrigation works: an 
increase in the general wealth and prosperity of the community through increased 
crop production; water recharge through large storage networks; and protection 
against famine. Recognising the need to include the Deccan trap area within the 
protective belt, it stated: 
We have already observed that apart from the question of famine protection, there 
is no reason why the[ S]tate should accept a permanent charge on the revenue for 
the sake of increasing the productiveness of land belonging to private owners […] 
[T]he reservation in respect to famine protection is however all important. The 
obligation of the [S]tate to incur whatever expenditure that may be necessary to 
save life during famine involves future liabilities that cannot be evaded, and of 
which full account must be taken[…] For the present, we may disregard the 
indirect cost of famine to the [S]tate, and the loss and misery which famine 
imposes on the people, and confine ourselves to the purely economic question of 
comparative demands on the tax payer, involved in an immediate expenditure and 
in the future relief of the distress which may be anticipated if these works are not 
constructed (Indian Irrigation Commission, 1903a: 30). 
 
Protective irrigation or works
55
 were thus envisaged as “works for protection 
against famine and not necessarily to bring revenue to the state” (Narain cited in 
Narain 2003:20). The Commission essentially set out to measure the cost of 
construction of such works against the future costs of providing relief. The long 
discussions and testimonies documented during the tour of the members bear 
evidence to this fact (Indian Irrigation Commission, 1903b). The IIC Report, 
which stratified and categorised the Indian topography, was essentially a cost-
benefit analysis for irrigation work. It conceded that providing for protective 
works might not be directly productive or remunerative for the government in 
comparison with the North Indian irrigation networks, which were essentially 
constructed on productive lines (Indian Irrigation Commission, 1903a). 
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 Several reservoir systems and canal works were started by the British for famine protection: the 
Mutha canal (1860), the Khadakvasla dam (1879) and the Nira Left Bank Canal (1885). 
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This is how the concept of protective irrigation
56
 emerged as a significant feature 
of British “colonial hydrology”, an intervention which altered Deccan’s “fluvial 
and social world” (D'Souza, 2006: 625). Thus, extension of irrigation works in 
the Deccan area became a part of the mitigating measures of the colonial policy, 
with the dual ambitions of securing colonial rule and generating revenue (Bolding 
et al., 1995; Narain, 2003). Initially the protective works were promoted for 
subsistence cropping, but towards the turn of the twentieth century a phenomenal 
shift took place on the Nira Canal (Pune district, Maharashtra) where farmers 
began to experiment with sugarcane cultivation (Attwood, 2005). This 
experiment was to change the agrarian and political alignments of this region for 
years to come. 
5.2.1 The irrigation frontier: protective irrigation and sugarcane 
cultivation 
Despite the construction of canal networks, one of the significant challenges 
faced by the irrigation bureaucracy was the lack of demand for water in years of 
normal rainfall. Maintaining storage reservoirs and networks, in this case, was 
expensive for the establishment and also led to a reduction in budget from the 
central government. Mr. Visvesaraya
57
, in his testimony to the IIC, lamented:  
Water is very expensive in Bombay [Presidency] […] It may be roughly stated 
that on account of the great cost of storage, water supply is three to six times more 
expensive here than in other irrigation systems […] I think working on productive 
lines, we should not lock up water on the chance of famines. We should every 
year make an estimate of the water available for high class crops and in famine 
years make some concession in favour of dry crops (Indian Irrigation 
Commission, 1903b: 97-99). 
 
In this region of Deccan, farmers cultivated sorghum and millet, and waited for 
the rainfall before placing a demand for water (IIC 1903b). The water retentive 
capacities of the black soil could support one season of crops in years of normal 
to good rainfall. In these years, maintaining water in storage reservoirs was 
expensive. The solution, for Mr. Visvesaraya, lay in creating conditions for 
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 A specific form of large-scale irrigation found in semi-arid and drought prone areas of the 
Indian sub-continent. These systems are designed to “protect” areas and distribute available water 
(in rivers or storage) thinly over a large area in equitable manner (Mollinga, 2003; Narain, 2003). 
Under British colonialism, protective irrigation was specifically targeted at famine prevention, in 
present times it is generically used to indicate irrigation systems in drought prone areas with 
specific technical, organisational and socio-economic characteristics (Narain, 2003). They are also 
referred to as “water constrained systems”.(Tilak and Rajvanshi, 1991: 1) 
57
 He is also called the Father of Engineering in ‘Modern India’. 
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permanent demand for water through a crop which had flexible planting and 
harvesting times, as opposed to the dry crops (Bolding et al., 1995). The answer 
was the cultivation of water-thirsty sugarcane through the block system of water 
delivery.  
 
A block is defined as “a portion of land for which long term irrigation sanction is 
given” (Patil and Lele, 1994: 23). Under this system, the farmers were required to 
enter into a fixed period, six- year contract with the Department to receive water. 
The Department was bound to supply water and farmers were required to pay for 
it. This system thus became a source of perennial irrigation in the famine belt of 
the Deccan. Under this system, one-third of the land was cultivated with 
sugarcane and two-thirds with other food crops (Attwood, 1987; Bolding et al., 
1995). The Saswad Malis
58
, who migrated from their native town of Saswad near 
Poona city (now Pune) to the Nira canal capitalised on this opportunity. The 
abundant yet underutilised canal water provided promising opportunities for this 
small, enterprising community, which was skilled in intensive irrigation of garden 
crops. The experiment was to use the canal water initially used for growing 
subsistence crops such as millet and sorghum for the cultivation of sugarcane 
(Visvesaraya, 1951; Attwood, 1987; Bolding et al., 1995)
59
.  
 
Thus the block system shifted extensive irrigation (for subsistence) to intensive 
irrigation (for cash cropping). This system enabled the farmers to move towards 
high value crops, and also served dual aims for the colonial rule. It addressed the 
problem of famine protection in two ways. With canal villages cultivating 
sugarcane alongside food crops, this agricultural expansion led to demands for 
labour, causing farmers from dry villages to migrate to productive regions 
(Gadgil, 1948; Attwood, 1987). It stabilised revenue for the British treasury, and 
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 garden cultivators from the Mali (gardener) caste. 
59
 There is considerable debate over the ramifications of this shift; some scholars from the 
Dependency school argue that this was an imposition from the British to extract revenue, which 
further aggravated the pauperisation of the peasant economy and created pockets of prosperity. 
For instance, Whitcombe (1993) makes this case in her analysis of colonial policy in North 
Western India. Others, such as Attwood (1992), argue that such theorisations miss out on local 
innovation, and read the development of sugarcane cultivation as an attribute of the business 
enterprise of the local population (Attwood, 2005). For colonialism and the sugar industry, see 
Chithelen (1985) and for links between sugarcane cultivation and irrigation modernisation, see 
Bolding et al (1995). 
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previously wasted water now brought in high returns. Once these objectives were 
met, several other propositions proposed by Visvesaraya to reform the water 
delivery system were not pursued further, as the British were not keen to 
jeopardise their fiscal interests (Attwood, 1987; Bolding et al., 1995). However, 
intensive irrigation under the block system went against the principles of 
extensive irrigation for famine protection/subsistence cropping. The IIC, 
however, declared that the “system producing the best commercial results would 
also be the most protective system” (IIC 1903a:70). This is how protective works 
were transformed into productive works in the Bombay Deccan (Attwood, 1987; 
Bolding et al., 1995). 
 
This introduction of the block system was also accompanied by certain techno-
managerial interventions to curtail the sporadic demand for and distribution of 
water. This entailed the control of water discharges through modular structures 
and the introduction of volumetric supply for water efficiency. However, 
volumetric pricing and modular structures encountered substantial bottlenecks. 
The IIC held extensive discussions on the modular structures and gates, which 
could enable volumetric delivery of water, but without any substantive 
conclusions (Indian Irrigation Commission, 1903b). In fact, during his service 
tenure in Pune, Visvesaraya made several experiments of this kind on the Nira 
Canal, but the British officers found them to be inefficient or expensive (Indian 
Irrigation Commission, 1903b; Bolding et al., 1995). This did not prevent the 
subtle encouragement of sugarcane cropping, which had already rolled out 
“modernisation” (Bolding et al., 1995) of the agrarian culture through the block 
system. This pattern of water distribution and cash-crop cultivation eventually 
spread to other parts of this region. For instance, the opening of the Godavari and 
Pravara (Ahmadnagar) canals in the early twentieth century played a vital role in 
the extension of sugarcane cultivation and the development of the sugar industry 
in the 1930s
60
, or what Attwood calls the “irrigation frontier”(Attwood, 1985: 
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 I do not argue that the extension of canal networks was the sole factor responsible for the 
extension of sugarcane cultivation in the Deccan region. There were other socio-political and 
economic factors that aligned with this development. For instance, the Deccan Riots of 1875 
prompted the colonial government to re-examine money-lending practices in the region. Similarly 
the colonial protective tariff policy for sugar contributed to the development of sugar mills in 
Maharashtra (Baviskar, 1980; Chithelen, 1985). 
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66). The first sugar cooperative – the Pravara Cooperative sugar factory – was set 
up in Ahmadnagar district in 1950.  
 
Canal irrigation was certainly not a neutral technology, as it was designed to 
serve the interests of the Empire. The extension of canal networks essentially 
became a premise to operationalise rule from a distance. Irrigation was not only 
rendered increasingly technical through large scale networks: it also led to 
“configuration of habits, aspirations and beliefs” (Li, 2007: 5) favouring cash 
crop cultivation. The extension of canal networks also led to institutionalisation 
of the water bureaucracy through the Bombay Irrigation Act (1879).  
The productive dimension had an inherent bias towards stressing irrigation and 
economic activities and downplayed the polyvocal properties of water especially 
as an as important element in the lives of the people, the society and ecology. The 
Irrigation Acts, which developed over the historical continuum from the colonial 
Acts, were essentially geared to maintain the use of surface water within the state 
territory, and laid down rules and restrictions for diversion and impoundment 
(Government of India, 2010a). 
The cultivation of sugarcane stabilised colonial revenues on one hand and 
ensured prosperity for the farmers on the other. Thus irrigation became one of the 
central instruments of colonial rule, burdened with contradictory goals of “famine 
prevention, revenue stability, the settling of unruly tribes, expansion of 
cultivation, extended cultivation of cash crops, enhanced taxable capacity, 
improved cultivation practices, and political stability” (Stone, 1984: 9). 
 
This “fundamental duality” (Bolding et al., 1995: 810) in the colonial regime is 
also symptomatic of the contradictory nature of the State in the water sector. It 
has diverse objectives, but central to each strategy is a form of control, be it 
through discharges of water, or controlling and modernising the agrarian pattern. 
While sugarcane cultivation spread rapidly across Western Maharashtra, the 
problems of water distribution, salinity, land degradation and discipline, i.e. 
inability to exert control on cultivators (PWD 1910 cited in Bolding et al.1995: 
827), within the system largely persisted, and continues to do so in present times. 
I explore this further in Chapter 7 of this work. Colonial intervention through 
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large scale irrigation gave birth to distinct patterns of regulations, which are 
manifest even in the current case of regulatory reforms in Maharashtra. For 
instance, volumetric pricing, which was subject to extensive discussion among 
the members of the Indian Irrigation Commission (1901-1903), also forms part of 
the recommendations of several contemporary committees and commissions, 
including the Vaidyanathan Committee Report on water pricing (Government of 
India, 1992), and the reports of several other Irrigation Committees and 
Commissions appointed by the Government of Maharashtra (Joy and Kulkarni, 
2010). It is also the cornerstone of the reform-led entitlement policy.  
 
The shift in the definition from a protective system into a remunerative system 
had fundamental implications for the post-independence period. The Government 
of India’s irrigation policy (1972) emphasised the shift from protective 
dimensions of irrigation to “a means for attaining greater production of food, 
fibres and oilseeds” (Mollinga, 2003: 14). While this drive for self-sufficiency 
drove the Green Revolution, it was also complemented by the cooperative 
movement in this region of Maharashtra. This section showed how the colonial 
rulers encouraged sugarcane cultivation at the turn of the 20
th
 century
61
. This rule 
thus brought in a “new and distinct form of developmental state” (Mosse, 2003: 
125), which was most fully expressed in its post-independence avatar, where 
control over water moved upwards. The post-independence project of national 
development justified a massive expansion of state bureaucracy into everyday 
rural society through control of prices and fertilisers, power subsidies, and control 
over irrigation (ibid). I now turn to this phase of development in the next section. 
5.2.2 Engineering Development  
In the period following independence, the overarching national policy with its 
emphasis on engineering and infrastructure also aided this spread of sugarcane 
cultivation. To cultivate a perennial crop such as sugarcane, perennial sources of 
irrigation were required. This meant harnessing the untapped potential of water 
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 As I have already argued there were other factors responsible for the growth of sugar cultivation 
and industry during the colonial period. For instance, Baviskar (1980) and Attwood (1992) 
attribute the birth and extension of sugar cooperatives to the business enterprise of the Malis and 
the emerging class-caste complex between the Brahmins-Malis-Marathas and other non-
Brahmins. I do not dispute their claim, and also touch upon these issues in Chapter 7, which 
highlights the socio-political dynamics of sugarcane cultivation in the Jahot LBC. For this 
chapter, I have primarily concentrated on the irrigation-sugar cooperatives link. 
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sources through large storage reservoirs, sub-surface water and/or groundwater. 
The state of Maharashtra was no exception to this transformation (Attwood, 
2005). The extension of irrigation activities also brought in a sizeable portion of 
land into cultivation under the canal irrigation: the construction of a series of 
projects including the Jahot system (where the current study is located) also 
started in this period. In the irrigated tracts of the erstwhile Western Deccan, now 
Western Maharashtra, sugarcane became the chief cash crop (Baviskar, 1980), 
which favoured extension of irrigation services. Dams were also an attractive 
enterprise for politicians and technocrats as they provided the leverage to extend 
‘political and private’ control over resources (McCully, 2001)62. 
 
In the post-independence phase, the emphasis in Maharashtra, as in other parts of 
the country, was on food sufficiency, and irrigation was an important input to 
boost agricultural production. However the geographical challenges of the state 
caused the Maharashtra Irrigation Commission (1962) to cap the full irrigation 
potential of the state to a mere 30 percent of the cropped area (Joy and Kulkarni, 
2010). This required optimising water use and tapping the irrigation potential of 
the state. As I explained in the previous chapter, this ‘water development’ meant 
harnessing water resources than optimising its use and distributive allocation. In 
present times, the emphasis on developing storage capacity is one of the moot 
points of the engineering perspective on water, and was fairly evident during the 
fieldwork. The consultant at the Regulatory Office advocated vehemently that 
that development of storage capacity - i.e. more dams - was the only way to 
address water woes in the country. Thus this engineering perspective is still fairly 
dominant in the water resources sector in India. 
 
Alongside this drive for water optimisation in the early decades of independence, 
two simultaneous developments followed: the growth of the sugarcane 
cooperatives in the Deccan trap region, now Western Maharashtra, and further 
institutionalisation of the demand-managed system of irrigation i.e. shejpali, to 
which I now turn. 
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 During the period 1970-89, 4,921 dams were built in India (Rangachari et al. cited in Attwood 
2005). 
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Institutionalisation of hydrocracy: shejpali or demand managed irrigation 
The block system, which provided a win-win situation for the farmers and the 
colonial government, was the result of the peculiar problem of wasted water, 
whereby farmers did not demand water and waited for the rains until the last 
minute (Indian Irrigation Commission, 1903c). While the block system started in 
the late 19
th
 and early 20
th
 century in sugarcane tracts of the Western 
Maharashtra, other protective irrigation works were primarily covered under the 
rules of the Bombay Irrigation Act (1879), which was the precursor to the 
Maharashtra Irrigation Act 1974. Shejpali
63
, or the practice of demanding water, 
is largely framed on the 1879 Act (Brewer and Raju, 1995) and still governs 
water management practices even today.  
 
The system of watering by turns is called shejpali. Under this system, the 
watering of crops is tied to a specific number of rotations from the canal, and the 
farmer is required to apply to the Department for water every season before the 
rotation begins. This system gives enough power to the Department to control 
water allocations in several ways: first, the farmers have to apply for sanctions in 
each season (Brewer and Raju, 1995; Joy and Kulkarni, 2010); second, the 
Department needs to sanction the area and type of crops; third, they regulate the 
demand for water by determining the quantity and time of supply (Brewer and 
Raju, 1995; Narain, 2003); and fourth, the Department also has the right to reject 
the application if the farmer has defaulted on previous payments (KI48). 
In contrast to the block system, which guaranteed the quantity of supply over a 
period of time, the shejpali system does not carry any such guarantees of water 
delivery (Brewer and Raju, 1995). Although under the shejpali system the dates 
for water turns are fixed, there is a great deal of uncertainty because the onus to 
provide water is not as binding as in the case of the block system. This 
uncertainty of supply, in the context of large-scale irrigation systems, can also 
promote rent seeking behaviour among officials (Wade, 1982; Moore, 1989). 
Moreover, there are no restrictions on the time a cultivator could take to irrigate 
the sanctioned area. This led to the rigid shejpali system, or rotational water 
supply, where the time for taking water is also fixed, but this system has not been 
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 A system of taking turns for water; shej means turn and pali means water (Narain, 2003). 
System of irrigation in Maharashtra and Gujarat (Brewer and Raju, 1995). 
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implemented uniformly in the state (Pike, 1995; Narain, 2003). Besides the 
degree of uncertainty in water supply, the shejpali system also places greater onus 
on the state machinery to deliver water to each farmer and to monitor water theft. 
The geographical peculiarity of the Bombay Deccan introduced the system of 
water on the basis of demand. The primary concern of both these systems, the 
block and the shejpali, was to put ‘scarce water’ to full, and efficient use. This is 
evident from the following quotation, which captures the essence of the shejpali 
system: 
The irrigation Engineer has to see that the total water available with the storage 
along with the river gains is fully utilized up to June of every year and no drop of 
water remains unutilised; at the same time his foremost duty is to see that all the 
committed irrigation is fully satisfied according to the rules and practices of 
irrigation and no crops starve for the want of water. (Gandhi cited in Narain 2003: 
60-61). 
 
With increased responsibilities of the State, an institutional set-up geared to 
maintain this “workload” was also required. The system placed a great deal of 
pressure and onus on the Executive Engineer and the subordinate officials. It also 
made the Canal Inspector, the last player in the irrigation system, an extremely 
significant figure in water delivery. His duties included: preparing the palipatrak 
or list, for farmers on every outlet; setting a certain time for the irrigation of the 
sanctioned area; releasing water as per the turns of the farmers on a tail to head 
basis; ensuring collections and monitoring that the area/crop irrigated are as per 
the approval granted (Patil, 1988; Narain, 2003)
64
. Clearly, the implementation of 
these functions is far more complex than the step-by-step process outlined in 
several official reports.  
In fact, entitlements are primarily targeted at changing the shejpali system 
(Chapter 7), which has placed substantial onus for water delivery on the 
Department. Though Saleth (2007), in his support for the water rights system, 
argues that shejpali has an in-built mechanism of water rights through its 
demand-managed system, he overlooks the significant role of the bureaucracy in 
running this system. The system (irrigation bureaucracy) based features (Abrams, 
1988) of the State, most notably proliferated under the shejpali. The irrigation 
bureaucracy had to engage with every individual farmer to collect applications, 
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 For the technological implications of shejpali and its calculations etc., see Narain (2003). 
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deliver water deliver and collect water charges, a combined practice that many 
state officials call the “headache of the State” (Field Journal, April 2012). 
However this practice also extended the powers of the State and made the farmers 
both legible and amenable to improvement; the State now moved into the 
domains of the rural society through demand processes, as outlined above. This 
also preserved State domination, which was pervasive under the colonial rule, as 
the authorities determined the nature, quantity and time of water supply. It 
simultaneously helped in created the vision of the shaasan, that majestic 
institutional structure which represented itself through the wry and mundane 
practices of guage registers, patrols, demand collection, and the significant penal 
powers of the State in times of payment arrears. 
Reforms, by way of entitlements, seek to address these discrepancies inherent in 
the shejpali system. They seek to convert this overgrown bureaucracy into a 
service agency whereby a system of water rights will ensure the certainty and 
quality of water supply. However, this translation, as the next chapters will show, 
is peppered with inequities between big and small landholders across the canal 
system. Another important driver for this skewed access is the power of the 
sugarcane cultivators, which is inevitably tied to the growth of cooperatives in 
this region. 
The fruits and fallacies of irrigation: sugarcane cooperatives and raajkaran (politics) 
When Visvesaraya proposed the block system to the IIC in 1903, he had studied 
the Saswad Malis, who had migrated to the Nira Canal and started cultivating 
sugarcane (Indian Irrigation Commission, 1903a), and pioneered commercial 
farming in this region.(Baviskar, 1980; Attwood, 1987). While cooperative credit 
societies emerged in response to peasant immiserisation, with the rapid spread of 
sugarcane cultivation, they were increasingly dominated by the sugarcane 
farmers. For instance the membership of Big Bagaitdar (large landholders) 
societies was restricted to sugarcane farmers cultivating ten acres of land or more 
of sugarcane (see Baviskar 1980). There is a strong relationship between the 
extension of irrigation facilities and the burgeoning of sugar cooperatives in this 
region of Maharashtra (Rath and Mitra, 1989; DeSouza, 2010) . For instance, the 
four northern talukas of Ahmadnagar district (where the current study is based) - 
Kopargaon, Shrirampur, Sangamner and Rahuri - witnessed rapid expansion of 
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sugarcane cultivation as they prospered under the Pravara canals in the early 
decades of independence (Baviskar, 1980). Most of the cooperative sugar 
factories in Ahmadnagar were established in the interests of the sugarcane 
farmers (ibid). 
Until the Indian Independence in 1947, sugarcane factories and cooperatives were 
largely privately owned (Rosenthal, 1974), and in the first few decades after 
independence, they were on the decline until the central government intervened 
through loans
65
, and guaranteed market prices The cooperatives also formed an 
integral part of Congress’ vision for rural development (Lalvani, 2008). Thus 
started the great expansion in cooperative movement, in congruence with the 
extension of irrigation networks in the Maharashtra. The construction of several 
canal systems, which today support the sugar pockets, started during this period. 
For example, this was when the systems of Mula, Jahot, Waghad and Mangi 
(Western Maharashtra) were built. The cooperatives extended rapidly all over 
India, and by the year 1977-78, Maharashtra had 56 operating cooperatives - the 
greatest number in the country – with the majority of them located in the 
Ahmadnagar district (Baviskar, 1980). Between 1960-61 and 70-71, sugarcane 
production doubled in terms of area as well as volume of production (Lele, 1990).  
The expansion of cooperatives
66
 has two significant implications for the irrigation 
services. One, since sugarcane required perennial irrigation sources, canal 
development and sugarcane cultivation went hand in hand, especially in this belt 
since the soil features were appropriate for sugarcane cultivation. Where canal 
irrigation was deficient, wells and groundwater sources were harnessed to support 
the yield (Jyotishi and Rout, 2005). Moreover, agricultural and power subsidies 
played a substantial role in exacerbating this groundwater extraction 
(Narayanamoorthy and Deshpande, 2005). Second, as noted in the previous 
section, cash crop cultivation also created pockets of prosperity and power to the 
extent that the fortunes of state politics, at one time, were determined on the 
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 For example, the establishment of rural banks for addressing problems with agricultural credit.  
66
 There are also other kinds of cooperatives, which operate at different levels (village or multi-
village) and in different sectors (credit, dairy development, marketing federations). See (DeSouza, 
2010). For instance, in my field site, the cooperative sugar factories also had an extended arm in 
the area of rural credit (Field Journal, January 2012). 
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backs of sugar lobbies (Rosenthal, 1974; Kamat, 1980; EPW, 1987; Mohanty, 
2009).  
 
Given the large scale effects that cooperative factories had on the rural 
population, they became the local opportunity structures, which steered the 
politics at the taluka (sub-district) and district level (Rosenthal, 1974). Baviskar 
(1980) reflects on the rise of this capitalist peasantry, or the ‘bullock capitalists’,67 
(Rudolph and Rudolph, 1987) and their social power: 
Wherever big cooperatives such as sugar factories have emerged, their leaders 
tend to monopolize important positions of power in other spheres as well. Those 
who do not control such cooperatives lack opportunities of competing [sic], leave 
alone of winning, against the powerful cooperative leaders. If sugar cooperatives 
have been instruments of development, politics is the process which has sustained 
this development (Baviskar, 1980: 111-112). 
 
Even from a comparative perspective, the growth of cooperatives, which was now 
wedded to the politics of the state, had significant consequences for the 
development trajectory of Maharashtra. Lele (1990), commenting on the regional 
politics concerning water, argues that “it was generally recognised […] that in the 
areas of irrigation, roads and primary education, the regions of Vidarbha and 
Marathwada were significantly lagging behind the rest of Maharashtra” (Lele, 
1990: 177). The figure below provides a glimpse of this differentiated 
development in terms of percentage of irrigated area across the four regions of the 
state. 
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 The rise of cooperatives signifies the rise of a particular class of rural elite in opposition to the 
urban elite, which drove and dominated the early years of Indian independence. Several scholars 
argue that the nature of the Indian State and democracy changed substantially with rise of this 
intermediate caste-class coalition which Rudolph and Rudolph call ‘the bullock capitalists’ since 
their source of power was the rural agrarian economy (1987). Bardhan calls them the intermediate 
caste (1998) and Attwood refers to them the capitalist peasantry (1985). The case of Maharashtra 
could be read in parallel with similar mobilisation in other parts of India, such as the Kamats and 
Reddys in Andhra Pradesh and the Jats in Haryana and Western Uttar Pradesh. These were 
intermediate caste groups with a powerful rural base that emerged as a by-product of the success 
of the Green Revolution from the late 1960s onwards. 
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Figure 5.2: Percentage of the total area irrigated in Maharashtra 
[Adapted from Mohanty (2009) (TE=Triennium ending; WM=  Western Maharashtra)] 
 
Sugarcane cultivation and cooperatives played a significant role in steering the 
irrigation development and the politics of the state. At particular moments in 
history the state interests were aligned with expansion of sugarcane cultivation: in 
colonial times it was aligned with revenue and extractive capacities; since 
independence the interests of cooperatives have, over the years, been aligned with 
the stabilisation of political interests (Rosenthal, 1974).  
Sugarcane cultivation, control over the cooperatives and the extension of 
irrigation networks are also serious areas of contention in Ahmadnagar (DeSouza, 
2010). The observations made in the previous paragraphs also resonate with the 
politics in the Jahot system (which covers the talukas of Shrigonda and Karjat). 
There are at least five major sugar factories in Shrigonda and Karjat, and the 
ownership of these factories also played a central part in manoeuvring the water 
flows. Sugarcane cultivation and canal irrigation have significantly contributed to 
the agricultural development of this area. The majority of people associate the 
development of Shrigonda with the Jahot canal system (Interviews January, 
2012). The farmers often approach local politicians and petition them to release 
water for irrigation. In fact, the farmers in the Karjat taluka, which forms the tail 
of the canal system, were certain that their water fortunes would change because 
the deputy Chief Minister of the state took over the sugar factory located in 
Karjat. There is another significant area where the cooperative system and the 
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irrigation canal become intertwined in the Jahot system: water charges are 
collected directly from the sugar factories, as they maintain the accounts for the 
farmers.  
However, over time, the cooperative movement has declined as many of these 
cooperatively owned sugar factories are now closing down due to recurring 
losses, or are being privatised. Cooperatives formed an important pivot for the 
discussions on the WUA Act and entitlements. I explain the implications of this 
in the next chapters. 
 
Figure 5.3: The sugarcane economy 
Tractors laden with sugarcane outside the Viladri sugar cooperative factory, Shrigonda  
(February 2012) 
 
In this section, I demonstrated how shejpali as a system of water delivery 
provides greater leverage to the Department. Simultaneously, I also highlighted 
how the sugar cooperatives are interlinked with the irrigation networks and the 
development fortunes of the state. These two developments need to be historically 
located in the congruence of factors that emerged at the intersection of 
contradictory goals of revenue, self-sufficiency, political imperatives and also the 
peculiarities of geographical features of Western Maharashtra. However, 
sugarcane cooperatives and irrigation extensification did not bear fruit for all. 
While they created opportunity structures for some, they also resulted in 
marginalisation of farmers who lacked the leverage and constituency to 
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participate in these gains. This led to movements for water rights and equity in 
the state, which is the focus of next section. 
5.2.3 The Discourse of Rights and Equity  
Similar to the fall-outs observed during the colonial period, pockets of prosperity 
boomed alongside the inequities of the canal system. In Maharashtra, there were 
two kinds of inequities: regional and canal level, which concentrated 
developments in specific parts of the state and in the head reaches of the canal 
system respectively. In the literature on canal irrigation, this head-tail inequity 
has been the focus of several works in the Indian context (Wade and Chambers, 
1980; Ramamurthy, 1995; Mollinga, 2003; Narain, 2003). In the context of 
Maharashtra, this critique is further laced with lop-sided effects of sugarcane 
cultivation and the politicisation of the cooperatives, which created “small islands 
of prosperity” (Sathe, 1986: 737). In the light of this uneven spread of ‘big 
development’, there were initiatives which emerged and local solutions to 
problems of inequity created through the canal system or sustained periods of 
drought. In this section, I focus on two significant initiatives: pani panchayats 
(water councils) and Participatory Irrigation Management (PIM). These have, in 
current times, provided discursive hooks and tropes for discussion on regulation 
and entitlements.  
Water rights and the pani panchayats  
In 1971-72, Maharashtra suffered a massive drought. Several old villagers in 
Jahot (esp. in the head reaches) recalled this bheeshan dushkaal (intense period of 
drought) and described the Jahot system as a blessing to the village. The birth of 
pani panchayats needs to be located as a mitigation measure during this drought. 
The brainchild of an engineer, Vilasrao Salunkhe
68
, the pani panchayat model is 
based on five principles of sustainable and equitable management of water: first, 
water is granted on a per capita basis equivalent to that needed for half an acre per 
person, with a maximum of 2.5 acres per family, to ensure that basic needs of the 
family can be sufficiently satisfied; second, irrigation is provided for seasonal 
crops only. Cultivation of water intensive crops such as sugarcane and grapes is 
not permitted; third, twenty percent of cash contributions are borne by the 
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 Salunkhe set up a trust organisation called the Gram Gaurav Pratishthan (Naigon village, 
Purandhar taluka) which provided technical and financial help for setting up lift irrigation 
schemes for areas not covered under canal irrigation (Sangameswaran, 2009b). 
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community; and fourth, these principles are held together by the common 
property resource ethic, whereby water is regarded as an inalienable right of the 
community. 
 
The most remarkable feature of the pani panchayat is that it delinks water and 
land rights so that water rights are not tied to land ownership. Under this model, 
the landless are also provided with water rights. However, in practice, the 
landless component could never be operationalised because of the cost involved 
in collecting cash contributions, uncertainty about returns to water, and the 
limited potential for the landless to lease out water since all members had water 
rights. Moreover, the landless members were a minority that was both 
numerically and socially weak (Phadke, 2002; Sangameswaran, 2009b)
69
.  
Over the years, the pani panchayat model has emerged as an alternative to the top 
down system of irrigation management. Its emphasis on social justice and 
equitable water distribution had a deep influence on the watershed movement in 
Maharashtra and the protest movements in Southern Maharashtra
70
 in terms of 
equitable distribution of the canal water. The pani panchayat model tried to 
provide a link between livelihoods and water rights by decoupling land and water 
rights, and linking the protective and productive dimensions of water. It also 
emerged as a counter to large-scale development sustained by mega-projects and 
sugarcane cultivation. This thinking is fundamental to a counter paradigm of 
rethinking entitlements in Maharashtra, especially in the context of reforms, 
which I discuss in the next chapter.  
Participatory processes in irrigation
71
 : precursors and patrons 
Though PIM is associated with donor-led reforms in several countries, in 
Maharashtra it is treated as a part of the social fabric of the state. Several water 
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 Also inspired the Khudawadi experiment by SOPPECOM in the Osmanabad district, where 
societies of the landless members were formed. SOPPECOM worked with members, especially 
women, to stabilise their incomes. The experiment had several positive spin-off effects such as 
establishment of self-help groups, but did not prove to be sustainable over time (KI11). 
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 For example, the movement for the Baliraja memorial dam on the Yerala river in Sangli district. 
The movement started in the late 1980s to oppose sand mining from the river-bed. Since these 
were also drought-affected regions, the local people, under the leadership of ‘Mukti Sangharsh’ 
(‘struggle for freedom’), constructed a check dam to address the water issues of the region.  
71
 I want to distinguish them from the reform-led initiatives of irrigation management transfer. I 
differentiate between the initiatives led by the State - top down models - and those sporadic but 
grassroots initiatives started and sustained by certain civil society organisations. 
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practioners and grassroots activists consider the WUAs to be a home-grown 
experiment and separate it from the global trend of Irrigation Management 
Transfer (IMT) (KI07, KI11, KI12, KI14, KI15). Historically, community 
management of water in Maharashtra can be traced to the phad
72
 system in Nasik 
and Dhule, which was the precursor to the block system which Mr. Visvesaraya 
experimented with on the Nira Canal in the late nineteenth century.  
In order to address the sporadic nature of water distribution among farmers, 
Visvesaraya tried to group sugarcane ‘block’ cultivators into groups for internal 
distribution and achieved limited success (Visvesaraya, 1951). Later, this 
recommendation of establishment of water panchayats, one for every ten miles of 
canal section, also formed part of the Bombay Enquiry Committee, 1938 (Narain, 
2003; Narayanamoorthy and Deshpande, 2005). In fact, one of the earliest 
initiatives to form water cooperatives took place on the Godavari canals in 1937, 
namely the Big Bagaitdar Society at Samavatsar village in Ahmadnagar district 
(Patil and Lele, 1994). Though the PIM initiative has an endogenous element in 
the case of Maharashtra, the major initiatives to remedy the canal system that 
have emerged in Maharashtra from 1980s onwards are also aligned to the global 
trend of irrigation reform (Mollinga and Bolding, 2004). Two experiments on 
WUAs, initiated during the late 1980s and early 1990s, have had a substantial 
impact on these developments. I discuss these below. 
As I mentioned in the previous chapter, irrigation is managed at state level in 
India, but the central government has, from time to time, provided the operating 
framework for redressing inefficiencies in the sector. For example, the CAD 
programme was heavily financed by the central government (Chapter 4). In 1985, 
a circular from the Ministry of Water Resources, aligned with the global trend in 
irrigation reform, recommended the formation of user groups for distribution 
below the minor and sought the active collaboration of NGOs
73
. Enthused by this 
offer, the Centre for Applied Systems and Development (CASAD), a civil society 
organisation, led a pilot action research programme at the Mula dam, a major 
irrigation project in the Ahmadnagar district. This initiative (henceforth the 
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 Refers to the system of building check dams on rivers from which canals spread out into the 
field. The system was prevalent in the Northern districts of Maharashtra. These systems are 
managed and operated by the beneficiaries themselves (Joy and Kulkarni, 2010). 
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 Reiterated in the National Water Policy, 1987. 
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Chanda experiment) involved the creation of user societies, supplying water on a 
volumetric basis to promote the economic use of water. The initial results 
received positive feedback in terms of an assured supply of water and 
improvement in crop yields, but as Lele and Patil (CASAD) note, there were 
substantial bottlenecks, especially regarding water use efficiency, and therefore 
the Chanda experiment only attained the “first stage of the learning process” 
(Patil and Lele, 1994: 4) 
Taking lessons from the positive story of the Chanda experiment, Mr Bapurao 
Upadhye and his colleague, Bharat Kaware, tried to replicate this idea of user 
association on the Waghad dam in Nasik district in the early 1990s. These two 
founded the Samaj Parivartan Kendra (SPK), an NGO in Nasik working to 
support rural livelihoods. The deprivation within the tail system led to the 
formation of three user organisations in Ozar village
74
. The Ozar experiment was 
the product of galvanisation provided by civil society organisations such as the 
SPK and technical help from SOPPECOM and the Water and Land Management 
Institute (Keremane and McKay, 2006; Paranjpe et al., n.d.). These organisations 
provided the requisite base for negotiations with the bureaucracy on one hand and 
farmers on the other (KI15). By getting water to the hitherto ‘unreached portions’ 
of the system, the Ozar experiment led to the spread of user associations to other 
parts of the Waghad canal system. Waghad is a successful example of federation-
level user organisation, where the entire canal system is handed over to the 
Project Level Association (PLA). 
Today, the Waghad case enjoys an iconic status in the history of PIM in 
Maharashtra
75
, and the Department organises visits from different parts of the 
state to get the farmers/ WUA committee members to understand the dynamics of 
successful ‘participation’, largely defined as full cost recovery. The deputy 
engineer who accompanied me during the visit defined Waghad as the “ideal 
project” (KI31). I spent three days at the Waghad site, meeting members of Ozar 
WUAs, PLAs, Bharat Kaware and Department officials. It was interesting to see 
how farmers, SPK and the Department had different scales to weigh its success. 
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 WUAs: Jay Yogeshwar, Mahatma Phule and Banganga. 
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 Though the story of Waghad started as a grass-roots movement, it has become a mobilising 
metaphor for WUA formation since 2005. 
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In this story, lesser known are the struggles and underlying tensions of WUA 
formation; the conjunctive use of water and grape farming, which has boosted the 
agricultural economy of this region (based on interviews and observation, 
December 2012- July 2012). In subsequent interviews, several respondents 
referred to Waghad as an atypical example that would be hard to replicate at other 
sites, which by their standards were raw and average (Field Journal, January 
2012). 
  
From 1992 onwards, the government of Maharashtra has tried to replicate the 
PIM model elsewhere, with limited and location-specific success. But this 
enterprise is beset with obstacles such as the formation of user groups above the 
minor level (Narayanamoorthy and Deshpande, 2005). Others, such as Bharat 
Kawale and Sudha tai (from SPK), whom I met during the mobilisation 
workshops for the WUAs in Ahmadnagar, declared that these should be need 
based strategies. This limited success has, however, not deterred the government 
from experimenting and expanding PIM. Until 2005, these WUAs were formed 
under the Cooperative Societies Act, but now come under the water-specific 2005 
Act, the MMISFA. This Act is not a significant departure from the erstwhile 
practice of PIM, apart from the question of entitlements (Chapter 6).  
 
Bolding et al. (1995) argue that IMT-led reforms may provide a space for 
reconsidering issues of accountability in irrigation management, i.e. reconsidering 
the state-citizen relationship in the water sector. However, altering these 
relationships may also imply a change in the nature of the government. 
Government regulation and deregulation may be signals of power transferring 
from one sphere to another. This is evident from the following statement made by 
an Executive Engineer in Maharashtra, who lauded the current efforts of user 
formation and was certain that this was the only way forward: “The State is 
unable to reach every individual farmer as it has limited capacity to do so, 
therefore the WUAs would be the means to extend this control” (KI40). 
 
The PIM experiment in Maharashtra is a convergence of grassroots innovations 
and bureaucratic imperatives. While the grassroots imperatives from 
organisations such as CASAD (and later SOPPECOM) and Samaj Parivartan 
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Kendra (SPK) have targeted the inequities within the canal system and worked 
with the tail-end farmers to form user associations (as in the case of Waghad), the 
bureaucratic imperatives are marked by a clear interest in increasing the 
efficiency of the system, reducing the “gap between potential created and 
potential utilised” and reducing state expenditure (various interviews between 
December 2011- July 2012).  
 
In sum, the idea of farmers’ participation in water management is now part of the 
historical and social fabric of the state. It is for this reason that both the 
bureaucracy and civil society actors tend to support these WUA-based reforms, 
through opposing discourses of efficiency and equity (Chapter 6). In contrast, the 
MWRRA Act faces strong opposition, for reasons that I discuss in the next 
chapter. 
 
5.3 Conclusion: change and continuities 
This chapter highlighted the contested development trajectory of the state, which 
was fractured along regional lines. It is against this lop-sided development that I 
have historically located the genesis of irrigation practices in Western 
Maharashtra, which have accentuated and amplified these divisions. In this 
chapter, I have focused on four distinct interventions which shaped the extension 
of irrigation in Western Maharashtra: the ideas of protective irrigation; the 
shejpali system of water management; the sugarcane cooperatives punctuated 
with innovations as the pani panchayats, and Participatory Irrigation 
Management. These have subsequently influenced policy processes in 
Maharashtra. 
These four interventions underlined the distinct rationalities of improvement, 
which in principle had as their target the benefit of the subject population, 
through raising agricultural productivity. This was achieved by developing the 
irrigation frontier in both colonial and postcolonial times, interspersed with 
grassroots initiatives from the 1970s onwards. This chapter demonstrated that 
what started as palliative or protectionist measures during colonial times 
subsequently transmuted, with the introduction and expansion of sugarcane 
cultivation, into a remunerative enterprise. The extensive deliberations of the IIC 
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(1901-1903) on the nature of irrigation works in the Deccan trap area highlight 
several issues. The Commission’s concern to improve the conditions of “men and 
things” was guided by two distinct rationalities – to generate revenue and to 
secure the colonial rule. These disparate goals were successfully maintained 
through extending networks and providing protective tariffs to sugar industry in 
the 20
th
 century. The large-scale engineering works also became the manifestation 
of State power, or what Scott calls the ‘high modern’ (Scott, 1998). This also laid 
the basis of the high and low water cultures, whereby irrigation became a domain 
of hydraulic experts. Most of the problems which the IIC and subsequent 
Commissions
76
 have highlighted continue to be the fundamental focus of the 
reformist discourse, and it does make one wonder whether reforms do in fact 
bring anything new to the table.  
The decades following independence, which focused on extension of irrigation, 
led to a distinct political constellation through the rise of the water cooperatives. 
These have had significant ramifications for the development trajectory of 
Western Maharashtra and also of the state. Moreover, the expansion and 
penetration of bureaucracy through the shejpali system reinforced a more 
interventionist role for the State. This is precisely the target of regulation through 
reforms. Key ideas from the pani panchayat model and the PIM initiative(s) also 
significantly influence the current policy processes, for they provided different 
idioms of equity and participation in the water discourse of the state. 
Therefore the current discourse and practice of regulation is a bricolage of old 
and new practices (Cleaver, 2012). These have, over a period of time, played a 
significant role in determining the support for reforms. Though reform-led 
regulation challenges these very practices of the past, they have also become 
‘tropes’ (Throgmorton, 1993) for several actors to sustain, legitimise and 
challenge the reformist regime, either through user participation and cooperatives 
or water rights (Chapter 4 and 6). In the next chapter, I analyse how these key 
ideas and practices, which developed over time, influence the current discourse(s) 
of regulation in Maharashtra.   
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6. “The Will to Improve”
77
: Reforming the Water Sector in 
Maharashtra 
 
Maharashtra is not an irrigation state: it has the lowest irrigation potential among the 
[Indian] states. It is an industrial and a rapidly urbanising state. There will be a lot of 
demand for water from the industry and the growing urban centres. Now irrigation will 
have to do some sacrifices. We have to live with this situation. Given the small role of 
irrigation in Maharashtra, we have to think whether a regulator is required specifically for 
the irrigation sector? Irrigation may be huge in terms of volume of water, but in terms of 
significance, I think it is third in priority.  
       Member, MWRRA (June, 2012) 
Introduction 
Until April 2011, Maharashtra was the only state in the country to have accorded 
higher priority to industrial uses of water than agricultural uses. Though the 
events of 2011, as this chapter will show, have reversed this priority, the clamour 
of water scarcity in the face of urbanisation and industrialisation remains 
unabated. The previous chapter demonstrated that ‘improvement’ was at the heart 
of water resource development in Maharshtra. This was sustained on diverse 
ambitions in colonial and postcolonial times. In this chapter, I locate the current 
wave of reforms in this very logic of improvement whereby diverse - and at times 
contradictory - rationales are provided to initiate and sustain this reform process. 
In Chapter 4, I demonstrated how it is the economic framing of regulation, 
defined in the language of tariffs, licenses and private sector participation, which 
is becoming mainstreamed in water policy discourses at the national level 
(Chapter 4). This chapter shows how these key concepts of regulation are 
translated in the corridors of the state government. It highlights the triad of 
narratives, actors and politics which constitute Maharashtra’s water sector, and 
opens up the “policy worlds” (Shore et al., 2011) of Maharashtra, in which actors 
and agents compete for influence and ‘make’ regulation.  
This chapter shows how regulation through reforms is conceptualised (sections 
6.1 and 6.2) and contested (section 6.3) in the state. I argue that the MWRRA 
faces a legitimacy crisis in the state as various actors resist, oppose or challenge 
its mandate. This is further reinforced through the discursive politics over 
entitlements (section 6.4 and 6.5), which reshapes the regulatory space in 
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Maharashtra. Through these various contestations, I locate the agency of the State 
in framing and reshaping the agenda of water regulation, thereby asserting and 
maintaining its control (section 6.6). 
6.1 On the Path of ‘Improvement’: the narrative of reforms and 
regulation (2000-2005) 
From 2005 onwards, under the World Bank-aided Maharashtra Water Sector 
Improvement Project (MWSIP), Maharashtra set itself on the determined path of 
reforms. It legislated in two separate Acts: Maharashtra Water Resources 
Regulatory Authority Act (MWRRAA, 2005) and Maharashtra Management of 
Irrigation Systems by Farmers Act (MMISFA, 2005). These two acts constitute 
the regulatory framework in the state. Not only were these Acts aligned to the 
aims of the national and the state water policies of institutional restructuring, but 
they also introduced the new vocabulary of the independent water regulator and 
the concept of entitlements into the water discourse of the state and the country.  
Though the MWSIP was formally inaugurated in June 2005, the negotiations for 
reforms between the senior officials in the state government, chiefly the Water 
Resources Department (henceforth the Department), began in 2001 and 
culminated in a reform package of 325 million US dollars being given to 
Maharashtra (World Bank, 2005). During this period, Maharashtra also launched 
its State Water Policy (SWP), which was developed with inputs from the Bank 
(KI20). Besides offering technical advice for the SWP, the Bank also had 
substantial influence in drafting the reform legislations: the MMISFA and the 
MWRRAA. The extent and degree of the Bank’s influence over the legislations 
has been variously described as considerable pressure by some officials, who 
agreed that the Acts were designed in consultation with the Bank (KI20, KI23, 
KI23), and as made behind the door by other observers of the reform process 
(KI07, KI08).  
Thus, for some senior officials it was the financial help, for some it was the 
technical expertise, while for others senior bureaucrats it was the muscle flexing 
by the Bank that led to these changes. These senior officials, who were either part 
of the dialogues with the Bank or participated in the Cabinet-level discussions 
during the legislation, agreed that the Bank was able to push through agendas 
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which, in normal circumstances, the bureaucracy would find difficult to get 
through the Cabinet (KI22). This also shows how bureaucrats view donor-driven 
programmes as circumventing political opposition. A senior bureaucrat serving at 
the Mantralaya (Secretariat, Maharashtra) during these negotiations characterised 
the role of the Bank in this manner: 
It is an outside agency which propels you to make change […] and they [the 
Department] went to the World Bank. However the Bank said that we will help 
you but you must carry out these reforms. The Bank is normally interested in 
carrying out reforms and distributing money on the basis of conditionalities and 
many a time these conditionalities are watered down. But in Maharashtra, people 
are more enlightened and ready to work for change (KI23). 
 
In Chapter 4, I described how certain changes within the lending policy of the 
Bank have made the states the focus of reform in the last two decades. However, 
the introduction of reforms in Maharashtra was also sedimented by a positive 
context. This has provided the institutional and ideational alignment for rolling 
out this process, which is the focus of the next section. 
6.1.1 The roadmap to reforms 
Between 2001 and 2005, the proposal for radical restructuring was underway in 
Maharashtra. The state also faced elections while the reform Bills was being 
discussed in the legislature. This delayed the passing of the Acts to some degree. 
But there were certain factors that provided continuity to this project of reforms. 
The most significant among these was the presence of Mr. Suresh V. Sodal, who 
headed the Water Resources Department as its Secretary and later became the 
Secretary of the MWRRA. A civil engineer by training and the Department’s 
man, Mr. Sodal’s continued presence during the formative years of reforms 
provided the required push for this legislation. In several of my interviews, he 
was described as the “man behind the reforms”, and this attribution resonated 
with the field level bureaucrats as much as it resonated at the top level of policy 
making.  
 
Mr. Sodal brought with him two key advantages for moving forward the water 
reform project. One, as the Secretary of the Department and later of the MWRRA 
(upon its formation in 2005), he provided bureaucratic continuity to the agenda of 
the reforms. His close influence on and institutional proximity to the Department 
provided some degree of legitimacy to the reforms. His credibility and 
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employment record at the Department also made for a cordial relationship 
between the MWRRA and the Department. In fact, as I show later in this chapter, 
the MWRRA office became a microcosm of the Department itself. Furthermore, 
given his experience of the water sector and his record of service within the 
sector, he was well regarded by all for his “missionary zeal” (KI06) for reforms, 
even among sections of civil society.  
Mr. Sodal started the negotiations with the Bank when he was the Secretary of the 
Department and ensured that these Acts were passed. His ‘good relations’ with 
the Irrigation Minister, Mr. Ajit Pawar, and his influence within and outside the 
Department were highly instrumental in mainstreaming this reformist project in 
the water sector in Maharashtra (KI22).  
This interlocking was further enhanced with the presence of Mr.Kale, also a 
technocrat, who had initially served with the Central government, New Delhi and 
now led the project for Maharashtra from the World Bank’s side. He explained 
that since he was familiar with the water scenario and institutional landscape of 
Maharashtra, the Bank was able to provide technical guidance and assistance in 
this restructuring project (KI02). These key officials acted as pivots to reforms, 
and their actions highlight a clear pattern of circulation of ideas and momentum 
through the levels of policy making. 
Mr. Kale listed three main ingredients for the reforms in Maharashtra. One, 
Maharashtra provided a suitable ground for these reforms as it had started to 
restructure its water sector even before 2000. Two, the ‘vision’ of the bureaucrats 
who could capture the idea of reforms, and three, their capacity to push it 
forward. While independent regulation and entitlements are new concepts in the 
state’s vocabulary, certain other ideas within the MWSIP, especially those related 
to farmers’ participation, are historically embedded in water sector of 
Maharashtra (see Chapter 5). Some department officials were also reticent about 
giving the Bank ‘credit’ for these reforms. They argued that Maharashtra was also 
following certain ‘good practices’ regarding accountability and transparency even 
before the reforms were introduced in 2005; the irrigation reports were published 
since the 1980s, though the documents were not made public until 2005. The state 
also initiated a process of benchmarking of projects in 2001 (KI02, KI26). This 
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willingness to move towards reforms and the presence of a ‘positive context’ - 
and most essentially the continuity provided at the top level of policy making - 
provide the framework for the introduction of reforms into the state.  
However, the Bank did require political commitment to these reforms to ensure 
the durability and sustainability of the project. (KI02). This political commitment 
is also congruent with Bank’s sector-wide strategy of restructuring, as explained 
in Chapter 4. In his interview, Mr. Kale agreed that the Bank had ‘pressured’ the 
Government of Maharashtra (GoM) to legislate for the MWRRAA and 
MMISFAA. He explained that the Bank imposed these conditions to ensure that 
“there is no going backwards on the law and the legislations will provide a legal 
backing to the reforms and that these were necessary conditions to avail the loan” 
(KI02). 
The Bank took its legal commitment extremely seriously and it is only when 
Maharashtra had brought these Acts into force that the MWSIP loan agreement 
was signed, between the Bank and the Government of Maharashtra. The 
introduction of the Acts and the MWSIP followed a clear chronology of events 
which made these legislations a mere curtain-raiser to the reform process that 
were about to unfold in Maharashtra from 2005 onwards. MWRRAA was 
published in the official Gazette on 4 May 2005, followed by the MMISFA on 19 
May 2005. The GoM entered into the agreement with the Bank on 26 May 2005 
(Thakkar, 2007). Cullet (2012), writing on donor led programmes, argues that 
such legislation (as MWRRAA) brought under pressure from development 
agencies undercuts the democratic process and are thus reduced to a rubber 
stamping exercise. This backdoor entry (Dubash, 2013) also meant a transfer of 
the Bank’s water managerialism and its corresponding narratives to strengthen the 
reformist discourse in Maharashtra.  
6.2 Recipe for Reform 
As argued in Chapter 4, the World Bank, in its country-specific documents, 
highlights the issues of scarcity and inefficiency that are pushing India towards its 
“turbulent future”(Briscoe and Malik, 2006). Likewise, the Project Appraisal 
Document (PAD) portrays the Maharashtra water sector as straining under water 
scarcity and intersectoral competition of water where irrigation is at the core of 
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reform; irrigation  uses 80 percent of the state’s water resources (Government of 
Maharashtra, 2005c; World Bank, 2005). The report states that the water sector in 
Maharashtra: 
is faced with critical challenges. First, competition among different sectors has 
increased dramatically; giving rise to disputes and conflicts […] the long term 
efficient and equitable intra and inter-sectoral management of the state’s water 
resources will become more critical. Second, poor quality irrigation service is 
undermining the performance of irrigated agriculture. Third, the limited cost 
recovery in the irrigation sector […] has added to the financial burden of the state. 
Fourth, planning and management of water resources in the state are fragmented 
and uncoordinated (World Bank, 2005: 1). 
As I met more and more officials in Mumbai over a period of eight months, this 
rationale for reforms was reiterated as an article of faith. They highlighted several 
problems in the water sector: low efficiency of water use in irrigation; 
overexploitation of groundwater; poor water delivery systems; high incidence of 
water pollution; inability to recover the costs of operation and maintenance 
(O&M); and intersectoral conflicts, especially within the context of increased 
urbanisation and industrialisation in the state (KI02, KI20, KI21, KI23, KI28). It 
is these issues that have come to characterise the “unregulated” nature of the 
water sector in Maharashtra (KI21). The water woes of Maharashtra were thus 
articulated as problems of demand and supply, or problems of irrigation potential 
created and irrigation potential utilised. In a newspaper interview, Mr. Sodal said: 
“All the water in the state is fully harnessed. All that we can do now is to improve 
the efficiency with which we use water” (Sodal quoted in Rajshekhar, 2006).  
Amidst these crisis portrayals, I was yet to understand the need for ‘independent 
regulation’ in Maharashtra. In my initial interviews, the desire for regulation was 
always articulated in a list of “ills in the water sector”, and regulation was felt to 
be absolutely fundamental to setting things right. Stirling (2005: 225) argues that 
framing policy is not simply limited to the choice of policy questions but also the 
setting of agendas and the bounding of institutional remits. Likewise, in 
Maharashtra these crisis portrayals also meant a particular way of seeing 
regulation.  
Since ‘independent regulation’ entered the policy world of Maharashtra through a 
reform project, regulation was increasingly conflated with reforms. It was 
conceptualised to serve different purposes, address ad hocism in water supply and 
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delivery, recover cost(s), induce efficiency and provide holistic understanding of 
water resource planning in the state (KI20). Moreover, the intersectoral conflicts 
made judicious allocation of water resources by a third party absolutely 
fundamental to the state (KI22). These framings were not consistent across policy 
actors as some attributed regulation with improvement of efficiency, some with 
addressing water conflicts and others with ‘improving’ the entire water sector 
itself. As I showed in Chapter 4, regulation made its way into the MWSIP 
through three different storylines: the narrative of the failing State; the success of 
models; and the need for water markets. But, in Maharashtra these rationales were 
becoming more and more obscure. In the next section, I unpack what the contours 
of this reform-led regulation were, and how it became embedded through: the 
State Water Policy, the MWRRA Act and the related provisions of the MMISF 
Act. I analyse how regulation was framed as a policy choice in the water reform 
discourse in Maharashtra, and how it was contested within and outside the state 
water apparatus.  
6.2.1 Instruments of change 
The SWP made a clear commitment to legislate in three Acts in order to 
restructure and revise the roles of the Department. Two of these Acts were the 
MWRRAA, which initiated the establishment of an independent water resource 
regulator, and the MMISFA for decentralisation of irrigation management, which 
made statutory provision for the constitution of WUAs (Government of 
Maharashtra, 2005a). Alongside these, the SWP also mentioned a separate Act for 
the constitution of River Basin Agencies (RBAs) to convert Irrigation 
Corporations into water services agencies
78
.  
These Acts indicated the formula for institutional restructuring, i.e. to move away 
from a ‘command and control’ style of operation to market-based water 
management and thus were the harbinger of the new regulatory framework in the 
water sector of the state. Endorsing this shift, Mr. Sodal mentioned in his 
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 The Constitution of RBAs was one of the key points of institutional restructuring in the state. 
Five RBAs were planned for the five river basins in Maharashtra (Krishna, Godavari, Vidarbha, 
Tapi and Konkan). The Irrigation Development Corporations for these five regions were to be 
restructured and reconstituted as RBAs (Government of Maharashtra, 2005c). These RBAs were a 
significant institutional mechanism for the implementation of reforms and entitlements. However, 
this Act had still not been passed until the completion of my fieldwork in October 2012. The 
water resources department and its machinery continued to perform the functions of the RBA, and 
implemented the entitlements in the field.  
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interview with the media that "as per the new policy, the state government is 
seeking to move out of its managerial role in these irrigation projects by 
effectively handing them over to agriculturists’ bodies” (The Business Standard, 
2004). 
Though the SWP mainstreamed the key principles of National Water Policy, it 
digressed from it in one fundamental way. In listing the water allocation 
priorities, the SWP gave priority to industry over irrigation and thus highlighted 
the development priorities of Maharashtra. In addition to this, it reaffirmed its 
faith in private sector participation. Introducing the vocabulary of independent 
regulation and entitlements, the SWP defined them as stable use rights issued by 
the State. It noted: 
[...] the state recognizes that there is considerable economic and social value in 
water user entities and service providers having a stable bulk entitlement to water. 
The State shall establish well defined, transparent system for water entitlements 
that cannot be unilaterally changed by any state, agency or authority (Government 
of Maharashtra, 2003: 10). 
 
The SWP defined entitlements but did not state clearly their implications. It did 
not expand on and define these rights and entitlements (Joy and Kulkarni, 2010). 
However the succeeding clause on the transfer of entitlements “between 
entitlement holders in any category of water uses” (Government of Maharashtra, 
2003: 10) pointed towards the intersectoral trading of entitlements. This was also 
dovetailed with an argument for compensation for such water expropriation 
(Government of Maharashtra, 2003). The changes in allocation priorities, and the 
introduction of entitlements that might be amenable for trading, and the clause on 
private sector participation - in sum the ‘market oriented reforms’ - opened the 
gates to heated contestation around entitlements, which will be explained later in 
this chapter.  
The entitlements were spelt out in the succeeding Acts. The MMISFA and the 
MWRRAA had overlapping responsibilities for managing the entitlements
79
. In 
order to “facilitate and ensure judicious, equitable and sustainable management 
and allocation of water resources”(Government of Maharashtra, 2005b: 434), the 
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 The provisions of entitlement distribution in the MMISFA are to be read alongside Sections 11 
to 14 and section 22 of the MWRRA Act (Government of Maharashtra, 2005a) which deal with 
criteria for entitlements and redressal of grievances. 
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MWRRA is required to set entitlements for various categories of uses (drinking, 
irrigation and industry) and the equitable distribution of entitlements within each 
category, and also to fix tariff rates for use of water for agriculture, industry and 
drinking water (ibid)
80
.  
 
The MWRRAA defined “entitlement” as an authorisation by any RBA to use 
water for the purposes of the Act (Government of Maharashtra, 2005b). They are 
“deemed to be use rights, which may be transferred, bartered, bought or sold on 
an annual or seasonal basis, within a market system and as regulated and 
controlled by the Authority” (Section 11 (i) (i), Government of Maharashtra, 
2005b). Determined on a volumetric basis and subject to review every three 
years, they deal with surface and sub-surface irrigation
81
.  
The onus of equitable and judicious allocation rested on this new but important 
idea of entitlements. The MWRRAA, however, turned out to be a very irrigation 
centric Act, in script and in practice. It is mainly concerned with bulk uses 
entitlements and tariffs on water i.e. water from the reservoir. It does not cover 
retail distribution or water supply systems i.e. drinking water. For industries, 
water is either delivered to the individual industries, which directly lift water 
from the dam, or delivered via the Maharashtra Industrial Development 
Corporation (MIDC). However, the regulations for agricultural uses of water are 
far more detailed and explicit. A senior bureaucrat, who also served as the 
Chairperson of the MWRRA, noted the irrigation bias but argued: 
The Act is definitely more irrigation printed but at the same time there is a 
realisation that you need to view water as a resource, which is not confined to 
irrigation and you need to look at the subject holistically rather than sector wise. 
And the MWRRA would do it. But, when we held public consultation from all the 
sectors, in practice they were all dominated by the irrigation sector (KI23). 
 
Though there was this underlying idea of resource perspective and inter-sectoral 
coordination, the MWRRAA was initiated by the water resources department. 
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 While tariffs and entitlements are two key regulatory tools, the 2005 Act also entrusts the 
Regulator with certain other functions. These include: 1) administration and management of inter-
state water resources and apportionment for river systems of the state, 2) review and clearance of 
water resource projects with special emphasis on removal of backlogs in the Vidarbha region as 
per the Governor’s directive (Government of Maharashtra, 2005b). 
81
 The Department officials and the MWRRA were swift to realise this gap between flow 
irrigation and groundwater, and efforts are being made to amend the MWRRAA to include 
groundwater. During my fieldwork (2011-2012), several officials told me that the Bill was 
awaiting the assent of the Governor (KI20, KI26). 
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This also resulted in the MWRRAA becoming more irrigation centric Another 
MWRRA official argued that since a higher proportion of water goes to 
agricultural uses, it is here that efficiency must be attained. He categorically 
stated that industrial uses of water are already ‘efficient’ in terms of cost 
recovery, but it is the agricultural uses which are responsible for the irrigation 
sector being “loss-making” (KI21). This also reflects the power of a particular 
world view in which irrigation, as a loss-making sector using 80 percent of the 
water resources of a water-starved state, needed to be ‘disciplined’ through cost 
recovery and allocation mechanisms such as entitlements. This narrative is also 
apparent in the emphasis on full cost pricing of water (see Chapter 4). 
All this means a larger role for the MWRRA in the irrigation sector. It is required 
to set the quota at the sub-basin/project level for equitable distribution of water in 
the command area of the project, on the basis of the land in the command area, 
with the caveat that during period(s) of scarcity each landholder would be given 
water to irrigate at least one acre of land. Also, in order to address tail-ender 
deprivation in the canal system, the Act also provides for tail to head water 
rotation. A local regulator, one per irrigation project, was to be appointed and he 
was to be the representative of the MWRRA. It is the regulator’s duty to ensure 
that the entitlements were delivered as per the Act (Government of Maharashtra, 
2005b; MWRRA, 2007). This also provisions of the MMISFA and the 
MWRRAA closer. 
The MMISFA (2005) dealt with the operationalisation of the entitlements to the 
WUAs. By making WUAs mandatory vehicles for receiving entitlements, the Act 
ensured that all irrigation projects would be decentralised to enable irrigation 
management transfer (Government of Maharashtra, 2005a)
82
. However it 
restricted this compulsory participation to landholders in the command area of the 
project. It stated: 
All the landholders and occupiers in delineated land of a Water Users’ 
Association at Minor Level shall be deemed to be the members of Water User 
Associations at Minor Level (Section 8 (2), Government of Maharashtra, 2005a). 
 
                                                          
82 However, to start with, 226 projects undertaken under the MWSIP were commissioned for the 
MMISFA experiment. The WUAs formed under the old Cooperative Act were also transferred to 
the new legislation to be covered under the MMISFA. This experiment was to be upscaled to the 
entire state within six years (KI20).  
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The entitlements are explained through three particular themes: volumetric 
measurement of water; freedom of cropping; and fixing of responsibilities for 
service delivery and distribution of water. Entitlements are described as “bulk 
water use entitlements or individual water use entitlements as determined by the 
Appropriate Authority from time to time” (Government of Maharashtra, 2005a: 
483). They are allocated to the WUAs concerned in terms of volume of water, 
which is calculated and measured at the point of supply. The Act notes that 
entitlements would ensure freedom of cropping since farmers would have prior 
knowledge of the volume of water to be received. While the Department retained 
responsibility for delivering water to the WUAs, the WUAs were responsible for 
delivering the water to the farmers as per their individual entitlements 
(Government of Maharashtra, 2005a). However, the Act did not specify how 
these individual entitlements were to be measured and supplied. 
However, the regulatory framework put forth in these Acts, MWRRAA and the 
MMISFA, glossed over questions of equity in distribution. The Chairperson of 
the MWRRA stated that “our responsibility stops at the outlet level and 
unfortunately we do not have any authority to regulate the internal distribution” 
(KI22). The MMISFA made elaborate provisions for various types of 
entitlements, which in effect defined the relationship between the Department and 
the WUAs. The Department officials maintained that once the WUA received 
water as per their entitlement, they would be able to distribute water among 
themselves, and efficiency would guarantee equity. This emphasis also reinforced 
the principle of cost recovery and standardisation of service rather than equitable 
distribution of water. By keeping retail distribution out of its mandate, 
distributional equity amongst users was kept out of the purview of regulation. 
Likewise, the Act focused on bulk water entitlements and not individual 
entitlements
83
. Entitlements therefore became guarantees from the WRD to the 
WUAs of the supply of water from the department
84
, but would not necessarily 
translate into guarantees of water to individual farmers. In Chapters 7 and 8, I 
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 The MWRRAA mentions individual entitlements with reference to groundwater but as Chapters 
7 and 8 will show entitlements were only calculated on canal water. 
84
 The MWRRAA discusses at length the distribution and criteria for entitlement distribution in 
irrigation i.e from WRD to WUAs. It has specific provisions for appointment of regulator and 
dispute resolution officers, who can be approached for breach of entitlements. This will become 
clear in Section 3 of this chapter which unpacks the concept of entitlements. 
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analyse how this framing interacted with the power ridden realities of the 
localized project. 
A close analysis of the SWP and the corresponding Acts highlights the nature of 
the reformist discourse that emerged up to 2005. The narrative of inefficiency 
associated with the loss-making irrigation sector, coupled with inter-sectoral 
conflicts, led to the creation of the image of a water stressed sector. The SWP and 
the Acts provided ‘technical’ recipes for addressing this water stress. It 
rationalised a specific, problem-solving approach as independent regulation 
became an answer to corruption and clientelism, where the entitlements as 
guarantees are defined and designed to ensure standards of water delivery rather 
than to ensure equitable distribution. Divergent views emerged as regulation was 
conceptualised in the water sector. It served three functions: it was a third party, 
which needed to curtail the powers of the Department; it was a vehicle to stem 
inefficiency in the water sector by standardising service with a definite emphasis 
on irrigation; and that the Regulator would build a resource perspective in the 
water sector. 
So far, I have presented the ‘official’ view of regulation and reforms. These Acts 
also generated a momentum of civil society participation. The particular 
development trajectories of the water sector in Maharashtra through PIM and 
pani panchayats have provided civil society with an authoritative voice in water 
discourses of the state (see Chapter 5). Though there are disputes over the nature 
of participation and how far their suggestions are factored into the policy 
processes, they have formed a strong bulwark against the Department. 
The civil society in Maharashtra comprise a wide ranging set of actors who do not 
necessarily have uniform positions on water issues, which are most often shaped 
by their area of work. For instance, Prayas, a Pune-based organisation led by 
Prof. Wagle from TISS bases its work on water regulation on the experiences 
gained in the electricity regulation sector. Led by engineers turned social 
scientists, Prayas has also organised several round-table consultations across the 
country to galvanise thinking on the rise of Independent Regulatory Agencies 
(IRAs) (also see Chapter 4) SOPPECOM is well respected for its ground-
breaking work on grassroots initiatives in the water sector. It has been at the 
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forefront of the participatory irrigation management movement in Maharashtra. 
Gomukh, on the other hand, works in the area of river basin management. These 
organisations are also joined by several independent activists, academics and 
political party workers across Maharashtra.  
 
In the implementation of reforms, there are limited avenues for the involvement 
of NGOs in the water sector reforms, except when they are contracted for specific 
services, such as building capacity for the farmers involved in these reforms 
(Chapter 7), or invited to take part in stakeholder/ public consultations. Several of 
these actors were members of the sub group constituted by the Planning 
Commission (see Chapter 4). They are invited to tariff consultations and other 
meetings at the Regulator’s office but, as a civil society member, noted “their 
presence does not mean that their perspective will be incorporated” (KI12). 
 
As far as the regulatory processes are concerned, civil society operates in 
two/dual capacities. As opposition to official and mainstream processes, they 
have come together under an umbrella organisation called MANCH, and have 
sedimented their activism in the state (discussed further in section 6.5.1). They 
have challenged the insulation and bureaucratisation of the regulatory process and 
pushed the boundaries of the regulatory space
85
. They have also been contracted 
as consultants or NGOs for implementing these reforms. For example, these 
leading organisations such as Prayas, Gomukh and SOPPECOM who have been 
critical of the reform process have also been working on studies commissioned by 
the MWRRA or the WRD. This also results in a degree of ambiguity regarding 
the positions of these leading civil society actors who, on one hand, oppose the 
government by challenging the regulatory mandate in the state (as I will show 
below) or propose alternatives to MWRRA (at the national level) but, on the other 
hand, continue to work alongside the Department/ Regulator and compromise on 
their critical positions, especially when they act as consultants to these institutions 
(see Chapters 7 and 8).  
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 Examples include changes such as making tariff papers available in Marathi at the taluka level, 
and making the consultations accessible to the public by pressurising the MWRRA to hold public 
consultations on tariffs in all revenue divisions, rather than only at the Mumbai office as originally 
scheduled. 
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Right from the start, organisations such as Prayas and SOPPECOM were highly 
critical of the insular process of reform. This also toughened their resistance 
against reforms, especially the MWRRAA. The next section highlights this 
contestation. By unpacking the resistance to the MWRRAA in its formative 
years, it shows how it faced widespread opposition from the start. From here I 
also begin to draw the contours of the regulatory space as I highlight the 
contestation around the MWRRA Act. 
6.3 The Bias at Birth: Resistance to MWRRAA 
Public consultations on the two Acts were organised during their formative years: 
2002-2003. Several NGOs regarded the regulator as an alien concept and an 
imposition from above (KI05, KI11, K114). They linked it to neoliberal 
understandings of reforms, and the evident ideational, financial and technical role 
of the Bank made it an object of suspicion in the eyes of civil society actors. By 
contrast, attitudes towards the MMISFA were more positive and garnered support 
from several sections of civil society in Maharashtra. In the formative years, 
MMISFA appeared more home-grown than the regulatory act, which alienated 
several actors in the state water sector. Various civil society actors and villagers 
registered strong protests when the MWRRA Act was introduced (Sainath, 2005). 
Certain clauses of the Act provoked deep resentment. These included provisions 
on: marginalisation of elected panchayats, imposing high tariffs for farmers with 
more than two children
86
, and making sprinklers mandatory in certain regions 
(Sainath, 2005). This section looks at the battle of ideas that started in the 
formative years of the MWRRA Act by highlighting the main axes along which 
the Act was contested. 
6.3.1 MMISFA vs. MWRRA 
Historical affinity with the concept of user participation in Maharashtra (see 
chapter 5) helped garner support for the MMISFA. In contrast to the Cooperative 
Act, the MMISFA provided an opportunity for a water-specific Act. It also 
removed the clause of voluntary participation of 51 percent (in the Cooperative 
                                                          
86 Section 12 (11) states that “Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, a person having 
more than two children shall be required to pay one and half times the normal rates of water 
charges fixed under the clause (d) of Section 11 [clause on tariffs] to get entitlement to water for 
the purpose of agriculture” (Government of Maharashtra, 2005b: :448). This particular clause was 
inserted at the Joint Committee deliberations in the State legislature and was the single point of 
discussion during the legislative debates in the formative years (KI20 and KI21). 
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Act) and provided for the “automatic” or compulsory participation of all the 
landholders in the command area. Mr. Bharat Kaware from SPK, the organisation 
which led the PIM movement at Waghad, also praised the automatic nature of this 
participation because, according to him, it would prevent the user association 
being taken over by the elite. However, the Act had certain limitations. 
SOPPECOM criticised the draft MMISFA for the nature of participation which 
was tied to land rights, and therefore froze the inequities in land distribution 
(KI10; KI11). They campaigned instead for the rights of the landless. Despite the 
criticism, this provision of land-based membership was retained in the final 
Act
87
(KI11). Largely though, the MMISFA met with a favourable reception, and 
there was no general resistance against the introduction of the Act itself.  
An academic and member from Prayas was insistent that it was “misleading” to 
consider the MMISFA as a product of the reforms because farmers’ participation 
has a legacy in Maharashtra and should be seen as rooted in the history of water 
management in the state. In his view “MWRRAA is certainly a part of the 
sectoral reforms but MMISFA started much earlier in the 1990s” (KI07). 
Similarly Joy and Kulkarni (2010) also confirm that the MMISFA legislation is 
“not radically different from the existing PIM practice in the state where the 
WUAs were registered under the Cooperative Act” (2010: 53). In contrast they 
argue that “the MWRRA Act has the stamp of having been made in haste, to take 
responsibility of taking hard decisions away from political figures and push it on 
the administration and to bring it in line with the current thinking of donors like 
the World Bank” (2010:52). 
With regard to the consultations organised for both these Acts, MMISFA had a 
fairly participatory input in comparison with the MWRRAA. Joy and Kulkarni 
(2010) recall that the MMISFA was one of the few pieces of legislation that was 
debated extensively among civil society organisations, as opposed to the 
MWRRA, which was “done in haste” (ibid:55). Prayas (2010a) also refers to the 
cosmetic nature of participation in the consultations
88
, where comments from 
members of civil society were rarely taken into consideration. In their analysis of 
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 The civil society activist campaigned for women’s representation in the WUAs, which was 
incorporated in the final Act (KI11). 
88
 I tried to access the minutes of the Secretariat Consultations which were organised during the 
formative years (2003-2005) but these were not available.  
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the consultation process, Wagle and Warghade (2010: 55) argue that “these 
consultations were limited to a small number of NGOs and were conducted in an 
unaccountable manner […] the comments and suggestions given in these 
consultations were not incorporated in the final bill”. 
 
The Department officials confirmed the lopsidedness of this participation, and 
noted that there was greater participation in the MMISFA than the MWRRAA 
(K126). This was reasoned out by another seasoned bureaucrat, also involved 
with the preparation of the MWSIP. He noted that on the institutional side, while 
the discussions on the MWRRA were generally held with the experts from the 
World Bank, for MMISFA the discussions were dominated by the Water and 
Land Management Institute (Aurangabad) and the Mantralaya (Secretariat, 
Mumbai) (KI29). This bias also played out effectively during my interviews with 
the senior policy makers in Maharashtra, who were eager to take ownership of the 
MMISFA as ‘their reforms’ but were less keen to talk about the MWRRA and the 
resultant changes. The moment I began to speak about the Regulator, my 
respondents appeared unfamiliar with the subject, but when I broadened the 
question and asked them about reforms in Maharashtra, they instantly referred to 
WUAs and the benefits of this reform. MWRRAA already looked like an 
abandoned project in 2011 (Field Journal, November 2011). 
 
For the Department and the Bank, the MMISFA underlined the shift from a 
command and control style of water management to the introduction of consumer 
behaviour and efficiency in water delivery. It revised the relationship between the 
State and the water users. Civil society members, such as SOPPECOM, saw in 
the Act the space to articulate issues of equity and justice for the small and 
marginal farmers, tailenders, the landless and women (KI11). For them, it was an 
extension of already established PIM principles in Maharashtra. In the case of the 
MMISFA this ensured a degree of alignment of context and ideas which was 
missing or limited in the case of the MWRRA.  
 
Since Maharashtra was one of the first states to appoint a water resources 
regulator, there was not enough local evidence and knowledge about a regulator. 
The policy makers as well as the civil society organisations often referred to the 
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international experiences in Mexico, Australia and Chile and attempted to 
extrapolate the evidence to the Indian context (see Chapter 4). As the World Bank 
“brought the international wisdom from other countries” (KI26), MWRRAA 
became more of the Bank’s idea. One of the senior bureaucrats remarked on the 
origin of the MWRRAA as follows: 
The World Bank scheme which came in, the project was designed by the Bank people 
and there was a space for a regulator, they needed a third party to regulate the 
supplier and the water user and therefore the concept of the regulator came into 
Maharashtra (KI22).  
 
In contrast, historical affinity brought MMISFA a general acceptance not just 
among the civil society actors but also, to a certain degree, among the Department 
officials. In contrast, the MWRRAA raised “more questions than answers” (Joy 
and Paranjape, 2009: 244). Echoing some of the concerns raised at the national 
level (Chapter 4), several civil society groups such as Prayas and SOPPECOM 
also began to question the need for a regulator in the water sector (KI10, KI12). 
6.3.2  Alienation and search for analogies 
The Bank’s stamp created an environment of scepticism and mistrust, and 
analogies from the international cases of Chile and Australia, where water 
entitlements and water markets already existed, became points of reference for 
resistance to the MWRRA (see Prayas, 2010a). Furthermore, given the lack of 
local experience of a water regulator, the experience of electricity sector reforms 
acted as a logical analogy for water sector regulation. This analogy, which formed 
a part of the Bank’s discourse, also translated into the state level and shaped the 
regulatory debate in different ways. The analogies drawn with electricity sector 
regulation in Maharashtra raised several questions about the comparability of 
electricity to water, and also concerns about path dependence in terms of private 
sector participation.  
Path dependence  
As argued in chapter 4, several reformist principles were tried out in other public 
sectors before they were introduced into the water sector. The power sector 
reforms were a ‘positive example’ for the reformers in the case of Maharashtra 
(World Bank, 1998a)
89
. The Maharashtra Electricity Regulatory Commission 
(MERC) was established in 1999 under a Central Act, later superseded by the 
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 Also interview with KI23. 
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Electricity Act (EA) of 2003. The presence of the electricity regulator helped in 
garnering support for the water regulator among the political leaders of the state. 
One of the senior bureaucrats remarked: 
These ideas were vetted in the 1990s during the liberalisation period; there was a 
need to have regulations and lift the authority of the government. The model of 
electricity sector reforms [where the MERC] would set tariffs was accepted by the 
Minister and the Chief Minister. Yes, we could probably have something good if 
we have a regulator in water. It [the electricity regulation] was the first Act for a 
regulator in the state, so the water regulator was modelled on this sector (KI23). 
 
This narrative of path dependence was premised on the idea of mimetic 
isomorphism. DiMaggio & Powell (1983) argue that goal ambiguity and 
uncertainty in the environment may also encourage imitation among 
organisations as they emerge. This leads organisational patterns from one sector 
to be applied to other sectors in conditions of organisational uncertainty. In the 
same way, electricity regulation gave legitimacy to the idea of a water regulator 
among the officials and the politicians, but this support was limited to functions 
of tariffs and cost returns. Functions that came specifically with a water centric 
regulator such as the entitlements, state water plan, etc., were missing from the 
debate in the formative years. One of the senior officials explained this 
institutional isomorphic trend as follows:  
We had a regulator in the telecom sector, the Telecom Regulatory Authority of 
India, and then electricity, then they [referring to the discussions in the Cabinet] 
said that this [water] is the sector which is not giving any returns, people are 
taking everything for free. Perhaps the regulator will bring some discipline into 
the sector (KI23). 
 
The official discourse rested on this powerful analogy of applying the ideas of 
electricity regulation to the water sector. This was further strengthened with the 
appointment of the first Chairman of the MWRRA, a retired senior bureaucrat 
who had headed the electricity regulator, MERC. This organisational uncertainty 
spread to civil society as well. Prayas, a civil society organisation which has 
worked very closely with electricity regulation in Maharashtra, was at the 
forefront of resistance to this regulatory intervention. This overlapping also meant 
a critique of a resource-based sector from the perspective of utility regulation. 
Comparing the two Acts, Mr. Warghade and Mr. Sathe from Prayas argued that 
the MWRRAA is weaker than the EA as it lacks certain positive and empowering 
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features regarding transparency and accountability that are present in the 
Electricity Act: 
The MWRRAA has emerged because of the World Bank. There may have been 
some influences from the electricity sector, but if you look at the water regulator, 
it is weaker than the electricity regulator. Many things that could have been 
adopted in the water law such as the participation process and reasoned order are 
not there in the water law. In case of entitlements, there is no provision for 
participation […] we have this kind of a water regulator because they have not 
learnt from the experience of the electricity regulator (KI08). 
 
While the experience of electricity regulation provided some degree of legitimacy 
to the MWRRAA, especially among politicians and senior policy makers, 
organisations such as Prayas have used a similar logic to critique the same model. 
They are still pushing for transparency and accountability processes to be adopted 
by the MWRRA. This overlap has also raised a serious concern about 
institutionalisation based on two fundamentally different sectors and how far this 
could be sustained. 
 
Electricity is part of the Concurrent list
90
 of the Indian state, while water forms 
part of the State list. This allows for some degree of state variation and autonomy 
in water governance. The nature of consumers is also different in these two 
sectors. Electricity has different kinds of consumers – household, commercial and 
industrial – whereas water regulation, as per the Act, is limited to bulk consumers 
such as industry, municipalities and irrigation (KI23). Beyond these 
organisational variants, the key bone of contention is the difference in the nature 
of the two resources. Several policy actors, including senior officials, some 
officials at the MWRRA, and civil society activists, agreed that these two 
resources differed in nature, constitution and governance. This scepticism 
questioned the very need for a regulatory model in the water sector in the state. 
This scepticism was articulated in this way: 
IRA may not be able to handle the water sector, it can handle electricity Water has 
specific characteristics: permeability of water; under the ground as well as the 
over the ground, it permeates with administrative and local jurisdictions. Water 
sources are different; there are geomorphological and topographical differences 
and water is needed for sustenance for humans and animals. This makes water 
different from other resources. You cannot have IRAs sitting at the state level and 
lording over different regimes and different socio-cultural understanding of water 
(KI07). 
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 Includes subjects in respect of which both the centre and states can legislate over issues. 
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What emerged through these comparisons was a tussle between the roles of the 
regulator: between the tariffs and the entitlements. The analogy with the EA was 
chiefly based on the tariff functions, and this won the approval from the Cabinet. 
It also simultaneously limited the discussion on other water specific functions of 
the MWRRA. This had a corresponding effect of prioritising the tariff role, which 
was more acceptable across the board than its role in terms of entitlements. There 
were several reasons for this difference in outlook. From the beginning, 
regulation was associated with pricing and tariff, because of the experience of 
electricity sector. Moreover, the provisions of tariff consultation did not apply to 
other provisions as entitlements or the integrated state water plan. Entitlements, 
on the other hand, were a new regulatory tool, not present in other sectors. Thus 
they were unique to the water sector. One of the officials explained that the 
entitlements came into the picture because of the Bank [because of international 
experiences of] Mexico and Chile (KI21, KI26). This limited knowledge and 
limited engagement with entitlements became a battleground for the regulatory 
mandate in the following years. 
Back door to privatisation of water 
Another downside of the path dependence approach was the argument of 
privatisation through the backdoor. Independent regulators, as in the case of 
electricity, heralded a phase of private sector participation in retail distribution. 
Several civil society actors felt that MWRRAA would be the gateway to private 
sector participation in the water sector. This fear was further accentuated by the 
fact that the SWP had clearly stated that private sector participation would be 
sought in the river basin operations (Government of Maharashtra, 2003). 
Moreover the MWRRAA explicitly mentioned the possibility of trading water 
entitlements. These statements created an environment of suspicion in several 
civil society organisations. Shripad Dharmadhikary, founder of the Manthan 
Adhyayan Kendra, a research organisation dedicated to monitoring and evaluating 
neoliberal reforms in the energy and water sectors, criticised the MWRRAA as a 
flawed model for water regulation (2007). For Dharmadhikary, a staunch anti-
privatisation activist, this Act reinforced the standard World Bank pattern of 
reforms. He argued: 
The World Bank has emerged as a knowledge provider. The assumption was that 
the public utilities are desperate and in disarray and the only way to put them in 
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order was full cost recovery to address their inefficiency. Therefore a body such 
as IRA was required to depoliticise this sector by setting up the tariff system, 
something that has been replicated in all the sectors. The purpose was to enable 
privatisation and advance a particular way of looking at water, the economic good 
approach to water (KI05). 
 
He stated that by introducing the language of marketisation, the regulatory act 
subtly legitimises the use of water by the highest payer (ibid). Water trading thus 
became the galvanising point for activism. News items with titles such as “sponge 
bath for the future” (Rajshekhar, 2006) painted an ominous picture of a future 
with MWRRAA. There was a genuine fear among several NGOs that the 
MWRRA would take the “water debate out of the political arena, make it a 
commercial process, demolish ideas of social justice and entitlements, and take 
something as basic as water into the realm of negotiable rights” (Rajshekhar, 
2006). The genuine fear underneath this resistance was privatisation of a public 
good, and the provision of water trading only amplified that fear. Dharmadhikary 
writes: 
The economic logic is that this trading will ensure that water is allocated to the 
highest value user - thus ensuring efficiency of use. What does highest value use 
or user mean? It means essentially money. A cubic metre of water used by a 
farmer on his land to produce a coarse cereal like jowar [sorghum] may yield only 
limited money to him. The same cubic metre of water used for a golf course will 
yield much higher profits. Thus, it makes for good economics for the farmer to 
sell his right to water to grow jowar to the golf course company (Dharmadhikary, 
2007). 
Water trading has been a contested area in the regulatory landscape since the 
drafting of the MWRRA Bill in 2003. Fear of privatisation charged the regulatory 
debate but, to the disappointment of civil society actors, these protests proved 
unable to influence the process and the outcomes radically, and the provisions on 
trading were retained in the 2005 Act. 
6.3.3 Resistance from within 
This resistance against the MWRRA was not merely limited to just the provisions 
for water trading and full cost recovery. There were certain other aspects that also 
moved the MWRRAA away from ownership and approval within Maharashtra. 
Foremost among these was the constitution of the Regulator itself. The regulatory 
body consists of a Chairman and two other members (experts) from water 
resource engineering and water resource economy, appointed by the Governor of 
the state on the recommendation of the Selection Committee, which includes 
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bureaucrats from various departments (Government of Maharashtra, 2005b). This 
makes MWRRA a non-majoritarian institution, i.e. one of those governmental 
entities that (a) possess and exercise some grant of specialised public authority, 
separate from that of other institutions, but (b) are neither directly elected by the 
people, nor directly managed by elected officials (Thatcher and Sweet, 2002). 
  
There was much scepticism amongst the Department officials related to the 
creation of an outside body such as the MWRRA. One of the senior officials 
involved with the discussions on the Bill at Cabinet level noted that there were 
inhibitions regarding the constitution of the MWRRA, which would be chaired by 
the retired Chief Secretary, a civil servant. He noted that there was fear in the 
Cabinet regarding outsiders penetrating the “closed irrigation bureaucracy” and 
that this might make the workings of the regulator difficult (KI23). Outside of the 
bureaucracy, civil society organisations resisted the creation of the Regulator as 
“technocratic and expertocratic” (KI07). At the time of the fieldwork (2011-
2012), among the four officials at the Regulator’s office, 3 were engineers who 
had served in the water sector with the Chairperson being a retired civil servant 
and a field economist. Civil society actors argued that members trained in 
economic and technical aspects might not address the social and political aspects 
of regulatory decisions about a dispersed resource such as water (Joy et al., 2011). 
At the official level there were recommendations to include regional 
representation from the six administrative divisions, but the civil society 
organisations demanded further representation, of farmers and the social sector 
(KI23, Prayas 2010).  
 
The Regulator’s office became a sub-group of the Department as it was linked by 
an “umbilical cord of staffing and bureaucratic housekeeping” (Hall et al., 2000: 
:26). In fact, there was substantial overlap of the working staff either working on 
deputation from the Department or joining the Regulator’s office post-retirement. 
The retired Chairman of the MWRRA commented on the implications of this 
overlap: 
In case of appointments, the Department coordinates with the Regulator. In water 
this is the odd thing that the Department is the service provider […] budget and 
other things are coordinated through the Department. The process has to be 
initiated by the Department and there is a little contradiction there because the 
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Regulator depends on the Department for vacancies and budget and at the same 
time it is supposed to treat the Department as the service provider. There is a 
contradiction of sorts! In course of time, we could expect that the Regulator will 
be financially independent. It might take some time. It all depends on whether the 
government wants to have the Regulator and make it independent (KI23).  
 
The Regulator made it clear that they are not subordinate to the Department but 
also that they will not “enforce or punish the department” as matters can be 
resolved amicably: “they are also our people” (K107). This ‘mix and match’ is 
also evident at the local level, where the local regulator is also an officer of the 
irrigation bureaucracy (discussed further in Chapter 7). The field level officers 
find it difficult to distinguish between the MWRRA and the Department as there 
is quite an overlap between the ‘the processes and the people’ at the top level. 
This cross-migration, which is justified on grounds of experience and costs, has 
smeared the independent image of the Regulator. It has also brought with it the 
hydraulic bureaucratic culture and its incumbent labels, to look at the water sector 
and its woes in the traditional closed sector approach.. For example, when I 
returned to Mumbai after the local level fieldwork, the staff at the MWRRA 
office was very keen to know what I had discovered during my study of the Jahot 
system. The wide range of questions included: “did you observe volumetric 
pricing? Were the meter gauges available? How did you measure the efficiency of 
water distribution?” (KI48, KI49) 
The creation of the Regulator as an expert body prioritising technical knowledge 
of water, and as an un-elected body of retired civil servants, went down poorly 
with several actors. Besides being the Bank’s creation, the Regulator also earned 
the reputation of being a body staffed with retired bureaucrats. This was a ground 
for resistance from both civil society organisations and the Department itself. It 
created a façade of independence since its officers were retired bureaucrats and 
most of them came from the Department itself. One of the officials defined the 
society as the “Maharashtra Water Resource Retired Personnel Rehabilitation 
Authority” (KI35). This nicely indicates the resistance within the Department. 
Another senior official involved with the project preparation expressed his 
disappointment over the regulatory design, which by-passed the arm’s length 
principle and had reduced the Regulator to a “protégé” of the Department (KI27). 
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The Department defended this model of dominance on account of experience, but 
it also sowed the seeds of capture by the Department itself.  
 
This section has revealed the limitations of the MWRRA in relation to its 
constitution, context and introduction of regulation into the water discourse of the 
state. The MWRRAA was an imported idea drawing heavily on the electricity 
sector, which added a spin to the regulatory discussion in Maharashtra. The 
constitution of the Regulator as a ‘protégé’ of the Department only added to this 
alienation and resistance within civil society as well as amongst some officers 
within the Department. This alienation and resistance, in the formative years, cast 
the MWRRA as an outsider in the water debate in the state. Post 2005, the 
MWRRA concentrated its efforts on developing the entitlements regime in the 
state. Six projects were chosen under the MWSIP to pilot entitlements, with the 
hope that they would be rolled out across the other projects in the next few years. 
The term entitlement generated curiosity, skepticism and doubt among various 
sections of the bureaucracy, academics, activists and NGOs working in the water 
sector. The Bank advocated entitlements for reasons of efficiency and with the 
idea of introducing water markets for water trading. The next section will show 
how this rationale was contested, challenged and diluted through the regulatory 
spaces and eventually became a powerful tool to trim the mandate of the 
MWRRA in Maharashtra.  
6.4 Technical rules, Political Results: the discursive politics of 
entitlements 
The MWRRAA defines entitlements as use rights: as “an authorisation given by 
the RBAs to use water for the purposes defined in the Act” (Government of 
Maharashtra, 2005b). However, water entitlements are not ownership rights but 
rights to use water, defined in the volumetric sense. Such entitlements cover both 
surface and sub-surface water sources. (Government of Maharashtra, 2005b). 
While the MWRRA allocated bulk rights, the basin organisations and, at a lower 
level, user organisations were given responsibility for day-to-day monitoring and 
enforcement.  
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For the Bank, entitlements meant a formal water rights system, leading to 
voluntary transfer of water, “making reallocation both politically attractive and 
practical” (Briscoe, 2005). For Briscoe and Malik (2006), entitlements lay at the 
heart of the 2005 Regulatory Act. To start with, the MWRRA established bulk 
water entitlements, even though the Bank placed emphasis on individual 
entitlements. However Prof.Maria Saleth, writing in defence of the (temporary) 
bulk water entitlements argued that while establishment of individual and 
transferable water rights was a long term strategy, the Bill had adopted a 
“politically and administratively pragmatic intermediate strategy of issuing bulk 
water entitlements” (Saleth, 2007: 300). Thus bulk water entitlements were a stop –
gap arrangement which would eventually translate into individual entitlements. 
 
However, the official framing of entitlements digressed from the Bank’s framing 
in two key ways. Instead of individual entitlements, the MWRRA instituted bulk 
water entitlements (KI21, KI26). Explaining this digression, the MWRRA official 
remarked:  
The World Bank model is different and they want to go beyond trading. They 
wanted a concept of individual entitlements where we should build a model in 
which the farmers within the WUA should also trade. Our response is, in any case, 
they can do it informally; there is no need to have formal rules (KI21). 
 
The Department officials defended their decision, arguing that “models of Chile, 
Australia and South Africa where farmers have large landholding could not be 
imported to the context of small landholders in India where average landholding 
size is two acres of land” (KI26). They defended their decision of implementing 
bulk entitlements instead of individual entitlements as both practical and 
manageable. Moreover, the Bank’s position on entitlements was that they were 
like any other property right which provides legal certainty, but should be 
delinked from land rights. However, the MWRRA Act froze these entitlements to 
landowners in the command area. The officials were unable to imagine the 
possibility of giving entitlements to people without land since irrigation water is 
only meant for agriculture. This limited the use of water to productive uses and 
downplayed its value for domestic uses (see Chapter 4 and further discussed in 
Chapter 8). 
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Moreover, for the Department officials, there was also an inherent fear underlying 
the entitlements. A senior official revealed that several officials feared that if 
entitlements were strictly defined as legally backed rights for farmers, “they 
might have to face the court every other day” if they failed to deliver water 
(KI26). Therefore entitlements were not as normatively charged as water rights in 
other countries such as South Africa where equity and social justice are central to 
the water allocation reform (see Movik, 2012; Woodhouse and Chhotray, n.d.). 
Thus, though the MWRRA Act made entitlements legally enforceable, it also 
imposed several riders on the concept of entitlements. For example, entitlements 
are further broken down into: sanctioned water entitlements which are fixed on 
the basis of capacity of the system to deliver water; applicable water entitlement 
for the particular year contingent on water availability in the reservoir; and 
entitlement during the scarcity period. This differential framing of entitlements 
undermined their enforceability and equated them with quotas (Upadhyaya, 
2005). Finally, the water that was delivered to the water user entity per season 
was still called the quota. As much as the Act created different types of 
entitlements, the policy language used to describe these entitlements was still 
‘quotas’, similar to what had existed before the reforms. Mosse (2004) rather 
argues that policy goals and their project instruments do not bear a singular 
rationality: they are a result of complex negotiation over meanings. Likewise the 
concept of entitlements has a certain degree of ambiguity and this very ambiguity 
has not only provided the space to manoeuvre but also undermined the rights 
based potential of entitlements.  
Civil society activists have contested this conceptualisation of entitlements as an 
efficiency centric principle and advocated the principle of equity in entitlements. 
SOPPECOM, for instance, advocates for a rights-based framework, which 
prioritises basic needs, livelihood needs, environmental and socio-cultural needs, 
while also allowing for economic use of water (Joy et al., 2011). SOPPECOM’s 
livelihood framework is similar to the ethic which lay beneath the pani panchayat 
model (see Chapter 5). They also support delinking land rights from water 
entitlements, and draw a clear line of separation from the Bank’s position: 
For the World Bank, the rationale for delinking water rights from land rights is to 
make it a commodity. For social movements and grassroots initiatives committed 
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to the equity agenda, the rationale for delinking of water and land rights [is] to 
create access to the resource poor sections including the landless (Joy et al., 2011: 
14). 
While several other civil society actors support SOPPECOM’s demand for 
delinking water rights from land, they are wary of operationalising this rights 
framework. Prof. Purandhare, a retired Professor at the Water and Land 
Management Institute (Aurangabad), is severely critical of the way reforms have 
unfolded in Maharashtra. Having observed them since 2001, he is sceptical 
whether “rights to the landless” can eventually be worked out (KI16). Likewise 
others also made his scepticism apparent, stating that rights to the landless may be 
a distant dream, and “first we need to work on getting water to the marginalised 
farmers in the command areas of the project” (KI07). 
So when the MWRRA hosted a meeting about water trading in January 2012, it 
created quite a stir in the policy circles. A draft paper on water trading was 
circulated by the MWRRA to elicit responses from various sections (MWRRA, 
2012). This meeting was attended by several NGOs and representatives from the 
Department. In the draft paper, the Regulator proposed the provisions of “trading 
within the sector for now” but did not rule out the possibility of inter-sectoral 
trading. Pitched in the rights language, the organisations representing several 
sections of Maharashtra were critical of the use ‘commoditised’ language of 
trading. A seasoned political activist argued: 
The first step is to give equal rights to water […] Water distribution is not 
happening according to the principles of social justice. First they (farmers) should 
get water and then we should think of trading […] the substitute for the use of 
trading is sharing; how can you include a market oriented concept? Water is an 
important constituent for social development […] we cannot permit business on 
hakkadari (entitlements) It is a bluff (Field Journal, January 2012). 
This meeting reinforced the significance of situated meanings in the policy 
discourse. The resistance to the idea of trading not only reemphasised the anti-
privatisation, anti-commodification position of several civil society members, but 
also voiced their stringent opposition to the anti-expert character of the Regulator. 
This meeting further opened the debate on entitlements; the discussion was not 
just limited to its conceptualisation of commodity vs. rights, but also included 
issues of implementation of entitlements in the state from 2007 onwards. It 
touched upon the character and implementation of reforms, the poor condition of 
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water delivery and infrastructure and the near absence of entitlements in most of 
the field sites. This meeting thus opened up a previously closed sector to scrutiny 
from the outside.  
Since the conception of the MWRRAA from 2000 onwards, entitlements and 
trading have been viewed suspiciously by civil society. The Bank, the 
Department and the Regulator conceptualised entitlements as a tool for 
efficiency. They came up with elaborate criteria and calculations to determine 
entitlements based on the optimistic assumption that standardisation of service 
would ensure equity in distribution. However, the mobilising point for civil 
society was on the grounds of equity and distributive justice. They saw the Act as 
laying a duty on the State to provide water, and more radically as a protection of 
the rights of farmers to receive water. In time, entitlements also became the 
grounds for opening a discussion on the character and implementation of reforms. 
The Regulator, however, remained reticent about its proactive role. One of the 
officials stated: 
Everyone wants to fire from our shoulders and to make us fight for their cause. 
This is not the job of the Regulator. Probably civil society wants a proactive 
Regulator but that is not possible as we function strictly within the boundaries of 
the Act (KI21). 
Within the regulatory space of Maharashtra, the introduction of entitlements as 
formal rights backed with legal certainty was a positive measure but the actors’ 
opinions differed from each other as to the purpose and goals of these 
entitlements. For the Bank, entitlements were half-way to water markets where 
water could be allocated to the highest bidder. The Department officials in 
Maharashtra saw them as legal fetters and wanted to keep the intent of the Act as 
narrow as possible and thus entitlements came with several caveats. The 
MWRRA interpreted the Act to the letter and was not willing to push the 
boundaries. Civil society actors, though sceptical of the market-oriented origins 
of entitlements, were keen to push the idea in the direction of equity and some, 
such as SOPPECOM, extended it to a rights based framework.  
This section has shown how entitlements were narrowly defined in the policy 
language and how civil society tried to extend their scope. From 2007 onwards, 
the Regulator began to pilot entitlements in five selected sites (Ghod, Kukadi, 
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Mangi, Diwale and Benikre), with the intention of rolling them out to all the 
projects in the state in the next six years. However, from 2008, certain 
developments in the Vidarbha region
91
 related to the Upper Wardha project began 
to shape the politics and future of entitlements. This had an enormous impact on 
the jurisdiction of the Regulator itself. The next section shows how entitlements 
became a battleground for the jurisdiction and existence of the Regulator. 
6.5 The Politics of Sectoral Allocation: the ‘shrinking’ of 
entitlements (2008-2011) 
Prior to 2005 MWRRA Act, a High Power Committee (HPC)
92
 decided on water 
allocation in Maharashtra. These decisions were often based on ad hocism and 
political opportunism (Wagle et al., 2012). In order to avoid the influence of 
government, and in accordance with the rationale of ‘independent’ regulation, the 
Regulator was given the mandate, by the 2005 Act, to determine and enforce 
entitlements for drinking, industrial and agricultural purposes (Government of 
Maharashtra, 2005b). While the Regulator was piloting the use of entitlements in 
six projects, a controversy regarding the illegal transfer of agricultural water to 
industry achieved political dimensions. This case was referred to the High Court 
(by the aggrieved group of farmers) stating that diverting water without the 
sanction of the Regulator was an encroachment of their rights and therefore 
illegal. The case refers to the Upper Wardha dam controversy in Vidarbha region 
of Maharashtra. 
 
The Wardha case spurred the government into action which was intended to 
clarify the role of the state government vis-à-vis sectoral allocation and 
entitlements. (Writ Petition No. 1038/2010, 2010a; Government of Maharashtra, 
2011d). However this Amendment had a major impact in revising the regulatory 
space in Maharashtra since it substantially affected the powers of the Regulator. 
This section looks at the politics of allocation through the case of the Upper 
                                                          
91Vidarbha is the Northern region of Maharashtra covering the Nagpur and Amravati divisions. 
See Chapter 5 for a discussion on regional development.  
92
 The 2003 Water Policy of Maharashtra accorded higher priority in water use to industry over 
agriculture. This was followed by a promulgation of a Government Resolution, which provided 
for the constitution of a Ministerial Level Committee, the HPC. It was constituted to make 
decisions on allocating and reserving water for non-irrigation uses based on a high priority being 
given to industry (Wagle et al., 2012).  
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Wardha dam, which revised and reshaped the definition of the entitlements and 
thereby the role of the MWRRA in the Maharashtra. 
6.5.1 The Upper Wardha case 
In 2008, the HPC decided to transfer 87.60MMᶟ water from the reservoir of the 
Upper Wardha project to a thermal power project and defended the decision on 
the grounds of the water allocation priority listed in the SWP 2003, which placed 
industry ahead of irrigation (Government of Maharashtra, 2008). This case of 
water diversion from agriculture to industry resulted in the loss of 23,219 hectares 
of irrigated area and increased the non-irrigation use of water from the reservoir 
from 19 percent to 32 percent (extract from the Writ Petition No. 1038/2010, 
2010b). In a Public Interest Litigation (PIL) filed in 2009 at the state High Court, 
this decision was challenged on two grounds: first, Vidarbha has a special status 
for Backlog Prevention and thus this decision to divert water was a violation of 
Article 371 (2) of the Indian Constitution
93
; second, the decisions on diversions 
infringed the authority of the MWRRA as per the provisions of the 2005 
MWRRA Act, whereby the Regulator had the right to determine water allocations 
(ibid). 
The petitioners noted that the MWRRAA 2005 empowers the MWRRA to 
regulate and allocate water for “different categories of use” (domestic, 
agricultural irrigation, agro based industries, industrial or commercial, 
environmental etc.). These were interpreted as powers of sectoral allocation, 
through determining the criteria for issuance, modification and monitoring 
(extract from the Writ Petition No. 1038/2010, 2010b). The HPC therefore had 
bypassed the authority of the Regulator
94
 by deciding on diversions for a project 
for which entitlements had not been duly calculated by the Regulator.  
While this case was sub judice the state legislature moved two successive 
Ordinances (2010 and 2011)
 
to amend the MWRAA Act (2005), the final 
amendment being in April 2011. In this intervening period, civil society actors 
                                                          
93
 Article 371 of the Indian Constitution (Government of India, 1950) provides special powers to 
the Governors of the states of Maharashtra and Gujarat, under the directives of the President of 
India, to provide for: separate development boards in the regions of Marathwada and Vidarbha in 
Maharashtra or any area of Saurashtra and Kutch; and also for the equitable allocation of funds in 
these areas. This is to redress the issue of balanced regional development in these two states. 
94
 Under Section 21 of the MWRRAA (2005), the Authority also has special responsibilities with 
regard to the backlog regions as per the Governor’s directives. 
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galvanised under an umbrella platform called the Lokabhimukh Pani Dhoran 
Sangharsh Manch (MANCH). This included several civil society organisations, 
independent activists and academics working on water issues in Maharashtra. 
Dharnas (sit-in protests) were organised outside the legislature and pressure 
mounted to stall the amendment. MANCH opposed the Ordinance, and the 
amendment bill could not be passed in the following inter session of the state 
legislature in 2010. Taking cognisance of this, the government revoked the 
Ordinance and issued a fresh one for the next six months. In the summer session 
of April 2011, MANCH resisted the tabling of the bill, but could not prevent its 
passage. The Bill was passed clandestinely in the middle of the night, at 1.30 AM 
on 14
th
 April, the only working day between two holidays (Prayas, 2011). This 
clearly was a deliberate strategy to evade the mounting resistance. In the light of 
the protests against this pro-industry move, the government decided to amend the 
allocation priorities in the State Water Policy. It now gave a high priority to 
agriculture over industry, but retrospectively provided immunity to all decisions 
on diversions. The amendment stated that diversions which had been approved by 
the HPC before the promulgation of the 2010 Ordinance could not be challenged 
in court and “shall be deemed to have been granted in accordance with the 
provisions of this Act”(Section 6 (31B),Government of Maharashtra, 2011c)95. 
The amendment clarified the roles of the state government and the MWRRA in 
relation to allocation of water (Government of Maharashtra, 2011c). It stated that 
the Cabinet has the sole authority to determine allocation as these decisions have 
a bearing on the economic development of the state (Government of Maharashtra, 
2011d). The state Cabinet now had the power to determine the allocations for 
various categories of use (drinking, industry and agriculture) and the Regulator 
would determine entitlements within those categories.  
The amendment also created a distinction between sectoral allocation and 
entitlements (understood to be the same under the 2005 Act) and made 
entitlements subservient to the category of allocation. While the initial Act of 
2005 defined the powers of the Regulator vis-à-vis the entitlements as to 
“determine the distribution of entitlements for various categories of use and the 
                                                          
95
 See appendix 11.4 for the relevant provisions of the Act. 
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equitable distribution of entitlements within each category” (Section 11 (a), 
Government of Maharashtra, 2005b), the Amended Act 2011 revised and limited 
that power “to determine the criteria for entitlements” (Section 3 (1) (a), 
Government of Maharashtra, 2011c)
96
 thus reducing the mandate of the Regulator 
to determining criteria instead of enforcing its entitlement prerogative.  
Furthermore, the amendment ensured that entitlements are only applicable within 
projects, which are delineated under the MMISFA Act (insertion 31A) 
(Government of Maharashtra, 2011c). This effectively reduced the regulatory 
reach of the Act to the 226 projects taken under MWSIP and some of the old 
projects which were transferred from the Cooperative Act to the new MMISFA 
Act.  
The amendment brought to light the policy obscurity (Wagle et al., 2012) at the 
state level where much of this vagueness had resulted from the imported concept 
of independent regulation. The lack of debate within the legislature in the 
formative years led to this situation. Cullet et al. (2010) claim that reformist 
legislations, congruent with international commitments, are often a big bang 
approach, rather than a long process of evolution that progressively adapts and 
updates existing laws in areas that have been unregulated in the past. The 
amendment controversy also underlined this fact. In 2005 when the initial Act 
was tabled in both houses of the legislature, there was minimal discussion on the 
nature of changes and the implications of this Act. Even the Joint Committee 
convened to discuss the Act did not suggest any major revisions in its provisions 
(Government of Maharashtra, n.d.).  
Introducing the Act, Mr. Ajit Pawar, the irrigation Minister, reinforced the 
scarcity situation in Maharashtra, and the importance of the MWRRAA and 
distribution of water. However, most of the discussions related to imposing high 
water charges for farmers with more than two children (Maharashtra Legislature, 
2005)
97
. It is evident from the report and the discussions that were held between 
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 See appendix 11.4 for the relevant provisions of the Act. 
97
 The Joint Committee also made some recommendations but these focused on water for 
irrigation and not the inter-sectoral implications of the Act. Some of the recommendations of the 
Committee related to use of water distribution, priority in water distribution, increase in irrigation 
potential, incomplete irrigation works and use of volumetric supply of water to farmers, etc. 
(Government of Maharashtra, n.d.). 
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2003 and 2005 that intersectoral water distribution was considered only 
superficially, and there was a conspicuous absence of any debate over the 
implications of concepts such as entitlements (Maharashtra Legislature, 2005; 
Government of Maharashtra, n.d.) 
However, the Upper Wardha case (2009) was an eye opener for the political arm 
of the State, which was spurred into action, producing Ordinance and 
amendments from 2010 onwards. The discussions in the state legislative 
assembly and state legislative council are testimony to this fact. In the legislative 
discussions, the Minister for Irrigation provided “clarification” for the 
Amendment, stating that MWRRAA is in contravention of the Maharashtra 
Irrigation Act, 1976, which gives the government power to determine allocations, 
and that therefore it was urgent to clarify the role of the government (Government 
of Maharashtra, 2011e; Government of Maharashtra, 2011b). He also asserted 
that the government had “the right to make sectoral allocations as in a democracy, 
this right resides with the elected representatives of the government” 
(Government of Maharashtra, 2011e: 3). Though these discussions were 
dominated by debates on lopsided regional development in Maharashtra, with 
special reference to Vidarbha and Amravati regions, even within these 
discussions the debate focused not so much on “who has the authority to decide” 
but the politics of regional development within the state. 
The character of the legislative debate, about the introduction of the Bill in 2005 
or about the amendment in 2011, is symptomatic of a particular politics of 
contingency which revolves around preserving the interests of powerful players 
and appeasing certain constituencies, especially the industry. From 2003 to 2010, 
the HPC diverted approximately 2885 mcm (million cubic metre) of water from 
irrigation to non-irrigation uses across 43 dams in Maharashtra, where 31 percent 
of dams are in Vidarbha (Prayas, 2010b; Greenpeace, 2012).  
The MWRRA official agreed that entitlements could protect such diversions, but 
not for long because under the provisions of the Act entitlements must be 
reviewed every three years. Irrigation must give way to other uses that are 
congruent with the development priorities of Maharashtra, pointed out another 
MWRRA official (KI21). In the policy circles of Maharashtra, the image of an 
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industrial and rapidly developing and urbanising state is increasingly used as a 
strategic metaphor to limit irrigation use. However, these diversions are often 
politically motivated rather than part of a strategic policy toward irrigation 
reform. The Upper Wardha project is located in the underdeveloped and 
politically weak constituency of Vidarbha (Chapter 5), and has now become the 
powerhouse for the rest of Maharashtra. This region also has one of the largest 
clusters of water-guzzling thermal power plants. For example, a Greenpeace 
(2012) report states that by 2010, Vidarbha had over 71 thermal power plants at 
various stages of approval. It also states that between 2003 and 2011, nearly 
398.87 mcm of water was diverted from agricultural to industrial uses per year, a 
volume capable of irrigating 77, 794 hectares of farmland (ibid).  
Thus protection against diversions through entitlements could not now be legally 
enforced in the non-reform/ non-MWSIP projects. This political wrangling also 
shows how the water resource regulator to a great extent became an irrigation 
regulator chiefly responsible for bulk uses and intra sectoral water uses. An 
MWRRA official in the regulatory office described it as follows: 
The basic doubt is [after the amendment] whether we are a water regulator or an 
irrigation water regulator. If we are a water regulator, we should decide with our 
job on sectoral allocation and water allocation for domestic purposes. This was a 
grey area in the Act and with the amendment Act, this has been clarified (KI22). 
 
This exercise of clarification also turned the MWRRAA into “a toothless tiger” 
(KI22). Though it continues to deal with uses of water, it does not have the power 
to allocate. One of the Department officials registered his disapproval and said, 
“The politicians should not have done this; the soul of the MWRRAA has been 
taken away and now the body is redundant” (KI32).  
My fieldwork started in the aftermath of this amendment and there was a great 
deal of scepticism in the MWRRA office. As some MWRRA officials 
complained about the political invisibility (KI22) of the MWRRA, another 
official warned me that “by the time [I] finish [my] fieldwork, the MWRRA may 
not be around” (KI22). This changed climate in the light of the amendment had 
far-reaching implications for the regulation reform, which started in 2005. The 
following section shows how the amendment decision was received by various 
actors and what it meant for the regulatory mandate on entitlements. 
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6.5.2 Of laws and authority: challenging the regulatory mandate 
The response to this amendment was mixed. Though in principle the conditions 
of the Bank loan had been transgressed through this amendment, the Bank 
continued to support the MWSIP. Moreover the amendment came into force in 
2011 when the MWSIP was in its last year of operation. A Bank official defended 
its position, saying: 
A Regulator has no business to make policy especially in a democracy. The job of 
the Regulator is that of an umpire. It needs to reconcile with realities (KI02). 
While the Bank seemed to accept the political realities of Maharashtra, sections 
within the bureaucracy, the Regulator and the civil society were divided on the 
legitimate role of the Regulator in terms of its right to determine allocations. The 
amendment brought to light the problems of the regulatory mechanism’s 
institutional design and exploded the myth of the independence of the Regulator 
in a state with an industrial mandate for development. It also pointed to the fact 
that the Regulator faced legitimacy crises in the state: several political parties, 
civil society groups and some sections within the bureaucracy opposed the 
mandate of the Regulator itself. There are four key issues that emerge from this 
politics of amendment. 
The first relates to the contestation within civil society. Some organisations such 
as SOPPECOM and Prayas had opposed regulatory intervention since the start in 
2003. They saw the MWRRA as a creation of the World Bank, put in place to 
pave the way for water privatisation. For them, the amendment was a welcome 
move to curtail the powers of the MWRRA. However, they resisted the idea that 
the power to allocate water should be transferred to the Cabinet and not to the 
legislature; they termed this change a transfer from ‘one expert body to another’, 
which would still leave allocation undemocratic (KI08).  
The second issue relates to the legitimate role of the Regulator in water resource 
management and the development of the state. The amendment meant redrawing 
the jurisdiction of the Regulator. Some senior officials from the Department as 
well as the MWRRA concurred that the original Act had been vague about 
sectoral allocation and the amendment had clarified this role. However, it is also 
true that until the 2010 Ordinance, the MWRRA had interpreted sectoral 
allocation as being within its mandate. Several documents and presentations made 
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by the MWRRA officials at different forums verify this fact (Sodal, 2009; Sekhar, 
2011). This amendment made clear the distinction between entitlements and 
allocation, and made entitlements subordinate to the category of allocation. It 
restored the right to determine entitlements with the Regulator, but qualified the 
implementation of entitlements to irrigation with a caveat that they would only be 
implemented in projects where WUAs were already in place (Government of 
Maharashtra, 2011c). From 2008 to 2010, until the Ordinance came in, this 
deadlock resulted in several cases of water grabs and illegal diversions
98
. It 
therefore limited regulatory reach and veritably removed the politically sensitive 
decisions about allocation from the body which had been created to take such 
‘political’ decisions in ‘apolitical’ ways. One of the officials clarified the role of 
the Regulator in the following way: 
Our decision is to let the economic planning be with the government and since 
sectoral allocation is an important constituent of economic planning, it will be in 
the domain of the government. It is the government that will decide which user 
should be allocated what percentage of water (KI21). 
 
The third and the most significant point is the role of the political leaders of the 
State. The amendment politics is in line with Lele’s (2000) argument that the 
political arm of the state cannot be bypassed for long in matters affecting water 
policy. Several sections of bureaucracy and civil society read in this amendment 
the malafide intentions of the politicians or a deliberate strategy of policy 
obfuscation to promote water grabbing, since the legislature showed ‘great 
urgency’ to amend the Act even before the court gave its verdict on illegal 
diversions (Wagle et al., 2012). By making the establishment of the WUAs a 
mandatory condition for the enforcement of entitlements, the amendment pushed 
the agenda of judicious allocation of water resources into some distant future and 
made the non-MWSIP project sites amenable to illegal diversions. A member 
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 While the Upper Wardha case was sub-judice, the Regulator received a petition related to a case 
of water diversion in May 2010 from agriculture to industry in the Hetavne. The Regulator put the 
case on hold until judgment was made on the Upper Wardha case. In the case, Professor ND Patil 
and others vs. Chief Engineer, Konkan Region, and others, the petitioners approached the 
Regulator citing section 11(a) of the 2005 parent Act, which gave the Regulator the power to 
determine and distribute entitlements (Case no. 3 of 2010, 2010). However with the Ordinance 
(Government of Maharashtra, 2011d) and Amendment (Government of Maharashtra, 2011c), the 
case was dismissed in face of a similar defence of amended authority, as in the case of the Upper 
Wardha. 
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from Gomukh outlined the predominant role of the legislature in drawing the 
boundaries of regulation in the following way: 
How much does the legislature want to push in and make it [the power of the 
Regulator] a broad spectrum? If the legislature was interested, the Regulator could 
have been powerful but the mandate has been kept thin by intent. The political 
intent of these reforms is quite narrow. Moreover the changes that the MWRRA 
wants to introduce, such as accountability etc., are fairly ambitious and difficult to 
come by because of the attitudinal baggage of the colonial and feudalistic ties, the 
centralised nature of the bureaucracy and the existing inertia within the Irrigation 
Department (KI18). 
 
This politics over allocation redefined the concept of entitlements, from inter-
sectoral and limited it to intra-sectoral. Now the MWRRA was responsible for 
distribution of water within sectors once the allocation priorities had been decided 
by the ministerial Cabinet. Entitlements in the irrigation sector inextricably tied it 
to the provisions of the MMISFA, a domain of the Department. The MMISFA 
required several criteria of delineation and rehabilitation to be fulfilled, which 
also required financial approval from the Department. The Regulator asserted that 
it was the government’s prerogative to take projects under entitlements, and it 
could not intervene on allocation and diversion issues in non-MMISFA projects 
(KI21).  
 
While the amendment had clarified the role of the Regulator, it also brought to 
the fore its reticence to adhere to a reactive rather than a proactive role. The 
NGOs had pushed for a proactive regulator, one that needed to intervene in 
projects by speeding up the entitlement programme and establishing the principle 
of equity, as promised in the Preamble of the Act. However the Regulator 
maintained that it could not transgress the Department’s prerogative of taking up 
the entitlement programme. This position also highlighted the ‘disputed’ role of 
the Regulator vis-à-vis the entitlement programme in the post-amendment period. 
Since the Cabinet was “dragging its feet on sectoral allocation” (KI21), the 
Regulator could not intervene in cases of illegal diversions unless they came 
within the entitlement programme. This was a prerogative of the Department, and 
the MWRRA needed to receive a complaint regarding transgression of 
entitlements before it could get involved. One senior MWRRA official remarked: 
The Authority can only be a catalyst and motivator of the department. To expect 
that the authority will be leading the entitlement programme is wrong. The 
entitlement programme is of the Department. The Authority is only a regulator 
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and fixing the criteria and tariffs; other things have to be done by the department 
as they have the staff to do it (KI22). 
The amendment also led to a certain devaluation of the entitlement function 
within the MWRRA. The weightage varied according to the preference of each of 
the four members of the Regulator. The Chairperson maintained that entitlements 
were no longer a key role of the Regulator in the absence of sectoral allocation, 
and that tariffs should be the Regulator’s main focus. Moreover there was general 
acceptance of its role in issuing tariffs, among politicians and with some 
contestations, within the civil society (KI22). Entitlements on the other hand were 
neither subject to such public consultations nor could be made technical, 
apolitical or scientific now. They were already being discursively shaped in the 
regulatory space of Maharashtra.  
 
This shift in emphasis also meant a degree of confusion over the ownership of the 
entitlement programme between the Department and the Regulator, and created 
problems of jurisdiction, control and accountability. The ambiguity only 
reinforced a culture of blame. One of the members in the Regulatory office 
maintained that - 
The Department does not own the entitlement programme. They have formed the 
WUAs and given them entitlements [and argue that] it is the work of the 
Regulator from there. What we are saying is that the whole entitlement 
programme belongs to the Department. Our job is to fix the criteria. The 
Department tells us that the field level officers are at your beck and call. They 
send reports but the Department doesn’t know what is going on […] We should 
monitor the Department and not the field level officer! (KI21) 
 
On the other hand the Department maintained that entitlements were the 
Regulator’s project and they should monitor and implement them (KI26). 
Bridging these two extreme positions, there were some officers in the Department 
and in the Regulator who maintained that entitlements are more diffused than 
tariffs, and it was thus a “joint responsibility” of the Department and the 
Regulator (KI24). The reformist discourse on regulation was premised on the 
myth of an independent Regulator which would ensure efficient and transparent 
decision making, with clear lines of accountability. This discursive politics over 
the entitlements shows how these ideas of regulation faced critical challenges in 
Maharashtra. 
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6.6 Conclusion: the dynamics of regulatory space 
In this chapter, I have shown that the regulatory space at the state level is defined 
by the interplay of several actors, which include civil society organisations, the 
Department, the Regulator and the politicians. I argue that the Regulator faced 
several major obstacles from the very inception. The primary reason for these 
crises was the fact that the Regulator had entered the policy space in Maharashtra 
through the World Bank initiated MWSIP project. Some sections of civil society, 
despite their oscillating positions, were highly critical of this regulatory project as 
they saw it as an ‘import from above’ or as an assertion of authority on the part of 
retired bureaucrats, while officials within the WRD saw it as an ‘invasion of 
outsiders’. This impeded the introduction of the Regulator in the institutional 
landscape of Maharashtra. Moreover, analogies with electricity sector regulation 
and fears of privatisation fuelled this scepticism to the point of alienation.  
One of the significant reasons for the fragility of the regulation project is the 
ambiguity regarding role of the Regulator in Maharashtra and, more specifically, 
in terms of water regulation there. At one level these ambiguities resulted in 
comparisons with the electricity sector, and on the other, they undermined the 
possibility of informed dialogue and deliberations in the formative years. The role 
of the Regulator was never clear in the minds of state policy makers. In fact, the 
MWRRA Act was drafted by consultants from the Bank and adopted with very 
limited revisions by the legislature. The ambiguity and uncertainty came out very 
clearly in defining entitlements, which were at the heart of the Bank’s idea of 
regulation. Inter-sectoral entitlements were reduced to intra-sectoral, thus 
overturning the mandate of the Regulator as an arbiter for inter-sectoral conflicts. 
The lack of debate in the formative years of reforms (2000-2005) created fierce 
contestation regarding the regulatory mandate once the political leaders 
understood that they had legislated for an institution that could challenge their 
domain of power. This is explained through the discursive politics over 
entitlements, which led to a turf war at the state level. 
It is evident that there is no one particular framing of regulation at the state level, 
as each of the actors viewed regulation from their particular vantage point. The 
Bank’s idea of regulation was premised on the logic of depoliticisation, scientific 
water pricing and clearly defined individual water entitlements, which would 
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enable water trading, leading to allocation of water to its high value use. The 
official framing in Maharashtra digressed from this framing with the 
conceptualisation of entitlements as bulk use rights, and tied them to land 
ownership. By creating ‘confusions’ over quotas and entitlements, the legal scope 
of the entitlements became extremely narrow. Also, the politics over sectoral 
allocation clearly showed the implications of depoliticising a politicised resource. 
Furthermore, the rights-based framework of entitlements put forth by civil society 
organisations also resulted in contestation over meaning, with special reference to 
water trading, and more significantly over entitlements as weapons against illegal 
diversions.  
This discursive contestation over the making of regulation highlights the 
complexity of the policy process at the state level. Central to this complexity is 
the agency of the State itself. The State here is formed through diverse practices. 
These include: the interactions of the civil society and the irrigation bureaucracy; 
the capture of the Regulator by the Department and the maintenance of policy 
obfuscation  (Wagle et al., 2012). These have resulted in diluting some of the core 
concepts of ‘independent regulation’. The digressions in the framing of 
entitlements showed the key ways in which the State used its discursive power to 
capture the idea of regulation. Moreover the politics over sectoral allocation 
ended up in a direct assertion of control by the State. Also significant in this 
politics is the way actors perceived the jurisdiction of the State, represented by 
the legislature in the case of the amendment. Even civil society actors maintained 
that the power to make legitimate decisions regarding development rested with 
elected representatives rather than with an independent regulator. This 
demonstrated the alienation the Regulator faced in Maharashtra. Despite this 
alienation, civil society in Maharashtra has played a proactive role in challenging 
the opaque process of reform. They have used the consultation platform to 
highlight the gaps and lacunae in the implementation of reforms. Their agile use 
of the media following certain regulatory activities or consultations created a 
counter force to the traditional pattern within this sector of opaque style of 
working.  
The legislature and political parties engaged in a politics of contingency. Though 
their interaction is visibly limited to two cases at the state level, i.e. passing the 
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2005 Act and ordinance and the amendment Act 2009-2011, it changed the path 
of regulation in substantial ways. This is evident from the controversy over 
entitlements and allocations. In terms of the effects, the amendment defined the 
jurisdiction of the Regulator, but it also raised some very serious questions 
regarding the democratic process and the role of the legislature in this reform 
process. The amendment politics raked up all these issues simultaneously because 
the character and manner of the amendment, that is to say the extraordinary haste 
exercised in passing it, was indeed politically motivated.  
 
By highlighting the contested role of the MWRRA and the fractured regulatory 
mandate in Maharashtra, this chapter showed the transformation of regulation 
from a technical and apolitical concept to a political and contested concept. This 
is analysed further in the following chapters, which provide an account of the 
politics of entitlements in the Jahot canal system. They show how entitlements 
are shaped by the wider politics around and on water in the prosperous, politically 
powerful sugarcane belt of Western Maharashtra. 
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7. Plural Cultures, Plural Norms: Reforming the Jahot System 
For these last two months, I have wondered about the rationale of upscaling the 6 
pilot projects on entitlements to 226 projects as I fail to see any material presence of 
these reforms. Even though civil society resists these reforms, arguing that they are 
neoliberal, and that they emphasise the retreat of the State, I see the State everywhere: 
in the section officers’ lament on the rise of politics and the decline of the irrigation 
Department’s supremacy; in the farmers’ description of shaasan (Department) and 
water distribution; the tussle for authority between sarkaar (politicians) and shaasan 
(bureaucrats); the ‘us’ and the ‘them’; and probably in the everyday battles for 
ownership of water that are fought over the canals and outlets in different locations of 
section offices, district headquarters, morning chaupals (meetings), sugar factories, 
tea stalls... 
                               Field Journal (February, 2012) 
Introduction 
By December 2011, the amendment politics had fundamentally altered the nature 
and jurisdiction of the MWRRA. The altered definition of entitlements, from inter-
sectoral to intrasectoral, had a corresponding effect on the nature and site of my 
project-level work. Entitlements now were closely linked to the implementation of 
the MMISFAA, and entered the contested terrain of the Department-farmer 
relationship. This chapter focuses on this tenuous relationship and analyses how 
entitlements are translated into practice, and how relationships of control are 
altered and perpetuated in this process. I argue that the content and jurisdiction of 
regulation are inextricably tied to questions of responsibility and accountability of 
the actors in the Jahot system. However these boundaries are becoming 
increasingly blurred as the regulatory space is decentred with different sites and 
actions of power. These include the prosperous sugarcane farmers, heads of 
cooperatives, political leaders and the field officers. Entitlements here become 
subsumed into discussions over rehabilitation, constitution of user groups and the 
embedded role of the local regulator. These constitute the key axes for the 
creation, maintenance and proliferation of plural regulatory cultures in the Jahot 
system.  
 
In January 2012, I arrived at the Jahot canal system after a two-hour journey from 
Ahmadnagar city. As the government jeep drove through the canal roads, passing 
bullock carts laden with sugarcane ready to be delivered to the factories, the 
liaison officer explained to me how things have changed politically. He lamented 
how politics is responsible for the decay of the water management system. 
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(looking scornfully at the bullock carts) he told me how there was a time when 
these common people (yeh log) could not use this canal road as a thoroughfare, 
how they were scared of the word shaasan, and now they look into our eyes if we 
ask them to move. Politicians have spoilt them (KI41). 
 
This officer who took particular pride in the exclusive and powerful position of the 
Department was now annoyed that politics has ‘breached’ this relationship of 
superiority and reverence. I could scarcely have known then that I was just being 
introduced to the intricate balance of power in this canal system (Field Journal, 
January 2012). Upon my arrival in Jahot
99
 I was received by the irrigation 
officials, surprised and curious to understand the focus of my survey. I informed 
them that I was there to study how water entitlements work. They instantly 
corrected me, saying that these were quotas. At that point I could not understand 
the distinction between the two. They conflated my study with the study on WUAs 
and announced their conclusion about the ongoing reforms as “WUAs will not 
work madam! People do not want them. It is like selling sarees to women who 
wear salwar kameez!” (Field Journal, January 2012). I found the analogy 
particularly gendered, especially so when the farmers in the discussion were 
inevitably male. However, I was more perplexed to see that entitlements were 
being conflated with farmers’ participation. I had come to Jahot with the 
understanding that entitlements were as much about the rights of the farmers as 
they were about claims on the Department. It is for this very reason that the 
officials in Mumbai had tried to keep the intent of entitlements as narrow as 
possible, as discussed in the previous chapter. 
  
I wondered if this response was part of bureaucratic resistance, of ignorance 
about entitlements, a product of translation at work, the logic of top down 
approach or the agency of actors. Through a day-long conversation with section 
officers, I realised that the vocabulary of entitlements or paani hakkadari 
(Marathi term for ‘entitlements’) had not reached here, or, more probably, it was 
too early to expect it, or it was evolving in context-specific ways. The official 
records that brought me to Jahot showed that entitlements were being allocated on 
this site from 2007 onwards. They were in fact upscaled to the whole system from 
2010 onwards. Jahot was also one of the first pilot sites to be taken under the 
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 Jahot is a canal system but in this thesis I have also used it to signify the place and the offices 
that came under the jurisdiction of the project. 
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entitlement programme of the MWRRA in 2007. It thus offered a fertile site to 
study the reform process and understand the making of regulation, through 
entitlements.  
This chapter analyses the different ideational, social and political factors that shape 
the regulatory framework in the Jahot system. In section 7.1, I situate the Jahot 
system in the socio-cultural and political context. I then begin to understand and 
unpack the meaning of entitlements in section 7. 2.  Here I focus on the field 
officers who are responsible for calculation and distribution of entitlements.  
Following this discussion, I highlight how the discourse of entitlements is tied to 
the unfolding of reforms in the Jahot system (section 7.3) and how this process has 
redefined the nature, scope and content of entitlements. I argue that entitlements 
exist in parallel with different relations of power that have developed over time, 
around water, in the Jahot system. These, however, are neither necessarily equal 
nor uniform across the Jahot system, but are tied to the sugarcane economy and its 
institutional and social paraphernalia. Depending on their position in this 
sugarcane economy, the farmers share different power equations with the field 
officers and these in turn define the nature of regulation in the Jahot system. 
 
7.1 Setting the context: profile of the region 
The Jahot river forms the boundary between two important districts of Western 
Maharashtra, Pune and Ahmadnagar. Several government reports have 
characterised this eastern part of the Pune and Ahmadnagar district as chronically 
famine affected, with scanty rainfall and erratic distribution of rainfall (Indian 
Irrigation Commission, 1903c; Beale, 1909; Government of Maharashtra, 2006b). 
Following the Indian Irrigation Commission Report (1901-1903), the government 
surveys recommended the possibility of a reservoir system in this region on a 
protective basis (Beale, 1909). However, the Jahot project was only constructed 
after independence, and was completed in 1965. This study is based on the Left 
Bank Canal (LBC) of the Jahot system, which is located in the district of 
Ahmadnagar. 
The Jahot canal system covers the three talukas of Shirur (Pune), Shrigonda and 
Karjat (Ahmadnagar). The right bank of the canal system flows through the 
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Shirur taluka in Pune and the left bank, running to 84 kms, is covered by 
Shrigonda and Karjat talukas in Ahmadnagar. The command area of the Jahot 
system also intersects with the command area of the adjoining Ryat canal system, 
and at several places on the LBC, especially in the middle and tail regions, 
farmers are beneficiaries of both canal systems. 
  
Topographically, Ahmadnagar has quite a varied profile due to its size and 
location adjoining the crest of the Sahyadris hill range. The district as a whole is 
an elevated tableland and can be divided into three parts: the Sahyadris hill range 
in the north; the plateaus of Akola, Ahmadnagar and Jamkhed; and the basins of 
Bhima river
100
 in the south and the Pravara and Mula basin in the north (see figure 
7.1). The drainage of the district belongs to two major river systems: Godavari in 
the North and Bhima in the South. The southern portion of the district lies in the 
Bhima basin (Government of India, 1995).  
The distribution of rainfall in the district is fairly uneven. Most of the district lies 
in the rain shadow to the east of the Sahyadris. The major proportion of the annual 
rainfall falls during the south-west monsoons, September being the rainiest month. 
Near the hill range that runs south-east down the centre of Shrigonda and Karjat, 
primarily the area now irrigated by the Jahot system, the land is very poor with 
occasional patches of good light soil near Karjat and other places (ibid). The soil 
can give good results with an assured water supply, making canal irrigation 
important in these parts of the district (Government of Maharashtra, 2006b).    
The region has thrived on canal irrigation since it was introduced in the 1960s. 
This is also responsible for the spread of sugarcane as a major cash crop (see 
Chapter 5). In recent times, however, canal irrigation has become supplementary 
to other sources such as lifts
101
 and groundwater. 
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 The Bhima river passes through the boundary between Ahmadnagar and Pune. It rises close to 
Bhimashankar in Pune, enters Ahmadnagar district near the village of Sangavi Dumale in 
Shrigonda and flows south east. Jahot and Sina are two chief tributaries to the Bhima river. 
(Government of India, 1995). 
 
101
 A system of lifting water (through motor pumps) from other sources of water such as river, 
canals etc. 
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Figure 7.1: The Bhima basin outlining the Jahot canal system 
(Source:  Government of Maharashtra)
102
 
 
The main crops in this region are sugarcane (ganna), sorghum (jowar), onions 
(kanda), sweet sorghum (kadval), wheat (gahu) grams, (harbhara), grapes 
(draksh) and lemon (nimbu). Jahot is a twelve monthly or perennial project with 
an initial capacity of 4 to 6 planned rotations of water, subject to availability. The 
non–irrigation uses include sugar cooperative factories, industrial units and 
various local municipal bodies
103
. Other reservations on water can be authorised 
by the district magistrate during periods of ‘scarcity’. No major renovation or 
maintenance having been carried out since the project completion in 1965, this 
project was taken under the Maharashtra Water Sector Improvement Project 
(MWSIP) in order to rehabilitate the dam and its distribution system 
(Government of Maharashtra, 2006b). The Jahot canal system was one of the first 
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 http://ahmednagar.nic.in/gazetteer/ahmadnagarn.html (Accessed 13/08/13). 
103
  For a detailed list of non-irrigation users, please see the Appendix 11.5.  
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projects to be taken within the pilot programme for entitlements under the 
MWSIP in 2006.  
It is interesting to see that most of the MWSIP pilots were located in the 
politically prosperous belt of Western Maharashtra
104
. The senior officials 
involved with the project preparation provided two sets of rationale for this 
selection. One, that the basic criterion for the selection of projects was whether 
the context of these areas was conducive. Since Western Maharashtra has a 
background of cooperative movement, it provided a germane ground to test the 
ideas of collective action in the water sector (KI26). Therefore analogies were 
drawn between the new water cooperatives and the other cooperative networks
105
. 
Two, since the Bank had set the criterion of not financing any new projects under 
the MWSIP (KI02), old projects which were in need of rehabilitation were 
chosen, such as Jahot. By imposing this condition, the Bank had also played to 
the engineering bias towards works and structures. The MWSIP was already 
interpreted as a rehabilitation project and displayed the underlying professional 
bias  of civil engineers with works, structures and gates (cf. Chambers, 1988). 
This became apparent in my visits across Maharashtra where the Department 
officials wanted me to inspect the canal lining and various structures for water 
conveyance. According to these officers, these structures were central to 
reforming the water system and for increasing the system’s efficiency (KI26, 
KI20, KI21 KI26, KI28 and KI84). 
The project selections, which were concentrated in Western Maharashtra, also 
displayed a certain degree of political bias. Highlighting the inherent bias, a a 
member from Prayas described it as a “marriage of convenience” and argued:  
Reforms happen in those areas where there are convenient players who might not 
resist issues. The MWRRA handpicked those sites where results could be shown, 
or where results could be shown on paper. WUAs will get money to show those 
results where WUAs will compete to gain subsidies and be very successful 
(KI07). 
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 MWRRA introduced the entitlement programme in six projects in the first phase, 2006-2007. 
These included Jahot, Kukadi, Mangi, Diwale and Benikre located in Western, South Western and 
Southern Maharashtra. 
105
 For the relevance of cooperatives for building and strengthening water systems, also see 
Meinzen –Dick et al. (2000).  
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Both Mosse (2005) and Baviskar (2004) also make similar observations in their 
studies on decentralised resource management projects in India. They show how 
‘success’ can be manufactured through the choice of projects, where parameters for 
selection are often guided by administrative expediency to demonstrate success 
rather than the ecological necessity of resource use. In Jahot however, the field 
officers were quick to deny any such bias and insisted that Jahot was an old project 
that needed rehabilitation. Though I could not establish the veracity of direct 
political involvement, the first few days at the Jahot system brought to the fore the 
distinct socio-political apparatus which cuts across the water distribution system in 
intrinsic ways. I now turn to this political constellation in the Jahot system. 
7.1.1 Raajkaran (politics): the political demography of Jahot 
system 
Before I entered Jahot, several officials in Mumbai warned me that I would find a 
lot of politics in this place and that it was a ‘problem site’. Many of them 
encouraged me to take the adjoining site of Ryat where there was ‘less politics’. I 
struggled to understand those dangerous aspects of politics that these officials 
referred to. For the officers, politics meant party politics; for the farmers, it meant 
the nexus between the Department, sugarcane factories and large landholders in 
the head of the system; as for me, any questions on shortcomings met with the 
opaque phrase, ‘paani par raajkaran’ (politics on water). 
 
“Where there is sugarcane, there will be politics, madam”, remarked the car driver 
as he took me around the canal system. As mentioned earlier, the Jahot system 
traversed two talukas of Shrigonda and Karjat on the left bank . The location of 
this system shows an unusual criss-cross of state and local politics, where the large 
villages located in the head system, Pimpegaon and Viladri, are strongly divided 
across political factions and party lines. The ruling coalition partners in the state, 
i.e. the Congress Party and the National Congress Party (NCP), compete against 
each other in the local Panchayat elections. This is further complicated by two 
political stalwarts. Mr. Bajirao and Mr. Navade, who dominate the political scene 
in the head reach of the canal with their political bases in Pimpegaon and Viladri 
respectively. The sitting NCP Member of Legislative Assembly (MLA) and also a 
Minister in the state Cabinet, Mr Bajirao is the paalak mantri (guardian minister) 
of Shrigonda. He owns the sugar factory in Pimpegaon. The Navades, from the 
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Congress, are the prosperous sugarcane farmers of Viladri, controlling the gram 
and zilla (district) panchayats. For them, the WUAs are another source of political 
capital whose membership is dominated by the Navades and their extended family. 
I met Mr. Navade at the Viladri gram panchayat office during my first few weeks 
of fieldwork in Jahot. A civil engineer, Mr. Navade also worked as a contractor in 
Pune. In my first meeting with him, I was introduced to the political clout that his 
family enjoyed in the area. He told me that his family members headed different 
local institutions in Shrigonda and these included the Viladri sugar cooperative 
factory and the local gram panchayat. He drew clear analogies between the sugar 
cooperatives and the WUAs and said that they should be run on the same 
principles:   
We will have full control over water and we should get our water. As our sugar 
cooperatives work, we will also work like that in water cooperatives (KI51).  
 
This positive analogy was only limited to a few politically powerful farmers – such 
as Mr. Navade - who saw the WUAs as source of power
106
, and where irrigation 
could actually “free ride” (Mearns, 1996: 303) on other institutional forms of 
cooperation. During the course of my fieldwork I met several such farmers who 
did not feel the same way. I met a primary school teacher in Uzalgaon, who owned 
land in the tail end of the Jahot system. A WUA sceptic, he compared the new 
WUAs to those sugar cooperatives which were closed down due to charges of 
corruption. Though the analogy developed a shared understanding about the new 
institution (cf. Douglas, 1986), its legitimacy was limited due to the failure of 
cooperatives in recent times
107
. 
 
For Mr. Vishwasrao who owned twelve acres of land in the head of the system, 
these WUAs only meant transfer of power from the shaasan to the bade log (rich 
and powerful people). As he showed me around in his field where he planted 
lemongrass, broccoli and thyme to sell to the continental restaurants in Pune, he 
also told me that these big people might not listen to the tail-end farmers. Similarly 
Mr. Nitin Navade, a tail-end farmer in Viladri also made a similar observation. I 
                                                          
106
 Mosse (2003) also makes a similar observation in his study on decentralised irrigation 
management in South India. 
107
 In recent years the cooperative movement has been on the decline in these parts of 
Maharashtra. Several cooperatively owned sugar factories were closed down due to charges of 
embezzlement of funds and corruption. Some of them have been revived through privatisation. 
Some ministers in the state government have also taken over these factories as private owners. 
176 
 
met Mr. Nitin in the office of the cooperative bank in Viladri. To gain familiarity 
and access and delink myself as the representative of the Department, I spent the 
first few days in here talking to the farmers. I mostly got introduced to the rich and 
powerful farmers there, and then by some stroke of luck met Mr. Nitin Navade. 
Very reserved, he chose his words extremely carefully, and told me that it was 
difficult to get water from the big landholders in Viladri.  Despite this unequal 
power dynamics, there was little that small farmers such as Mr.  Nitin Navade 
could do. He categorically mentioned that any action or complaint would mean a 
boycott from the sugar cooperative system. 
-  
-  
Figure 7.2: In the fields of Mr. Vishwasrao 
(The Jahot system, February 2012) 
 
Sugar cooperatives form an intrinsic part of the social fabric of the Jahot system. 
There are five sugar factories that cater to and depend on the Jahot system. These 
sugar factories were the products of a cooperative movement that swept across 
Maharashtra from 1960s onwards (see Chapter 5). They are either privately owned 
or sahkar (cooperatives). Notwithstanding the pattern of ownership, it is through 
them that the politics of the region - including water politics - is articulated. As a 
cooperative, they are owned either by the local politicians or privately by ministers 
in the government. The WUA, in proximity to a sakarkarkhana (sugar factory) can 
rarely face water scarcity! This is the sacred belief of the farmers who dominate 
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the head-end WUAs of Pimpegaon and Viladari and a symbol of hope for people 
in Uzalgaon in the tail, where the deputy chief minister has taken over a closed 
cooperative factory. 
While Shrigonda taluka located in the head of the region enjoys political 
prominence, Karjat taluka receives step-motherly treatment as it is ruled by the 
opposition party
108
 and also has a smaller command area, compared to the 
Shrigonda taluka, under the Jahot system. Nevertheless the political criss-crosses 
and overlaps remained very alive in Karjat, which benefits from the two canal 
systems of Ryat and Jahot. In a politically fractious context, the local farmers are 
able to use political leverage to derive benefits, which also includes getting water. 
While the head-end farmers are the political heavyweights of the region, the tail 
end or small farmers use their political links to ‘demand water’. Mr. Mudrik, a 
local leader of the NCP, who owns land in the tail of the Jahot command, told me 
that he often called up Mr. Bajirao or even the deputy Chief Minister when there 
was delay in releasing water for rotations
109
.  
A second entry point for exercising this political leverage is the Canal Advisory 
Committee. This Committee is an executive group comprising the officials from 
the Irrigation Department in charge of the canal, and the political representatives 
(MLAs) of the three talukas, Shirur, Shrigonda and Karjat. Though it decides the 
date and time of rotations, its de facto mandate extends well beyond its advisory 
role. The dates and time of rotations are often politically manoeuvred. For 
instance, several farmers recounted the 2011 November-December rotation as 
paani par raajkaaran (politics over water). When the water had just been 
released in the tail, it was diverted to a sugar factory in the head at midnight. Mr. 
Navade recalled: 
We usually get the rotation at end of December or early January, but they needed 
water to start the sugar factory. None of us wanted water then, but because they 
wanted water to start the factory and fill their tanks, it was released in November. 
I can guarantee now that we will have problems in our summer rotations (KI51). 
                                                          
108
 Maharashtra, as a state is ruled by a coalition of NCP and Congress at the state level and BJP 
and Shivsena are the opposition parties in the Legislative Assembly. 
109
 Mollinga (2003) also refers to such political brokering in the water distribution system in 
Southern India.  
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This was the latest of the many episodes of contestation when I arrived at the Jahot 
system. With the Panchayat office in the centre, the cooperative bank towards one 
side, a cooperative sugar factory aligned to the boundary wall and the canal system 
a few kilometres away, this physical layout in many ways illustrates the axes of 
politics of the Jahot system (Field Journal, February 2012). The cooperatives 
which function as multipurpose organisations – banks, bachat ghats (saving 
groups) and political platforms for panchayat election – are the fulcrum of social 
and political organisation in the Jahot system and resistance is shaped alongside 
the membership of these cooperatives. Defections can be punished by denying the 
farmer access to sugarcane processing (cf. Rosenthal, 1974; Baviskar, 1980; Sathe, 
1986; DeSouza, 2010).  
In the Jahot system, water and cooperatives are closely aligned in a peculiar 
system of collection of water charges. The water charges are collected through 
these sakarkharkanas and not individually from the farmers. These factories 
maintain the accounts for farmers who bring in their sugarcane to be processed 
here. The Department deducts the money, as part of water charges, from these 
accounts. This norm, which is now a standard practice, has blurred the boundaries 
of accountability and responsibility in the Jahot system. The Department maintains 
that this system ensures steady collection and checks evasion of payments. The 
farmers complain that they often pay for the water that they never receive. The 
farmers, especially in the head system, pay their bills through the sugar factories. 
In the tail section, the system of cash-in-hand payment exists parallel to the sugar 
factory system.  
Rents from irrigation services and the underlying corruption have been the central 
focus of a vast literature on irrigation management (see Wade, 1982; Repetto, 
1986; Moore, 1989). This body of work has also been used to justify incentives 
and mechanisms of transparency and accountability which will act as checks for 
these rents. However these practices may also thrive on certain complex, 
contingent and overlapping institutional systems, which make collection of water 
charges an opaque exercise. In some ways this practice also raises questions about 
issues of cost recovery. In the current discourse of regulation, low cost recovery 
and financial incentives are the key reasons provided for the restructuring of the 
water sector (as discussed in Chapters 4 and 6). However, in Jahot, sections 
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officers took particular pride in telling me that they have had 100 percent recovery 
in their jurisdictions since the money is deducted from the accounts at the 
cooperative (KI43, KI46). This also shows how overlapping and nebulous systems 
which ensure full recovery might not necessarily translate into well maintained 
systems and accountability in water distribution. It became extremely difficult to 
understand and trace the practices of collection of charges because these practices 
have evolved socially as part of the social and historical landscape of the Jahot 
system. The jurisdictions of the cooperatives are neatly aligned with the 
administrative jurisdictions of the Jahot system itself. 
 
Figure 7.3: The bill from the sugar factory showing the water levy 
                          (February 2012) 
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Figure 7.4: On the way to the sugar factory 
                           (March 2012) 
 
Figure 7.5: A sugar factory in Shrigonda taluka 
                        (April 2012) 
7.1.2 Shaasan (Department) in Water: administrative jurisdiction 
in the Jahot LBC 
The Jahot Left Bank Canal system is divided into 5 sections: Zorebali, Viladri 
and Pimpegaon form the head of the system, Vinaygaon the middle and Uzalgaon 
the tail. It is a reservoir-based annual system running from 15
th
 October until the 
181 
 
June of the following year. The LBC has a carrying capacity of 14.15 cumecs 
(cubic metres per second), with a Gross Command Area of 39,040 hectares and a 
Culturable Command Area (CCA) of 30,293 hectares
110
. 
In its early years, i.e. the 1960s onwards, the Jahot system had the capacity to 
afford almost 8 rotations, but with time and dilapidation of the dam and canal, 
complemented by the emergence of other dam systems above Jahot, such as Ryat, 
the water capacity of Jahot has decreased (KI41). The water cycle begins on 15
th
 
October after the monsoons have receded and goes up to May. There are three 
crop seasons in the Jahot system: Rabi (October to February); Hot 
Weather/Unhaal (March to June); and Kharif (July to September). The kharif 
crop is mainly sustained on the monsoon rains (KI40). The water calendar and 
rotation preparation are determined on the basis of the available water in the dam 
with a minimum of two rotations planned for any season. These rotations last for 
over 15-20 days, with a gap of at least 20 to as much as 45 days between any two 
rotations (KI40). 
In Jahot, in a normal year, the rotations are generally planned for the months of 
late November/ December, and the end of January, March and May. The officials 
explained to me that the first rotation can be delayed if they have a good rainfall 
as farmers benefit from water recharge either through wells or through the 
overflow from the dams above Jahot
111
. The dates of water rotation are decided 
by the Canal Advisory Committee (KI40, KI41, KI42). The general public 
usually receives information by word of mouth, through meetings or through 
newspapers and submits demand for water accordingly. Once the farmers are 
aware of the general dates of water rotation they are required to fill a form called 
Form No. 7. This demand form, as it is generally referred to, provides details of 
the crop to be irrigated
112
. This helps the Department in calculating the demand 
for water, and in planning the quantity and hours of water rotation accordingly. 
Once the water is received by the farmer, the patkari (Canal Inspector (CI)) goes 
around the fields recording the areas/crops which have been irrigated and 
                                                          
110 Information received from the MWSIP Section office (Shrigonda. Ahmadnagar).  
111
  Water released into the canals once the dams are full. 
112
 Information collected through several interviews with the field officers. 
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prepares the bill for the individual farmers. This is the crop-area method of water 
assessment.  
This system of water distribution also affords an extensive reach and mandate to 
the field bureaucracy.  The CI, or bhau sahib as he is called in the Jahot system, is 
the gateway to the shaasan as he provides the information regarding the date, 
time and duration of rotation. The CI is not merely the representative of the 
government: he is also part of the social fabric of water distribution. He goes 
house-to-house to collect water charges and, at times, signatures on official 
documents. While farmers are suspicious of his underhand dealings, he also 
enjoys a status of prominence among them. In Jahot, he is the first point of 
contact for understanding the process of reforms as the questions on canal 
ownership, water losses and bills are mostly directed to him (Field Journal, March 
2012). When I asked Mr. Ginoji, an elderly man and the former chairman of a 
tail-end WUA, about how he received information regarding the current changes 
in the canal system, he replied: 
Whom are we going to ask? The local patkari, we cannot go above him. At the 
most we can make the effort to go the head office in Vadgaon but the local patkari 
gives us the information. He is the shaasan (KI85).   
  
The entitlement system that was introduced in Jahot from 2007 onwards aimed to 
alter this relationship. As already explained in the previous chapter, entitlements 
seek to restructure the mandate of the shaasan to that of a service provider, to 
make consumers out of the WUAs and to finesse this relationship with 
accountability, transparency and predictability. Once the system was handed over 
to the WUAs in 2010-2011, a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) was signed 
between the Department and the WUA, represented by the Chairman. This MoU 
outlined the division of the roles and responsibilities of the Department and the 
WUA respectively. It also mentioned the sanctioned entitlement of the WUA. 
With this, the Department now moved from being a “retailer of water” to a 
“wholesaler of water” (Uphoff, 2000: 28), making entitlements the pivot for this 
altered relationship.  
 
These entitlements are calculated and enforced by the MWRRA in Mumbai and 
are to be monitored by the local regulator who is put in place to verify the 
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delivery of these entitlements to the WUAs. This system should, in line with the 
reformist thinking, remedy the previous system riddled with corruption of the 
patkari, politics and un-scientific water supply, which caricatured the state-led 
water apparatus. This is the rationale vigorously supported by the key actors from 
the World Bank and the irrigation bureaucracy in Mumbai and Delhi. But what 
did entitlements mean to the field-level officers in the Jahot system? 
 
Entitlements entered the vocabulary of reforms in Jahot in 2007. Initially 10 
WUAs were chosen for pilot schemes on entitlements. These were mainly located 
in the head regions of the canal. For Ms. Seema Kulkarni from SOPPECOM, who 
worked on the Jahot system training female members of the WUA, there was an 
inherent bias in this selection. She argued that the WUAs in the head regions 
were chosen for the initial experiment because it was easier to gain constituency 
among the big landholders and also “show results” in this region (KI11). These 
WUAs covered the head sections of Pimpegaon, Viladri and Zorebali and thus 
were also the first ones to receive the rehabilitation package in order to pilot 
entitlements.   
 
Mr. Balasaheb from Pimpegaon stopped over to talk to me as he was driving 
down the canal roads in one of the head WUAs. I asked him if he saw any 
changes with the new system and he replied that he did because the “water now 
came with full force” (KI109). This meant that big landholders, who had been 
receiving water under the previous system, still received water but through a 
system with better conveying capacity. By 2009/10, however, the entitlements did 
move downwards into the system. They were rolled out to all 55 WUAs of the 
Jahot system.  
7.2 Hakkache Paani (Entitlements): the official discourse on 
entitlements 
In the first few days of my stay at Shrigonda, I tried to understand what the field 
bureaucracy thought about entitlements. I started with a senior official, Mr. 
Parekh, who was the Engineer in charge of the Jahot system. Described as an 
honest and upright man throughout the course of my fieldwork, Mr.Parekh 
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genuinely believed that these reforms are a “step forward” in irrigation 
management. As for entitlements, he explained: 
This is going one step forward. When some quota is fixed for the irrigator, he is 
totally aware about the percentage of his quota. Today, we call applications from 
the farmers and sometimes he may not fill that form no.7, and he may not put in 
his demand. But once the quota is given to him, it is compulsory for the WUA to 
give the water quota to the farmers. Each farmer must get water. This is the 
concept of samanvay vaatap (equity in distribution). It is the farmer’s right to get 
water as per the area (KI40). 
 
Mr. Parekh’s description of entitlement as quota alerted me to the constant 
blurring of these two concepts in the field. This new system was seen as replacing 
the old system of application-based demand system. It also did away with the 
bureaucracy of forms between the Department and the farmers by ensuring that 
entitlements would be delivered even if not demanded. The ‘quotas’ were 
calculated according to the principle that every landholder in the command was 
entitled to water on the basis of the area of land s/he owned within the command. 
This meant that every acre of command land had a fixed quota of water. But the 
distribution of these quotas to individual farmers was the ‘compulsory’ 
responsibility of the WUAs concerned. Mr. Parekh explained this division of 
roles as follows:  
The WUAs distribute water on an area basis and not on a volumetric basis, 
because the farmer cannot measure water at every property. The WUA collects the 
water charges according to the crop but the Department does not collect charges 
on area basis. We collect charges on a volumetric basis as water is delivered on 
this basis. This water is cheaper than the area-based water (KI40). 
 
These entitlements created two separate systems of water charges: one, from the 
Department to the WUA who are the bulk consumers of water, and two, from the 
WUA as a bulk supplier to individual farmers. The WUA distributed water on an 
individual basis but this distribution was carried out on the basis on the old 
pattern of area-wise calculation. For Mr. Parekh, it was the volumetric pricing of 
water that was at the heart of the entitlement system. Advocacy for volumetric 
pricing is in line with the reformist thinking on water use efficiency that payment 
for the actual quantity of measured water will influence farmers’ decisions on the 
quantity of water they use (Mollinga, 2000), since they will plan the crop as per 
the availability of water or the sanctioned quota. This therefore meant that 
farmers who benefited from the under-pricing of water and grew sugarcane might 
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then need to shift to other, water-efficient crops or methods in face of water 
rationing. 
 
To understand the nuances of these calculations and distribution, I was then 
directed to the officer concerned, Mr. Sayaji, who oversaw the progress of 
entitlements in the Jahot system. When I met Mr. Sayaji, he explained that his job 
was limited to calculation of entitlements, which are calculated every year and 
also by season. In Chapter 6, I already mentioned that entitlements are divided 
into different categories and sub-categories of sanctioned and applicable 
entitlements. The sanctioned water entitlement means the quantity of water that 
will be delivered to the WUA in any normal year when the dam is full. Mr. Sayaji 
explained that over the past few years this had rarely been the case in the Jahot 
system. Therefore it was the applicable entitlement which determined the water 
rotations and distribution in the canal system. Applicable entitlement is calculated 
on the basis of water available in that particular year. It was usually less than the 
sanctioned entitlement as agreed in the MoU as it depended on the rainfall 
received in the dam’s catchment and the quantity of water available. While 
sanctioned entitlements are decided on the basis of cropping season, water for 
each rotation is called the quota.  
 
Quotas, therefore, are a subset of entitlements and can be adjusted as per water 
availability in each season. Mr. Sayaji, like Mr. Parekh, was certain that this 
system provided for more ‘accuracy’ in the distribution of water from the 
Department to the WUA. He also explained the method of calculation, through 
equations and deductions in entitlements which are calculated as per the 
MWRRA guidelines
113
: 
We deduct the quantity of silt, government sanctioned lifts, deductions for 
industrial and domestic quota, sanctions of the district magistrate, the lifts on 
backwater, the KT weirs on Jahot River. After all these deductions, the net water 
that remains is divided by the total CCA of the canal. Next, we also deduct the 
transmission losses and then calculate the water left at the head of the WUA by 
the total CCA of the WUA. This becomes the entitlement of that particular WUA 
and we estimate that quantity per hectare (KI41). 
 
Entitlement of the WUA =  
Total water available at the head of the canal
CCA of the WUA
 
                                                          
113
 See Appendix 11.6 for an illustrative example of calculation of entitlements. 
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Entitlements are thus calculated on the residual water which is divided by the 
total CCA of the canal, which is further divided by the CCA of each WUA to 
calculate their bulk water entitlement. As far as the ‘mathematics’ of the 
entitlements were concerned, the digits and the numbers were imputed and 
several Excel spreadsheets were produced to reaffirm the delivery of the 
entitlements. However, this technical understanding also played on some inherent 
biases in water prioritisation. Following the 2011 Amendment and in the face of 
resistance from farmers and civil society organisations, the government had 
overturned sectoral priorities to give preference to agriculture over industry 
(Chapter 6). However, at the local level, the entitlements gave precedence to non-
irrigation uses of water over agricultural water needs. It is only once the non-
irrigation water is secured that entitlements are calculated for agricultural water. 
Thus the change in allocation priorities, under which non-irrigation were still 
privileged at the specific project level, become just an “eye wash”, explained the 
MWRRA official (KI21). 
These quotas guarantee water to WUAs and also give them freedom of cropping 
because once the farmers are assured of the supply of water, they can plan their 
crops accordingly. As Mr. Sayaji explained: 
The members of WUA have the right to water; we have to give them the x amount 
of water mentioned in the MoU. Through this system, people are going to get 
surety of water. Once we have planned for the water, we tell the WUAs about how 
much water is going to be allocated to them and how many rotations have been 
planned. The WUA therefore will have freedom of cropping. They can decide 
about the crop they want to grow. We will give them x quantity of water and we 
apply the same formula head to tail. They are going to get water as per the 
entitlement (KI41).  
The entitlements are not given on individual basis, so in order to receive water, 
the farmer needs to be a member of the WUA. The MMISF Act also made this 
participation compulsory and automatic. Every farmer in the command is 
automatically registered as a member of the WUA. Besides freedom of cropping 
due to surety of water supply (KI41, KI20, KI24, KI26, KI40, KI41), the 
entitlements also ensured a degree of uniformity as the same formula was applied 
from head to tail. However this uniformity did not factor in the systemic biases of 
the irrigation system and the capacity of the farmers to demand and capture water 
(I discuss this later in this chapter). 
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Entitlements defined the relationship between the Department and the WUA, 
whereas the language of quota was retained for farmers, which ensured that water 
rights might not necessarily translate into each farmer securing rights to water.  
When I asked Mr. Pomane, another section officer in charge of the head region, 
about entitlements, and if he thought these were rights for the farmers, he was 
perplexed and said that these were quotas, which the Department gives to the 
WUAs, also called manjoor quota (sanctioned quota). Entitlements, for the 
bureaucracy, meant delivering the calculated quota to the WUA on the basis of 
volume of water. To the field-level inspectors and section officers, this translation 
of quotas to entitlements and vice versa did not indicate any fundamental change. 
It prioritised calculations with accuracy in delivering water and demarcated their 
responsibility and jurisdiction upto the WUA. Quotas also became the essential 
vernacular of entitlements, and these were beginning to dilute the rights-based 
core of entitlements. Moreover, as I have shown, the way entitlements are defined 
and calculated is intensely technical and wrapped in the language of volumetric 
pricing.  
 
Mr. Sayaji calculated entitlements for the WUAs and informed the section 
officers, who were to make sure that water was allocated as per the quota and 
were required to present the bills calculated in volumetric terms. This report was 
then filed with the MWRRA in Mumbai. For the field-level officers, entitlements 
also created a division of accountability upwards. Since the MMISFA and 
MWRRAA formed a part of the MWSIP package, the implementation of these 
two Acts rested with the Department and the MWRRA respectively. But at the 
project level the accountability was merged into the same officers. Mr. Sayaji 
explained: 
We have the Authority as per the law, which has the right to plan and make rules 
for water delivery. What does the Act say? It says water would be delivered to the 
areas where WUAs are formed; this is compulsory and water would be delivered 
only after the formation of the WUAs (KI41).  
The rules for water delivery which are the entitlements make formation of WUAs 
critical for the success of entitlements. They are the bulk water consumers in the 
new entitlement regime. The official discourse, so far, had hinged on the belief 
that the surety of water supply ensures equity in water distribution, and provides 
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freedom of cropping but this equation was not an easy one to balance in the Jahot 
system. Moreover this limited understanding of entitlements was based on certain 
presumptions.  
 
Programmes of improvement are often shaped by what they exclude and how 
they are constituted (Li, 2007). Likewise in Jahot, the framing of entitlements as 
quotas limited the reach of the language of hakkadari i.e. right or title (cf. 
Upadhyaya, 2005). Moreover to translate quotas into practice, several 
assumptions were made: that the irrigator was aware of the quota of the water to 
be received; that water through entitlements was cheaper than water received 
through the previous system; the system to deliver entitlements was in place and 
that WUAs would be responsible for ensuring that every irrigator got his/her 
quota of water. In the following sections, I show how these assumptions are 
misplaced and mask the reality of the entrenched power systems in Jahot. 
7.3 Translating entitlements: prerogatives, presumptions and 
power 
Once the Jahot project was taken under the aegis of the MWSIP project in 2007, 
the work on rehabilitation, formation of WUAs and the delineation
114
 started 
simultaneously
115
. The tasks were categorised into Priority I and Priority II. 
Priority I included mandatory works of construction and Priority II were 
supplementary works. The field officers also resorted to the “rule of the thumb as 
they extended their method and preferred approach with decided emphasis on 
construction and rehabilitation” (Chambers 1988). In several interviews with the 
                                                          
114
 Delineation refers to the drawing of the command area. The command was delineated for the 
first time when the Jahot project was planned in the 1950s. The new delineation would update, 
extend or remove areas on the basis of present use. Also, as per the 2005 Act, this delineation was 
to be done in line with the needs and the demands of the farmers. 
115
 The command area of the project was delineated in order to form the WUAs. The WUAs with 
CCA less than 500 hectares were entitled to have 9 directors and those with above 500 hectares 
would have 12 directors. The directors were chosen through elections convened after the WUAs 
had been formed. The Act made it mandatory that the committee members would represent the 
head, middle and tail sections of the WUA. The MMISF Act and Rules also provided for the 
mandatory election of at least one woman in the managing committee of the WUA. This WUA 
would then be divided into several sub-committees to oversee the process of rehabilitation, water 
distribution and collection, agriculture and cropping patterns. These committees were to be in 
place to ensure the delineation/rehabilitation process is participatory and includes the response of 
the irrigators. While the WUAs were formed at the minor levels, it was envisaged that they would 
be complemented with the formation of Distributary Level Associations (DLA) and then Project 
Level Associations (PLA). The PLAs would eventually take over the canal system and water 
distribution (Government of Maharashtra, 2005a). 
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irrigation bureaucracy, I was often told about the ‘works’ and how structures are 
fundamental to reform (cf. Mollinga 1999). Partly this is also due to the fact that 
MWSIP is considered, designed and understood to be more of a rehabilitation 
project than a reform project. When I visited Jahot for the first time, I was 
directed towards structures, gates and gauges since the officials were under the 
impression that I might be on inspection. Infallibly the success of reforms was 
always defined in terms of “irrigation works” and failures in the language of 
“farmers’ incompetence” and slow uptake of reforms (Field Journal, March 
2012). Alongside this process of rehabilitation, the WUAs were also to be 
formed, simultaneously. The MWSIP stipulated the condition that-  
WUAs at minor level should be formed by no later than June 30, 2006 in all 
irrigation schemes covered under the project; Distributary Level Associations and 
Canal Level Associations by no later than June 30, 2007, and DLAs, CLAs and 
PLAs by no later than June 30, 2008 in all schemes covered under the project 
(World Bank, 2005: vii) 
 
The progress of reforms and completion of targets thus became a mission of the 
field bureaucracy, who were continuously under pressure to show results. Shah 
(2000) makes a similar observation on the role of the field officers in irrigation 
reforms in India. He notes that these officials are “subjected to a monitoring and 
rewarding system that rewards them only in terms of physical and financial 
achievements (Shah, 2000: 157). In Jahot, reporting also had a greater emphasis 
on the ‘hardware’ component and focused on rehabilitation and building of 
outlets and gates.
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However some of the field officials did register their disdain for the process 
where they had to show outcomes in a limited period of six or seven years (KI42, 
KI41). Once the rehabilitation was complete, the system was to be handed over to 
the WUA. The WUAs thus became bulk water consumers, the Department the 
service provider, and the regulator the monitor of the standard and quantity of 
water received. Within a period of two years 55 WUAs were formed in the Jahot 
system. The social element of the project was assigned to the NGO, Pune-based 
Prerna, which was made responsible for raising awareness among the WUA 
members, ‘educating’ them on their roles and responsibilities, informing them 
about the benefits of the MMISF Act and collecting contributions. However, this 
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 Observation made through reading progress reports with the PPMU, Mumbai and interviews 
with project consultants for monitoring the progress of reforms (KI19). 
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NGO only entered the scene of action in 2009 when the lowest-level systems 
were ready to be handed over to the farmers
117
. 
In Jahot, handing over was carried out in a phased manner, and between 2009 and 
2011, the minor systems were handed over to the respective WUAs. Handing 
over marked the jurisdictions of control and accountability regarding the 
distribution of water between the Department and the WUAs. It was the 
verification of the fact that the system was in a fit condition to be given to the 
WUAs to manage it. This required the WUA and the Department to enter into a 
contract defining the division of roles and responsibilities between the two actors. 
After the handing over was complete, the WUAs were required to take up water 
distribution and also the maintenance of the canal system. Handing over was also 
the point when government via the Department became the government of the 
community as WUAs took over the distribution of water. Thus entitlements 
sought to change the mai-baap (patron-client) relationship into a service based 
relationship whereby farmers would be consumers of water. 
7.3.1 Making consumers and communities: the ritual of handing 
over 
The 2005 Act underlined the function of the NGO to initiate capacity building, to 
‘nurture’ the farmers into the roles of consumers and to prepare and train them for 
water distribution (KI48). However, in the Jahot system, Prerna was included in 
the process only in 2009, when WUAs had already been established, delineation 
completed and handing over was in process. Prerna complained that it was 
difficult to coordinate activities as their role as capacity builders was reduced to 
mere collectors of contributions from farmers. Also, since the WUAs had already 
been established in a particular way to meet certain targets, they found it difficult 
to reverse this process since “much of the damage had been done” (KI113).  
Thus the formation of the WUAs from 2007 onwards was inevitably process 
guided under the auspices of the Bank experts (KI28) and the Department. Mr. 
Surve, officer-in-charge of the MWSIP in Mumbai, highlighted the central role of 
the Bank in the user formation. He mentioned: 
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 While the officials in Mumbai cited logistical reasons for the delay, the coordinators from 
Prerna hinted at certain problems with the tender. They also stated that they were  unable to 
disclose any further details.  
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The Bank officials also had meetings with the farmers, they told them about the 
positive aspects of water user committees. They told them about the importance of 
making contributions for the user committees. You will value it more if you 
contribute to the project, you will feel that it is your own project. If you do not 
contribute, you will not realise the value of the project (KI28).  
 
In a distinct neoliberal sense, these communities of farmers, assumed to be 
homogenous, “were encouraged to take responsibility” (cf. Rose, 1999) and own 
their water. In order to create a sense of ownership among the farmers, the WUA 
members were required to make contributions in cash and in kind, which would 
create a responsibility among the farmers towards maintenance of the system
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(KI41, KI42). Articulating participation and cooperation in terms of structures 
and incentives, this understanding reflected the ‘apolitical’ assumption, where 
farmers as rational agents determine rules of collective resource use to avoid the 
tragedy of the commons (cf.Wade, 1989; Ostrom, 1990). In this reorientation of 
the community, social power is assumed to be a level playing-field, providing 
equal opportunities for resource access and use, where economic incentives trump 
social inequalities. However, this apolitical and technical construction of the 
community is mediated through unequal access to power (Mehta et al., 1999; 
Cleaver, 2000; Mosse, 2003; Brara, 2007; DeSouza, 2010), where communities 
become sites of contestation between farmers and bureaucracy and between 
farmers themselves. 
 
In Jahot, these meetings for mobilisation of farmers were held with influential 
farmers and mostly comprised the head end villages, which were the first ones to 
be chosen under the entitlement programme in 2007. Also, the level of 
information did not go beyond the influential people who were the big 
landholders. In Viladri, it was Mr. Navade that I would most often be directed to 
for meeting farmers and getting information on reforms. This influence was also 
evident in the first batch of WUA committee members who were put in place in 
2007. Though the MMISF Act stipulated conditions for elections, these members 
who were the influential farmers were handpicked by the Department. Elections 
were shortchanged for the sum of 15,000 rupees, to be awarded for unanimous 
candidature. For field officers, this smoothed the way to target completion, which 
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 This would amount to 200 Indian Rupees (in cash) and 300 rupees (in kind); the ‘in kind’ 
contribution entailed clearing of the field channels, etc. (KI42). 
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otherwise could be riddled with obstacles and “headaches” in the event of 
elections. Mr. More, another section officer of the tail-end WUA, defended this 
decision and said: 
We tried to hold meetings but the farmers do not come. So we got in touch with 
people who have more influence in the village and who are better educated, so 
that they can handle it (KI42). 
 
By making this provision for unanimous representation, the 2005 Act had severed 
the hopes of democracy and laid the system open to capture of power. However 
this bias in participation also meant information asymmetry. Very few farmers 
that I spoke to knew about the changes accruing in the Jahot system. Therefore 
my sources of information were limited to a handful of committee members, as 
other farmers did not know about these WUAs. In the tail of the Jahot system, 
this participation was further impeded by the geographical distance from the tail 
end villages to the head office where the farmers’ meetings would often be 
conducted. These meetings were often held at the Vadgaon office which is 
located in the head region of the Jahot system. Sanjay bhau who now was the in-
charge of a tail-end WUA told me that he never went to these meetings because 
he did not have the time to do so. These meetings often involved political costs of 
time and resources for the farmers (cf. Li, 2007). The Chairman of a tail-end 
WUA saw it as “waste of time and petrol to travel to the head office” (KI105). 
The Department officials however claimed: 
 
We have told them about the meeting but they do not come for the meeting. We 
organised big meetings, arranged for food, got loudspeakers but they are not 
showing interest. We do not know why. They are only interested in water and as 
long as they get it, their work is done (KI43). 
 
This othering process and labelling of farmers as not interested or subjects 
without agency who could be ‘lured’ into ‘participation with food’ underlines 
how the socially and politically differentiated farmers were viewed by the 
Department. It also oversimplified the agency exercised by these active agents. 
This making of the community thus occurred in situated spaces which had their 
boundaries of inclusion and exclusion set. These were also most often demarcated 
by the Department. These labels also defined their capacity and agency to 
participate, and their entitlement to know and decide, as well as the aims and 
obligations of those who involved them (Cornwall, 2004). 
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The absence of the NGO, and complemented by the light-touch visits of the Bank 
led to the field bureaucracy remaining the chief purveyor and implementer of 
reforms in the canal site. This also drew them into the race for target completion 
as project targets were reduced to the quantified figures, inputs in logrolls and 
‘yes’ and ‘no’ answers. The six monthly reviews sent to Mumbai and the World 
Bank verified the project progress on these grounds, which underlined a process 
of compression and prioritisation of the several objectives that were fundamental 
to rolling out of entitlements
119
. 
 
This process of target completion also led to the ritual of handing over. While the 
officials ensured that the system had been handed over to the WUAs (at the minor 
level) and that WUAs should start their distribution and maintenance of the 
system (KI40), the farmers, including some of the committee members, had no 
knowledge of this handing over. There was enormous confusion as to who was 
handling the responsibilities of delivery and distribution of water, and more so 
who was responsible for the collection of water charges. Mr. Navade from 
Viladri, who was usually quite well informed about the progress of reforms, was 
quite unaware of this progress, and summarised the essence of this process: 
Our WUA came into being in 2007-08; we assumed that the CI will come and 
give us water but then the Department had to use the funds of the World Bank, 
then the Bank put the burden of this condition of forming cooperatives and that is 
the reason that these people have done the paperwork. Before we could know, the 
societies were formed and then once everything was done, we were asked to sign 
so that funds could be taken. This is the reason for the lopsided work in Jahot […] 
Handing over is not done as of now, we are in the process of doing it. We have 
not started the collection either. I came to know only last time that we had to 
handle this rotation, and also do the collection. MoU has been signed and 
handover is done on paper but not in practice. Everyone sees things on paper 
because in order to do the actual work, they [officials] have to face us. They have 
a mindset that we will shout at them, abuse them and therefore they think it is 
better that we do not go there. They do not want to face us directly (KI51). 
 
Mr. Navade’s explanation made it clear that handing over of the system also 
meant greater control over funds. What is more important, however, was the way 
he perceived the relationship of big farmers such as himself with the Department. 
He mentioned several times that the Department is “scared of the farmers” but he 
is well informed about reforms because the “section officers gave him the details 
about reforms in good faith” (KI51). This also shows the relationship between the 
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 Observation made during an interview with the monitoring and evaluation team of the MWSIP. 
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Department and a certain section of (farmers) in the Jahot system who have 
helped in maintaining the façade of reforms. Baviskar (2004) makes a similar 
observation in her study on watershed management projects in Madhya Pradesh 
(India) where she argues that such people “become collaborators in the charade of 
decentralisation – even more so when they participate in corruption, help 
manufacture the charade of success and/or benefit economically from 
it”(Baviskar, 2004: 39). 
 
The NGO Prerna, however, was not a collaborator to this maintenance of the 
façade. To the contrary, they were perplexed at the process of handing over and, 
as a mark of protest, declined to inform the farmers about entitlements since they 
were not convinced about the transparency of this process. For Prerna, 
entitlements are the last stage of the process and the “hardware” to implement the 
“software” of entitlements was not in place. The hardware issues related to the 
incomplete rehabilitation works. They argued that the Department had 
consciously subverted the information about entitlements because this might pose 
a threat to favouritism in the Department since entitlement would spread and 
distribute water across the command area, as opposed to the rich and loyalists. 
They were equally critical of the language of entitlements. Mr Raman, in- charge 
of the MWSIP project in Prerna said: 
We have told the shaasan unless you certify and give us the copy, we will not tell 
them (the WUA) that this is your entitlement. There is a general entitlement in the 
contract but they have to certify that this WUA has this much quota in this year. It 
is not a matter of producing figures in Excel spreadsheets…we have to make sure 
that the WUA knows it and gets the water (KI114). 
One of the serious contentions over the ritual of handing over was the status of 
the rehabilitation and works. As Mr. Navade mentioned, the handing over was 
done on paper, but several WUAs complained of poor works that were affecting 
the distribution of the water. Thus it became difficult to gauge who would take up 
the responsibility of maintaining the system now as the delivery of entitlements 
was directly affected by the capacity of the system. But are rehabilitations need-
based or are they fundamentally political decisions? What constituted 
rehabilitation, who decided on rehabilitation, and what the jurisdictions of 
rehabilitation were became politically contested lines in the Jahot canal system.  
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7.3.2 Unpacking rehabilitation: a continuing crisis 
After a month at the Jahot system, and perplexed by its multiple versions of 
reforms, I finally discovered that the Jahot project is a disputed site. The work on 
the main canal was incomplete as there was some ‘crisis’ between the contractor 
responsible for repair works and the Department. The Department cited this as the 
reason for delay in results or any other problems that they encountered during 
rotations and water delivery
120
. When I pressed them further about handing over 
in the face of pending works and how entitlements could be delivered in such a 
situation, the officials were convinced that these works did not affect the 
distribution of entitlements.  
The officials make a clear distinction between the main works and the field 
works, which pertain to the area beyond the outlet, and they claimed that the 
works are complete in all the WUAs and therefore the handing over was done. 
The officials, both in Mumbai and in Jahot, concurred that the Priority 1 works 
were complete and therefore entitlements could be delivered (KI28, KI23, and 
KI40). On the contrary, they argued that farmers want more work to be done, 
especially relating to field channels. The officer-in-charge, Mr. Parekh, remarked: 
They are expecting much more works. We prepared estimates first and then there 
was a walk-through-survey with the farmers. The works listed at that time have 
been completed but the farmers are expecting some more structures, some more 
crossings or outlets. It is their estimate, their tender, we cannot consider increasing 
the value of the tender (KI40). 
 
The system rehabilitation that started soon after the project was selected was 
completed before the system was handed over to WUAs in 2010. However there 
were many areas where the quality of work was poor and the channels had nearly 
collapsed (Field Journal, March-May 2012). Due to the WUAs being inactive, the 
areas that were delineated for the repair works were decided by the shaasan. 
Esmail (1997), in his study on decentralisation and rural development, notes that 
though rehabilitation may provide a crucial incentive for farmers to take 
responsibility for water management, the WUAs need to actively contribute in this 
process, a key ingredient missing in Jahot. 
                                                          
120 I was informed about this dispute when I asked questions about the delivery of water to the 
lower levels of the canal and also the relevance of handing over the system before completing 
rehabilitation. The immediate response was that canal has some problems. It is then that I learnt of 
the dispute which was regarding the work of the contractor and his payment.  
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The controversy now was over the repair works that were never carried out. The 
Department also maintained that entitlements were key to ensuring that the WUA 
got their water quota during the rotation but internal distribution is within neither 
the mandate of entitlements nor the accountability of the Department. Thus the 
dilapidation of works beyond the outlet was no longer their responsibility once the 
system was handed over to the WUAs. Mr. Parekh said: 
Yes, we have completed the work of the WUA. We have not accounted for the field 
channels. It has to be done by the WUAs. We have completed the works up to the 
distributary and the minor. After that it belongs to the jurisdiction of the WUAs. 
The WUAs say we want bridges here, line the canal here. Their demands are 
increasing. When we started to work, we formed the WUAs and a canal 
management committee was created with the WUA director. No one came forward 
at the time when the work started. Those who did come, we have done the work 
according to them. We had to make the payment to the contractor once the director 
had signed and was satisfied with the work. It is then that these questions should 
have been raised by them. They need to collect the money and do some 
development on their own (KI40). 
 
The discussion on reforms and their progress usually focused on ‘rehabilitation’ 
and ‘works’ in the Jahot system. While the farmers complained of poor and 
incomplete works which made handing over a mere ceremony, the Department 
maintained that the system was in an appropriate condition to deliver water as per 
the entitlements because the field works beyond the outlet were complete. This 
also prepared the ground for a culture of blame within the Jahot system, whereby 
the shaasan and the farmers (big and marginal alike) resorted to blaming each 
other. Though these works had inherent problems, this contestation also 
highlighted the priority of entitlements, which were limited to the main system.  
In the official discourse, entitlements were pitched as a surety of supply from the 
Department to the WUA, but short-circuited the discussion on distribution 
between the farmers, assuming that it would be equal and transparent. Besides 
constructing the community as a monolith, entitlements were also based on the 
logic of horizontal power relations within the community.  
 
They overlooked the fact that communities are historically and socially situated, 
and have their own rules for resource management which can be unequal; 
entitlement to participation, in shaping and reshaping social practices, is privilege 
of the few. For example, though the MMISF Act stipulated the condition for 
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women’s representation, and WUAs did consist of female members, I was usually 
directed to the male member of the family for discussions (Field Journal, 
February 2012). This lack of voice also meant a lack of entitlement towards the 
other uses of water (cf. Van Koppen et al., 2006). These remained absent from the 
discussions on community participation and hakkadari as entitlements were tied 
to land right, making irrigation for agriculture the dominant use of water. In the 
Jahot system, farmers stayed in their respective fields rather than in the village, 
therefore the household and irrigation needs of water were often joined together. 
This discussion, however, only surfaced during scarcity periods and more so in 
the tail regions. I discuss this further in the next chapter. 
7.3.3 Sabotage of the system: the geographies of power 
As already explained the entitlements were piloted in the head of the system and 
later upscaled to all the WUAs on the LBC. The head of the canal system was 
dominated by large landholders with strong political leverage. These included the 
constituencies of Mr. Navade and Mr. Bajirao, in Viladri and Pimpegaon 
respectively. The membership of these WUAs showed a complex mix of 
interests: sugar barons, political fortunes and cooperatives - and thus water - 
played a central role in this power matrix. Mr. Bhonsle, from Prerna, explained 
this to me: 
There is a major issue in Jahot where rehabilitation has been done, where the 
lands go in double digits, they are lifting water from other sources and all of them 
are the haves i.e. prosperous farmers. They do not listen to anyone. This is all 
positioning of the resource and it is politically determined. Therefore you cannot 
make it right tomorrow, because these two lines are going to coincide. These are 
the people expected to hold positions and bring change. Reforms in Jahot sanctify 
rather than remedy these wrongs (KI113).  
 
The embedded networks of power, which have proliferated in the Jahot system 
since the introduction of canal irrigation, have also been hard to displace. For 
example, distributary (DY) 12 had two WUAs: Triveni and Balaji. Triveni was in 
the head and Balaji in the tail of this DY system. The Navades dominated the 
Triveni WUA committee and in Balaji an intricate balance was maintained 
between the NCP and the Congress members.  
Mr. Vishwasrao, a former chairman of Balaji, mentioned that “it was important to 
maintain a balance between our people and theirs to ensure the functioning of the 
WUA”. While farmers in the head boasted of the power of cooperation and 
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claimed that the Department was solely responsible for the misdistribution of 
water, farmers in the tail spoke of the nexus between the Department and rich 
landholders that was creating a system of inequity. Mr. Vishwasrao’s fields were 
located at the start of the tail. Since he had access to a lift system from the Jahot 
river, the situation was not as dire as was the case with other tail members. When 
I met some of the tail-end farmers from Balaji, they complained of the collusion 
between the Department and the powerful landholders in Balaji, and expressed 
their concern in this way: 
The big farmers above us do not release water, someone needs to tell them to 
close the water, who will tell them? No one listens to the CI and he does not say 
anything to them, he takes money from people and keeps quiet. If they do not give 
water to us, we go to the MLA and then they tell the irrigation Department to 
release water for people in the tail. No one demands through the WUA since 
people in the head have borewells and wells, once the water is in the canal, it 
recharges their canals and borewells. They do not need to go to the irrigation 
office. If they want water, they will put pipe in the canal and draw water, no one 
can stop them. We need to go ten times and tell them that we want water (KI62, 
KI63). 
 
Several issues emerged in this tale of capture. It highlighted the differentiated 
relationship that farmers of Balaji and Triveni shared with the Department as well 
as the brokering involved with the MLAs. The internal differentiation between 
farmers was also on the basis of access to other sources of water, especially wells 
and bores. In many ways this differentiated access to diverse sources of water 
also created vertical slices of power. This does not mean that they did not rely on 
canal water, they rather saw it more as a source of recharge than explicit 
irrigation. For example, Mr. Jagmohan Navade owned land in the middle of the 
distributary. He grew sugarcane and other fruit crops. He told me categorically 
that he will only let the water flow downstream once his wells are recharged (KI 
54).  
The entitlement system froze the inequities that were inherent in the canal system 
as water was determined on the basis of land ownership. Mr. Raman at Prerna 
highlighted the skewed patterns of this land distribution: 
It is not equitable; it covers only the command areas and depends on how much 
one owns land. We are talking about farmers who have land of 1 acre to 2 acres 
against landholders who own lands of acres in double digits. Small owners have 
no voice. Is this fair? (KI114) 
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The case of Balaji and Triveni showed complete absence of entitlements in 
WUAs though they were the first ones to be taken into pilot programmes. There 
were problems of head and tail within the canal, on the distributaries and minors, 
and between large and small landholders. Procedurally, the MMISF and 
MWRRA Acts tried put in place enough checks to prevent this capture by 
recommending tail to head irrigation. Mr. Parekh, the official in charge, was 
confident that entitlements would limit this capture: 
Big irrigators should not get water as per their wish. Their people should be 
trained by NGOs as well as their Departments; this is your system and not of the 
big irrigator. We have given preference to the tail end so that the system is fair to 
everyone. The big irrigators expect to get large shares of water but we have fixed 
the quota and they will not get water beyond the quota (KI40). 
 
Undoubtedly Mr. Parekh’s views on entitlements do not take into account the 
relationships of power that are formed in the Jahot system, some of them 
sustained on certain social and agricultural systems that had pre-existed before 
2006 reforms. For example, the system of granting blocks created large 
disparities in the canal system since farmers situated in the head of the system 
were its chief beneficiaries. In Chapter 5, I demonstrated how the block system 
was a particular innovation in Western Maharashtra to make water systems 
profitable during colonial times. They also led to the spread of sugarcane 
cultivation in this drought-prone region of Western Maharashtra. For the large 
landholders, the block system guaranteed water supply when they entered into a 
six year contract with the Department to receive water. “The Department had to 
deliver water without any excuse or we could take them to court,” said Mrs. 
Gaekwad, the Chairman of Balaji WUA. Mrs. Shyama Navade, though a member 
of Balaji, did not face problems with water delivery as was the case with other 
members in her WUA. Her land was located in the head of the system but she did 
assert that with WUAs, there is no guarantee of water, and blocks were a better 
system. With these pre-emptive rights, these farmers also, in time, because of 
sugarcane cultivation, became large landowners. Mr. Sayaji explained this power 
equation: 
They [the Navades] have large landholding and others are relatively small 
farmers. First the fields in the head are irrigated, and they get water first. This is 
the system since many years. We have heard such complaints from farmers of 
Balaji WUA. We do need to change this system (KI41). 
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The field officials maintained that the block system was in place until 2007 when 
it was replaced by the new entitlement system. They also confirmed that farmers 
in the head seem to have benefitted greatly from this system. Though the block 
system of water distribution was abolished before the reforms came in, the 
sugarcane fiefdoms it had generated created resistance to entitlements from the 
large landowners. Wade (cited in Joshi, 2000) in his study on South Indian 
irrigation system argues that transition from different property regimes not only 
‘locks in’ the farmers who resist rationing into episodes of struggle, but even 
officials may develop a behaviour pattern which prioritises irrigation over water 
rationing. In Jahot, this not only meant resistance towards entitlements as a 
system of water rationing, but also resistance in displacing the relationship 
between the field bureaucracy and the farmers.   
 
These large landowners were also the heads of the sugar cooperatives and 
political leaders who played a crucial role in determining the dates and delivery 
pattern of the water rotations. There was also greater resistance on the part of 
these farmers to receiving entitlements as the system divided water on area basis 
and not according to a per crop requirement. This meant a reduction in the 
quantity of water. Also, these farmers benefitted immensely from the under-
pricing of water, which would enable them to grow high value crops such as 
sugarcane for the price of subsistence crops such as jowar (sorghum). This 
system thrived on the basis of rents collected by the canal inspector. When I met 
Mr. Vitthal Navade at the Viladri panchayat office, he and his brother owned 15 
acres of land in the Triveni WUA command. While they did not see any material 
change with the coming of the WUA, they mentioned that the entitlements system 
may not be as flexible as the old demand system- 
If I have demanded 200 cusecs, they can give me up to 300 cusecs of water: there 
is more flexibility under the demand system. But if they measure and give us 
water (entitlement), they will only give us 200 cusecs (KI69). 
 
What Mr. Navade called “flexibility” of the demand system was actually avenues 
for corruption through under-pricing of water and unaccountable water delivery. 
The role of the canal inspector was pivotal in these transactions. Several studies 
on irrigation projects in Maharashtra and in India highlight the centrality of the 
canal inspector diverting water streams, and how the inspector, as the State, 
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works to the benefit of elites and big farmers (for example, Parade, 1995; Joshi, 
2000; Narain, 2003). 
 
When I accompanied the canal inspector, Damodar bhau, during the water 
rotations in Balaji and Triveni, I noticed that he would only let me speak to those 
farmers who were getting water, and also were polite to him. The section officers 
had put him in charge of taking me around during water rotations. Damodar bhau 
mentioned that his job was to distribute the water as per the demand collected by 
the Department, which has told him how much demand needs to be collected, and 
that he is helping the WUAs in their tasks:  
We are delivering water on the basis of the old system because people (farmers) 
do not know about the new process. We need to train the WUA members about 
calculations and producing the bill. Farmers can complain to the WUAs if they do 
not get water. We will train them first and then they will understand the process. 
Paani hakkadari means that the farmer in the tail should get water first and the 
rotation should be planned as tail to head. He will pay as per the water that has 
been delivered to him. I roam around and ask people about how much water they 
want and then take out the bill as per their demand. The WUA members will also 
see how to do it, and then we can adjust things (KI46). 
 
Damodar bhau’s style of work highlights several key points about the head end 
system in Jahot. He agreed that water is not being delivered as per the new 
entitlement system yet, and the Department is still in charge of the rotation. 
Though he placed enough emphasis on training the farmers, I did not see any 
representative from the WUA with him when the water was being distributed. Of 
course, we walked across several fields and farmers surrounded him, some 
demanding water and some pleading for water (Field Journal, March 2012). 
Amidst this chaos, where people started complaining to me about water, I 
observed that there were no measurements in place. More significant is the 
description that Damodar bhau gave me for paani hakkadari, which is tail to head 
irrigation, as he knew little about volumetric pricing and measuring devices.   
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Figure 7.6: Diversion during water rotation in Triveni 
                           (April 2012) 
 
The case of Balaji and Triveni shows how different rationales and interests 
intersected in the head end system and how the Department and the farmers 
colluded to maintain a system which guarantees them water notwithstanding the 
absence of any clear lines of responsibility as envisaged in the reforms (cf. 
Baviskar, 2004). The senior officials either complained that farmers were not 
interested and therefore they had to take charge of the project, or justified their 
patronage on the grounds of training the farmers who were still ‘shishu’ 
(children) and needed to be taught. The farmers gave a different account of this 
situation: the tail end farmers complained of collusion and the head end farmers 
complained of “denial of the right to collection”. Amidst these contrasting 
positions, it became fairly evident that different interests had come together to 
maintain the status quo, and little had changed by way of reforms.  
7.3.4 In search of entitlements: demand vs. right  
In several interviews, I heard the officials complain about the progress of reforms, 
lamenting that the farmers are not interested and do not want this system. One of 
the reasons for this, they stated, was that “they have never faced water scarcity 
and they have a surplus of water, therefore they do not know the value of water” 
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(KI41). The reformist narrative places a great deal of emphasis on scarcity as the 
driver for efficient water management. For some scholars scarcity is an incentive 
to rule formation and rationing water use (Wade, 1989; Bardhan, 2005), and for 
others, such as the World Bank, induced scarcity through pricing reform may 
result in water use efficiency by the ‘wasteful farmers’ (World Bank, 1998a). In 
Jahot, similar assertions were made by the zonal coordinator of Prerna group 
working in the area, Mr. Bhonsle stated that due to conjunctive uses of water, the 
demand for canal water is not as high as it should be and farmers (in the head) do 
not demand water as flow irrigation recharges their wells and bores. Similarly Mr. 
Raman from Prerna also said: 
Whenever there is shortage of water, they (the big farmers) get it released 
through political connections. So we are basically asking the have-nots, who 
have never seen water in the canals, to make demands and pay. If we go and 
ask the farmers on lift to pay for water, they say, ‘I never ask for water, why I 
should pay?’ We have to have mechanisms and policy, clear cut guidelines, 
and at the same time motivation to implement it. If we are not able to do this 
in pilot projects, how should we replicate this model in other areas? (KI114) 
 
A large section of the Jahot system benefits from four distinct sources of water 
besides the Jahot canal. They are the Bhima River, the Jahot River, the 
backwaters of the Uzani dam and groundwater. Out of the 36 WUAs on LBC, 21 
WUAs are situated along the banks of either the river Bhima or the river Jahot. 
Using lifts from rivers and other adjoining water bodies is a common practice. In 
fact, one of the tail end WUAs, according to the field official, opted out of flow 
irrigation and switched to lift irrigation.  
 
Over the years the failure of the canal system has driven the farmers, who require 
perennial sources of irrigation, especially for sugarcane cultivation, to these 
diverse sources of water. These sources of water also come under different 
administrative jurisdictions and are not necessarily under the Jahot sub-division. 
This meant water regulation of one source of water did not directly affect the 
capacity of the farmers to harness other sources of water to irrigate their crops. 
This is also demonstrated in the case of Balaji-Triveni in the previous section, 
where farmers used groundwater and lifts from the Jahot river. The case of 
Sangam WUA, however, was slightly different. 
 
204 
 
 
Figure 7.7: A lift irrigation pump in the Sangam WUA 
                          (February 2012) 
 
As I mentioned earlier, the idea of demand is central to the water delivery system 
under shejpali. In contrast, the entitlement system created a two tier distribution 
and demand system. While entitlements were calculated for each rotation, water 
delivery was maintained through the shejpali system, which required the farmers 
to place demands for water. The Sangam WUA was at the heart of this parallel 
system of demand, sustained on a complex system of diverse water use, 
especially through the lifts from the backwaters of the Uzani dam. This WUA has 
657 members and at 986.03 hectares has one of the largest CCAs in the Jahot 
command. I arrived in the Sangam WUA with the official information that this 
WUA has not put in a demand for water as the majority of farmers drew water 
from the lift system in the Uzani backwaters. However the WUA members 
complained that they had stopped placing demand for water because they had not 
received water for many years. One farmer who was quite anxious to know if I 
could get water for him, remarked in our first meeting in Vinaygaon basti, in 
February 2012: 
We were told that we have to handle all the work of the WUA, handle the rotation 
and deliver the water to the farmers, collect 100 percent water charges and if we 
do that, 50 percent of the amount will be returned to us as an incentive. But since 
we do not get water, there is no meaning in demanding water (KI71). 
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Figure 7.8: Gangu tai and Mr. Khamkar next to their fields in the Sangam WUA 
                         (February 2012) 
 
The failure of canal system has driven a majority of farmers to the lift system. 
Lifts require setting up of infrastructure, i.e. laying down pipes from the field to 
the source of water. Gangu tai (elder sister), a fiery lady from the Sangam WUA, 
told me that a lift irrigation system required an investment of 5 to 6 lakh rupees. 
Because it is an expensive system, farmers often had to take loans to set it up. 
This not only meant that rich farmers were able to afford this system but it also 
had a corresponding effect on the nature of agricultural produce. Only the profits 
obtainable from sugarcane could ensure repayment of the loan. As with other 
parts of the Jahot system, sugarcane was also the dominant crop in the Sangam 
command. Thus the cultivation of sugarcane, whereby returns were 
approximately equal to 1000 US dollars per acre (KI81), and the propensity to opt 
for lift systems almost went hand in hand as one could only secure this expensive 
system if one had the support of a high value crop.  
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Figure 7.9: Green gram fields irrigated through the lift system in the Sangam WUA 
(March 2012) 
 
As I met more members over the course of few days, I discovered that the failure 
of the canal system had driven a large proportion of farmers towards lift 
irrigation. Initially the richest farmers secured permits to draw water through lifts 
from the backwaters of the Uzani dam. It turned out that the committee members 
of the WUA were farmers who had taken recourse to lift irrigation systems and 
did not have real stakes in flow irrigation. They did not discount the value of the 
canal water as it recharged their wells, but they were noncommittal about 
working towards setting the system right. While, on one hand, the failure of the 
canal system drew people towards the lift systems, on the other it also drew away 
a section of poor farmers to migration or agricultural labour. As they could not 
afford an expensive lift system, poorer farmers sold out land to the rich farmers 
and migrated as labour to the city. However, Mr. Khamkar, a young farmer 
battling for the cause of the marginalised farmers, said:  
50-60 % in this WUA are on the lift system. Those who have water on the lift 
system have no tension. The committee members, secretary and the Chairman of 
the WUA are on the lift system so they do not work for it. Those who require 
water from the canal and are solely dependent on this source are ignored by the 
committee. Only these big people were given the opportunity to become members, 
the government will not come to us poor people, it will go to the ones they know 
(KI74). 
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This collusion and bias in selection also had a corresponding effect on the nature 
of demand for the canal water. Lifts created a major problem in the formation and 
incentivisation of the WUAs and thus sustained a parallel system to entitlements. 
Since the committee members did not treat canal water as the main source of 
irrigation, their stakes in getting canal water were low. The case of Sangam also 
showed that these farmers were not a monolith and they had different identities. 
Some resisted the Department and wanted water, some were the free riders, some 
were the contractor-farmers; their relationship with the Department was not 
merely that of a villager or farmer but also of the group, which needs doling out 
of irrigation works from the Department. In the Sangam WUA, some of the 
committee members were also contractors and shared close relations with the 
officers (KI84). These were the same people handpicked as committee members 
in the WUA. 
Nearly 30 percent of the farmers who solely relied on canal water continued to 
operate on the old system of demand with the Department. Demand was thus 
confined by the relations of responsibility and accountability between the handful 
of (non-lift) farmers and the Department. The farmers claimed that it was the 
responsibility of the shaasan to ensure that people get water and therefore to 
make sure that the farmers filled in the forms. There was also a position of 
ambivalence of jurisdiction and accountability between the shaasan and the 
WUA whereby the farmers argued that the sanstha cannot do anything unless the 
Department would guarantee the supply of water. This WUA was caught in this 
contradictory framing of demand where the Department argued that they do not 
give water since there was no demand for water, while the farmers claimed that 
they would only demand water once they ‘saw’ it. Gangu tai explained this 
paradox to me: 
The Department only makes promises but they do not work. The WUA has not 
demanded water to date [February, 2012]. We get water today and it disappears 
tomorrow. Therefore there is no point in making a demand for water. Some people 
do not have water to drink: We will have to fight for this. People who rely on 
canal water tell us: ‘let the water come first and then we will see’. This time we 
saw water for the first time in this area for twenty years but it came one day, and 
stopped the next day. People want surety that they will get water and then only 
they will fight for it (KI75).  
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The Sangam WUA sustained itself on a parallel system of demand-based shejpali 
and entitlements. It underlined the principle need for surety and guarantee of 
water as far as the relationship between farmers and the shaasan were concerned, 
but also highlighted how non-canal based water sources were fragmenting the 
entitlement-based bulk water consumers. These overlapping sources of water 
have created impediments to user formation, on one hand and calculation of 
entitlements, on the other. Farmers who rely on other sources of water, especially 
through lifts which are more stable and predictable than canal water, choose to 
benefit from flow irrigation only to recharge their wells. As a result, they neither 
place demand for water nor are ready to pay for this water. Moreover, 
entitlements, which were calculated at the project level, did not incorporate such 
diversity of uses and users except for the water that is lifted through KT Weirs 
and lifts permitted on the canal (KI41). Despite the fact that some farmers and 
water user associations have opted out of the flow system, their entitlements were 
being calculated and water was balanced across the system (as I will show in 
Chapter 8). The officials were also aware of this problem and said that they 
“sanction water to everyone, but people who rely on canal water are fewer in 
comparison to those who rely on other sources. It is for this reason that they get 
water double or triple the amount”. This also affected the returns to the system 
(KI41). Therefore applicable and sanctioned entitlements became more a matter 
of guesswork and adjustments rather than calculations. 
7.3.5 Missing in action: the local regulator 
To ensure accountability in the system, the projects covered under the reform 
required a regulator to be appointed to ensure that the water is measured and 
delivered to the WUAs according to their sanctioned entitlement (MWRRA, 
2007). The regulator’s chief responsibility is to ensure that the entitlements are 
calculated, as per the regulations and approval of the MWRRA, and are delivered 
in the right measure to the WUAs. A WUA representative should also be present 
at the time of this measurement. In the case of disputes between the Department 
and the WUAs related to water distribution, the regulator is the first point of 
appeal. The regulator, by design, is not conceptualised as a local body but as a 
representative of the MWRRA (KI10, KI26). The Acts also provided for a Public 
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Dispute Resolution Officer (PDRO) (Government of Maharashtra, 2005b), the 
Executive Engineer who is the second point of appeal after the local regulator.  
I met Mr. Jadhav, the local regulator for Jahot, at the sub-division office in 
Shrigonda. As we began our conversation, he told me that he had several charges 
and could not find time to perform the duties of the regulator. Moreover since he 
is in charge of the adjoining Ryat project, he could not be present for the rotation 
in the Jahot system since the water is released about the same time as in Ryat. He 
stated: 
Yes, they asked me that they wanted to put my name as the regulator. I do not get 
the time as I have the charge of three sections under me. And the rotation of Jahot 
starts simultaneously with Ryat [adjoining system], which is under my charge. 
How can I leave that, how can I be present in two places?  
 
This revelation corresponds with the sentiment of many other local regulators 
whom I met during the course of field visits in Maharashtra. In Nagpur, the 
officer-in-charge was emphatic in telling me that it was “unfair to put so much 
burden on officials who are saddled with paperwork” (KI32). Mr. Jadhav was 
among the many such regulators who were appointed to meet the targets and 
conditions of regulation, but were unable to do so. However, he also highlighted 
that even if he was present, things might not change very substantially. He drew 
on his experience of the Ryat system and said: 
We do not have enough power. There are all these rules and regulations and 
government officers know it but they [farmers] are using political interference 
when they want water. Then the government officer cannot do anything. The 
rotations and water distribution in rabi were on political lines. Politics is the rule 
of the majority. Even if they are applying faulty laws, they are right. People get 
benefits from a faulty system. Measuring devices are there but they are faulty, 
everything is on guesswork. The Government should charge them two or three 
times more, so that they will stop this water loss and excess utilisation (KI43). 
 
Mr. Jadhav’s remarks unpacked the intricate web of relations that exist in the 
Jahot system. The field officers who work under pressure from politicians feel 
that these rules are difficult to implement in such a system. Often these remarks 
suggested the absence or limitation of this regulatory role, and raised an 
important question as to who bore the responsibility of verifying that the 
entitlement was delivered to the WUA. I raised this question in a series of 
discussions that I had across the bureaucracy and the MWRRA. Several officers 
acknowledged this lacuna in design but defended the ‘settlement’ in the interest 
of time and financial constraints. They mentioned that this would take time to 
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evolve and the Department was understaffed to meet such needs (KI26, KI86). A 
senior official at the Pune circle office, who was also part of the project 
preparation unit when reforms started in Maharashtra, articulated his concern as 
follows:  
You are regulating your own colleague and this does not bring out the 
inefficiencies in the system. The regulator is a person working on another project 
but reports to the same hierarchy. Therefore, the role of independence and 
regulation gets diluted in the process. He faces a similar situation in his own 
project and does not see anything wrong with the state of things (KI27).  
 
Thus the official affiliations of the regulator have prevented it from being the 
impartial overseer that it is meant to be. The absence of the regulator also raises 
an important question as to who owns the responsibility for ensuring that 
individual farmers get their quota of water. Most of the officials were silent on 
this aspect as the Act does account for inequity within the WUA. The officials at 
the local level made a two-level distinction: the Department-WUA relationship; 
and within the WUA. They placed the responsibility for ensuring justice within 
the WUA system with the chairman. For them, the WUA has the accountability to 
ensure just distribution. Mr. Parekh the officer-in-charge mentioned: 
In case of dispute, first they will ask the Chairman: where is my water? If that 
problem is not solved by the Chairman, the farmer will go to DLC. As of now 
they are coming to us. We also have the regulator but they are there only when the 
rotation takes place. He has to ensure the delivery of the quota. If they (the 
farmers) have any problem, they can tell the regulator, but he cannot meet 
everyone (KI40). 
For Mr. Parekh, it was quite clear that the local regulator is not responsible for the 
“internal matters” (KI40) of the WUA. However, for other section officers who 
were supervising rotations and were also overseeing the transfer of power, the 
need for internal regulation was equally crucial. They agreed that a regulator 
should ensure equity within the WUA, but in the current design of things, this 
was not possible since s/he was the member of the Department (KI27, KI22). 
This emphasis on the non-staff requirement is less to do with the clause of 
impartiality cited in previous sections and more to do with the burden of work 
that the lower officials complained about in such projects. Mr. Sayaji explained: 
A ‘clearcut’ (impartial) regulator needs to be separate from the Department; 
officials should not be given additional charges. The regulator should have the 
responsibility of equity in distribution, and he should be responsible for 
addressing the crises of water distribution, and should be responsible for resolving 
disputes. He is the representative of the MWRRA (KI41). 
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The absence of this regulator was repeatedly justified at all levels, on the grounds 
of understaffing, too many responsibilities on the field officer, the inefficacy of 
having parallel regulation, etc. While the error was recognised in principle, the 
interactions clearly showed that the priority of water delivery was framed more in 
the language of system efficiency and structures than institutional and processual 
factors, the local regulator being one of them. Moreover, the onus of efficiency 
was on the regulator in terms of overseeing the measurement and delivery of 
entitlements, but ensuring equity within the farmers was not a priority with the 
local officials. These included officers such as Mr. Jadhav, who would often 
recount the numerous problems that they have to face while they work in the 
field, and did not consider measurement and transparency as a priority. 
I have so far outlined the fundamental provisions that affected the translation of 
reforms in the Jahot system. While some of these pertain to design issues, which 
made entitlements amenable to bureaucratic capture, others are informed by the 
contextual and contingent factors of the shejpali system which made the presence 
of shaasan absolutely fundamental in the reform process. The implications of this 
haphazard diffusion were also dispersed across the Jahot system, as each of the 
WUAs operated in a distinct regulatory space, which determined the regulation of 
water. Fundamental to this field was the way the State (sarkaar and shaasan) was 
shaped by the social and resource demography in the Jahot system. Across the 
system the WUAs were put in place but were tied in different relationships with 
the Department: some existed as proxy organisations with different levels of 
collusion to maintain the status quo and others were staffed by prosperous or 
contractor farmers. I have explained that under the shejpali system there were 
several means by which farmers came to know about the dates of rotation. The 
level of information was contingent on his/ her social conditions and proximity to 
the Department, especially the CI. But the entitlements assumed an ‘informed’ 
farmer to be available to take in this new information and also put it into practice.   
7.4 Conclusion 
In the early months of 2012, the status of the Jahot project was far away from its 
original plan. The entitlements were being allocated and bills generated on 
volumetric basis, but the old system of water distribution continued alongside the 
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layering of entitlements. This chapter showed that the Jahot system were at the 
centre of the new and the old patterns of water rule, but new forms are still 
struggling for a material presence ideologically as well as materially, a struggle 
most visible between the old system of demands to the shaasan and the new 
system of entitlements. Entitlements in the Jahot system were unable to erode the 
social patterns of economic domination, as was evident in the politics of 
prosperity either through the sugarcane farmers or the lift irrigation farmers. This 
chapter showed how entitlements were reduced to mere paper and were watered 
down as they were subsumed into the language of rehabilitation, the ritualised 
practice of handing over, systemic biases of the canal system, social and 
institutional ties that pre-existed the reform phase and the institutionalisation of 
the reform process itself. 
 
While the entitlement regime attempted to create a new set of users from farmers 
who owned land, the previous cultures of water use and access came into close 
conflict and contestation with the new system. This either reduced them to a 
layering over the entrenched systems of bureaucratic control or put them in 
parallel with the previous system of water by demand. Entitlements, in theory, 
were applicable only on the water that was delivered through the canal networks, 
whereas the farmers accessed water through a variety of resources which included 
groundwater, the backwaters of the dam, and lifts from the river. This created 
difficulties in the constitution of the bulk water users, elucidated through the case 
of the Sangam WUA, and led to a system of overlapping rules and overlapping 
water regimes. 
The cases of Sangam and Triveni-Balaji also highlight the dual and dispersed 
nature of the State in the Jahot system. In much of this project, the WUAs were 
created to meet the targets of the reform, and water control remained in the hands 
of the Department. Represented through officials and field-level staff and also in 
relation to politicians, cooperatives and powerful landholders, the project of 
reforms in Jahot was virtually a “project of and by the State”. The State had acted 
as a midwife to bring these WUAs into existence and had nurtured them into roles 
and responsibilities that suited its hydraulic supremacy. In Triveni, owing to the 
political might of the rich farmers, the bureaucracy was not willing to tinker with 
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the established principles of pre-emptive access when the entitlements meant a 
loss in volume of water to them. However, the rich farmers who had ‘captured’ 
the dormant WUA were willing to work towards reforms, seeing cost recovery 
and collection as part of their political and financial capital.  
Distinction between political and technical issues is also a distinction between 
high and low politics of regulation (Li, 2007). This separation can be crucial in 
determining who controls and defines the regulatory process, and the choice of 
mechanisms of regulation, and bears important implications for practices of 
defining, labeling and framing (Hancher and Moran, 1989b; Morgan and Yeung, 
2007). In the case of the Jahot system, the reform process was fundamentally 
defined and driven by the field bureaucracy, which remained the chief purveyor 
and implementer of reforms in the canal site. This gave them the scope and 
opportunity to determine the level of information, and the jurisdictions of 
rehabilitation and water availability. This also gave them the power to decide the 
norms and jurisdictions of water flows by privileging rehabilitation over 
entitlements. The farmers continued to depend on the Department for water and 
were not aware of the entitlement system. The NGOs declined to educate the 
farmers about the entitlements as a mark of protest against the unaccountable and 
non-transparent reform process in Jahot. A combination of the Department’s 
technical supremacy and the NGOs’ activist stance, coupled with the embedded 
role of the regulator, resulted in diluting the rights-based element of entitlements. 
This shaasan-sarkaar combination constituted the State in the Jahot system and 
their interactions produced differential shaping of regulation. The case of Jahot 
decentred regulation in so far as the definition of entitlements and regulation(s) 
was co-opted into the existing patterns and structures of power, but it did not 
displace the relevance of the State itself. This chapter demonstrated the social life 
of entitlements as they were embroiled in the languages of rehabilitation, 
structures and gates and the dormant WUAs. Entitlements had indeed been 
subverted and reincarnated in fundamental ways in the Jahot system. This chapter 
narrated the story of subverted or missing entitlements; the next chapter will show 
how entitlements became the very ground for contestation of knowledge and 
authority in a tail-end WUA of the Jahot system.  
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8. Entitlements in Action: The power and performance of regulation 
Water [in the canal] is like a ball of ice in the hands of a king. When the king decides 
to distribute that ball among his subjects, it changes hands and goes from one person 
to the other. In this process, it begins to melt and by the time it reaches the last 
person, neither ice nor water is left. People at the tail end have a similar plight. By the 
time it is our turn to take water, there is none left in the canal. This is natural… 
                             Savita tai (Uzalgaon, March 2012) 
 
Introduction 
I was fascinated by this analogy that Savita tai drew to tell me how water scarcity 
has been naturalised (cf. Mehta, 2005) in the Jahot system over the years. This 
quote also presents the world view of farmers in the tail who see their inability to 
get water as part of a natural process, and highlights how these tail-end farmers 
relate to the Department, which has assumed the status of a king in their lives as 
water recipients. This long wait for water is an intrinsic part of the story of water 
rotations in the tail-end WUA where farmers have adapted to the fact that they 
indeed are at the end of the queue for receiving canal water
121
. They merely hope 
that some part of the ice, i.e. canal water, will reach them before it melts and 
disappears.  
I arrived in the Jai-Gauri Paani Waapar Sanstha (JGP) WUA during the first 
summer rotation in March 2012. The JGP is located at the tail end of the Jahot 
system. This was the first time in several years that the rotation had started from 
the tail end of the Jahot system as well as within the command of this WUA. Tail 
to head irrigation has been a firm basis for demanding equity in water distribution 
in the canal systems (see chapter 5). Nevertheless this has also been one of the 
hardest to implement over the many decades of canal irrigation reform (see 
Rajgopal et al., 2002). For a tail-end farmer in the JGP, seeing water in the canal 
for four days was both a surprise and a reason to celebrate. The farmers, however, 
did not attribute this ‘miracle’ to reforms but to the sugar factory that was 
recently taken over by the Deputy Chief Minister of Maharashtra. The 
Department claimed that since water is distributed as per the entitlement of the 
WUA, there were better outcomes in the 2012 rotations. The majority of the 
WUA members seemed very positive about this change but were unsure how long 
it would last. 
                                                          
121
 Several studies have examined tail end deprivation as part of canal irrigation reforms. See 
Mollinga (2003), Narain (2003), Shah (2003), Rajgopal et al.(2002) & Chambers (1988). 
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In 2012, the JGP was a peculiar case in the Jahot canal system. It was one of the 
first WUAs that I saw handling the water distribution in the Jahot system. 
Located at the tail of the canal system, the JGP came under the entitlement 
regime from the rabi (winter) season of 2011. I had now stumbled upon a WUA 
where the jurisdiction of the Department supposedly stopped at the CTF 
(measuring device), and the entitlements were being delivered to the WUA. This 
chapter focuses on this transition of control from the Department to the WUA. 
After setting the context for the JGP (section 8.1), this chapter analyses how 
‘creation of consumers’ through entitlements is embedded in certain relationships 
of power practised through politics of knowledge (section 8.2), questions of canal 
ownership (section 8.3) and different understandings of scarcity (section 8.4). In 
strategic ways these also reinforce the authority of the State, blur the distinction 
of state vs. community and constitute the regulatory cultures in the JGP.  
8.1 Setting the scene 
The JGP is based in the village of Uzalgaon. This village is located in the Karjat 
taluka of Ahmadnagar district. Located in the tail of the Jahot canal, JGP covers 
five distributaries
122
 (henceforth DY) 24, 24A, 24B, 25 and 26. Neighbouring 
Uzalgaon is the village of Deluwadi, which is covered by WUA 27. Conflicts 
over water between these two WUAs were reported as well as observed during 
the water rotations.  
In Karjat taluka, there are opportunities at several points to draw water from both 
the Jahot and Ryat canals, and some farmers are able to irrigate land through both 
these systems
123
. JGP has a Culturable Command Area (CCA) of 393.25 hectares, 
with 103 vihir (wells) within its command area. The entitlement (for any normal 
season) as agreed to in the handover contract is 387.32 thousand cubic metres 
(TCM) for the winter season and 323.74 TCM for the summer season 
(Government of Maharashtra, 2006a). This entitlement is applicable for three 
years (from 2009 onwards) and is subject to review by the MWRRA after three 
years (ibid). 
                                                          
122
 I use the term used in common parlance in the Jahot system, DY. 
123
 In the common discourse, Kukadi enjoyed a better status than the Jahot canal system. People 
said that their WUAs were formed under the old Cooperative Act and the canal system was in a 
better condition as it was lined (KI87, KI88). Jahot was an older system than Kukadi, but both 
systems were taken under the MWSIP. I also made visits to Kukadi and met farmers and WUA 
members during my stay. 
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The dominant caste in Uzalgaon is the Maratha caste, with strong reverberations 
of group politics between the two Maratha sub-castes of Gawde and Sudriks. The 
majority of the landholders are either Gawde or Sudrik and they control important 
positions in the local governance system i.e the Panchayats, the dairy business 
and the WUA committees. The main occupation in the village is agriculture and 
the farmers cultivate sugarcane, pulses, onions, lime, fodder and jowar 
(sorghum). They also engage in livestock rearing and dairy farming. The canal 
water is used for the purposes of farming and livelihood activities, especially 
cattle maintenance
124
. However the need for water for livelihood activities is 
rarely expressed as a dominant need. I met medpalaks (sheep herders) near the 
canal during water rotations, but they did not belong to the village and were not 
the members of the WUA as they did not own land. Cattle rearing is also a 
domestic activity and the gendered division of labour has played a prominent part 
in keeping the discourse on livelihoods muted regarding the canal water
125
. 
Among the many WUA members that I met in the course of my work, majority of 
them were men. Even where land was registered in the name of women, it was 
their husbands or fathers who spoke for them. The public discourse on canal 
water is confined to irrigation activities and farmers (usually male) with land and 
the perspectives and rights of the landless medpalaks, women and their livelihood 
issues are conspicuous by their absence; it is only during the periods of scarcity, 
from June onwards that the livelihood discourse surfaced during the discussions 
(section 8.4 of this chapter).  
The JGP was formed in June 2006 and the ‘handing over’ was completed in 2009 
(Government of Maharashtra, 2009) . The WUA has 376 members, of which 333 
are male and 43 female (Government of Maharashtra, 2009). The managing 
committee of the WUA has nine members. As far as the 2005 Act is concerned, 
there should be equal representation from the head, middle and tail WUAs, but 
such is not the case in JGP. The head-end, which also has the largest command 
area, is greatly over-represented with 6 members. Some farmers have dispersed 
landholdings as they own land in the head as well as the tail of the command. For 
                                                          
124
 Information based on interviews conducted with the JGP WUA members. 
125
 For example, van Koppen et al. argue that gendered divisions of labour also create false 
dichotomies in the productive and household needs of water. Domestic water needs are often 
sidelined in the discourse on  irrigation water (see Van Koppen et al., 2006). 
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instance, the first Chairman of the JGP and also a local politician, Mr. Vitthal 
Sudrik, owns land in the head, 24A, as well as the tail, 26. However, he became 
the JGP Chairman by virtue of being a member in the tail. Though the Act gave 
priority to the tail members on grounds of equity and representation of 
marginalised landholders, dispersed landholdings skewed this rule in favour of 
politically visible and strong people. 
The logic of WUA formation in JGP is no different from the stories that were 
narrated in Chapter 7. The field bureaucracy selected the politically visible and 
influential people to circumvent the “headache” of elections. What is important 
and perhaps different in the JGP is the entrenched role of the State in governing 
these communities. Sanjay bhau, a small farmer who was initially a taxi driver 
and is now the canal inspector for the WUA, told me about the process of WUA 
formation: 
The shaasan [Canal Inspector] told us that if you form WUAs, you will get more 
structures and water will stay for more days. They also told us that if we have 100 
percent collection of water charges, 50 percent will be given back to us but we 
have to give them 100 percent payment. Madam, it is a very difficult thing to get 
full collection. This is unfair, they have transferred the entire headache to us 
(KI81). 
 
In this flow of information, there was more emphasis on collection and recovery 
of bills, with the added incentive of subsidies for one hundred percent recovery. 
To this the Department also added extra emphasis on structures and repair of the 
canal system once the WUA was formed. This galvanised the formation of this 
WUA. In November 2012, JGP was scheduled for its first election, but several 
discussions circulated around the grant of 15,000 rupees which was provided to 
the WUA in 2007. This money was given to the WUA for conducting binvirodh 
(unanimous) selection of candidates. In several discussions, the chairmen (former 
and current) of the WUA referred to this amount and said that “since they [were] 
the Chairman, the amount should be in their name” (KI80, KI82). In this way, the 
WUAs were also becoming both political and financially attractive to the farmers.  
 
Along similar lines, societies were created and registered across the Jahot system, 
but the dormant case of Triveni-Balaji and Sangam WUA (Chapter 7) showed 
that these WUAs had not taken over the water distribution process. JGP was an 
exception to this rule. The possibility of getting more water, as promised by the 
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Deputy Engineer, gave birth to this collective enterprise. Another unique feature 
of the JGP is the delineation of its command area. Unlike other WUAs in the head 
system where the CTF are placed on the minors, in JGP the measuring devices 
are placed at the head of the distributaries. The official justified this on the 
ground of a smaller command area of the JGP. I observed the water rotations in 
the JGP and the following sections map this flow of water and flow of control 
across its command.  
8.2 Rotations and entitlements: demand, ownership and 
regulation 
The JGP handled the summer rotation of March 2012. It was one of the first few 
WUAs in the Jahot system to have taken over the process of water distribution. 
The WUA members explained that they had taken over to change the system and 
remove corruption, a regular feature under the shaasan. For this purpose, they 
had changed the process of demand collection.  
As explained in Chapter 5, shejpali is the dominant method of water distribution 
and demand control. The demands were collected prior to rotation and water was 
delivered in turn. This process, as several farmers argued, was ad hoc and form 
number 7 (a form meant for lodging a demand for water with the Department) 
was seldom collected. This system, argued Ramdas Gawde, a JGP committee 
member, did not guarantee water to the farmers and resulted in under-pricing of 
water. Farmers circumvented the system by paying the rate for sorghum while 
they grew sugarcane. Taking this into account, the WUA decided to collect 
demand(s) after the rotation to ensure that the water was not “misused” and there 
was no “theft”. I met Sanjay bhau on the first day of the water rotation in JGP and 
asked him whether he saw any change from the previous system.  
We have not collected demands prior to rotation this time. Under the previous 
system, farmers would demand one acre and use water for 2 acres, the Department 
was at a loss. In the WUA, we will charge people as per the water they have 
consumed and not on the basis of the demand. Once the rotation is over, I will go 
their farms and enter their demand, and every farmer will get water. No one can 
lie and steal in this system (KI81). 
 
In several interviews, the farmers compared the WUA to the ad-hocism that had 
persisted under the rule of the Department. How did this understanding of 
demand interact with the idea of fixed quota entitlements? Though Sanjay bhau 
was unclear about his own role as the sanstha ka patkari (Canal Inspector of the 
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WUA), he was confident that WUAs were being set up to stabilise the demand 
for water in the tail. He explained to me that collecting demands after the water 
rotation is going to show the difference between fudged (previous system under 
the Department) and real demand (under the WUA). The logic which several 
farmers and especially the committee members in the JGP applied was that more 
demand would equal more water in the JGP command. They clearly had no 
information about the entitlements which fixed their water allocation as per their 
command area for three years. Therefore Sanjay bhau explained to me that he 
needed to work hard and ensure that water is distributed effectively to show that 
there was greater demand in the tail. This ‘reality’ would force the Department to 
increase their quota of water. They could then get more area under sugarcane 
cultivation. As Sanjay bhau tried to understand the implications of fixed quota 
through the entitlements, which were promoted on grounds of freedom of 
cropping, he was quite resentful and said that this way, he would never be able to 
cultivate more sugarcane or bring more area under cultivation.  
JGP shared several features with other WUAs across the canal system. These 
relate to incomplete works, speedy hand-over, limited information, etc, but the 
fact that it was located in the tail, faced water scarcity in terms of low availability 
of water during rotations, and had limited alternative sources of water set it apart 
from the head and middle level WUAs, which were discussed in chapter 7. The 
upcoming sugar factory in the neighbourhood had now provided an additional 
impetus to increase the area under sugarcane. Therefore scarcity of water (cf. 
Wade, 1989) and the imperative of increasing demand through the WUA so that 
water could stay for longer in the canal was one of the chief drivers of cohesion 
and initiation of cooperation in the JGP.  
 
For Sanjay bhau and others, there were clear incentives for maintaining the WUA 
to make claims on the canal water. Sanjay bhau also told me that they were 
promised more structures and more water if the WUA took over water 
distribution. However this user community, which was pulled together by the 
field officers, had ambitions that were different from being just a bulk user geared 
towards 100 percent cost recovery. In many ways JGP challenged the monolithic 
and technical understanding underlying regulation, and reinforced the 
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micropolitics of control that created contestations over entitlements, which 
became the very ground for control during water rotations to which I now turn. 
8.2.1 Rule of the Technical: the performance of volumetric pricing 
Volumetric pricing or gin ke paani dena, i.e. giving water in bulk through 
measuring devices (the CTFs), form the backbone of implementing the 
entitlements. These CTFs were constructed at the head of the distributary (DY). 
When the water was released into the DY from the main canal, the readings were 
to be collected in the morning and evening. These readings were then to be 
countersigned by the WUA chairperson and the WUA CI. This process lay at the 
heart of converting farmers to consumers who will now, as a collective, pay for 
the bulk water. The WUA has to ensure a 100 percent collection in order to be 
eligible for getting 50 percent of the money back as funds for maintenance. This 
task seemed daunting to many of the members in the JGP. They often told me that 
if the shaasan could not do so, how do they expect the farmers to make the 100 
percent collection? 
While the Department claimed that WUAs are being trained for volumetric 
pricing, this was far from reality in the JGP. Sanjay bhau told me that he did not 
know how to read the calibration device and no readings had been taken in his 
presence. During the rotations, gauge reading were taken but not at the CTFs, 
they were recorded at the main canal gauge (device at the head of the section of 
canal to check the flow of water).  
 
Figure 8.2: The CTF device in a head end WUA 
                          (January 2012) 
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Figure 8.3: The damaged CTF on DY 24 (JGP) 
                           (April 2012) 
  
 
Figure 8.4: The damaged device on DY 25 (JGP WUA) 
                          (April 2012) 
 
Several others had different stories to account for this measurement. Mr. Gawde 
is a former chairman of the JGP. He has 3.87 acres of land and his fields are 
located in the head-end of the JGP command. He confessed that the device 
impedes the flow of water but he knew little about the calculations because he 
“only knows how to read and write”. Several other farmers reported that the water 
was not measured and that the device impedes the water flow. In some cases it 
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would be the narrowness of the pipe outlets, problems with gravity, and water 
flowing above the calibration devices, and in others the structure itself was 
damaged. Except for the head DY, 24A, the devices at other DYs had either been 
tampered with or were broken. In JGP, it was not difficult to ascertain the reason 
for this tampering. Since the water did not flow with enough force due to system 
conditions or outlet structures, the farmers decided to break the structures. Sanjay 
bhau never told me the names of the farmers but maintained that they broke the 
structures. There was an implicit collective effort to do so! 
I met Chorekar bhau, the Department’s Canal Inspector in Uzalgaon. During one 
of our discussions about the new system, he told me that he had asked the farmers 
to break the measuring devices because the water did not flow with enough force. 
By law, breaking devices is a punishable offence, but this was also a collective 
effort to get water! These acts of ‘deviance’ were not reported and neither were 
the complaints registered. The damaged devices were also strong evidence to 
suggest that water was not calculated on volumetric basis, despite the adamant 
claims made by the Department. 
In JGP, there was a great deal of mistrust with regard to the measuring devices. 
Like Mr. Gawde, many other committee members thought that it required a great 
deal of scientific knowledge to understand the functioning of the device and 
decided not to question the shaasan about it. So after the rotations, Sanjay bhau 
took me to an educated young farmer, Ankur Gawde. A first year science student 
at the college, Sanjay bhau was certain that Ankur could explain the mathematics 
behind the CTFs. Ankur explained: 
The Department has put the gauge above the level and it is wrong, the water does 
not come with enough pressure and stagnates. This is the mistake of the 
Department. We used to get more water before the CTF was put in place, now we 
get less water (KI93). 
These head-end farmers in DY 24 were convinced that the gauge obstructed the 
water flow. The canal inspector and the section officer-in-charge were aware of 
this mistrust but these issues were not reported to the officials above the local 
level. Mr. Sayaji at the sub-division office clarified that he had not received any 
complaints of devices being tampered with. He also said farmers and the CI 
cannot understand these calibrations and remarked that the CI does not 
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“understand entitlements, he just follows orders, he is not technical person” 
(KI41). Thus gin ke paani dena, which were in effect the entitlements, generated 
their own discourse of knowledge hinging on mathematics and calculations. By 
privileging the structure and the engineering around it, the CTF symbolised the 
social and material interactions between the Department and farmers. 
This experience with mistrust of the CTF was not new to the bureaucracy. In 
several interviews with senior bureaucrats, they would often repeat that farmers 
do not understand “the mathematics” and “need to learn”. The solution therefore 
was to train them, and in course of “time they [would] learn” (KI25, KI22, KI20, 
KI40). Errors were attributed to ignorance, not of the shaasan, but of the farmer. 
This also led to a displacement of blame and responsibility (cf. Chambers, 1988; 
Stirling, 2005) where, according to the Department, entitlements became hard to 
implement due to the uneducated and ignorant farmers  
Mr. Prabhakar, former Secretary of the Department and now an MWRRA official, 
offered a different perspective on this situation. He said, “We are in a transition 
stage; very few societies have been formed. So we are issuing theoretical 
entitlements. We know it. They should understand that is their right”(KI24). 
Theoretical entitlements virtually meant entitlements which did not translate into 
water rights for the WUAs. While some officials were aware of the poor 
rehabilitations and incomplete works, they insisted as Mr.Prabhakar “that 
whatever is possible needs to be delivered”, and this led to another version of 
entitlements, that is the so-called “possible entitlements” (KI24).  
Possible entitlements were a practical approach to the realities of incomplete and 
slow rehabilitation and were seen as a way to maintain a balance of accountability 
to the Bank in the light of resistance of various sorts that have been outlined 
above. This thus amounted to a practice of myth and ceremony (cf. Meyer and 
Rowan, 1977) in regulation. By maintaining a ceremonial conformity to the 
reformist vocabulary of entitlements, the Department and the MWRRA were able 
to maintain the prospect of the survival of the MWSIP. This implicit ceremony 
worked its way downwards to where the state agencies not only maintained this 
myth of complicity but also were willing accomplices in challenging some of these 
rules. Despite this tampering and the evidence that water was not measured at the 
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head of the DYs, gauge registers were maintained, signatures collected and JGP 
was presented with the bill on a volumetric basis for the rotation in March. This 
bill was calculated on the basis of entitlements, and produced close to the magic 
figure of the sanctioned entitlement.  
8.2.2 Serving the Bill: the politics of adjustment  
The bill for the March rotation was never formally handed over to the WUA, but I 
procured a copy on request. I also noticed that Chorekar bhau, the Department’s 
CI kept the three rotation registers close at hand: the gauge register, the bill 
register, and the rotation register. In the March bill, the JGP was penalised for 
water use in excess of its entitlement. It was served in English and the bill book, 
which was meant to be with the WUA, was also in English. Thus the micropolitics 
meant that billing was itself an alienating exercise.  
Sanjay bhau felt that this is the first rotation in which “everyone received water 
and yet they were penalised for their hakkadari” (KI81). Since it was on him that 
the responsibility for collecting the water charges would finally accrue, he was 
perplexed and said that he “could not understand how the money that they have 
been asked to recover for one rotation is more than the sum of money that they 
usually pay for one full year?” This discrepancy had occurred due to the fact that 
farmers had no idea about the nature of entitlements and their sanctioned quota 
The WUA had consumed the water beyond their sanctioned entitlement, but did 
not know when and how this water was measured. Incidentally, the bills were 
signed by the (then) Chairman, Mrs Gawde, who later told me that the bhau sahib 
came to collect her signatures at her house at the end of the water rotations (KI94). 
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Figure 8.5: Water charges for the rabi season (2011-2012) 
                          (May 2012) 
 
This billing exercise was also reduced to bureaucratic procedures. Chorekar bhau, 
rising to the rescue of the Department, told me that the bill was prepared by the 
Section Officer, and that they had measured the water through the canal regulator 
and made andaaz (estimates). Not to dispute the estimation and guesswork that 
went into producing the magical figure of entitlements and water used in excess of 
the entitlements, this performance went against the grain of entitlement thinking. 
Instead of creating bulk consumers with paani hakkadari, for accountability and 
transparency in the system, the CTF had now created an unaccountable and non-
transparent system clothed with a technical aura, which farmers could not easily 
challenge and the Department could manipulate with ease. Thus billing became a 
spectacle of bureaucratic procedures and rule by proxy. The mechanics of bill 
production - the language barrier, and the ownership of the bill book and the 
rotation register - reinforced a certain control by the Department. It also subverted 
the provider-consumer ethos embedded in the water regulation discourse.  
While the first bill penalised this WUA for excessive water use, the second bill 
was adjusted to remove the penalty
126
. The officials explained to me that since 
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 The new bill was produced after I had left Uzalgaon for Mumbai. When I returned in August, 
Sanjay bhau told me that the bill had been revised and was close to the usual figure. He also told 
me that people in Uzalgaon thought that I had pressured the Department and used my ‘influence’ 
to make the changes. I clarified that I had no role in this whatsoever and had merely asked 
questions for my research. 
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some WUAs, in the Jahot command, are on lifts (as is Sangam WUA in Chapter 
7), they have extra water to adjust this overuse of the JGP. At the WUA level, 
volumetric pricing created confusions over questions of who is measuring water 
and when and how the bill is presented. The bureaucracy, on the other hand, 
treated volumetric pricing as a target to be met. Mr. Sayaji, the officer-in-charge 
for sending information on entitlements to the MWRRA, explained to me the 
imperative of volumetric pricing as follows: 
We have made volumetric pricing compulsory from 2010-11 but we are not 
getting the bills; the section officers keep telling us but do not produce the bill. 
Unless we make the bill in volumetric pricing as per the entitlement, the WUAs 
will not receive their subsidy. Our own officers also need to act (KI41). 
Mr. Sayaji’s confession also showed that field officers were not producing 
volumetric bills and this got in the way of target completion. Thus, volumetric 
pricing served several ends: it was a means to ensure WUAs receive subsidy; it 
made knowledge technical; and it maintained the position of farmers as subject 
consumers, who needed to be taught and trained. Its over-emphasis on cost 
recovery was punctured with the politics of adjustment and contingency. Both 
farmers and field officials faced limitations in putting volumetric pricing in place.  
While the farmers were unaware of their hakkadari, they were not averse to 
measuring per se, unlike in the head regions (Chapter 7). They did not trust the 
CTFs in the face of unreliable and low intensity water supply. The technical aura 
of the CTFs only exacerbated this fear. While these manoeuvrings highlight the 
everyday practices of water regulation, they also indicate the larger 
manifestations of these practices. They problematise the constructions of farmers 
as ignorant or uninterested in payment, and show how the technical practice of 
volumetric pricing was made socially malleable as per the diverse aims and 
interests of the canal officer, field officer, section officer-in-charge and the head 
and tail farmers, who had different understandings of the CTF. Besides the social 
and political shaping of volumetric pricing, the first rotation which was handled 
by the JGP revealed several blindspots (cf. Wade and Chambers, 1980) or gaps in 
this entitlements system. These gaps also demonstrated the axes of the 
relationship between the Department and the WUA, which goes beyond the linear 
service agency/consumer relationship. They also reinforce centrality of the 
Department in discreet ways. I now turn to those aspects in the JGP WUA. 
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8.3 Hydraulic boundaries and the battle for ownership of and 
jurisdiction over water 
In the Jahot system, the cropping pattern in the head and tail regions of the canal 
system is different. Sugarcane is grown in the head and jowar in the tail. These 
crops need watering at different intervals. Moreover the variation in soil 
conditions and diversity of water sources in use in the head region also 
contributes to the difference in water needs of this region. For example, unlike the 
tail-end farmers, the farmers in the head region can access water through different 
sources, and therefore sustain sugarcane on well-water etc. However, water is 
released to the farmers as per the requirements of the sugarcane crop. The 
officials defend their decision on the grounds that the majority of the area within 
the Jahot command is in the Shrigonda taluka. Calling this situation a “crisis”, 
Mr. Sayaji explained: 
The problem of the tail is that there soil is light, it does not retain water and 
therefore they require water more frequently. We call a meeting in which the 
members from the tail are also present. They demand water frequently on an 
interval of 7 to 15 days and the farmers in the head say we want water after 30 
days, this is the crisis and we try to resolve it in ways that are beneficial to both 
head and tail (KI41). 
 
Mr. Shiv Narayan Sopore was busy supervising the digging of wells, when I 
arrived in his field after the March rotation. He was the chairman of the JGP from 
2009 to 2011. It was under his chairmanship that the handover from the 
Department to the WUA was completed. Similar to other WUA members, Mr. 
Sopore did not have any information about entitlements and volumetric pricing, 
but was very assertive that these changes do not mean anything unless the WUA 
gets control over the dates of rotation: 
The Department told us to form the WUA and we did so. But I have been telling 
bhau sahib that we need water on time. What is the point in getting water when 
our crops are damaged. I lost my crop in December because the rotation was 
delayed. They release water as per the wishes of Shrigonda taluka. Our 
accountability only starts when there is certainty of getting water for the crop 
(KI82). 
 
Since the Department decides on the dates of rotations, which are usually delayed 
by ten to fifteen days (referring to the last rotation), it results in a reduced crop to 
the farmer. (Field Journal, April 2012). This sugarcane vs. jowar controversy is a 
regular head and tail controversy in any canal system (see Shah, 2003), and Jahot  
was no exception. However, the way the JGP WUA understood the notion of 
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their accountability also has important implications. The WUAs, in general, 
wanted more power in determining dates and time of rotation, which would 
eventually be the case once the entire canal was handed over to the Project Level 
Association
127
. However, given the powerful lobbies in the head region there is 
no certainty that these problems will be resolved even then.  
As I demonstrated in the previous chapter, the head and tail controversy is not 
merely about cropping patterns but also about political divisions. Equity in this 
sense is complicated by trade-offs between quantity of water, timeliness and 
guarantee of supply, and not just the volume of water circumscribed in the 
definition of entitlements. Knowledge of rotations and how and when they are 
determined are issues that lay outside the purview of the WUA. It would be 
within their jurisdiction once the whole canal system was handed over to the 
PLA, but given the politics of rotation, the head-tail crises, and the competing 
realities and water requirement of different sections in the canal system, it is 
difficult to ascertain whether these issues could be resolved through community 
and participation, which are often treated as homogeneous categories. Besides 
jurisdiction issues related to the main system, there were several other concerns 
that created overlaps and question of control during these water rotations. 
8.3.1 Where water seeps: Who pays for the losses? 
Most perplexing was the issue of water losses and who should take responsibility 
for them. In calculating entitlements and distribution, the Department kept a 
margin of 20 percent losses as system losses; this was in relation to the main 
canal system. However, once the distribution system was handed over to the 
WUA, the responsibility for losses was placed on the WUAs. The understanding 
was that with the (supposed) rehabilitation of the system, the possibility of losses 
was miniscule, and in case of water loss, this would only lead to water recharge in 
the command area, due to seepage. This logic was plausible in the case where 
water flowed only through the command area, but in the case of the JGP, the 
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 In the three-tier framework of farmers’ management of irrigation system, the WUA is formed 
at the lowest level (at the minors), followed by the Distributary level Associations (DLA) and then 
the Project Level Associations. Once the system is handed over to the PLAs, the elected members 
can then decide on the dates and time of rotations. In Jahot, the PLA had already been formed by 
the Department but there were disputes regarding membership between the farmers of left and the 
right bank canal making it non-functional (KI41). 
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geographical terrain was rocky in places (udapa kshetra) and this led to a curious 
overlap of command and non-command area. 
 
During the rotation on DY 24, three farmers walked with me to show me the CTF 
(measuring device) for DY 24, which is located in the head of the JGP system. 
Water was flowing out of the DY beyond the CTF. There was a long and heated 
discussion about whether the losses were being calculated in the demand for 
water and whether the WUA would need to pay for these losses. To clarify this, 
we went to the house of Mr. Ramdas Gawde, a former Committee member, where 
farmers of DY 24 had gathered to register their water demands. Mr. Gawde 
instantly called up Chorekar bhau who told him that the losses were the 
responsibility of the WUA. Mr. Gawde was shocked at this revelation and felt 
cheated by the Department. He said that “the Department created the WUA but 
did not inform them of the details. We did not know that this [loss] would be 
calculated in the demand. The association should not have taken control of water 
distribution unless the work was complete” (KI89). 
 
From this rotation onwards, incomplete works became a liability for the WUA. 
Underneath this shock was the growing realisation of the many responsibilities 
that the WUA would be taking on. Mr. Gawde and the other committee members 
that I spoke to told me that the officials had made it clear that they will not pay 
for any more repair works. While the farmers said that it was the DY that needed 
repair, the officers claimed that it was field channels and that the Department had 
never been responsible for the field channels.  
Here the question was of water losses due to poor rehabilitation. But what was 
worrying Sanjay bhau was also the issue of water seepage. The wells in the 
command now came under the jurisdiction of the WUA and water seepage was, 
in effect, recharging the command area. Mr. Vitthal Sudrik, the first chairman of 
the JGP (2007-2009) said that a surcharge on wells was required or else the WUA 
would never be able to recover the costs for the volume of water, but other 
farmers including Sanjay bhau resisted the idea, saying that they have never paid 
for water in the wells.  
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The water that seeped in, either through losses or recharge, became a contentious 
issue in the translation of entitlements into individual quotas. This did not present 
immediate problems for the JGP. This was so because there were sections in the 
command that did not receive water due to poor rehabilitation, and were thus cut 
off from the supply - as was the case in the tail of DY 26, where farmers were 
now resorting to lift irrigation (section 8.4). This provided the JGP with the room 
to manoeuvre within the individual quotas of the farmers. I return to this group of 
farmers in section 8.4. 
8.3.2 Lift vs. others 
JGP comprised farmers mainly from Uzalgaon; however there were also a set of 
farmers from the adjoining village of Deluwadi who used water via a lift from the 
canal. This lift affected the velocity of the water on DY 26 (JGP) and the WUA 
below the JGP. This in turn created disruptions and quarrels between the lift 
farmers and the JGP farmers. These lifts usually operated in the night and 
siphoned off water between the DYs using motor pumps. 
The lift farmers did not want to speak to me at first, thinking that I was an officer 
carrying out an inspection. When they realised I was a research student, they 
openly shared their problems. These farmers were members of the WUA in the 
Ryat project but owned a patch of land near DY 26 which was a non-command 
area. They irrigated their grape crop with the Jahot water. The lift farmers 
accepted that they were “stealing” water from the Jahot system but they had no 
better alternative since their fields were adjoining the Jahot canal. They stated 
that though they “know that they do not have any right on this water, they need it 
for irrigation of their crop”. They defended this act of stealth and said: 
We have been told by the officers that we do not have any right to this water 
because we are from the outside [of the JGP]. These officers do not take our 
demand. We want to be included in the WUA. Then if we make the demand and 
pay for water, it will be our water and the shaasan will also get some money, 
which currently goes into the pockets of others, but we are told that we have no 
right. However we need water and if the water flows from here, and X says this is 
not your water and Y says you can’t get it, we will still take it from here. We put 
pipes and lift the water automatically (KI104). 
 
Lifting water by stealth was clearly illegal and section officers maintained that 
there was no permission for lifts in Uzalgaon. This illegal lift system created open 
battles of ownership and jurisdiction, not only between the Uzalgaon and 
232 
 
Deluwadi village but, more importantly, between the Department and the WUA. 
Sanjay bhau claimed that this water belonged to the JGP, while the lift farmers 
maintained that the WUA had no jurisdiction over the canal, since it belonged to 
the Department and they were accountable only to them. This problem had arisen 
due to the inchoate command of the JGP where 5 DYs of the main canal were 
grouped together to form the JGP. The bone of contention was the water flowing 
between these DYs, which, although flowed through the main canal, was also 
under the jurisdiction of the JGP as it affected the flow of water to DY 26. 
These lift farmers were not against paying for water and were ready to go through 
the legal route by becoming members of the JGP. The WUA members also 
wanted them to do so as they suffered due to the reduced water velocity. 
Inducting them into the JGP, explained Sanjay bhau, also had the potential to 
raise the demand for water by raising the command of the JGP. An increase in 
demand meant that water could stay for more days. However, JGP did not have 
the right to decide this issue because the area irrigated by illegal lifts, was not 
under its CCA. The lift farmers saw the shaasan as arbiter and categorically said 
that the WUA could not stop them from taking water: 
The shaasan has control over canal and the JGP over the chaari [here: 
distributary]. The officials have more power. When they say something, the 
farmer will do it. Here, he is my friend and he is the secretary. I will not listen to 
him. We need better planning (KI104). 
 
These farmers were adamant that only the Department could stop them from 
taking water. However, the section officers maintained that they had no 
knowledge of such lifts in the Uzalgaon area. Clearly these unsanctioned lifts 
thrived due to the grey areas of rent and corruption. This also created a battle of 
ownership over the canal water. The members on DY 26 were already suffering 
due to narrow outlet pipes and an unfavourable slope gradient, which affected the 
velocity of water. This siphoning off of water raised the question of how to 
regulate an open access system and how entitlements could be as accurate as the 
formulas claimed them to be. 
Mr. More, the section officer in charge, denied the existence of any illegal lifts 
around JGP, as did the Chorekar bhau, which meant that there was no official 
record for these lifts. Thus the issue remained more local than official. This 
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invisibility created problems for the JGP and problematised the jurisdiction and 
control of the WUAs. They could neither stop these farmers for limited 
jurisdiction nor include them into the user association for technical reasons, even 
though these lifts affected the water flow and thereby the entitlements of the JGP. 
The Department had the right and legitimate authority to sanction or stop them 
but there was no record of the existence of these lifts.  
This battle of ownership was, in real terms, a contest over the command area. As 
per the 2005 Act, the delineation of the command was a ‘historic opportunity’ to 
create a need-based system, but as demonstrated in the previous chapter, this 
process was led by the field officers and farmers ended up having a limited voice. 
While the lifts clearly fell outside the mandate of the JGP, there were lands within 
the command that had virtually become non-command. I now turn to one of the 
pivots of the state machinery in the JGP, a central figure who represented the 
shaasan to the farmers and defined the jurisdictions of control. It was through this 
officer that these illegal lifts survived in the tail. As Prof. Purandhare, an 
Aurangabad-based water expert put it: “It is amazing to see how the onus of the 
irrigation machinery rests on the shoulders of one man who has no technical 
know-how but enjoys immense power” - i.e. the canal inspector, who is the link 
between the Department and the farmers (KI16). 
8.3.3 The small man of the irrigation sector: The Bhau Sahib 
The officials in Shrigonda and above repeatedly argued that the CI, called the 
bhau sahib in the Jahot system, was not interested in the WUA since he liked to 
distribute water on a per area basis, which gave him greater leverage to exercise 
authority. “He opposes volumetric pricing because he fears the end to his rule 
through reforms and handing over”, chipped in Mr. More when I asked him about 
the slow pace of reforms in Jahot (KI42). For Mr. Jadhav, the Prerna coordinator 
who was ‘training’ WUA members in other parts of the Jahot system, “the 
reforms meant the transfer of money from the CI to the WUA and for this reason 
he resists the reforms”. Mr. Raman from Prerna explained the situation in this 
way: 
Every minor has a patkari, these guys are a parallel system. One side the 
Competent Authority is there, section officers are there and in parallel we are 
trying to overthrow it and create the WUAs. It’s a conflict of interest. For one 
vehicle of reforms, we are putting in two engines or two drivers. The Act says that 
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the Department will stop functioning, the control will go into the hands of the 
WUA, but the Department has not even released their machinery (KI114). 
 
The Canal inspector was the lynchpin between the government and the farmers, 
and observations during water rotations identify him as a critical factor. It would 
be a generalisation to argue that he was against the reforms, because he did have 
vested interests in maintaining certain aspects of them. The emphasis on 
measuring and figures nowhere became so reified as in the activities of the CI, 
who displaced most of the questions of accountability into gauge registers and 
practices of measuring. For the farmers, the CI is the information link, the 
feedback loop for grievances and virtually ‘the State’. “For so long, people only 
recognise him as the face of the government and therefore he has to handle the 
authority because ultimately he executes; he says no or he says yes and he has the 
right to penalise the farmer”(KI113), underlined Mr. Bhonsle from Prerna as he 
expressed his disappointment over the state of affairs in Jahot. These reforms 
downplay the powerful role of this ‘small man’, who not only has a vested 
interest in the system but also is a part of the social and institutional fabric of the 
canal system. 
In the name of training the farmers, Chorekar bhau was present during water 
rotations in the JGP. Chorekar bhau was an elderly man, also a farmer with fields 
in another part of the Jahot system. He took great pride in telling me that he used 
the drip irrigation method and that he was fairly ‘modern’ in his approach to 
farming. I accompanied Chorekar Bhau during the water rotations, and he 
explained to me how hard he was working in training the farmers and how 
committed he is to the vasooli (recovering water charges), and penalising the 
farmers who do not pay up. As far as the reforms were concerned, he did not 
have any information on entitlements as paani hakkadari, but explained that he 
maintained a register for the gauge readings and collected the signature of the 
Chairman when required. When I asked for a copy of this register or the bills that 
have been produced for the WUAs, he immediately told me that the original is 
with his senior, Rao sahib (section officer).  
It was Chorekar bhau who was training Sanjay bhau during the March water 
rotations, and exclaimed that he was happy that his “headache of water 
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distribution” was over and now he could concentrate on the vasooli. He stated 
that: 
Farmers have an advantage in this system. Through the WUAs, farmers will get 
water on time so that is to their advantage. We do not have any advantage, how 
can this be to our benefit? Yes, this has reduced my headache...I had a lot of 
power before but now politics has ruined it (KI48). 
 
This training also meant that the practices of inclusion and exclusion as 
previously determined by Chorekar bhau were getting naturalised and repeated in 
the work of Sanjay bhau, who was now the CI for the JGP. As I have explained 
before, for the members of the WUA, as well as for Sanjay bhau, Chorekar bhau 
was the first point of contact. He was the source of information and guided him in 
the “right way for doing things” (KI81). He controlled the distribution of water 
and moved the jurisdictions of the command and non-command. For example the 
tail region of DY 24, though under the command area, did not receive water 
because it ran through rocky areas. Chorekar bhau defended his decision saying: 
I do not give water to them despite their demand because the water has to flow 
through rocky areas and there is a lot of wastage; just for the sake of two people, I 
cannot waste the water. I decline their request…they will not get water! (KI48) 
 
This decision was not reversed even when Sanjay bhau took over the water 
distribution. He argued that delivering water to that section of the command only 
involves wastage and the WUA might not be able to do much about this 
situation. Some of the tail members of this DY had invested and constructed 
lined channels to get water to the fields. Mr. Arun Gawde, a committee member 
of the JGP, was one of those farmers who invested approximately twenty 
thousand rupees (340 US dollars) to get the canal water to his fields but others 
who could not afford to do so either looked for alternative sources such as 
borewells or waited for the shaasan to repair the structures. 
8.3.4 Waiting for the shaasan 
In JGP, there were several farmers who complained about incomplete works, but 
most of them agreed that structures were repaired between 2007 and 2010. They 
conceded that people did get water through rotations once or twice, but with time 
(2010-2012) these structures had fallen into disrepair
128
. They complained that 
the Department checked the flow of water and handed over the WUA to them. So 
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 This discussion is based on the conversation with a group of farmers on the tail of the head DY 
24. 
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now the farmers and the WUA are responsible for the maintenance of these DYs 
and channels. In one of the group discussions on this, some of the farmers stated 
that they were not in a position to make such investments and the government 
must come to their rescue: 
The shaasan did ‘good’ work and we got water for one year, but these structures 
fell apart because of the rains. Two years back, officials from above told us that 
we had given a request in the Mantralaya to sanction plaster works but nothing 
happened. The point up to where the water comes is 1 km from here; shaasan 
needs to do something to ensure that water comes to us. The sanstha cannot make 
this investment from their pockets, it is not a joke! (KI100). 
 
The farmers on the tail end of DY 24y had therefore taken to irrigation via bore 
and wells. Before the WUA could even get on its feet, it was saddled with the 
burden of repair works and gauge repairs. Sanjay bhau, who was now responsible 
for collection, explained to me that it would be difficult to collect money from 
people if they did not get water. Unless the structures are repaired, some farmers 
might not be prepared to pay for water: “they could fight with them now but not 
with the government”, as was the case before the handover. 
Both the Acts put in place a mechanism of checks via the public dispute 
resolution officer (PDRO) and the local regulator in the event that the entitlement 
is not delivered to the WUA. These farmers could complain to the PDRO but they 
used traditional mechanisms via the Rao Sahib and the Bhau Sahib. The irrigation 
bureaucracy above the section officers made the assumption that as “water is so 
essential and if [the farmer] does not get it, s/he will make noise about it. If 
anybody is not getting it then he can make a complaint and then there is a 
mechanism” (KI27). Alternatively, Mr. Prabhakar, another senior bureaucrat in 
Mumbai, explained the situation in this way: 
The farmers should know their share is and how much I should they get. But, in 
reality, they do not know! They are still not complaining because it takes time to 
go against the State! Speed is less than our expectation! (KI24). 
 
While these reforms, through independent regulation and entitlements, clarified 
the role of the State in the form of the Department as the service provider and that 
of farmers as consumers, it did not factor in the relationships which have tied the 
farmers to the State or how the farmers see the State. Moreover, they need not 
necessarily be on an even footing (KI04). The fact that individual quotas, and 
thereby internal distribution of water, are the sole responsibility of the WUAs 
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may be too simplistic an understanding, which would gloss over the links by 
which farmers are tied to Department in relationships of control, patronage and 
even corruption. 
WUA formation and independent regulation through entitlements have 
transformed the WUAs into economic entities tied to the State in economic 
relationships on the basis of taxes and rents. However, the farmers still feel the 
need for the State to intervene in the process of distribution. Mr. Vitthal Sudrik, a 
former chairman of the JGP who wanted to put in place clear rules for collection 
of demands and charges on wells. He said: 
The Department has an important role. If the Department is absent, farmers will 
start fighting. It is the mentality of the people that they do not accept the pressure 
of their own group since both are farmers; he will not accept my control. But if he 
knows that there is government then he will treat us as people from the 
government. If there is no government, then he will not listen to us. Farmers must 
know that there is the government ahead of the WUA (KI80).  
The undercurrent of these battles and contestation not only problematises the 
superficiality of entitlements in such a contested terrain, but also the embedded 
role of the State, which pervades beyond the gates and structures. Entitlements 
treated the politics beyond the CTFs in an opaque manner which, in the case of 
JGP, was beginning to create worries. These were only exacerbated by the May 
rotations in Jahot – in 2012- when the spectre of failed monsoons and impending 
droughts loomed large over Maharashtra. 
8.4 The long wait for water in May: dimensions of scarcity and 
the politics of a hot weather rotation 
As I waited to observe the last rotation for 2011-2012, i.e the May rotation, there 
was a discussion among the farmers at the village chaupal regarding the 4
th
 
rotation. I met Professor sahib (as he was called) at the Uzalgaon bus stop. He is 
one of the tail end farmers on DY26. He asked me if I had any information from 
the officers in Shrigonda about the May rotation. Quite anxiously he told me, “If 
we get the fourth rotation, it will be good for us or we will not get water to 
drink!” Despite several enquiries that I had made regarding the uses of water in 
the JGP, from January to April 2012, this is the first time that I had heard 
someone connect drinking water needs with irrigation water in the JGP.  
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Within the canal system, this water in May was supposed to do several things: 
irrigate crops, recharge wells for the upcoming dry summer months which would 
sustain the kharif (summer) season and address people’s drinking water woes. 
These needs differed according to the status and resource position of the people. 
As the prosperous head-end farmer, Mr. Navade, put it: 
The definition of scarcity depends on our water needs from the canal system. For 
me, it means I do not get enough water to irrigate my crops while for people in the 
tail, it may also mean that they do not have water to look after their cattle or do 
not have water for drinking (KI51). 
 
During the first few days in May, the Department constantly underlined the fact 
that there was “no water in the dam” (KI41). However people in Uzalgaon were 
positive that they would get water for irrigation because the politicians would do 
something. The Department, to the contrary, told me that there was no water in 
the dam and whatever was left was reserved for drinking for the coming months. 
However, this time the farmers were right. After several days of waiting and 
denials by the Department, and rounds of meetings within the Department at the 
head office and Mumbai, the water was released under the banner of drinking 
water (Field Journal, May 2012). By this time there was a sense of urgency 
among the farmers for this rotation, which became more contentious with time.  
Just before the water was released in the second week of May, a meeting was 
organised by the Department in the head office at Vadgaon located in the head of 
the system. It was attended by the guardian minister, Mr. Bajirao. This meeting 
was organised in the context of the upcoming water rotation, and the striking 
feature about this meeting was that it was dominated by or limited to the farmers 
in the head of the system. The farmers in Uzalgaon had no information about this 
meeting, although their officers and CIs were present. The immediate suspicion 
of the people in the tail was whether the water would be released only for 
Shrigonda taluka and not for Karjat. 
Though this water was released for drinking water purposes, in reality the water 
was meant and used for irrigation (KI41, KI76, and KI81). The rotation had been 
planned from tail to head but there was rampant theft and stealing of water across 
the canal systems. People in Uzalgaon were not sure if the farmers ‘above’ would 
let the water reach to the tail. Since this rotation was declared as a rotation during 
“dushkaal” (scarcity) and explicitly released for drinking water purposes, 
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entitlements were not calculated and distributed during this rotation. But this was 
not the first time that such a scarcity measure was taken in Jahot. Several farmers 
across the Jahot system noted that over the years, the fourth rotation had usually 
been a rotation “released in the name of drinking water but people irrigate their 
crops” (KI115).  
For five days, the farmers in Uzalgaon waited to receive water from this rotation. 
They tried to speak to politicians concerned, made trips to the head office, spoke 
to Chorekar bhau but there was little the Department could do to get water to the 
tail through a head system where farmers used all means to irrigate their crops 
and lift the water to fill their private wells (Field Journal, May 2012). Though 
there was enough police protection to ensure safety and security for the water, the 
rotation did not reach Uzalgaon in May. There were diversions, captures and 
blocks whereby farmers in the head-end adapted to scarcity by breaking and 
capturing water from the main system.  
The formal definition of entitlements has steered clear of defining scarcity. The 
2005 Act mentions that in scarcity years, entitlements may not apply. It defines 
scarcity as a year of below normal rainfall. There are safeguards such as reserving 
water for drinking, and allowing one acre of irrigation to each farmer. But what 
does scarcity mean in a competing context of water conflicts mediated by these 
relationships of power, as in case of the Jahot system? 
 
Figure 8.6: A public meeting with Mr. Bajirao on the scarcity rotation at the Jahot 
head office (May 2012) 
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Figure 8.7: In search of water: well construction in the JGP 
( May 2012) 
 
 
Figure 8.8: Illegal lifts being disconnected during water rotation 
                    (May 2012) 
 
It was in this period of scarcity that several farmers spoke of their livelihood 
needs from the canal water and how wells in the command were used for the 
purposes of securing domestic water and maintaining the cattle for their dairy 
business. By mid-July, it had become clear that the monsoons had disappointed 
the farmers of Maharashtra. The crops were burning in the fields and there was a 
tough year ahead. According to Dr. Harsh Gawde, who ran a small medical 
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dispensary in Uzalgaon and also had four acres of land in the JGP command, this 
was not an unusual sight in a rain shadow and drought prone area such as 
Uzalgaon. He also mentioned that this crisis, which would affect the next seasons, 
was just unfolding. It is at this point that people started harnessing groundwater as 
it became clear that there may be no water in the dam for 2012-2013, apart from 
what was reserved for drinking. As I made my last visit to Uzalgaon in August, 
there seemed to be a sudden movement to bore more and deeper wells in search 
of water. This became a common topic in my farewell discussions (Field Journal; 
August 2012). 
The MMISF Act, 2005, states that the WUAs shall “have the freedom of using 
groundwater in their command area, in the prescribed manner, in conjunction 
with canal water or otherwise there shall not be any extra charge to be paid to the 
WRD for the use of groundwater” (Section 25 (2), Government of Maharashtra, 
2005a). Mr. Pomane, section officer in charge of the head section in the Jahot 
system mentioned: 
Initially we would also calculate the charges on well irrigation but now we do not 
do that anymore. Now this area is under the catchment of the WUA and they have 
the authority to calculate, we would only calculate volumetrically. Volumetric use 
has its benefit…if the rotation is delayed, they can use the water from the wells. 
They have also started bore. This would give them good sugarcane crop. Prior to 
rotation, it is well and bore and then canal water; the sugarcane survives on this 
combination and use pattern (KI43). 
 
As canal water started failing the tail end farmers, they simultaneously shifted to 
other sources of water: lifts and borewells in the head and borewells and dug 
wells in the tail. The MWRRA Act overlooked the use of groundwater, and this 
glaring gap in water policy has gained state-wide and nation-wide focus. 
Groundwater in Uzalgaon, as in other areas of the system, is now used for 
irrigating the water-thirsty crop of sugarcane. However the hard rock topography 
in certain areas in the JGP command does not make it very lucrative or affordable 
for some small landholders. The official data on wells and bores collected from 
the talati (land records) office in Uzalgaon did not reveal the intensity of the 
water extraction that is in place in the region. Sanjay Bhau and Dr. Gawde told 
me that almost every farmer has a bore in the WUA, and they are on the rise with 
every period of scarcity.  
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Dr. Gawde recalled that the drought year of 2002 and the successive dilapidation 
and unpredictability of the canal water system had made farmers shift to 
borewells. The canal water would recharge the sub-surface wells, but now 
farmers have also started using borewells to recharge the wells. He made it clear 
that dushkaal was a recurring phenomenon every ten years and the farmers now 
plan according to this cycle and look for more practical solutions. 
For ten years, people have been harnessing water through the wells and bore 
wells. At the minimum every farmer has one or two borewells and wells. The 
water table has been declining. But only deep bores can sustain sugarcane 
cultivation in this year (KI79).  
 
Groundwater sources have become essential for surviving drought periods. As 
already explained in the previous chapter, mixed use of water was widely 
prevalent in the Jahot canal system due to farmers having access to several 
sources of water. This mixed use was more common in the head and middle 
regions than some areas in the tail. Entitlements were introduced in a system 
which had lost favour with several farmers in the JGP. Their interest in 
maintaining the canal water was more to do with increasing the demand in the 
JGP command, a notion that was antithetical to a fixed system of entitlements. In 
times of failure, these farmers were dynamic agents exploring and exploiting all 
possible resources, political and material, to keep the water flowing. 
8.5 Conclusion 
This chapter has shown how the practice of entitlements was unfolding in the 
JGP. In theory, entitlements meant radical restructuring in the way irrigation 
water was delivered to the users. It entailed the revision of lines of authority 
between the farmers and the irrigation bureaucracy, but in reality these became 
grounds for contestation. For the field bureaucracy, entitlements normatively 
meant equity in distribution but how this would be implemented, was neither their 
concern nor priority.  
Two distinct rationalities were in operation on the issue of entitlements in Jahot. 
They were practices of technical rule for the bureaucracy, who saw volumetric 
pricing as “its own task”, and therefore the site of measuring shifted from the 
jointly owned outlet gauge to the main canal where the Department’s legitimacy 
and control were unchallenged. On the other hand, the farmers equated “their 
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right over water” with a means to extend and increase their original quota and 
more decision making powers for controlling the water rotations. 
In JGP, physical conditions for measuring water did not exist and were equally 
hard to administer (cf. Moore, 1989) At one level, entitlements were reduced to 
one of the policy objectives that needed to be met in order to show the progress of 
reforms. This is evident in Mr. Sayaji’s subsidy argument (section 8.2). On the 
other hand, they were articulated through the complex process of volumetric 
pricing and CTF devices, which did not find a constituency with the farmers. For 
them equity and rights meant having more control over determining rotations and 
length of rotations, and ensuring that all fields were irrigated. It also nurtured a 
culture of blame displacement where errors were generally ascribed to the 
“uneducated farmer”, or the CI, who was not a “technical person” (KI41). These 
also obscured the practices of power which were often embedded underneath 
these patronising labels. 
The performance of volumetric pricing brought to light the disciplinary power of 
the State. JGP was required to maintain daily schedules and take responsibility 
for the delivery of water to each individual farmer; the tedious burdens of 
ensuring equity and distribution were transferred to the JGP and the Department 
retained the rights to demand payment for the water that was delivered. The 
‘science of measuring’ made this an opaque exercise. They were required to 
maintain records and bill books, which were audited by the Department. 
Significant powers to allocate water (lift irrigation) and approve finance, 
determine rehabilitations, plan rotations and fix entitlements remained in the 
hands of the State. The remark of one civil society actor is telling in this regard as 
he complained that these reforms had transferred the “donkey work” to the 
WUAs and the government was “complicating” the process deliberately (KI114). 
To paraphrase Mosse (2003: 289), regulation thus brought the State into the 
village in new ways. 
However, this control of the State was equally contested. Farmers also exercised 
agency from below by tampering the CTFs. Moreover the canal inspector also 
colluded in this exercise. The episodes of CTFs being tampered which went 
unreported, the March bill which was adjusted to waive the penalty of the JGP, 
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and the illegal lifts that continued to thrive show the diverse manifestations of 
interactions and meaning making of regulation (as also in Chapter 7). These also 
unpack the strategic relationships that are formed over and for water. This 
collusion and contradiction in the layered practices of the State lay at the heart of 
the varied manifestations of rule in the Jahot system. 
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9. Conclusion: Of Rules, Regulation and Reform 
This thesis set out to study the process of the evolution of the ‘independent’ water 
regulation in Maharashtra. In the preceding chapters, I have focused on the 
discourses and practices that have shaped the water regulation reform in 
Maharashtra, and illustrated how the regulation reform has successively built on 
the already existing relations of power. I have demonstrated that the regulation 
reform is embedded in networks and practices of power. These extend from the 
systemic features of the water sector, such as the formation of the State-led water 
apparatus and the role of the bureaucracy, to the contestations over questions of 
what constitutes regulation and how should it be practised.   
Based on these insights, I have argued that this neoliberal project of 
‘independent’ water regulation is evolving with plural rationalities at work. While 
the national-level discourse reinforces a standard framing of regulation with the 
retreat of the State, these ideas become diffused into the institutional and 
discursive complexities at the state level and lead to plural meanings of 
regulation. From the politics over water allocations to the refinement of 
entitlements, regulation has become the very ground of contestation and 
articulation of the discursive and material power of the State. This also reveals 
that the narrow framing of economic regulation may not obviate the underlying 
systems and strategies of power on which the Indian water sector has sustained its 
practices. The regulation reform has thus been subsumed into a pattern of State 
rule rather than conspicuously displacing the monopoly of the State as originally 
envisaged in the reform. In this chapter, I conclude this discussion by briefly 
summarising the findings discussed in the previous chapters (section 9.1). I then 
move on to discuss the implications of this research for larger debates in the water 
sector and beyond (section 9.2). I conclude by considering future pathways to 
further research.  
9.1 Putting the puzzle together 
In this thesis, I have shown how ‘independent’ water regulation has emerged at 
the confluence of the changing conditions of political economy in India and roll-
out neoliberalism. Hence the regulator avatar of the State, as a promoter of 
competition, was required to make space for private sector operators and become 
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a service agency to be monitored by an ‘independent’ regulator (a model followed 
in the telecommunications and electricity sector). ‘Independent’ regulation was 
thus framed in the language of ‘depoliticised and scientific tariffs’ and secure 
property rights that could mimic market conditions in the water sector, with an 
emphasis on the distanced role of the State (see Chapter 4). This ‘independence’ 
was hard to come by in a sector such as water which was quite firmly bound to 
the State, and which was - as this study shows - discursively constructed and also 
constituted through the practices of multiple actors. These included: the socially 
complex group of farmers in Jahot; the field bureaucrats who worked towards 
securing the rule of the shaasan; civil society which made claims on the State; 
and various senior officers in Mumbai whose interactions among themselves and 
with the politicians constituted and shaped the boundaries of the State. This 
diffused and decentred understanding of the State kept “the idea and the system” 
(cf. Abrams, 1988) at the centre of regulatory discourse and practice in 
Maharashtra. Therefore the path of the water regulation reform in Maharashtra 
was governed by the intangible realities of power - how power is exercised and 
how it is felt. Power, in this work, was relationally constituted, and through this 
optic I unpacked the politics of knowledge, the multiple framings of regulation, 
the diverse practices of regulation and, fundamentally, the practices of the State, 
which contests, competes and colludes to maintain this veneer of reforms. In the 
light of this understanding, this work has shown the agency of the State in 
reshaping the regulation reform in three ways:  
(1) At the national level, the predominance of the World Bank view regarding 
‘independent’ and ‘apolitical’ water regulator is increasingly been reshaped by 
the national bodies in the context of the Indian democracy and federal relations 
with greater emphasis on issues of accountability. It is important to note that the 
challenge here emerges more in the context of ‘framing’ regulation, i.e. what the 
appropriate goals should be for water regulation and how they should be 
institutionalised. The national level discourses do not displace the need for or 
relevance of a water regulator per se, but attempt to make it more salient to the 
anatomy of the Indian water sector (see Chapter 4), especially in the context of 
federal responsibilities.  
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(2) In Maharashtra, it is the political and bureaucratic agencies that shaped and 
subverted the ‘independence’ of the regulator. The fact that reforms in 
Maharashtra were led by the irrigation bureaucracy prepared the ground for 
mainstreaming it into the State project (Chapter 6). While the Bank imposed the 
condition of an independent regulator, certain factors in the state’s political circuit 
and the taken for grantedness of institutions (cf. Douglas, 1986) ensured that this 
independence could never be realised. The first dent in this dream was the 
makeup of the Regulator, which was a mere relocation of retired bureaucrats from 
the Department to the regulatory office. This cross-migration, which is justified 
on grounds of experience and costs, smeared the independent image of the 
Regulator. Moreover, since MWSIP was negotiated through the Department, 
water sector reforms - to a large extent - became irrigation sector reform. This not 
only kept water utilities and groundwater regulation outside of the proposed 
regulatory framework but also drew the contours of the content of the debate. The 
cross-migration of ideas and people also brought with it the hydraulic 
bureaucratic culture and its incumbent labels to look at the water sector and its 
woes in the traditional closed sector approach (Chapter 6). The hydraulic 
language of the ‘hardware and software’ of water - where hardware referred to 
structures, storage, efficiency and losses and software included the process-based 
issues of equity and participation - often found its way into the regulatory 
language. For example, the reform narrative was subsumed in the phrase, “the 
gap between the potential created and potential utilised” (see Chapter 6). These 
phrases acted as cognitive filters in defining the boundaries and the purpose of 
regulation (cf. Douglas 1985). This hydraulic vocabulary also represented a 
certain shared understanding, shared beliefs and shared solutions for the water 
sector in Maharashtra, which became particularly pronounced in the emphasis on 
rehabilitation (see Chapter 7). Thus the relationship between the Department and 
the Regulator - and the internal constitution of the Regulator - led to the creation 
of a regulatory world, layered over with languages, work styles and thought styles 
in continuation with and sometimes limited by the Department.  
The politics at the state level also presented fundamental challenges to the 
economic framing of regulation. By challenging and finally diluting the role of 
the MWRRA, the apolitical tenor of regulation was completely displaced. The 
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resistance that began with the ‘imported’ MWRRA model was further insinuated 
with fears of privatisation and water markets among civil society, which 
culminated in the politics of the amendment between 2009 and 2011. By limiting 
entitlements to the project sites where MMISFA was in force, the path of 
regulation not only became contingent on the progress and the politics of the 
MMISFA, but also removed the protective cover in the entitlements to prevent 
water diversions. This regulatory politics over entitlements fundamentally 
changed the path and process of regulation in Maharashtra as the bureaucrats and 
politicians defined the regulatory mandate at the state level. 
(3) While the space at the state level was shaped by questions as to who is 
responsible for regulating water resources and what regulation entails, i.e. 
defining the jurisdiction of the MWRRA, the boundaries of this regulation 
became amorphous and were fiercely contested in the Jahot system. Regulation 
here was subsumed within the discourses of canal mis-management, rehabilitation 
works, and overlaps and gaps in departmental jurisdiction. However, where bulk 
water consumers were created (JGP WUA) in the tail, regulation was subsumed 
as a tactic of discipline and power of the State (see Chapter 8). The very 
performance of volumetric pricing dismantled the scientific and transparent 
rationale that underpinned the notions of entitlements and regulation. It also 
revealed a certain politics of adjustment underlying the calculation and 
distribution of entitlements, where quotas of other bulk users -supposedly not 
demanding water- were adjusted with overuse of water in the JGP. This very 
performance of volumetric pricing and serving the bill articulates a certain 
politics of knowledge and power.  
In the Jahot system, the reform enterprise was shaped by water users and field-
level bureaucrats. The embeddedness of the local regulator within the irrigation 
bureaucracy only made the reproduction of the state machinery into elements of 
reforms easier; the field bureaucracy was the chief purveyor and implementer of 
reforms (Chapter 7). It was for this reason that the farmers, head and tail level, 
very easily associated reforms with the shaasan. This overlap also brought into 
the reforms a ‘project type’ focus within the bureaucracy, the success of which 
was calculated on the basis of target completions, exacerbated by the pressure to 
perform and report (cf. Baviskar, 2004).  
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This bureaucracy was relationally constituted in two ways. First, though they had 
a different perception of ‘progress’, they were helpless in the face of the pressure 
from Mumbai that neglected the realities and pressures of the field. It was these 
field officers who had to face the farmers (Chapters 7 and 8). This difference 
between the elite and vernacular worlds also mediated through political 
compulsions of the relationship between the shaasan and the sarkaar. These were 
visible in the differential management at the head and tail of the system. Second, 
in a politically rivalrous system such as Jahot, where the strongmen wanted to 
capture power through the associations (e.g. the cases of Triveni and Balaji 
WUAs), the small and marginal farmers (in the tail) wanted the bureaucracy to 
fight for their interests. The image of the State as a neutral arbiter when it comes 
to enforcing rules governing apne aadmi (our people) is considered to be more 
legitimate than the idea of  members of the same community, e.g. a WUA, 
enforcing the rules (cf. Shah, 2008).  
One could argue that this behaviour emanated from the fact that the power of the 
community had not been realised, as these farmers were tied to a patron-client 
relationship with the State. But, as I have shown, these communities were neither 
homogeneous nor powerless. These relationships were constituted in terms of 
their position in the sugarcane economy of Jahot, their relationship with the 
Department and also among themselves. These interactions demonstrate the many 
meanings that regulation takes (Chapter 7) when strategic relationships that are 
formed over and for water. For example, when the bureaucracy failed to get water 
to the tail, Vitthal Sudrik (former JGP chairman in Uzalgaon) lost no time before 
speaking with the minister to get water to the village (Chapter 7). When the May 
rotations were delayed and the field bureaucracy suspected violence on this 
account, they ensured that the guardian minister, Mr. Bajirao, addressed a 
meeting of farmers (from the head) as big landholders were suspected of creating 
disruptions (Chapter 8). Mr.Bajirao, on the other hand, earned credibility for 
releasing the water in May. These relationships of reciprocity between the 
bureaucracy and the politicians define the politics and water cultures in the Jahot 
system.  
These issues not only decentred regulation substantively but also rendered such 
dichotomies of state-society and formal-informal futile (Chapter 7). Regulation in 
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the Jahot system was the result of ‘mixing and matching’, or strategic 
interactions of the bureaucracy, the farmers, the political guardians, and the 
‘muted’ resistance of the NGOs. The embedded nature of the regulator, 
bureaucratic supremacy and plural jurisdictions of water underlined the resistance 
from different domains (the politicians, bureaucracy and the rich landholders) to 
the elements of reform. Moreover, the disciplinary nature of the State vis-à-vis 
the choice of what aspects of reforms should be implemented (rehabilitation) or 
not (entitlements as rights) highlighted its centrality, and its control over water.  
Thus this thesis has demonstrated that reform-led regulation was introduced in a 
particular context constituting different rationalities and corresponding 
frameworks. While the state systems of federalism, i.e. the institutional 
assemblage of the water sector, provided the framework and determined the path 
of regulation, it was also mediated by certain norms of what constituted the very 
porous idea of the State. These included questions of who had the institutional 
and democratic prerogative to make certain decisions and enforce them. These 
frameworks determined not only what was institutionally possible, but also what 
could become the right cognitive fit in the archaeology of the Indian water sector. 
At a deeper level, these regulatory cultures operated through the strong and 
persistent structures of thought and attitude which are considered peripheral to the 
current reformist discourse of water regulation. 
9.2 Pushing the boundaries: implications and future pathways  
This thesis has argued that the current process of regulation reform and the 
understanding of entitlements has so far been extremely narrow and such 
technical and limited understanding fails to engage with the politically 
heterogeneous, socially differentiated and ecologically dynamic realities that exist 
in Maharashtra. This heterogeneity is well tapped into through the concept of 
regulatory cultures. In this study, I used a policy process approach to unpack the 
interplay of discourse and practice. While ‘studying through’ had clear 
advantages of unpacking the mix of intended and unintended effects of the 
interaction between discourse and practice, it also meant a loss of depth on certain 
crucial aspects of water management, especially in relation to the 
interconnections between the diverse sources of water use.  
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In this study, I have argued that the State becomes the very site around which 
relationships of power were articulated. Embedded in diverse regulatory cultures 
that exist at the intersection of the internally heterogeneous layers of bureaucracy, 
water user associations, sugar cooperatives, and the donor relations, it is the 
architecture of the Indian State that is central to understanding the politics and 
practice of the water regulation in Maharashtra. Though, I have placed the State 
at the centre of the regulation reform, but have tried to steer away from the image 
of an all-benevolent State. The understanding that the State is not a pre-given 
entity and is constituted through discourse and practices of actors for different 
ends is important to understand its effects in the age of neoliberal reforms. 
Having said this, one must concede that the nature and modalities of State rule 
may be different in different sectors, and thus it is important to unpack those 
modalities to understand the corresponding State effects. In this section, I discuss 
the implications that these findings may have for wider academic and policy 
debates. 
9.2.1 Neoliberalism and Water Reforms 
The emergence of independent water regulation is a part of the larger process of 
neoliberal reforms in India. I have demonstrated how through diverse practices 
and discourses, the State continues to have a strong presence in this project of 
neoliberal reforms. The State operates and is constituted through different 
relationships of collusion and control. Unlike several studies that have focused, 
on the ‘local’ manifestations of the State (Mollinga, 2003; Mosse, 2003; Narain, 
2003; Shah, 2008), this study  looked at the interaction of different domains of the 
State at different levels, unpacking the power of the State at each of these levels, 
which may be contradictory or complementary. For example, in the Jahot system, 
the shaasan and the sarkaar came together to govern and control practices of 
water, while they competed with each other as was the case with the politics of 
amendment at the State level. 
In this study, I have emphasised on the understanding the State both as a system 
and an idea (cf. Abrams, 1988). Several studies on water reforms have 
highlighted the centralising and the decentralising tendencies embedded in 
neoliberal reforms. Studies on water privatization in Europe (cf. Bakker 2003, 
Finger and Allouche, 2002) have understood these neoliberal reforms as a process 
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of re-regulation whereby the administrative capacities of the State were 
strengthened through tighter contracts and rule making. In other contexts, such 
reforms have led to greater bureaucratization  such as the WUA reform in Mexico 
(Rap, 2006)  or greater control of the State through maintaining control on the 
canals, giving water permits, deciding the command area in South Africa ( Movik 
2012) as well as India (Cullet, 2010).  
This study also corroborates with the findings of the works cited above that the 
process of marketization or commercialisation in the water sector may not allude 
to distinct binaries of retreat of the State vs. reign of the free market. Instead, 
reforms have strengthened the capacities of the State, though the techniques of 
power may vary. What accrues in the process of reforms is far more complex and 
often results in reconfiguration of the power and the role of the State. For 
example, the case of water regulation reform in Maharashtra is a powerful 
example of the bureaucratization of the reforms but is unlike the instances of re-
regulation which Bakker (2003) or Finger and Allouche (2002) allude to in their 
study. Besides looking at the water supply framework, their central argument was 
regarding tighter rules of contract on the private entities where regulation has 
followed privatization. In the Indian case, as I highlighted, this trajectory was not 
only unclear but the motivations and reasons for regulation remained vague 
(Chapter 4 and 6).  The Regulator was associated with the introduction of the 
market than with the disciplining of the market. This understanding was also at 
the heart of the entitlements system introduced in Maharashtra. One of the central 
reasons for this disjuncture was- as this thesis argues- the character and the nature 
of the State contingent on its post-colonial, developmental forms, which is central 
to understanding regulation reform as a state project. As much as this thesis has 
investigated the unfolding of the regulation reform, it has also asked what this 
reform does to the character of the State and how its powers are reorganised in 
the process (cf. Bakker 2003)? 
However, the focus of this study was not only on the institutional dimensions of 
the State (policy frameworks and institutions) but also the sightings of the State 
i.e. how do  people associate with the State (Corbridge et al., 2005). Of course 
these sightings are not uniform and are determined by the particular positions of 
the actors. While some farmers may see the State as more 'neutral' than their own 
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kinsmen (cf. Shah, 2008), others may see it as colluding with the powerful 
(Chapter 7 and 8). The way the State is imagined also determines how it operates 
in governing the lives of people (Gupta, 1995; Corbridge et al., 2005). Therefore 
in order to discuss the effects of neoliberalism in a sector with such boundary 
blurring properties, it also important to look at how certain subjectivities are 
constituted and subverted throughout the process of reforms and among the 
actors. Thus, taking such an anthropological approach to the study of the State 
may help to unravel why the effects of neoliberal reforms have been so haphazard 
in the water sector.  
9.2.2 Regulation and regulatory cultures: 
This thesis adopted a decentred and dynamic understanding of regulation (cf. 
Black, 2002; Zwanenberg, 2011). As this thesis has demonstrated, the 
discourse(s) and practice of regulation was not limited to the water sector alone. 
They were often embedded and governed by the larger systems in which water 
policy and management came to be located. These included, among many other 
forces, the economic federalisation of the Indian State (chapter 4), the logic of 
path dependence through the electricity sector (Chapter 6) or the connections 
between the sugar cooperatives and water user associations (Chapters 5 and 7). 
By reading regulation, through interconnected networks and processes, this work 
highlighted the limitations of thinking regulation merely as ‘getting the prices 
right’. This work has showed how regulation is embedded in larger questions of 
the political economy of development, diverse systems of property rights and 
relationships of the State with its citizens.  
Thus in this study, regulation becomes a product of discourses and practice, the 
interaction of different domains, which cross spaces and scales. Such a dynamic 
understanding of regulation displaces the idea of a steady and de-politicised 
process. It recasts regulation more as a domain of interaction, which is in-turn 
governed by larger processes and may not be limited to the specific sector. 
Besides, reading regulation as an embedded and interconnected process, this 
study also placed a strong emphasis on the importance of framing regulation- who 
frames regulation, when, how and under what conditions. For example, even the 
civil society actors had different perspectives on regulation (Chapters 4 and 6). 
What emerges from this study is that the answers to such questions are neither 
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neat nor clear as the meanings of regulation are  necessarily plural and are also 
the product of a certain politics of knowledge (see Chapter 4 and 6). 
Reading regulation through such interconnected processes and relationships of 
power may be useful in unpacking the dynamics of translation of reforms in other 
sectors and contexts. This understanding may also help “broadening out and 
opening up the multiple pathways” (Leach et al., 2010: 172) that emerge during 
the course of reforms, and need to be tapped into to strengthen the debate on 
rights and accountability. 
Such understanding of regulation is central to the conceptualisation of regulatory 
cultures that is “the contested process of meaning making” (Wright, 1998: 9). 
Unlike other studies on regulation which explicitly focus on decision making 
aspects (Hancher and Moran, 1989b; Dubash and Rao, 2008; Chng, 2013; 
Uruena, 2013), I have argued in favour of plural regulatory spaces whereby 
decisions are made, regulatory bargaining occurs, and where regulation is framed 
and contested as a practice. I have thus argued for an anthropological and 
decentred understanding of regulation, which is not limited to institutional sites or 
aspects of decision making but looks at the discursive and material aspects of 
regulation. These, in turn, determine why plural regulations evolve through a 
seemingly singular economic idea of regulation reform. Such an understanding of 
regulatory cultures does not keep the Regulator at the centre of its analysis but 
analyses how different domains of regulation interact and lead to plural meanings 
and courses of regulation. 
9.2.3 The blurring of the regulatory state 
By reading the State through an anthropological lens, this study has provided a 
nuanced understanding of the post-colonial, regulatory state in the South, which 
is far more embedded and dispersed than what a limited neoliberal understanding 
would have us believe. This study began from the premise that regulation as a 
concept has evolved from the classic case of typical state based intervention to 
the neoclassical case of independent regulatory authorities, which I locate as a 
typical form of neoliberal governance or roll out neoliberalism (Chapter 2). 
Amidst these two contrasting positions of direct state intervention in the market 
for promotion of public good (cf. Glaeser and Shleifer, 2003) and retreat of the 
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State for promotion of market (cf. Majone 1997),  I locate the Indian case of 
water regulation reform. While independent regulation, in this study, is 
understood as non-State regulation (Chapter 4) in the context of the Indian water 
sector reforms, I argue that it does inadvertently become State based regulation 
through different discourses and practices of the State. However where this study 
does deviate from both these ‘classic’ (state-based and neoliberal) models is in 
the anthropological understanding of the State itself.  
In the neo-classical version, the regulatory State operates on a neat dichotomy of 
service provider and regulator (Majone, 1997). I have demonstrated that this 
dichotomy gets increasingly blurred in the Indian water sector. For example, the 
MWRRA itself was principally carved out of the bureaucratic establishment of 
the Department and the state bureaucracy (Chapter 6), and from within the 
Department at the local level (Chapter 7). This led to the peculiar situation where 
the State led MWRRA was regulating the State led Department in the water 
sector.  
This raises several questions: Is an ‘independent’ regulator required in the water 
sector? More fundamentally – is the decoupling of roles as envisaged in the 
regulation reform even possible? For example, in the water regulation reform, the 
Regulator came from within the Department, and the WUAs became both the 
bulk consumers of water for the Department and service providers for the 
individual farmers at the same time. As I have argued in Chapters 7 and 8, these 
overlaps had significant implications for issues of accountability and access to 
water. These questions also have significant bearing on the relevance and long 
term implications of privatization of service delivery and issues of accountability 
in a resource set up (cf. Bakker 2003) where the State is assumed to retreat and 
take up the function of regulatory oversight.   
Moreover, such examples of state regulating the state are not unique to the water 
sector (see Dubash, 2013) or the case of Southern contexts (Prado, 2013). In a 
recent study on water regulation in the UK, Walker (2014) has shown that despite 
several decades of regulatory reform in the UK, the argument for efficiency and 
competition so intrinsic to advocacy of regulation may be limited due to the 
institutional and governance specificities of water. Certainly, the regulatory state 
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in the Northern contexts as an institutional apparatus has had its own historical 
and contextual specificities (Vogel, 1996), and there may be some convergence of 
effects between the North and the South. This study has highlighted how a pre-
given idea of the regulatory State is reshaped in the process of reforms in the 
context of the global South 
The donor diffusion of regulation reform does add an extra caveat in the process 
of water regulation reform in the global South (Dubash and Morgan, 2013b). This 
aspect does change the dynamics of reforms in the global South as we see in the 
case of Maharashtra where the regulation reforms was initiated through the World 
Bank funded MWSIP. Nevertheless, this study highlights that the case of ‘donor 
effect’ in the translation of such reforms need not be overstated. Though water 
reforms in much of the global South have been introduced through direct or 
indirect donor pressure, they have often had varying results as is demonstrated in 
the case of Maharashtra. Entitlements which lay at the heart of the regulation 
reform and were put in place to introduce market oriented reforms became the 
very ground to exercise political (Chapter 6) and bureaucratic power (Chapters 7 
and 8). For example, this study shows that though the introduction of water 
regulation in India was credited to the MWSIP, but it was essentially the actors 
outside of the World Bank who strategically shaped the path and process of the 
regulation reform in Maharashtra as the Bank’s role receded in the face of politics 
within the state. This contest for power also had corresponding effect on the way 
the regulatory state was constituted and subsequently blurred in the unfolding of 
reforms. 
9.2.4 Going beyond the canal: ‘Opening up’ spaces for justice and 
developing synergies  
It may appear rather strange to be talking about justice in a study on water 
regulation when the regulation reform was not explicitly designed for the 
purposes of justice. It only did come remotely close to the concept by stressing 
that improved efficiency will ensure equity in distribution, and revising water 
rotations on a tail to head basis. However, this thesis has demonstrated that this 
understanding works on several assumptions of homogeneity, improved systems, 
benevolent bureaucracy and apolitical relationships which are difficult to relate to 
in field situations (Chapters 7 and 8). At the same time this thesis has also argued 
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that the effects of this neoliberal intervention are both complementary and 
contradictory (Sangameswaran, 2011). By studying water regulation as a site of 
practice, this study showed how the regulation reform opened up spaces for 
negotiation and contestation. These contestations touched upon questions of 
accountability, democratic propriety, and regional development of the State 
(Chapters 4 and 6). Thus, despite the inherent market logic of this neoliberal 
regulation reform, the contestation around regulation reform does open several 
spaces for articulation of water justice. 
Regulation thus became a site of practice whereby a hitherto closed water sector 
was opened to critical public scrutiny. The meetings in the MWRRA office on 
water trading, the tariff consultations, the protests and the sit-ins (see Chapter 6) 
not only highlighted the competing frames of regulation but also underlined that 
such spaces of empowerment and accountability may open up (cf. Corbridge et 
al., 2005; Dubash, 2013).  
Thus understanding resource regulation as a contested and negotiated process of 
water allocation, as this thesis has done, may help in unpacking regulation in 
other areas such as groundwater, lifts and drinking water which sit in different 
administrative silos but are used in different combination to sustain irrigation 
needs. The hydraulic boundaries of irrigation most often do not coincide with the 
administrative boundaries of water regulation (Chapter 8). Moreover, these 
divergent sources of water also come under jurisdictions of different 
administrative sub-divisions, which also tend to create false boundaries between 
resource and supply functions. For instance, rural water supply is most often 
placed under the jurisdiction of the local governments and WUAs are meant 
explicitly for irrigation water (see Upadhyaya, 2006) However, as verified in the 
case of scarcity rotation in Jahot (Chapter 8), farmers do use canal water for 
domestic needs on top of irrigation.  
It is evident from the case of Maharashtra that a resource regulator turned out to 
be an irrigation sector regulator for various reasons (see Chapter 6) and more so, 
restricted to the uses of water from the canal. For example, the narrow definition 
of entitlements as use rights on canal water overlooked the diverse property rights 
and use(s) of water that pre-dated the reforms in the Jahot system. Thus, the 
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effects of the block system, made entitlements politically and economically 
unattractive to the rich farmers in the head WUAs (demonstrated in the case of 
Balaji and Triveni in Chapter 7). It lacked incentive and appeal to farmers on lift 
irrigation in the Sangam WUA. The overlapping regimes of water in Jahot, which 
allowed certain farmers to draw water from diverse sources, were a serious 
impediment to the constitution of bulk water users. Furthermore, the fact that 
irrigation water is tied to land ownership already limited the sphere of water 
entitlements (Chapters 7 and 8) for the landless and other livelihood options. 
This distorted the entitlement system in different ways. This also raised question 
regarding institutionalisation of regulation i.e. whether it is pertinent to have ‘one 
in all regulator’ for the water sector or multiple regulators for different sectors 
and purposes (as in the UK) where three regulators work with the Department of 
the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (cf. Bakker, 2003). Within the federal 
set up of India, such regulatory bodies in the water sector may not be possible 
(see Chapter 4) and a basin approach with a basin regulator might make more 
sense than having a centralised regulator. This may also enlarge the scope and 
meaning of entitlements for various categories of uses, purposes, and sources 
where entitlements are granted as use rights for multiple purposes than merely 
restricting it to the purpose of irrigation. 
Reforms do not begin on a blank slate, they embed themselves into institutional 
cultures of prevailing regimes and require political and administrative 
constituency in doing so. Therefore a more nuanced process may be more fruitful 
than a sudden, big-bang approach. Developing synergies between the existing 
local institutions (such as the Panchayats and the WUAs; see Upadhyaya 2006) 
and government departments may help in making water regulation reform more 
inclusive from a resource perspective, and this may also encompass the different 
meanings and uses of water. 
9.2.5 Scarcity and water reforms 
Scarcity is one of the key narratives that have fuelled the need for reforms the 
world over (Movik, 2012), and the case of regulation reform, as this study 
demonstrated, was no exception to this rule. Regulation was a managerial 
response to mitigate this scarcity by providing water through predetermined 
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entitlements leading up to water markets, and tariffs (World Bank 2005; Briscoe 
and Malik, 2006). I have referred to this as the economic approach to regulation, 
and thus argued that such narrow framing limits the way in which the problems in 
this sector are defined and solutions pursued. For example, the entitlements were 
conceptualised on certain universalised notions of scarcity (Chapter 4 and 6), 
which eventually fed into technical responses through entitlements via volumetric 
pricing. Such technical responses are misleading and often result in 
oversimplification of complex realities. This in turn results in misdirected 
mitigation measures as is also evident in politics of drought (cf. Mehta, 2005) and 
watershed management (cf. Bharucha et al., 2014)  
At various points in this thesis, I have shown how scarcity is constructed (cf. 
Mehta, 2005) rather than limited to biophysical aspects (Chapters 7 and 8). The 
uneven topography of Maharashtra (especially the Deccan trap) does make it a 
water-scarce state in the biophysical sense. However, in the present context of 
reforms, the nature of scarcity is defined by the gridlock of competing scarcities: 
water for industry vs. water for irrigation; water for sugarcane vs. water for 
jowar; water for irrigation vs. water for life (scarcity rotation), which have 
exacerbated the water conflicts (Chapter 6). In this context, a purely economic 
rationale, which comes with the entitlements, is fairly limited by the context in 
which it needs to be implemented. Moreover restricting the definition of 
entitlements to canal water also ignored the other sources of water, especially the 
groundwater and lifts which have-for now- become proxy for mitigating canal 
water scarcity. 
The formal definition of entitlements has steered clear of defining what scarcity 
means in such a competing context, and where scarcity is naturalised due to 
intersectoral or intrasectoral conflicts. Thus this limited definition of scarcity is in 
opposition to the political framing of scarcity. In the current conceptualisation of 
entitlements, scarcity has been treated in absolute sense i.e. year of below normal 
rainfall or a period of water shortage declared by the state government 
(Government of Maharashtra, 2007). However, the case of May rotations has 
amply demonstrated how water released in the name of drinking was used for 
irrigation purposes (Chapter 8). By leaving entitlements to administrative and 
technical rule, the systems of power that induce and reproduce scarcity are 
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overlooked  For example, Mr. Navade’s claim (in Chapter 7) that “scarcity means 
no water for sugarcane to a head-end farmer, and no water for drinking to a tail-
end farmer” (KI51) amply demonstrates the competing claims on water that not 
only stem from diverse uses of water but also different meanings that are 
attributed to water and more specifically the unequal relations of access to 
irrigation water due to the agrarian patters and relations. 
So, when does water become ‘scarce’ for a particular set of actors? The answer is 
deeply embedded in the local narratives of water and scarcity. Scarcity needs to 
be defined in relation to human needs, practices, institutions and technologies (cf. 
Harvey, 1996). In this light, a more nuanced and dynamic understanding of 
entitlements may be required which not only highlights the diverse uses of water, 
but also has in-built measures for mitigating effects of induced scarcity. 
This question is extremely important when droughts and uncertain hydrological 
cycles are becoming increasingly rampant not only in India but the world over. In 
this context, it is important to have an empowering understanding of entitlements 
to address issues of livelihoods and access. This study has highlighted several 
limitations regarding the concept of entitlements, some inherent in its 
conceptualisation (Chapters 4 and 6), and others determined by the context 
(Chapters 7 and 8). The livelihood perspective on entitlements, which privileges 
both the productive and domestic uses of water, is one such example of this 
articulation (Chapter 6). The livelihood perspective is similar to the Multiple Use 
Services approach, which is grounded in the understanding that water supply 
systems can be used for purposes other than irrigation. This may include livestock 
rearing, washing and home gardens, etc. (Van Koppen et al., 2006; also see Joy et 
al., 2014). In several parts of the world, entitlements for the environment are also 
gaining strong currency (for example: in Australia and South Africa). There is 
thus an urgent need to have holistic perspective on entitlements which are 
mindful of the several dimensions of scarcities, multiple uses and meaning of 
water and the human and non-human stakeholders of water and their 
interlinkages. 
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9.3 Conclusion 
This work has analysed the dynamics of reform-led regulation up to 2012. In the 
last two years several changes have taken place in the landscape of Maharashtra 
as well as India. The World Bank project which led to the ushering in of ‘the 
regulatory age’ in Maharashtra came to its end in March 2014. The River Basin 
Agencies, which were supposed to be the restructured Departments to operate as 
water service agencies have not been introduced. After a brief period of staff 
shortage and lack of appropriate quorum, the MWRRA now has a set of 
appointed members. The MANCH, as I last learnt, has now begun to focus on the 
Department rather than the Regulator for demanding action in the water sector.  
The Regulator has, since 2012, given verdicts on industrial use of water, and the 
diversion of agricultural water to drinking
129
. While there is a persistent effort to 
re-frame the regulatory discourse and understand the rationale and practical limits 
of water regulation in India, there are three streams of enquiry that emanate from 
this study for future work: studying how groundwater regulation interacts with 
the current framework of water regulation in India, studying regulatory discourse 
and practice in a post-MWSIP world, and analysing how regulatory learning 
works through a cross sectoral study of electricity and water regulators. 
Furthermore, it may be useful to analyse how the functions and practice of the 
Regulator are evolving in this ‘new’ context. This is particularly imperative in the 
background of rising water conflicts, illicit cases of grabs, which are naturalising 
and reshaping water scarcity in Maharashtra. 
I began this study with the motivation to understand what neoliberal reforms do 
to patterns of authority and how reformist ideas are constructed and contested 
across this process. I have shown how the boundaries and content of water 
regulation is mediated by histories, contingency of interests, politics and 
institutional frameworks, whereby water regulation takes different meanings in 
different contexts. This study has also shown how a technical and seemingly 
apolitical initiative becomes the very ground for articulation of State control. I 
have thus argued how water regulation, as a deeply political process, is embedded 
in the networks and discourses of power.  
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Regulation emerged in the Indian water sector as a deeply ambiguous concept, 
especially as it came through the process of reform diffusion. Now that the 
MWSIP project has come to an end, and regulation is increasingly getting 
mainstreamed in water policy discourses, what does this mean for the future of 
water regulation reform in India? During fieldwork as well as in course of writing 
up this thesis, I have wondered if a non-Bank stamp could have salvaged the 
MWRRA and given it more legitimacy especially in the eyes of civil society? 
Would civil society activists then rally for a stronger regulator to protect illegal 
water diversions and water grabs? Furthermore, given the peculiarities of the 
water sector, is an independent water regulator an appropriate mechanism for this 
sector? I do not claim that this thesis has provided answers to these questions. 
Nevertheless, this study has revealed that regulation of water is embedded in 
diverse rules that have developed over time in the water sector and the regulation 
reform targeted only one and a limited aspect of this rulemaking and 
maintenance. The demand for the reduced State, by way of reforms, may achieve 
little constituency in a context where the State is constituted through multiple 
social and institutional relationships. The demand instead needs to be made for a 
State that is more responsive and accountable to the needs of the poor and 
marginalised sections (cf. Li, 1996). Understanding water regulation as a dynamic 
process that cuts across systems, across networks of actors and their divergent 
frames may bring greater insights, and open up spaces for leveraging 
accountability in this State led sector. This thesis is a contribution in that 
direction.  
               ***************** 
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11.  Appendices 
11.1 Glossary 
andaz estimate 
bavdi step well 
bhau elder brother 
bhau sahib canal inspector 
bheeshan dushkaal intense period of drought 
big bagaitdar large landholders 
binvirodh without opposition 
chaari minor 
chaupal community meeting/community space 
command area area irrigated by the dam 
dharna sit-ins for protest 
distributary channels taking off from main or branch canal supplying water to 
minors 
dushkaal period of intense drought 
form no.7 Form that farmers need to fill before the water rotation,  
also called the demand form 
gin ke paani volumetric supply of water 
hakk right 
hungam crop season 
kastkars      farmers 
kharif summer crop season from 1 July to mid-October 
lift Where water is pumped up from the source including reservoirs,  
rivers or backwaters, etc. 
Mantralaya Secretariat (Mumbai) 
medpalak Sheep herders 
minors The lowest level of channel on a main system 
mulgi girl 
Nizamiyat kingdom of the Nizam of Hyderabad 
paani water 
palak mantri guardian minister 
pani panchayat water council  
pani waapar sanstha water user association 
pani hakkadari water entitlement 
patkari  canal officer 
raajkaran politics  
rabi winter crop season from15 October to 28 February 
rao sahib section officer 
sanstha organisation, here WUAs 
sahib officer 
sarkaar government 
shejpali system of watering by turns 
shaasan irrigation bureaucracy 
shet chaari field channel 
shetkari farmer (Western Maharashtra) 
tai elder sister 
taluka administrative jurisdiction below the district 
takavi cash advances from the government for seeds, tools, etc. 
udapa kshetra rocky area 
unhaal crop season from 1 March to 30 June 
vasooli collection of  water charges 
vihir wells 
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11.2 List of interviewees 
KI Name and Affiliation
130
 Date of interview 
1 Prof. Ramaswamy R. Iyer, Retd. Secretary, Ministry of 
Water Resources (India); Research Professor, Centre for 
Policy Research (New Delhi). 
9 November, 2011 
2 Senior Water Resources Specialist, South Asia 
Sustainable Development Department 
15 November, 2011 & 4 
October, 2012 
3 Prof. Philippe Cullet, Professor, SOAS (UK); Senior 
Visiting Fellow, Centre for Policy Research (New Delhi)  
20 September, 2011 
4 Dr. Priya Sangameswaran, Assistant Professor, Centre for 
Studies in Social Sciences,  Calcutta (via email and 
phone)    
22 September, 2011 
5 Mr. Shripad Dharmadhikary, MANTHAN 10 October, 2011 
6 Dr. Navroz K. Dubash, Senior Fellow, Centre for Policy 
Research (New Delhi) 
5 October, 2012 
7 Professor, Tata Institute of Social Sciences (Mumbai); January, 2012 
8 Sachin Warghade, Prayas (Pune) 12 June, 2012 
9 Mandar Sathe, Researcher, Prayas 12 June, 2012 
10 Fellow, SOPPECOM 7 October, 2011 
11 Ms. Seema Kulkarni, Fellow, SOPPECOM 30 August, 2012 
12 Fellow, SOPPECOM 7 October, 2011 
13 Research Associate, SOPPECOM 30 August, 2012 
14 Social Activist, Shramik Mukti Dal, leader dam-oustee 
movement 
 
15 Social Activist, Samaj Parivartan Kendra, Nasik 2 &4 December, 2011 
16 Prof. Pradeep Purandhare, Professor (retd) WALMI, 
Aurangabad 
19 August, 2012 
17 Mr. S.N. Lele, Retd. Engineer (WRD); SOPPECOM 13 June, 2012 
18 Member, GOMUKH, Pune 9 October, 2011 
19 Team Leader , M&E Consultancy, MWSIP 24 July, 2012 
   
 Government officials   
20 Secretary, MWRRA, Mumbai 16 June, 2012 
21 Member, MWRRA, Mumbai 11January 2012 
22 Chairperson MWRRA, Mumbai 18 November, 2011 & 14 
June, 2012 
23 Chairperson, MWRRA, Mumbai 25 July, 2012 
24 Mr. Prabhakar, Member; MWRRA 20 June, 2012 
25 Secretary, WRD, Mumbai 28 November 2011 
26 Joint Secretary, WRD, Mumbai/Nasik 28 November 2011& 18 
August 2012 
27 Chief Engineer, WRD, Pune 26 July, 2012 
28 Mr. Surve, Superintending Engineer, WRD, Mumbai 13 July, 2012 
29 Executive Engineer, WRD, Pune 26 July, 2012 
30 Executive Engineer, WRD, Nasik 2 December 2011 &18 
August 2012 
31 Deputy Engineer, WRD, Nasik 2 December, 2011 
32 Assistant Engineer, WRD, Nagpur 9 December, 2011 
33 Superintending Engineer, WRD, Nagpur 9 December, 2011 
34 Junior Engineer, WRD, Nagpur 9 December, 2011 
35 Officer, WRD, Nagpur 10 December, 2011 
36 Superintending Engineer, WRD, Amravati 12 December, 2011 
37 Junior Engineer, WRD, Amravati 12 & 13 December, 2011 
                                                          
130
 Not all interviewees have been explicitly quoted in this thesis. However since all of these 
discussions have helped me in the analysis, I sincerely acknowledge and appreciate the help and 
time of my respondents. 
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38 Officer, WRD, Amravati 12 December, 2011 
39 Officer, WRD, Amravati 13 December, 2011 
40 Mr. Parekh, Engineer, WRD, Shrigonda 9 April, 2012 
41 Mr. Sayaji, officer , WRD, Shrigonda 6 April, 2012 
42 Mr. More, Officer, WRD, Shrigonda 10 May, 2012 
43 Mr. Pomane, Officer, WRD, Shrigonda 23 March, 2011 
44 Mr. Shirke, Officer, WRD, Shrigonda 27 March 
45 Mr. Jadhav, Officer, WRD, Shrigonda 12 May, 2012 
46 Damodar bhau, Canal inspector, Viladri 4 April, 2012 
47 Canal Inspector,Vinaygaon, Zorebali 22 February, 2012 
48 Chorekar bhau, Canal inspector, Uzalgaon 5 May, 2012 
49 Official , MWRRA 10 June, 2012 
50 Official , MWRRA 10 June, 2012 
   
 Project level  
(unless otherwise stated, all interviews were held 
between January and May, 2012) 
 
51 Mr. Mahadev Navade, Viladri, Shrigonda                   
52 Mr. Appa Navade, Viladri sugar factory, Shrigonda  
53 Mr. Nitin Navade, Viladri, Shrigonda  
54 Mr. Jagmohan Navade, Viladri, Shrigonda  
55 Mr. Sukharam Damodar, Viladri, Shrigonda                   Balaji WUA 
56 Mr. Jaisukh Baburao, Viladri, Shrigonda  
57 Mr. Vikas Narayan, Viladri, Shrigonda  
58 Mr. Bikaji Navade, Viladri, Shrigonda  
59 Mr. Bhaskar, Viladri, Shrigonda  
60 Mr. Ramsaras Chavan, Viladri, Shrigonda  
61 Mr. Baban Pawar, Dattewadi, Shrigonda  
62 Mr. Datta Damodar, Dattewadi, Shrigonda  
63 Mr. Shiv Narayan, Dattewadi, Shrigonda  
64 Mr. Takaram Chaoule, Dattewadi, Shrigonda  
65 Mr. Gulabrao Sangaonkar, Dattewadi, Shrigonda           
66 Mr. Ganpat Parekh, Phoolwadi, Shrigonda Triveni  WUA 
67                                       Mr. Vikas Britekar, Phoolwadi, Shrigonda                     
68 Mr. Govind Khamkar, Phoolwadi, Shrigonda  
69 Mr. Vitthal Navade, Phoolwadi, Shrigonda  
70 Mr. Vishwasrao, Dattewadi, Shrigonda  
71 Mrs.Shyama Navade, Viladri, Shrigonda  
72 Mr. Madhavrao Khamkar, Vinaygaon, Shrigonda  
73 Mr. Appa sahib, Vinaygaon, Shrigonda  
74 Mr. Siddharth Khamkar, Vinaygaon, Shrigonda          Sangam WUA 
75 Mrs. Gangu tai,Vinaygaon, Shrigonda  
76 Mrs Savita Gawde, Uzalgaon, Karjat  
77 Mr, Kishan Sastay, Karjat  
78 Dr.  Harsh Gawde, Uzalgaon, Karjat JGP WUA 
79 Mrs.  Harsh Gawde, Uzalgaon, Karjat  
80 Mr. Vitthal Sudrik, Uzalgaon, Karjat  
81 Mr. Sanjay Gawde, Uzalgaon, Karjat  
82 Mr. Shiv Narayan Sopore, Uzalgaon, Karjat                                                                                           
83 Primary school teacher, Uzalgaon, Karjat  
84 Professor sahib, Uzalgaon, Karjat  
85 Mr. Ginoji, Uzalgaon, Karjat  
86 Mr. Sukhdev Bhoram, Uzalgaon, Karjat  
87 Mr. Rahul Kadam, Uzalgaon, Karjat  
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88 Mr. Mukesh Kadam, Uzalgaon, Karjat  
89 Mr. Anil Gawde, Uzalgaon, Karjat  
90 Mr. Rajnikant Parkhe, Uzalgaon, Karjat  
91 Mr. Mahendra Parkhe, Uzalgaon, Karjat  
92 Mr. Kalyan Gawde, Uzalgaon, Karjat  
93 Mr. Ankur Gawde , Uzalgaon, Karjat JGP WUA 
94 Mrs.Vimla Gawde, Uzalgaon, Karjat  
95 Panchayat member, Uzalgaon, Karjat  
96 Mr. Vishnu Babban Bhonsle, Uzalgaon, Karjat  
97 Mr. Haribhai Gawde, Uzalgaon, Karjat  
98 Mr. Eknath Gawde, Uzalgaon, Karjat  
99 Mrs. Chanchal Gawde, Uzalgaon, Karjat  
100 Mr. Ganesh Sastay, Uzalgaon, Karjat                           
101 Mr. Hanuman Sastay, Uzalgaon, Karjat  
102 Mr. Ramdas Gawde, Uzalgaon, Karjat  
103 Mr. Nanasaheb Gawde, Uzalgaon, Karjat  
104 Farmer on Lift Irrigation, Deluwadi, Karjat   
105 Mr. Arun Sudrik, Deluwadi, Karjat  
106 Farmer on Lift Irrigation, Deluwadi, Karjat  
107 Mr. Thorate, Deluwadi, Karjat  
108 Mr. Subhash Chauhan, Zorebali, Shrigonda  
109 Mr. Narayan Dangab, Pimpegaon, Shrigonda  
110 Mr. Rao Pawar, Ryat  
111 Mr. Datter Pundikar,Nagpur  
112 Prerna coordinator, Uzalgaon, Shrigonda  
113 Mr. Sanjay Bhonsle, Prerna, Pune 27 July, 2012 
114 Mr.Raman, Prerna , Pune 27 July, 2012 
115 Mr. Madhav, Prerna, Uzalgaon, Shrigonda  
116 Mrs. Sudha, SPK 18 January, Rahuri 
 
11.3 List of the World Bank documents 
S.No Name of the document Year 
1 Irrigation Sector Review 1991 
2 Water Resources Management Policy: A World Bank Policy Paper 1993 
3 World Bank: Economic developments in India: achievements and 
challenges 
1995 
4 Initiating and Sustaining Water Sector Reforms: A Synthesis 1998: 
5 The Irrigation Sector Review 1998 
6 Inter-Sectoral Water Allocation, Planning and Management 1998 
7 Water Challenges and Institutional Reform: a cross- country perspective 1999 
8 India: World Bank Assistance for Water Resources Management: A 
County Assistance Evaluation 
2002 
9 Institutional Reform Options in the Irrigation Sector 2004 
10 India’s Water Economy: Bracing for a Turbulent Future 2005 
11 Maharashtra Water Sector Improvement Project: Project Appraisal 
Document 
2005 
12 Handbook of Water Resources in India: Development, Management, and 
Strategies 
2007 
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11.4 Selected Provisions of the Reform Acts 
11.4.1 MWRAA Act, 2005(Selected Provisions) 
Section 11. The Authority shall exercise the following powers and perform the following 
functions, namely:- 
(a) to determine the distribution of Entitlements for various Categories of Use and the equitable 
distribution of Entitlements of water within each Category of Use on such terms and 
conditions as may be prescribed; 
(b) to enforce the decisions or orders issued under this Act; 
(c) to determine the priority of equitable distribution of water available at the water resource 
project, sub-basin and river basin levels during periods of scarcity; 
(d) to establish a water tariff system, and to fix the criteria for water charges at basin, river basin 
and State level after ascertaining the views of the beneficiary public, based on the principle 
that water charges reflect the full cost recovery of the cost of irrigation management, 
administration, operation and maintenance of water resources project; 
(e) to administer and manage inter-state water resources apportionment on river systems, of the 
State;[…] 
(h) to lay down the criteria for modification in Entitlements for the diversion, storage and use of 
surface and  sub-surface waters of the State;[…] 
(o) to establish a system of enforcement, monitoring and measurement of the Entitlements for the 
use of water to ensure that the actual use of water, both in quantity and in type of use are in 
compliance with the Entitlements as issued by the Authority 
Section 12 (7) The Authority shall ensure that the principle of “tail to head” irrigation is 
implemented by the River Basin Agency[…] 
(11) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, a person having more than two 
children shall be required to pay one and a half times of the normal rates of water 
charges fixed under clause (d) of section 11 to get entitlement for water for the purpose 
of agriculture. 
Section 14 (2) Use of water for the purposes of agriculture, through any existing bore well or 
tube well or other well in the command area of the project on the date of commencement of this  
Act, shall be allowed to continue till such date as may be notified by the Authority. 
(3) There shall not be any restriction on digging of any bore well, tube well and 
other well in the command area of a project, till such date as may be notified by the 
Authority 
Section 22 (1)The Government shall by special order issued in this behalf authorise any  
 competent officer or officers for each River Basin Agency as Primary Dispute Resolution 
Officer, to resolve the disputes regarding the Issuance or delivery of water entitlement under the 
Act. 
11.4.2 MWRRA (Amendment and Continuance Act), 2011 
Section 3. In section 11 of the principal Act- 
1) for clause (a), the following clause shall be substituted, namely:- 
“(a) to determine the criteria for the distribution of Entitlements by the River Basin Agencies, 
within each Category of Use, on such terms and conditions as may be prescribed, after 
sectoral allocation is made under section 16A;” 
Section 5. After section 16 of the principal Act, the following section shall be inserted, namely:- 
        “16A. (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in section 11 or any other provisions of  
            this Act or in any other law for the time being in force, the State Government  
            shall determine sectoral allocation: 
           (2) After the sectoral allocation, as provided in sub section (1) is determined,  
The Authority shall determine the criteria for distribution of Entitlements under clause 
(a) of section 11”. 
289 
 
Section 6. After section 31 of the principal Act, the following sections shall be inserted, namely:- 
     31A. Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act or any other law for the time 
being in force, the term “Entitlement” shall apply only to such areas where compliance of all 
relevant provisions including delineation under the Maharashtra Management of Irrigation 
System by Farmers Act, 2005 is made. 
     31B. Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act or in any other law for the time 
being in force, or in any order, judgment or decree of any court, tribunal or authority, any person 
or Water User Entity to whom permission , allocation, sanction, authorization or Entitlement of 
water has been granted by the High Power Committee or the River Basin Agency or the State 
Government, prior to the 17
th
 September, 2010, being the date of commencement of section 1of 
the Maharashtra Water Resources Regulatory Authority (Amendment and Continuance) Act, 
2011, shall be deemed to have been granted, in accordance with the provisions of this Act and 
accordingly the same shall continue an no such person or Water User Entity shall be required to 
obtain fresh permission, allocation, sanction, authorization or Entitlement to draw water. 
11.5 The non-irrigation allocation in the Jahot canal system 
N
o
. 
Name of the Agency Purpose Source of Supply Yearly 
sanctioned 
Water Quota 
(M.Cum) 
1 Shrigonda Municipality, 
Shrigonda 
Domestic GLBC Canal 0.547 
2 Pimpegaon Gram panchayat Domestic GLBC Canal 0.15 
3 MIDC Ranjangaon Industrial Jahot Backwater 0.45 
4 Jahotganga SSK Ltd. Domestic 
Industrial 
Jahot Backwater 0.06 
1.10 
5 Shirur Municipality, Shirur Domestic Jahot Backwater 1.220 
6 Executive Engineer, Gramin 
Paani puravatha (Zilla 
Panchayat, Pune) 
Domestic Jahot Backwater 0.431 
7 Ashpa Board Pvt. Limited Industrial 
Domestic 
Jahot Backwater 0.046 
0.06 
8 Shrigonda Sugar Cooperative 
Ltd. 
Industrial GLBC 1.040 
Source:(Government of Maharashtra, 2006b) 
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11.6    Illustrative example for calculation of entitlements  
 
       Source: MWRRA, Mumbai (Government of Maharashtra, 2007). 
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